Isaac Newton · 艾萨克·牛顿
Principia · 自然哲学的数学原理
On Newton’s Argument of Universal Gravitation
Paper / 论文
In order to evaluate the importance of each step in Newton’s argument at the beginning of Book III, it is necessary to understand at the same time what each of his steps is. I make a rough division of the first 13 propositions, and I assign Proposition 1 till Proposition 5 to the first group of propositions, Proposition 6 till Proposition 10 to the second group, and finally Proposition 7 till 13 to the last.
This division follows the order of ‘the particular – the universal – the world’. The first group of propositions are all addressed to the astronomical data collected from observations of particular celestial bodies. The subject of each proposition is specific. For instance, Proposition 1 determines the nature of the motion of circumjovial satellites, Proposition 2 determines the motion of primary planets in the solar system, etc. All propositions in the first group are particular applications of the universal rule established in Book I, so as to provide concrete evidence of the validity of Newton’s new theory.
The first group of propositions, however, serve one other purpose as well. This purpose is explained by the scholium that marks the transition from the first group of propositions to the second group. This scholium states: ‘Hitherto we have called “centripetal” that force by which celestial bodies are kept in their orbits. It is now established that this force is gravity, and therefore we shall call it gravity from now on. For the cause of the centripetal force by which the moon is kept in its orbit ought to be extended to all the planets, by rules 1, 2, and 4’. In other words, the particular examples the first group of propositions deal with provide the basis for a general induction, so that if gravity is centripetal force for the moon, and if there is no reason to doubt other celestial bodies differ in kind from the moon, it is to be inferred that gravity is the centripetal force for all celestial bodies. Since the rules for induction are already given, the crucial step here is evidently Proposition 5 and its scholium, which establish the centripetal force for the moon to be the same as the gravity it suffers.
The second group of propositions are more general than those of the first group. Instead of celestial bodies, all bodies are now included in gravitation. Proposition 7 marks the pinnacle of universality. Although Proposition 6 has already established the equivalence of kind between celestial and terrestrial bodies, and thus between orbiting and falling, the centers to which gravity is directed remain to be ‘planets’ in the enunciation. Only in Proposition 7 is the doctrine of universal gravitation first developed in its precise form. After Proposition 7, the extent of the propositions is again restricted only to planets, yet we are meant to bear in mind that ‘planets’ from now on takes on a different significance. For all bodies are from this moment on to be construed as πλάνητες ἀστέρες, including terrestrial bodies, that they differ not in kind from the celestial ones and they all participate in the same act of gravitation.
The transition from the second to the last group of propositions is marked by the hypothesis that the center of the system of the world is at rest. From now on, the doctrine of universal gravitation is no longer conceived simply to be a physical or a mathematical theory, but it has become properly cosmic. That is to say, if the second group of propositions have only established a general theory of universal gravitation that remains abstract, with the introduction of Hypothesis I, Newton’s argument has come back to the anchorage of ‘this world’. This is of particular philosophical interest to me. For seemingly the development of Newton’s argument suggests that ‘the world’ cannot be properly understood without a prior understanding of the particulars, which by themselves are merely phenomena, and the universals, which by themselves are abstract notions. Only a synthesis between the two can comprise a ‘world’ that is both infinite (universal) and concrete (particular). It would be interesting to inquire more into this notion of the ‘world’ and its primary signification.
The most important steps in Newton’s argument, therefore, seem to me to be the following. First, Proposition 5 establishes the equivalence between centripetal force and gravity for the moon. Then, Proposition 6 and 7 expand this equivalence to all bodies. Finally, with Hypothesis I, ‘the world’ is welded back into his argument. These, I believe, are the most crucial parts of Newton’s argument for his new doctrine of universal gravitation.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
要评估牛顿在第三卷开头的论证中每一步的重要性,就必须同时理解,他的每一步究竟是什么。我将前十三个命题作出粗略划分,把命题1到命题5归入第一组,命题6到命题10归入第二组,最后把命题7到命题13归入最后一组。
这一划分遵循“特殊——普遍——世界”的次序。第一组命题都针对从特定天体的观测中收集到的天文学资料。每个命题的对象都是特定的。例如,命题1确定环绕木星的卫星的运动性质,命题2确定太阳系中主行星的运动,等等。第一组所有命题都是第一卷确立的普遍规则的特殊应用,从而为牛顿新理论的有效性提供具体证据。
然而,第一组命题还具有另一个目的。这个目的由标志着从第一组到第二组过渡的附释加以说明。附释说:“到目前为止,我们把使天体保持在其轨道上的力称为‘向心力’。如今已经确立,这一力就是引力,因此我们从今往后将称之为引力。因为依据规则1、2和4,应当把使月球保持在其轨道上的向心力之原因推广到所有行星。”换句话说,第一组命题处理的特殊例子为一般归纳提供了基础:如果对月球来说,引力就是向心力,而又没有理由怀疑其他天体与月球在种类上有所不同,那么就应当推断,引力是所有天体的向心力。既然归纳的规则已经给出,这里关键的一步显然就是命题5及其附释,它们确立了月球的向心力与其承受的引力是同一种力。
第二组命题比第一组更为普遍。如今被纳入引力作用的不仅是天体,而是一切物体。命题7标志着普遍性的顶峰。虽然命题6已经确立天体与地上物体在种类上的等同,从而确立轨道运动与坠落之间的等同,但在命题的表述中,引力所指向的中心仍然是“行星”。直到命题7,万有引力学说才首次以准确的形式得到发展。命题7之后,命题的范围又被限制于行星,但我们应当记住,从此“行星”具有了一种不同的意义。因为从这一刻起,一切物体,包括地上物体,都应被理解为πλάνητες ἀστέρες,即游星:它们与天体并无种类上的差别,都参与同一种引力作用。
从第二组到最后一组命题的过渡,以这样一个假设为标志:世界体系的中心处于静止。从此,万有引力学说不再仅仅被理解为一个物理学或数学理论,而是恰当地成为宇宙性的理论。也就是说,如果第二组命题只是确立了一种仍然抽象的万有引力普遍理论,那么随着假设I的引入,牛顿的论证就重新回到了“这一个世界”的锚地。这一点对我具有特殊的哲学意味。因为牛顿论证的展开似乎暗示,若不先理解特殊者与普遍者,就无法恰当地理解“世界”:特殊者就其本身而言只是现象,普遍者就其本身而言只是抽象概念。只有两者的综合,才能构成一个既无限(普遍)又具体(特殊)的“世界”。进一步探究这一“世界”概念及其首要含义,将会很有意思。
因此,在我看来,牛顿论证中最重要的步骤如下。首先,命题5确立了对月球来说向心力与引力的等同。然后,命题6和命题7把这一等同扩展到一切物体。最后,借助假设I,“世界”被重新焊接进他的论证。我认为,这些就是牛顿为他的新万有引力学说进行论证时最关键的部分。