Miscellaneous · 杂记
Language, mathematics, and expression · 语言、数学与表达
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语言、数学与表达——散记
Reflections · Pages
mythification与mystification是截然不同的。
语言的本质是呼唤。这是听与看的差异。
Memory is structured like an overtone series.
一个可待发展的而且估计有人处理过了的疑问:我们对呈现的维度选择是如何处理的?什么时候我们需要一个平面,什么时候需要一个立体空间?
两个猜想,一个是平面拒绝了有限视角与遮蔽,一个是平面拒绝了深度与高度(本质与超越性)
世界是理念之梦,世界的图像作为隐喻的身体。
说真理是一种技艺。
部分-整体与数的特殊性
“红”作为一个共相与“红的事物”的殊相是等价的,也就是说,红的事物是红的,这样的判断是真的。而在这一类的判断中,数量并不受关注,因为三个红的事物依旧“是红的”。“红”在对部分的刻画中保持了整体的一性,因此可以在转化为理念对象之后再次被视作被更高层次的“一”所统治的“多中之一”。但是数在这上面是完全相反的:“七”作为一个整体并不被七下属的任何一个“一”享有,因此“七”是彻底地不可能成为“一”的。换句话说,“红”可以被视作消除了部分-整体之间差异的“一”的理念对象把握,但“七”不能消除部分-整体之间的差异,因此不能内在地成为“一”被把握。这直接导致了“多”作为一个整体概念的不可能,因为作为一个概念,它没有内在地是一的对象。只有在象征数的系统中,被消去了部分而只以内在统一的符号的模式被展现的数才终于成为了一个内在地是“一”的对象。这个符号作为部分终于与其概念达成了整体上的统一,其作为符号所指涉的正是作为不确定整体概念的“多性”。至此,我们终于可以说,三是多了。
当然,是先有符号的表述再有多性的显示,还是先有多性的显示再有符号的表述,这一点就不那么重要了,因为Klein的先验历史的任务只是去揭示出这一意义结构的改变,并不需要刻画出新的意义结构与其现实表征的关系
语言无法处理一与多的悖论,只有数学可以解决。但数学的解决方式是通过比例(analogy)的投射,将未被专题化而仅仅被作为数学科学的材料的数所简练表达的一-多关系投射入理念的场所,并以此作为对感觉世界与数学世界的奠基。
简单来说,数学仅仅对数进行操作,却并不追问数本身的奠基性。而数本身的奠基性只能在理念数学中被思考,这一种思考的可能则是来源于对算学的普遍运用。也就是说,数学本身不反思,也因此没有意识到在自己的根源处就隐藏着解决一-多问题的关键钥匙;而数学家必须进入哲学家的领域才能被唤醒激活,泰阿泰德必须进入异乡人的“语境”。
而对于使用语言的哲学家,逻各斯的关键缺陷在于它无力处理悖论。当一与多被区分开,一与多就成为了两个分离的语词,而对它们的联结则只能走向多,一就被压抑了;而如果不分开,那语词将仅仅指涉一,而不会允许多。语言在这个意义上面临着根本的缺陷:语言在根本上是无法准确地去计数的。也因此语言无法处理数学所处理的疑难。
换句话说,那需要被理念数学把握的不是语言本身,而是那使语言得以成为可能的、奠基语言的秩序
语言的秩序本身不能被语言化?
语言是数学的奠基,数学是语言的完成。
一-多问题是通向数学理念的道路,而数学理念是通向理念之理念的道路。
新柏拉图主义者继承了毕达哥拉斯学派与欧几里得的两个传统,而这两种传统是不可兼容的。毕达哥拉斯学派的传统中,比例问题无法割舍可感音乐,因此可感音乐与天文学这些他者关联的学科被囊括在了自身关联的纯粹数学之内,比例科学从属于音乐科学。而欧几里得的传统中,比例问题被视作数学问题的衍生,因此对比例的讨论同样也是对纯粹数学的讨论,任何比例科学都是纯粹数学的分支。由于这两个传统的矛盾,尼各马库斯在区分出了纯粹数学后,却又将音乐科学放入了纯粹数学之内;而泰翁则在将比例科学、数学音乐与音乐科学三者区分开来的同时,把数学音乐也一起归入了纯粹数学中,而遮蔽了与之关联的音乐科学,尽管音乐科学在其它地方并没有被他忽略。一直到多姆尼努斯数学的分类才第一次获得了其系统性与科学性。他将数学以主题内容分为四类,分别是自身关联的质,他者关联的质,自身关联的量,和他者关联的量。自身关联的质就是对质数、单数、双数等的研究,他者关联的质则是对数与数之间可否彼此测量的研究,自身关联的量是对数的质料与其在数列中的排序的研究,他者关联的量则是比例算学。而从他的分类中可见,对自身关联的量的研究实则是将算学从实践中解放而获得了理论地位,并将计数算学与比例算学区分开来了。另一个值得注意的地方是,数学音乐作为对他者关联的质的研究获得了其独立地位,尽管它仍然需要比例算学的奠基。最后,音乐科学在这一种四分法中隐身了,而这并没有解决理论与实践的问题。在柏拉图那里,这种二分法在数学上是不一定正当的。而要进一步去探询这个疑问,就必须继续追问理念数与质料数的关系,以及两者是如何与这四个区域产生联系的。这一个问题则必须不能脱离新柏拉图主义的另一个视域被探究:即关于永恒与改变。是否与数学一样,在算学之内也有如何“构造”与“生成”某一个特殊比例的“知识”?而正是这种“构造”与“生成”决定了这门“知识”的质料性?但与数学不同的是,算学内的构造知识需要面对一个极端困难的问题:也就是除法问题。
其实两个传统的问题就是,一边不把他者关联的量从自身关联的量里区分开,另一边则让他者关联的量保持为与音乐科学相连接的状态,导致在讨论纯粹数学的时候把比例算学也整进去了。
所以质料被当成是自我关联的质与他者关联者的区分原则了,然而这就提出了一个疑问:质料是否也是自我关联的质与自我关联的量之间的区分原则呢?此外,质料的可感属性依然没有被确定或否定。
算学是实践的还是理论的,这个问题与质料的问题是分不开的。质料是否是自我关联的质与量之间的区分原则?正是因为这个问题未确定,质料是否外在于数自身就不能被把握,而与质料紧密联系的算学也因此在理论和实践两头都有了可能移动的空间。
至于除法问题,,,欧几里得那里的算学只考虑测量,因此是彻底的数学化的算学,而不是比例算学本身,因此那里根本没有真正的除法
除法最根本的问题就是在于,理论算学作为一种科学需要为实践算学奠基并同时解释理论上的和实践上的计算可能性,但是实践算学可以做到的理论算学却无法做到,这就否定了理论算学作为科学的正当性了。
书写与言说处在这样的一种交替张力中:通过言说的教化,书写文本得以获得其生命与理解,而书写者的权威被言说消解后成为协助回忆的材料;然而,正是书写的权威和整全性带来了异质的强度,而成为自然语言的超越性源泉。有意义的说其意义要求一种写的赠予,而写的意义,相反的,也需要说的再激活。这里的边界问题其实就是贯穿了德里达长久思考和书写实践的核心问题。相比较言说,书写是一种形式上的暴力;但没有这样的暴力,意志就无法成型,超越性也就是形式上不可能的。但没有言说,这样的超越性就无法获得其内容。
图像与符号的区分似乎是,图像关联于想象力而意向普遍性(参亚里士多德在 论灵魂 中对想象力的处理),而符号则本身就是普遍性的道成肉身,即,一切对直线的理解都以普遍的kx+b为中介,而kx+b并非是对每一条直线的理解,而是“直线”本身。比例的特殊性在这里表现为,无需任何限定,其普遍性就可以被直接地意向为a:b,线段仅仅是一个特殊实例的表征;而三角形的面积则必须先给出一个三角形,可给出的这个三角形无法是普遍的,直到在分析几何中被转化。
我怀疑时间作为尺度的特殊性在于任何一种对时间的衡量方式都与其测量者被预先统握在同一个同一性中了;而对长度进行测量则不同,标准长度与被测量的长度是分离的两个事物,因此一个被作为标准的时候另一个不受影响;然而当钟表时间成为标准,钟表时间也只是绝对的时间之流当中的一个意义载体罢了……换句话说,时间是绝对的形容词,对其客观化只是将其从时间转化到了其它的量而脱离了时间本身的原初领域(物显现之韵律)了
Truth(aletheia) is divine wandering(theia ale).
The two problems with truth: 1.circularity, if we attempt to ground truth with reason or to give an account for truth, there’s nothing that could give truth its firm ground than truth itself, thus we always beg the question 2.recursivity, any particular truth requires a higher truth to ground it, which in turn requires a higher one and ad infinitum. Thus either truth is founded on falsehood, the false commitment that there is truth, or is never given with a ground at all.
The third problem here is generality. If we have a first principle of truth, then this absolute truth must include all sorts of objects without exception; however, we only say a judgement is true when the presentation is in conformity with the object, which has a certain content and form; that is, the object must be determinate, while an absolute truth requires indererminacy.
Thus we always fail to derive content from form(one to all), or form from content(all to one), when we have to. Truth is always impossible, or The Impossible.
By thinking epistemically, one thinks of the being of knowing; to be strict on episteme one knows of the being of knowing: this is self-knowledge. And as knowing is the only passage way possible we could reach to being, this is tantamount to saying we know the being of being; self-knowledge is the being of being.
Epistemology is strictly metaphysical, and vice versa
Metonymy and metaphor are irreducible(an allusion to Paul de Man) precisely because they, within a language, belong to the same function: the deferral and differing from desire, the violent death, the absolute master.
問題的關鍵是,能不能就這麼打通海德格爾?甚至於說,德裡達?一種理解會認為海德格爾那裡語詞都是有著意義的有著本質的因此和拉康的否定性不一樣etc.etc.可是海德格爾那裡,語言不正是存在的居所嗎?而存在不正是否定性par exellence,Das Nichts Selbst Nichtet嗎?
empty speech其實也可以放在海德格爾的視域裡試著解決:empty speech empties——that is, it makes room for the arrival of what is presencing, it awaits, abides, makes abode, shelters for that violent truth of the subject.當然主體這個就很不海了。
Thus there is no such thing as an “empty speech”!
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
Mythification and mystification are entirely different.
The essence of language is calling. This is the difference between hearing and seeing.
Memory is structured like an overtone series.
A question worth developing, and probably already treated by someone: how do we handle the choice of dimensions in presentation? When do we need a plane, and when do we need a three-dimensional space?
Two conjectures: a plane rejects finite perspective and concealment; a plane rejects depth and height—essence and transcendence.
The world is the dream of the Idea; the image of the world is the body of metaphor.
Telling the truth is an art.
Part–whole and the distinctiveness of number
‘Red’ as a universal is equivalent to the particular ‘red thing’: the judgment that a red thing is red is true. In judgments of this kind, quantity is not at issue, because three red things still ‘are red.’ In characterizing parts, ‘red’ preserves the oneness of the whole. After being transformed into an ideal object, it can therefore again be regarded as ‘one among many’ governed by a higher ‘one.’ Number is exactly the opposite in this respect: ‘seven’ as a whole is not possessed by any ‘one’ belonging under seven, so ‘seven’ is utterly incapable of becoming ‘one.’ In other words, ‘red’ can be grasped as an ideal object of ‘one’ that effaces the difference between part and whole, but ‘seven’ cannot efface that difference and therefore cannot be grasped as intrinsically ‘one.’ This directly entails the impossibility of ‘many’ as a concept of a whole, because as a concept it has no object intrinsically one. Only in the system of symbolic numbers does number finally become an intrinsically ‘one’ object: its parts are effaced, and it is exhibited only in the form of an internally unified sign. This sign as a part finally achieves unity as a whole with its concept. What it refers to as a sign is precisely ‘multiplicity’ as an indeterminate concept of a whole. Only now can we finally say that three is many.
Of course, whether symbolic expression precedes the exhibition of multiplicity or the exhibition of multiplicity precedes symbolic expression is less important. Klein’s transcendental history need only reveal this change in the structure of meaning; it need not characterize the relation between the new structure of meaning and its actual representation.
Language cannot handle the paradox of one and many; only mathematics can resolve it. Yet mathematics resolves it through the projection of proportion, or analogy. It projects into the place of Ideas the one–many relation succinctly expressed by numbers that have not been thematized but merely serve as the material of mathematical science, and uses this to ground the sensible and mathematical worlds.
Simply put, mathematics merely operates on numbers without asking about the grounding of number itself. This grounding can be thought only in eidetic mathematics, whose possibility in turn comes from the universal application of calculation. Mathematics, that is, does not itself reflect and therefore does not recognize that the key to the one–many problem is hidden at its own root. The mathematician must enter the philosopher’s domain to be awakened and activated: Theaetetus must enter the Stranger’s ‘context.’
For the philosopher who uses language, the crucial defect of logos is its inability to handle paradox. Once one and many are distinguished, they become two separate words. Connecting them can lead only to many, suppressing one. If they are not separated, however, the word refers only to one and does not allow many. Language in this sense faces a fundamental defect: it is fundamentally incapable of counting accurately. It therefore cannot handle the difficulties mathematics addresses.
In other words, what eidetic mathematics must grasp is not language itself, but the order that makes language possible and grounds it.
The order of language cannot itself be put into language?
Language is the grounding of mathematics; mathematics is the fulfillment of language.
The one–many problem is the path to mathematical Ideas, and mathematical Ideas are the path to the Idea of Ideas.
The Neoplatonists inherit two traditions, the Pythagorean and the Euclidean, and these traditions are incompatible. In the Pythagorean tradition, the problem of proportion cannot be severed from sensible music. Other-related disciplines such as sensible music and astronomy are therefore encompassed within self-related pure mathematics, and the science of proportion is subordinate to the science of music. In the Euclidean tradition, by contrast, problems of proportion are regarded as derivatives of mathematical problems. Discussing proportion is thus also discussing pure mathematics, and every science of proportion is a branch of pure mathematics. Because these traditions conflict, Nicomachus distinguishes pure mathematics only to place the science of music back within it. Theon distinguishes the science of proportion, mathematical music, and the science of music, yet also places mathematical music within pure mathematics, obscuring the associated science of music even though he does not neglect it elsewhere. Only with Domninus does the classification of mathematics first acquire systematic and scientific form. He divides mathematics by subject matter into four kinds: self-related quality, other-related quality, self-related quantity, and other-related quantity. Self-related quality studies prime, odd, and even numbers; other-related quality studies whether numbers can measure one another. Self-related quantity studies the matter of numbers and their ordering in a numerical series; other-related quantity is proportional calculation. His classification shows that studying self-related quantity actually liberates calculation from practice, giving it a theoretical status and distinguishing counting-calculation from proportional calculation. Another notable point is that mathematical music acquires an independent status as the study of other-related quality, although it still requires grounding in proportional calculation. Finally, the science of music disappears in this fourfold division, which does not resolve the problem of theory and practice. For Plato, this dichotomy is not necessarily legitimate in mathematics. To investigate further, we must continue to ask about the relation between eidetic and material numbers, and how each relates to these four regions. This question must also be investigated within another Neoplatonic horizon: eternity and change. Is there, within calculation as within mathematics, a ‘knowledge’ of how to ‘construct’ or ‘generate’ a particular proportion? And is it precisely this construction and generation that determines the materiality of this knowledge? Unlike mathematics, however, constructive knowledge within calculation must face an extraordinarily difficult problem: division.
The problem with the two traditions is really that one does not distinguish other-related quantity from self-related quantity, while the other keeps other-related quantity connected to the science of music, with the result that proportional calculation gets included in discussions of pure mathematics.
Matter thus becomes the principle distinguishing self-related quality from what is other-related. Yet this raises a question: is matter also the principle distinguishing self-related quality from self-related quantity? Moreover, matter’s sensible character has still been neither affirmed nor denied.
Whether calculation is practical or theoretical cannot be separated from the problem of matter. Is matter the principle distinguishing self-related quality from self-related quantity? Precisely because this remains unsettled, we cannot grasp whether matter is external to number itself. Calculation, intimately connected with matter, therefore has room to move toward either theory or practice.
As for the problem of division… Euclid’s calculation considers only measurement and is therefore thoroughly mathematized calculation, not proportional calculation itself. There is consequently no genuine division there at all.
The fundamental problem of division is that theoretical calculation, as a science, must ground practical calculation while explaining the possibility of both theoretical and practical computation. Yet theoretical calculation cannot accomplish what practical calculation can, thereby negating theoretical calculation’s legitimacy as a science.
Writing and speech stand in an alternating tension. Through the education of speech, written texts acquire life and understanding; the writer’s authority is dissolved by speech and becomes material assisting recollection. Yet it is precisely writing’s authority and completeness that bring a heterogeneous intensity and become a transcendent source for natural language. Meaningful speech requires a gift from writing for its meaning, while writing’s meaning conversely requires reactivation by speech. This problem of the boundary is really the central question running through Derrida’s sustained thinking and writing practice. Compared with speech, writing is a formal violence. Yet without this violence, the will cannot take shape and transcendence is formally impossible. Without speech, however, this transcendence cannot acquire its content.
The distinction between image and sign seems to be that images relate to imagination and intend universality—see Aristotle’s treatment of imagination in De Anima—whereas signs are themselves the incarnation of universality. Thus every understanding of a straight line is mediated by the universal kx+b, and kx+b is not an understanding of each individual straight line but ‘straight line’ itself. The distinctiveness of proportion appears here: without any determination, its universality can be directly intended as a:b, while a line segment merely represents a particular instance. The area of a triangle, by contrast, requires a triangle to be given first, but this given triangle cannot be universal until it is transformed within analytic geometry.
I suspect that what distinguishes time as a measure is that any way of measuring time is already grasped together with what measures it within a single identity. Measuring length is different: the standard length and the measured length are two separate things, so making one the standard leaves the other unaffected. Yet when clock-time becomes the standard, clock-time remains only a bearer of meaning within the absolute flow of time… In other words, time is an absolute adjective. Objectifying it merely transforms it from time into other quantities and departs from the originary domain of time itself: the rhythm of things’ appearing.
Truth(aletheia) is divine wandering(theia ale).
The two problems with truth: 1.circularity, if we attempt to ground truth with reason or to give an account for truth, there’s nothing that could give truth its firm ground than truth itself, thus we always beg the question 2.recursivity, any particular truth requires a higher truth to ground it, which in turn requires a higher one and ad infinitum. Thus either truth is founded on falsehood, the false commitment that there is truth, or is never given with a ground at all.
The third problem here is generality. If we have a first principle of truth, then this absolute truth must include all sorts of objects without exception; however, we only say a judgement is true when the presentation is in conformity with the object, which has a certain content and form; that is, the object must be determinate, while an absolute truth requires indererminacy.
Thus we always fail to derive content from form(one to all), or form from content(all to one), when we have to. Truth is always impossible, or The Impossible.
By thinking epistemically, one thinks of the being of knowing; to be strict on episteme one knows of the being of knowing: this is self-knowledge. And as knowing is the only passage way possible we could reach to being, this is tantamount to saying we know the being of being; self-knowledge is the being of being.
Epistemology is strictly metaphysical, and vice versa
Metonymy and metaphor are irreducible(an allusion to Paul de Man) precisely because they, within a language, belong to the same function: the deferral and differing from desire, the violent death, the absolute master.
The crucial question is whether we can connect this directly to Heidegger—or even to Derrida. One understanding would hold that Heidegger’s words all have meaning and essence and therefore differ from Lacanian negativity, etc., etc. Yet is language not precisely the dwelling place of Being for Heidegger? And is Being not precisely negativity par excellence—Das Nichts Selbst Nichtet?
We could also try to address empty speech within Heidegger’s horizon: empty speech empties——that is, it makes room for the arrival of what is presencing, it awaits, abides, makes abode, shelters for that violent truth of the subject. Of course, the subject is hardly Heideggerian.
Thus there is no such thing as an “empty speech”!
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
mythification与mystification是截然不同的。
语言的本质是呼唤。这是听与看的差异。
记忆的结构如同一个泛音列。
一个可待发展的而且估计有人处理过了的疑问:我们对呈现的维度选择是如何处理的?什么时候我们需要一个平面,什么时候需要一个立体空间?
两个猜想,一个是平面拒绝了有限视角与遮蔽,一个是平面拒绝了深度与高度(本质与超越性)
世界是理念之梦,世界的图像作为隐喻的身体。
说真理是一种技艺。
部分-整体与数的特殊性
“红”作为一个共相与“红的事物”的殊相是等价的,也就是说,红的事物是红的,这样的判断是真的。而在这一类的判断中,数量并不受关注,因为三个红的事物依旧“是红的”。“红”在对部分的刻画中保持了整体的一性,因此可以在转化为理念对象之后再次被视作被更高层次的“一”所统治的“多中之一”。但是数在这上面是完全相反的:“七”作为一个整体并不被七下属的任何一个“一”享有,因此“七”是彻底地不可能成为“一”的。换句话说,“红”可以被视作消除了部分-整体之间差异的“一”的理念对象把握,但“七”不能消除部分-整体之间的差异,因此不能内在地成为“一”被把握。这直接导致了“多”作为一个整体概念的不可能,因为作为一个概念,它没有内在地是一的对象。只有在象征数的系统中,被消去了部分而只以内在统一的符号的模式被展现的数才终于成为了一个内在地是“一”的对象。这个符号作为部分终于与其概念达成了整体上的统一,其作为符号所指涉的正是作为不确定整体概念的“多性”。至此,我们终于可以说,三是多了。
当然,是先有符号的表述再有多性的显示,还是先有多性的显示再有符号的表述,这一点就不那么重要了,因为Klein的先验历史的任务只是去揭示出这一意义结构的改变,并不需要刻画出新的意义结构与其现实表征的关系
语言无法处理一与多的悖论,只有数学可以解决。但数学的解决方式是通过比例(analogy)的投射,将未被专题化而仅仅被作为数学科学的材料的数所简练表达的一-多关系投射入理念的场所,并以此作为对感觉世界与数学世界的奠基。
简单来说,数学仅仅对数进行操作,却并不追问数本身的奠基性。而数本身的奠基性只能在理念数学中被思考,这一种思考的可能则是来源于对算学的普遍运用。也就是说,数学本身不反思,也因此没有意识到在自己的根源处就隐藏着解决一-多问题的关键钥匙;而数学家必须进入哲学家的领域才能被唤醒激活,泰阿泰德必须进入异乡人的“语境”。
而对于使用语言的哲学家,逻各斯的关键缺陷在于它无力处理悖论。当一与多被区分开,一与多就成为了两个分离的语词,而对它们的联结则只能走向多,一就被压抑了;而如果不分开,那语词将仅仅指涉一,而不会允许多。语言在这个意义上面临着根本的缺陷:语言在根本上是无法准确地去计数的。也因此语言无法处理数学所处理的疑难。
换句话说,那需要被理念数学把握的不是语言本身,而是那使语言得以成为可能的、奠基语言的秩序
语言的秩序本身不能被语言化?
语言是数学的奠基,数学是语言的完成。
一-多问题是通向数学理念的道路,而数学理念是通向理念之理念的道路。
新柏拉图主义者继承了毕达哥拉斯学派与欧几里得的两个传统,而这两种传统是不可兼容的。毕达哥拉斯学派的传统中,比例问题无法割舍可感音乐,因此可感音乐与天文学这些他者关联的学科被囊括在了自身关联的纯粹数学之内,比例科学从属于音乐科学。而欧几里得的传统中,比例问题被视作数学问题的衍生,因此对比例的讨论同样也是对纯粹数学的讨论,任何比例科学都是纯粹数学的分支。由于这两个传统的矛盾,尼各马库斯在区分出了纯粹数学后,却又将音乐科学放入了纯粹数学之内;而泰翁则在将比例科学、数学音乐与音乐科学三者区分开来的同时,把数学音乐也一起归入了纯粹数学中,而遮蔽了与之关联的音乐科学,尽管音乐科学在其它地方并没有被他忽略。一直到多姆尼努斯数学的分类才第一次获得了其系统性与科学性。他将数学以主题内容分为四类,分别是自身关联的质,他者关联的质,自身关联的量,和他者关联的量。自身关联的质就是对质数、单数、双数等的研究,他者关联的质则是对数与数之间可否彼此测量的研究,自身关联的量是对数的质料与其在数列中的排序的研究,他者关联的量则是比例算学。而从他的分类中可见,对自身关联的量的研究实则是将算学从实践中解放而获得了理论地位,并将计数算学与比例算学区分开来了。另一个值得注意的地方是,数学音乐作为对他者关联的质的研究获得了其独立地位,尽管它仍然需要比例算学的奠基。最后,音乐科学在这一种四分法中隐身了,而这并没有解决理论与实践的问题。在柏拉图那里,这种二分法在数学上是不一定正当的。而要进一步去探询这个疑问,就必须继续追问理念数与质料数的关系,以及两者是如何与这四个区域产生联系的。这一个问题则必须不能脱离新柏拉图主义的另一个视域被探究:即关于永恒与改变。是否与数学一样,在算学之内也有如何“构造”与“生成”某一个特殊比例的“知识”?而正是这种“构造”与“生成”决定了这门“知识”的质料性?但与数学不同的是,算学内的构造知识需要面对一个极端困难的问题:也就是除法问题。
其实两个传统的问题就是,一边不把他者关联的量从自身关联的量里区分开,另一边则让他者关联的量保持为与音乐科学相连接的状态,导致在讨论纯粹数学的时候把比例算学也整进去了。
所以质料被当成是自我关联的质与他者关联者的区分原则了,然而这就提出了一个疑问:质料是否也是自我关联的质与自我关联的量之间的区分原则呢?此外,质料的可感属性依然没有被确定或否定。
算学是实践的还是理论的,这个问题与质料的问题是分不开的。质料是否是自我关联的质与量之间的区分原则?正是因为这个问题未确定,质料是否外在于数自身就不能被把握,而与质料紧密联系的算学也因此在理论和实践两头都有了可能移动的空间。
至于除法问题,,,欧几里得那里的算学只考虑测量,因此是彻底的数学化的算学,而不是比例算学本身,因此那里根本没有真正的除法
除法最根本的问题就是在于,理论算学作为一种科学需要为实践算学奠基并同时解释理论上的和实践上的计算可能性,但是实践算学可以做到的理论算学却无法做到,这就否定了理论算学作为科学的正当性了。
书写与言说处在这样的一种交替张力中:通过言说的教化,书写文本得以获得其生命与理解,而书写者的权威被言说消解后成为协助回忆的材料;然而,正是书写的权威和整全性带来了异质的强度,而成为自然语言的超越性源泉。有意义的说其意义要求一种写的赠予,而写的意义,相反的,也需要说的再激活。这里的边界问题其实就是贯穿了德里达长久思考和书写实践的核心问题。相比较言说,书写是一种形式上的暴力;但没有这样的暴力,意志就无法成型,超越性也就是形式上不可能的。但没有言说,这样的超越性就无法获得其内容。
图像与符号的区分似乎是,图像关联于想象力而意向普遍性(参亚里士多德在 论灵魂 中对想象力的处理),而符号则本身就是普遍性的道成肉身,即,一切对直线的理解都以普遍的kx+b为中介,而kx+b并非是对每一条直线的理解,而是“直线”本身。比例的特殊性在这里表现为,无需任何限定,其普遍性就可以被直接地意向为a:b,线段仅仅是一个特殊实例的表征;而三角形的面积则必须先给出一个三角形,可给出的这个三角形无法是普遍的,直到在分析几何中被转化。
我怀疑时间作为尺度的特殊性在于任何一种对时间的衡量方式都与其测量者被预先统握在同一个同一性中了;而对长度进行测量则不同,标准长度与被测量的长度是分离的两个事物,因此一个被作为标准的时候另一个不受影响;然而当钟表时间成为标准,钟表时间也只是绝对的时间之流当中的一个意义载体罢了……换句话说,时间是绝对的形容词,对其客观化只是将其从时间转化到了其它的量而脱离了时间本身的原初领域(物显现之韵律)了
真理(aletheia)是神圣的漫游(theia ale)。
真理的两个问题:1.循环性,如果我们试图以理性奠基真理,或者为真理给出说明,那么除了真理自身之外,没有什么能够给予真理稳固的基础,因此我们总是在预设结论;2.递归性,任何特殊真理都要求一个更高的真理为它奠基,后者又要求一个更高者,如此以至无穷。因此,真理要么建立在虚假之上,即对真理存在的虚假承诺之上,要么根本从未获得基础。
这里的第三个问题是普遍性。如果我们拥有一个真理的第一原则,那么这一绝对真理必须无例外地包含一切类型的对象;然而,我们只有在呈现符合对象时才会说一个判断为真,而对象具有一定的内容与形式;也就是说,对象必须是有规定性的,但绝对真理却要求无规定性。
因此,当我们不得不从形式推导内容(从一到全),或从内容推导形式(从全到一)时,我们总是失败。真理总是不可能的,或者说,是那不可能者。
以认识的方式思考,就是思考知的存在;严格坚持认识,就是知晓知的存在:这就是自知。而既然知是我们通达存在唯一可能的通路,这也就等于说,我们知晓存在的存在;自知就是存在的存在。
认识论严格说来就是形而上学,反之亦然。
转喻与隐喻不可还原(暗指保罗·德曼),恰恰因为它们在一种语言之内属于同一功能:对欲望、对暴烈的死亡、对绝对主人的延宕与差异化。
問題的關鍵是,能不能就這麼打通海德格爾?甚至於說,德裡達?一種理解會認為海德格爾那裡語詞都是有著意義的有著本質的因此和拉康的否定性不一樣etc.etc.可是海德格爾那裡,語言不正是存在的居所嗎?而存在不正是否定性par exellence,Das Nichts Selbst Nichtet嗎?
empty speech其實也可以放在海德格爾的視域裡試著解決:empty speech empties——that is, it makes room for the arrival of what is presencing, it awaits, abides, makes abode, shelters for that violent truth of the subject.當然主體這個就很不海了。
因此,根本没有“空言”这样的东西!