Miscellaneous · 杂记
Faith, grace, and religion · 信、恩典与宗教
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信、恩典与宗教——散记
Reflections · Pages
对于一些人来说,“宗教意识”似乎大体上能够分类成以下这样。
犹太式的宗教意识来源于一种感恩与报偿:既然一切都是神给予的,那我们自然要为给予世界给我们的神明保持敬畏与感恩。而当神立下约定,当他没有再次毁灭世界的打算了,这种感恩也就有了其依据。
形而上学式的宗教意识则来自于对永恒的渴望。形而上学的宗教等式是:永恒=善=真理=美。因为永恒意味着存在者不会互相倾轧,意味着秩序。而秩序就是和谐,与秩序和谐者就是善。秩序的和谐意味着不受攻击,也就意味着神圣的净定,也就是真理。这样的秩序在存在者中闪光,就是美。
希腊式的宗教意识则起源于对力量的追求。力量是使事物发生改变者。因此希腊的神明总在不安的变动中实现自身。希腊式似乎还囊括了一些更原始的宗教意识,比如对妖精和鬼怪的信仰。
信之所以在第一位,甚至还在爱之前,是因为信的不完美在于爱的缺失,但已经有了知识。因此,信的完美并非是对象上的,而是行动上的,即并非知识上的缺失,而是意志上的缺失。爱的完美则要求对至高善的终极肯定,这是对象上的完美,而其对象上的不完美则在于止步在特殊善;但除此以外,爱还有一个低于不完美的阶段,也就是对表面善实际恶劣之物的爱。信的起源本质上并不要求意志以何种形式去行动,因此其动力甚至可以来自于恶劣的非-爱;但是爱的起源一定要求(完美或不完美的)信作为其基础。因此,在起源上,信要先于爱。只有意志通过信的知识的指引被导向了正确的行动目标(善),爱才首次被创造出来,否则人拥有的就仅仅是罪与冲动而已。但是,当善在信的指引下变得完美,信本身也同时随之变得完美。因此一个意味上,信是第一个美德,恰恰因为它在尚未成为美德时就发挥了指引作用;但它也是第一个美德,因为当爱成为完美时,它也同时能成为完美。也就是说,在“尚未”的层面上,信先于望与爱;在“已经”的层面上,信不落后于望与爱。在这个意义上,信是第一个美德。
其实还有另一个原因,就是信似乎是可以通过求知欲抵达完美的;也就是对知识的根源的强烈的爱推动了对神的信,而因为这种爱只是特殊的、对神一个局部方面的爱,它并非完美;但由此得到的信却是完美的。
而望则来自于强烈的自爱;信认识到永福发源于神作为第一真理,而望则奠基于信带来的确定性上才得以生发。完美的望预设了完美的信,因为对永福的意志上的确证来自于对它的知识。这两者则都先于爱,因为特殊之爱要先于普遍之爱。
在“尚未”的层面上,信要先于望,因为望预设了信的知识。在“已经”的层面上,信依旧以同样的方式被望所预设。
在“尚未”的层面上,望要先于爱,因为自爱总是优先于普遍之爱,而通过自爱,人被劝导去爱神本身。在“已经”的层面上,如果只是臻近完美,望似乎可以独立于爱;但如果要获得真正的完美,爱则先于望,因为只有对神的完美之爱才能使自爱同样完美。信也同样,只有爱神本身,知识才能获得恩典的赐予。因此从“尚未”来说,信、望、爱依照顺序是无可置疑的。从“已经”来说,假如只是臻于完美,则似乎依旧是信、望、爱。但如果是以完美本身来说,则似乎可以视爱为第一本质;但由于其它两个美德在同时也被爱带入完美,因此信与望也并不落后于爱。
咋说呢,恩典真是一个好用的东西,恩典的充溢自然地就能带来美德的完备,甚至还超出于理性与美德而抵达了奇迹;不会因为过去犯下的罪恶而痛苦,也不会因为当下的必然性而恐惧,哪怕是未来的焦虑也足以被抹除;当然,这并不代表古希腊那样的德性修持就被放弃了,毕竟要成为恩典的容器也是有一定指标的,只是这最后一步,即理性之统治地位的维持,就只能靠信仰与神迹了。
但还是不能忘记薇依的警告:重负与神恩,神恩与重负,两者最终必然是本质上联系的。或许只有背负起必然性的镣铐,神恩才有抵达的可能。
身体污染了灵魂并扭曲了思想,使思想背负上了罪,这似乎可以理解为,自然的限制使理性被模糊,同时使爱不再纯粹。但是这个论法可以是向另一个方向颠倒的,也就是,恰恰因为我们爱得不彻底,理性才转向了更微小的目标,才这样导致了理性的谬误,才导致了与神的分离和自然的限制,也就是原罪的印记。而这个罪需要被耶稣赎清,也就是身体的偿还和复活。而在原罪当中的傲慢在于,认为自己可以拥有除神之外的善。
这个意义上,罪就是惩罚本身
祈祷不在时间之中,而是时间在祈祷之中。
Christianity dictates what is absolutely good. The good must be affirmed inexorably. Thus the good must always remain in a process of evaluation, interrelated with what is bad and confluencing into a world. However, as in Christianity God is absolutely and unconditionally good, this good cannot be diluted and must be otherworldly. What happens is the renunciation of world and life for that good which escapes all evaluation, affirmation and action. What cannot be affirmed is illusory and nihilism. Christianity is in this way a form of nihilism. Every man with a strong will, once lured into Christianity, necessarily falls under the prey of god and renunciates what he has and what he is able to and atrophy under it. He doesn’t get what is promised, the unconditional good that is, since it’s by definition “unconditional”, but he instead loses everything. Unless, someone with an exceptionally strong will might come over and affirm Christianity again: what’s unconditionally good is itself a means and a condition and in life, thus can be affirmed. But this Overman must not be confused with the Last Man. The last man is not affirmative; he denunciates God not because he is strong, but because God becomes weak. When every being is pressed into the same plane by God, and God himself is sacrificed for his own nihilism, what we’ve got is just a void of nothingness: everything is interchangeable, but there’s nothing good. The Last Man doesn’t believe in anything good or higher, he is indifferent to everything. The Overman, however, affirms God because he is stronger than God, he wants something even higher than the essentially, absolutely, unconditionally good. That is, he desires life (an eternal amalgam of everything) while the Last Man desires the average nothing.
Every good Christian is also a good tax collector; he always collects the debt owed by believers and non-believers alike. God promises heaven to earthlings; and this makes all people on earth indebted to Him, a debt so great and unfathomable that eventually, in an absolutely surprising event, God sacrifices himself on that cross to pay their check. By killing their God, all those good Christians are finally satiated with peace in heart: now they are sure to win their heaven, but in secret, for Jews and Muslims must be hereby excluded from this unique present. God dies for Christians, but not for Pharisees or those counterfeiters. What an absurd economy! Here we meet with a strange situation: Christians, exactly by doing nothing, win everything. Instead of a religion, we have a market here in which the price and the debt for salvation is too high to afford for anyone else, but not so high for those good Christian consciences. They are so sure that by death, they own their heaven, whether on earth or not.
So we could say what a certain Kierkegaard does is to raise the market price of religion so that it becomes not easily affordable, but still a price charged and once one is prepared to negate everything one values one is certain to have this absolute reward.
What a certain, and in his most eloquent voice to be sure, Nietzsche does is to shed light on this economy: No, Christianity, even that of Kierkegaard’s, is not the only true coin but still remains a counterfeit money, a Pharisaic exchange, but only more interior and more secret, that tries to win heaven by all his interiority, that tries to settle the account and pay the debt infinitely. What Nietzsche wants then is to resolve the debt altogether since it’s merely a subverting invention of assurance: for Christians, their irresolvable debt is exactly their best bet, their mutilation salvation, their self-hatred love, their death a secret contract.
What Derrida wants, finally, is neither to raise the debt so no one can easily afford, not to cancel the debt altogether, but to say how we are always indebted to the other, but not so sure how much, not even so sure to whom we are indebted, because of what. There’s no clear-cut delimitation in this arena: is the debt so high that it becomes no debt at all? Or is it because the debt never exists as such so that it becomes so unfathomable? Too Kierkegaardean that it turns Nietzschean or vice versa? We are into muddy water now, indeed, and things are getting pretty hairy. We are all indebted to Marx, so that we are all Marxists in some sense; but Marxists as such?
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
For some people, ‘religious consciousness’ seems broadly classifiable as follows.
Jewish religious consciousness comes from gratitude and recompense. Since everything is given by God, we should naturally maintain reverence and gratitude toward the deity who gives us the world. When God establishes a covenant and no longer intends to destroy the world again, this gratitude acquires its ground.
Metaphysical religious consciousness comes from a desire for eternity. Its religious equation is: eternity = goodness = truth = beauty. Eternity means that beings do not crush one another; it means order. Order is harmony, and what harmonizes with order is good. The harmony of order means freedom from attack, and thus sacred purity and stillness: truth. Such order shining among beings is beauty.
Greek religious consciousness originates in the pursuit of power. Power is what makes things change. The Greek gods therefore always realize themselves in restless change. The Greek form also seems to encompass more primitive religious consciousnesses, such as belief in fairies and ghosts.
Faith comes first, even before love, because faith’s imperfection lies in the absence of love while knowledge is already present. Faith’s perfection therefore concerns action rather than its object: the deficiency is in the will, not in knowledge. The perfection of love requires the ultimate affirmation of the highest good, a perfection concerning its object. Its imperfection concerning its object consists in stopping at a particular good. Yet love also has a stage beneath imperfection: love of what is apparently good but actually wicked. The origin of faith does not essentially require the will to act in any particular form, so its impetus can even come from a wicked non-love. The origin of love, however, necessarily requires perfect or imperfect faith as its basis. Faith therefore precedes love in origin. Love is first created only when the will is directed toward the right object of action—the good—through the guidance of the knowledge of faith. Otherwise people possess only sin and impulse. Yet when the good becomes perfect under faith’s guidance, faith itself simultaneously becomes perfect. In one sense, then, faith is the first virtue precisely because it guides before it has become a virtue. It is also the first virtue because, when love becomes perfect, faith can become perfect at the same time. At the level of the ‘not yet,’ faith precedes hope and love; at the level of the ‘already,’ faith does not lag behind hope and love. In this sense, faith is the first virtue.
There is actually another reason: faith seems capable of attaining perfection through the desire for knowledge. A strong love for the source of knowledge drives faith in God. Because this love is particular, a love of only one aspect of God, it is not perfect; yet the faith obtained through it is perfect.
Hope comes from intense self-love. Faith recognizes that eternal beatitude originates in God as the first truth; hope can arise only on the certainty brought by faith. Perfect hope presupposes perfect faith, because the will’s assurance of eternal beatitude comes from knowledge of it. Both precede love, because particular love precedes universal love.
At the level of the ‘not yet,’ faith precedes hope, because hope presupposes the knowledge of faith. At the level of the ‘already,’ hope continues to presuppose faith in the same way.
At the level of the ‘not yet,’ hope precedes love, because self-love always precedes universal love, and through self-love people are persuaded to love God himself. At the level of the ‘already,’ if one is only approaching perfection, hope seems capable of independence from love. To attain true perfection, however, love precedes hope, because only perfect love of God can make self-love perfect as well. The same holds for faith: only through loving God himself can knowledge receive the gift of grace. From the standpoint of the ‘not yet,’ the sequence faith, hope, and love is therefore unquestionable. From that of the ‘already,’ if one is merely approaching perfection, the sequence still seems to be faith, hope, and love. In terms of perfection itself, however, love might be regarded as the first essence. Yet because the other two virtues are simultaneously brought into perfection by love, faith and hope do not lag behind love either.
What can I say—grace really is useful. The abundance of grace naturally brings the completeness of virtue, and even exceeds reason and virtue to reach the miraculous. One no longer suffers over past sins or fears present necessity; even anxiety about the future can be erased. Of course, this does not mean abandoning the cultivation of virtue practiced in ancient Greece. Becoming a vessel of grace does, after all, have certain requirements. It is simply that the final step, maintaining reason’s position of rule, can rely only on faith and miracles.
Yet we must not forget Weil’s warning: gravity and grace, grace and gravity—the two must ultimately be essentially connected. Perhaps only by taking up the shackles of necessity does the arrival of grace become possible.
The body pollutes the soul and distorts thought, burdening thought with sin. This can seemingly be understood to mean that natural limitations obscure reason while making love impure. Yet the argument can be reversed: precisely because our love is incomplete, reason turns toward lesser goals, producing errors of reason, separation from God, and natural limitations—the mark of original sin. This sin must be redeemed by Jesus, through bodily repayment and resurrection. The pride within original sin consists in believing that one can possess a good apart from God.
In this sense, sin is punishment itself.
Prayer is not within time; time is within prayer.
Christianity dictates what is absolutely good. The good must be affirmed inexorably. Thus the good must always remain in a process of evaluation, interrelated with what is bad and confluencing into a world. However, as in Christianity God is absolutely and unconditionally good, this good cannot be diluted and must be otherworldly. What happens is the renunciation of world and life for that good which escapes all evaluation, affirmation and action. What cannot be affirmed is illusory and nihilism. Christianity is in this way a form of nihilism. Every man with a strong will, once lured into Christianity, necessarily falls under the prey of god and renunciates what he has and what he is able to and atrophy under it. He doesn’t get what is promised, the unconditional good that is, since it’s by definition “unconditional”, but he instead loses everything. Unless, someone with an exceptionally strong will might come over and affirm Christianity again: what’s unconditionally good is itself a means and a condition and in life, thus can be affirmed. But this Overman must not be confused with the Last Man. The last man is not affirmative; he denunciates God not because he is strong, but because God becomes weak. When every being is pressed into the same plane by God, and God himself is sacrificed for his own nihilism, what we’ve got is just a void of nothingness: everything is interchangeable, but there’s nothing good. The Last Man doesn’t believe in anything good or higher, he is indifferent to everything. The Overman, however, affirms God because he is stronger than God, he wants something even higher than the essentially, absolutely, unconditionally good. That is, he desires life (an eternal amalgam of everything) while the Last Man desires the average nothing.
Every good Christian is also a good tax collector; he always collects the debt owed by believers and non-believers alike. God promises heaven to earthlings; and this makes all people on earth indebted to Him, a debt so great and unfathomable that eventually, in an absolutely surprising event, God sacrifices himself on that cross to pay their check. By killing their God, all those good Christians are finally satiated with peace in heart: now they are sure to win their heaven, but in secret, for Jews and Muslims must be hereby excluded from this unique present. God dies for Christians, but not for Pharisees or those counterfeiters. What an absurd economy! Here we meet with a strange situation: Christians, exactly by doing nothing, win everything. Instead of a religion, we have a market here in which the price and the debt for salvation is too high to afford for anyone else, but not so high for those good Christian consciences. They are so sure that by death, they own their heaven, whether on earth or not.
So we could say what a certain Kierkegaard does is to raise the market price of religion so that it becomes not easily affordable, but still a price charged and once one is prepared to negate everything one values one is certain to have this absolute reward.
What a certain, and in his most eloquent voice to be sure, Nietzsche does is to shed light on this economy: No, Christianity, even that of Kierkegaard’s, is not the only true coin but still remains a counterfeit money, a Pharisaic exchange, but only more interior and more secret, that tries to win heaven by all his interiority, that tries to settle the account and pay the debt infinitely. What Nietzsche wants then is to resolve the debt altogether since it’s merely a subverting invention of assurance: for Christians, their irresolvable debt is exactly their best bet, their mutilation salvation, their self-hatred love, their death a secret contract.
What Derrida wants, finally, is neither to raise the debt so no one can easily afford, not to cancel the debt altogether, but to say how we are always indebted to the other, but not so sure how much, not even so sure to whom we are indebted, because of what. There’s no clear-cut delimitation in this arena: is the debt so high that it becomes no debt at all? Or is it because the debt never exists as such so that it becomes so unfathomable? Too Kierkegaardean that it turns Nietzschean or vice versa? We are into muddy water now, indeed, and things are getting pretty hairy. We are all indebted to Marx, so that we are all Marxists in some sense; but Marxists as such?
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
对于一些人来说,“宗教意识”似乎大体上能够分类成以下这样。
犹太式的宗教意识来源于一种感恩与报偿:既然一切都是神给予的,那我们自然要为给予世界给我们的神明保持敬畏与感恩。而当神立下约定,当他没有再次毁灭世界的打算了,这种感恩也就有了其依据。
形而上学式的宗教意识则来自于对永恒的渴望。形而上学的宗教等式是:永恒=善=真理=美。因为永恒意味着存在者不会互相倾轧,意味着秩序。而秩序就是和谐,与秩序和谐者就是善。秩序的和谐意味着不受攻击,也就意味着神圣的净定,也就是真理。这样的秩序在存在者中闪光,就是美。
希腊式的宗教意识则起源于对力量的追求。力量是使事物发生改变者。因此希腊的神明总在不安的变动中实现自身。希腊式似乎还囊括了一些更原始的宗教意识,比如对妖精和鬼怪的信仰。
信之所以在第一位,甚至还在爱之前,是因为信的不完美在于爱的缺失,但已经有了知识。因此,信的完美并非是对象上的,而是行动上的,即并非知识上的缺失,而是意志上的缺失。爱的完美则要求对至高善的终极肯定,这是对象上的完美,而其对象上的不完美则在于止步在特殊善;但除此以外,爱还有一个低于不完美的阶段,也就是对表面善实际恶劣之物的爱。信的起源本质上并不要求意志以何种形式去行动,因此其动力甚至可以来自于恶劣的非-爱;但是爱的起源一定要求(完美或不完美的)信作为其基础。因此,在起源上,信要先于爱。只有意志通过信的知识的指引被导向了正确的行动目标(善),爱才首次被创造出来,否则人拥有的就仅仅是罪与冲动而已。但是,当善在信的指引下变得完美,信本身也同时随之变得完美。因此一个意味上,信是第一个美德,恰恰因为它在尚未成为美德时就发挥了指引作用;但它也是第一个美德,因为当爱成为完美时,它也同时能成为完美。也就是说,在“尚未”的层面上,信先于望与爱;在“已经”的层面上,信不落后于望与爱。在这个意义上,信是第一个美德。
其实还有另一个原因,就是信似乎是可以通过求知欲抵达完美的;也就是对知识的根源的强烈的爱推动了对神的信,而因为这种爱只是特殊的、对神一个局部方面的爱,它并非完美;但由此得到的信却是完美的。
而望则来自于强烈的自爱;信认识到永福发源于神作为第一真理,而望则奠基于信带来的确定性上才得以生发。完美的望预设了完美的信,因为对永福的意志上的确证来自于对它的知识。这两者则都先于爱,因为特殊之爱要先于普遍之爱。
在“尚未”的层面上,信要先于望,因为望预设了信的知识。在“已经”的层面上,信依旧以同样的方式被望所预设。
在“尚未”的层面上,望要先于爱,因为自爱总是优先于普遍之爱,而通过自爱,人被劝导去爱神本身。在“已经”的层面上,如果只是臻近完美,望似乎可以独立于爱;但如果要获得真正的完美,爱则先于望,因为只有对神的完美之爱才能使自爱同样完美。信也同样,只有爱神本身,知识才能获得恩典的赐予。因此从“尚未”来说,信、望、爱依照顺序是无可置疑的。从“已经”来说,假如只是臻于完美,则似乎依旧是信、望、爱。但如果是以完美本身来说,则似乎可以视爱为第一本质;但由于其它两个美德在同时也被爱带入完美,因此信与望也并不落后于爱。
咋说呢,恩典真是一个好用的东西,恩典的充溢自然地就能带来美德的完备,甚至还超出于理性与美德而抵达了奇迹;不会因为过去犯下的罪恶而痛苦,也不会因为当下的必然性而恐惧,哪怕是未来的焦虑也足以被抹除;当然,这并不代表古希腊那样的德性修持就被放弃了,毕竟要成为恩典的容器也是有一定指标的,只是这最后一步,即理性之统治地位的维持,就只能靠信仰与神迹了。
但还是不能忘记薇依的警告:重负与神恩,神恩与重负,两者最终必然是本质上联系的。或许只有背负起必然性的镣铐,神恩才有抵达的可能。
身体污染了灵魂并扭曲了思想,使思想背负上了罪,这似乎可以理解为,自然的限制使理性被模糊,同时使爱不再纯粹。但是这个论法可以是向另一个方向颠倒的,也就是,恰恰因为我们爱得不彻底,理性才转向了更微小的目标,才这样导致了理性的谬误,才导致了与神的分离和自然的限制,也就是原罪的印记。而这个罪需要被耶稣赎清,也就是身体的偿还和复活。而在原罪当中的傲慢在于,认为自己可以拥有除神之外的善。
这个意义上,罪就是惩罚本身
祈祷不在时间之中,而是时间在祈祷之中。
基督教规定什么是绝对的善。善必须不可动摇地被肯定。因此,善必须始终处于评估过程中,与恶相互关联,并汇流成一个世界。然而,在基督教中,神是绝对而无条件地善的,这一善因此不可被稀释,而必须属于彼岸。于是,人为了那逃避一切评估、肯定与行动的善,弃绝世界与生命。无法被肯定的东西是幻象,是虚无主义。在这个意义上,基督教是虚无主义的一种形式。每一个意志强大的人,一旦被诱入基督教,就必然成为神的猎物,弃绝自己所拥有的、所能做到的,并在其支配下萎缩。他得不到被许诺的东西,即无条件的善,因为它按定义就是“无条件的”,反而失去了一切。除非,一个意志格外强大的人到来,再次肯定基督教:无条件的善本身也是一种手段、一种条件,也在生命之中,因此可以被肯定。但这一超人绝不能与末人混淆。末人并不肯定;他斥责神,并非因为自身强大,而是因为神变得软弱。当每一个存在者都被神压到同一个平面,而神自身又为其虚无主义被牺牲时,我们得到的只是一片空无的虚空:一切都可以互换,却没有任何善。末人不相信任何善或更高者,他对一切漠不关心。然而,超人肯定神,是因为他比神更强,他想要比本质上、绝对地、无条件地善者还要更高的东西。也就是说,他欲求生命(一切的永恒混合),而末人欲求的是平均的无。
每一个好基督徒也是一个好税吏;他总是在向信徒与非信徒一概收取欠债。神向尘世之人许诺天堂;这让世上所有人都欠了祂一笔债,这笔债如此巨大、深不可测,以至于最终,在一个绝对出人意料的事件中,神在那十字架上牺牲自己,为他们结账。通过杀死自己的神,所有这些好基督徒终于心满意足,内心安宁:现在他们确信自己赢得了天堂,但这是秘密的,因为犹太人与穆斯林必须被排除在这一独特馈赠之外。神为基督徒而死,却不为法利赛人或那些伪造者而死。多么荒谬的经济!这里,我们遇到一种奇异情形:基督徒恰恰通过什么也不做,赢得了一切。我们在这里拥有的不是一种宗教,而是一个市场,其中救赎的价格与债务高得任何其它人都无法承受,对那些善良的基督徒良心来说,却并没有那么高。他们如此确信,凭借死亡,他们就拥有了自己的天堂,无论它是否在地上。
因此,我们可以说,某个祁克果所做的,是提高宗教的市场价格,让它不再容易负担;但这依然是一个被索取的价格,而只要一个人准备好否定自己所珍视的一切,就确信能够得到这一绝对报偿。
某个尼采——确切地说,是以其最雄辩的声音发言的尼采——所做的,是照亮这一经济:不,基督教,即便是祁克果的基督教,也并非唯一的真币,而依然是伪币,是法利赛式的交换,只是更内在、更隐秘,试图凭借自己全部的内在性赢得天堂,试图无限地结清账目、偿还债务。于是,尼采想要的是彻底解除债务,因为它不过是一个颠覆性的保障发明:对基督徒而言,他们无法偿清的债恰恰就是他们最好的赌注,他们的残损就是救赎,他们的自我憎恨就是爱,他们的死亡就是秘密契约。
最后,德里达想要的,既不是抬高债务,让任何人都无法轻易负担,也不是彻底取消债务,而是要说明,我们如何总是欠着他者,却不那么确定究竟欠了多少,甚至不那么确定我们欠的是谁,又因为什么而欠。在这一领域,并没有清楚划定的界限:债务是否高到不再成其为债务?还是因为债务本就从不作为债务本身存在,才变得如此深不可测?是太过祁克果式,以至于转成了尼采式,还是反过来?现在我们确实进入了浑水,事情也变得相当棘手。我们都欠着马克思,因此在某种意义上都是马克思主义者;但这就意味着马克思主义者本身吗?