Friedrich Nietzsche · 弗里德里希·尼采
Ressentiment, the last man, and the overman · 怨恨、末人与超人
Undated 未注日期
怨恨、末人与超人——散记
Reflections · Pages
尼采对主谓关系的批判并不是对其真实有效性的批判,而是对其原始动机的批判。像亚里士多德早就意识到了有些主词和谓词是本质上必然联系在一起的,彼此之间甚至不仅仅存在单向依赖性,而是双向依赖的。但主谓关系的句法允许这样的表达不代表其在动机上是“好”的。因为既然你知道有这样的本质上互相依赖的主谓关系,为什么还要把它拆成主与谓呢?是一种什么样的道德精神在驱动这一种句法的扩张?
怨恨:将差异视作待消灭的敌人。差异是第一性的,怨恨因此是对差异的被动反应。强者不怨恨,因为强者不是消灭差异,而是主动制造差异,肯定差异。强者施加自己的意志不是为了消灭承受意志的质料,而是为了创造并改变质料的形式。怨恨的政治将政治对象视作同质化的二元论阵营,并将一方对另一方的消灭视作最终目标;同时,这个目标被认为是绝对善好的。对怨恨的政治的批判基于两个理由:一个是尼采式的对主人道德的推崇,对强者政治的认同,这是伦理学意义上的;一个是怨恨政治的非真实性,也就是政治世界的本质并非是二元阵营的一方消灭另一方,这是本体论意义上的。对民族主义或者种族主义的怨恨政治批判因此可以有两处着眼点:一是诉诸怨恨者的软弱,二是诉诸怨恨本身是受蛊惑煽动而无力解决政治问题的事实。因此我们可以批判无容忍和霸权实际上是对自身软弱的恐惧,也可以批判种族屠杀等手段是由领袖煽动进行的掠夺而无助于其普遍参与者的政治处境。暴力在怨恨政治中的使用并非创造式、肯定式的,而是摧毁式、否定式的。怨恨的暴力并不是创造主体性的暴力,也不是为了征服或争夺善好(“这个很好,我欲求它”)的暴力,而是从丑恶和软弱出发的对善好的玷污(“你必须和我一样丑恶,甚至变得比我更丑恶”“我得不到你也别想得到”)。怨恨的两种形态:暴力的怨恨,即对善好的摧毁,或自戕;欺骗的怨恨,即对差异的消解,或自执。
The last man sacrifices all things for something, Overman sacrifices all things for the all.
或许终于可以简单地表述对苦难这个问题的立场了。
苦难是人的命运;如果这是真的(我相信这是真的),那各存在样态也各有各自的命运。既然是命运,那必然不能要求还未受其呼召的人去理解这种命运。什么样的人受什么样的呼召,这要求判断和审视。判断力不足的表现,就是这样的综合过程其内容发生谬误或者其覆盖范围不够准确:尤其要小心“所有人”这样的用法;所有人当然都有苦难,那当我们说“所有人都应该去看苦难”的时候,我们只可能意味着“所有人都应该去看某一种特定的苦难”,否则就是在说一句废话;可是所有人都去看的“特定的苦难”难道不正是最廉价、最刻奇、最媚俗的?“伟大的事物留给伟大的人,深渊留给深刻的人,细微和战栗留给敏感的人;总而言之,珍贵之物是留给珍贵之人的。”
但相反,假如我们承认,苦难是人的命运;那我们就不可能去逃脱苦难。我们不能假装仿佛有一个地方是没有苦难,只有浪漫的、菜市场般顺滑的“冒险经历”的;对苦难的贬值意味着命运的贬值,也意味着追逐命运的意志的贬值。对苦难的估值就代表了对在苦难当中挣扎、生长的生命的估值。尽管我们可以假装不知道那里有苦难,为了短暂地休息、为了让自己活下去,但我们不能永远这样假装;命运是无法阻挡的。
简而言之,对苦难的态度就是对命运的态度。爱苦难(并不是审美“苦难”!)就是爱命运;就是爱欲本身。amor fati就是eros。
The portrait of the Last Man
He is indifferent to anything, his life is reduced to bare existence, because he believes and is always busy at confirming this is really so, by confirming the unchangeability of things, that the system is complete and the perfect. This means he’s busy at conserving himself, he is willing to sacrifice everything for just one single comfort, that he is the final, ultimate truth. He is indifferent to anything, nothing makes a difference to him because he believes he has secured the essential thing. Even if what he used to believe so dearly, even God, the unconditional truth par excellence, may be sacrificed, he still believes there must be something out there that secures his current life which is no better than dead. This something could be anything, no matter a TV program, a chic song, a popcorn blockbuster or a piece of knowledge. He just needs something to hang him over there whiling away. But he necessarily fails since nothing can fill his lack. He’s only fantasizing about his fulfillment and he always needs a placeholder for his fantasy, God, Philosophy, Talk Show, Revolution......
Who is the Übermensch?
Overman is always not satisfied. But he never fails: he wants to do it wrong in order to do it again and again. He conserves himself only to spend it later at a more rapid and precipitous challenge. He doesn’t worry about losing what he has since he knows from the start he doesn’t want to keep it at all. He gives and asks for no return: since he is too high above to desire things none could give him back. He is not indifferent even when he affirms everything: he affirms because he desires the good and wants it to return forever and ever in everything. He destroys what’s bad and sick but not totally, only to discipline those under his pleasure. He approves of difference and domination: he chases after Talk Show, Philosophy, Music, even God, not because he wants to remain indifferent and objective as long as security allows, viz to find a new master after the old one is failing; but to kill the old with the new and kill the new with the newer; to let the forces run through him and activates, again and again and again......
Letzte Menschen und Übermenschen
The last man is the inverted image of the Overman, just like the ape and Zarathustra. With the same phenomenon, the same text, we could have arrived at two interpretations: that of the last man and that of Overman. The last man babbles about morality and(!) immorality, stability, truth. Overman has passed through morality, beyond good and evil, and no longer intends to be either moral or immoral. He becomes too great to be discussed in these terms. Would we talk of God if he sins or not? Is God moral? Overman is artistic, creative, and genetic: he’s beyond the origin, the forgotten future, the Promise. Thus even if we look at the Last Man and the Overman and judge them exactly doing the same thing, their motivations are completely different: one wants to conserve himself, one wants to spend himself.
Christianity
Christianity asks all to spend everything and passes down the teaching of a higher Being; this is a contradiction in terms. If there’s something higher, one must not make do with everything for the sake of that, since it would stop being higher at that very moment. One should instead try everything to mark that something higher. Christianity has nurtured the possibility of Overman and destroyed its soil at the same time: one could reach higher and look further, but is imprisoned and mutilated. The unconditional good waters down everything to the same plane and the only security left is this Omnipotence. When this Omnipotence called God is failing in power we substitute it with Science, Hegelianism, Humanity so on so forth. This is exactly the consequence of Christian teaching, the teaching of the unconditional and the truth: we are mutilated by the unconditional, and have to lean on the staff it parsimoniously offers. When we can’t beat it, we thought we could join it or make a truce with it to stay alive for a while, but that only kept us sick. A make-shift choice: death or disease. Lured into this trap, what could be expected other than Chance, Strength, Promise, a Messiah as Zarathustra?
肯定之肯定的新世界。
幾個把握:1.肯定與差異產生了“becoming”,但是這個“becoming”本身如果要被不斷地意願,就需要被再次肯定並差異化,而這個高階的肯定本身又需要再次被肯定——神之惡性循環
2.無法從“becoming”中抽象出“Being”,“Being”必須同樣匯入“becoming”之中;因此“Being”,也就是被肯定者,必須重新進入永恆輪回,小輪回嵌套在大輪迴裡,因此要被再次肯定和差異化
3.肯定之肯定同時發揮了篩選的作用;所有無法被一再肯定意願的、所有虛無凝結者都將在永恆輪回中消亡;因此只有能被肯定,並且其肯定能一再被肯定的事物才能留存在輪迴中。
AI translated the non-English passages; original English passages are preserved. The mixed-language original is available under Original.
Nietzsche’s critique of the subject–predicate relation is not a critique of its truth or validity, but of its original motivation. Aristotle, for example, already recognizes that certain subjects and predicates are essentially and necessarily connected, with not merely a one-way dependence but a mutual dependence. Yet the fact that subject–predicate syntax permits such expression does not mean its motivation is ‘good.’ If you know that such essentially interdependent subject–predicate relations exist, why still split them into subject and predicate? What kind of moral spirit drives the expansion of this syntax?
Ressentiment: treating difference as an enemy to be eliminated. Difference is primary, so ressentiment is a passive reaction to difference. The strong do not resent, because they actively produce and affirm difference rather than eliminate it. They impose their will not to eliminate the material receiving that will, but to create and change its form. The politics of ressentiment treats political objects as homogenized binary camps and takes the elimination of one by the other as its final goal. This goal is simultaneously regarded as absolutely good. The critique of the politics of ressentiment rests on two grounds: one is the Nietzschean esteem for master morality and affirmation of the politics of the strong, an ethical ground; the other is the untruth of this politics, because the political world is not essentially a binary struggle in which one camp eliminates the other, an ontological ground. A critique of nationalist or racist politics of ressentiment can therefore focus on two points: the weakness of those who resent, or the fact that ressentiment is manipulated and incited and cannot resolve political problems. We can thus criticize intolerance and hegemony as fear of one’s own weakness, or criticize means such as genocide as plunder incited by leaders that does nothing to improve the political situation of ordinary participants. Violence in the politics of ressentiment is destructive and negative, not creative and affirmative. Resentful violence does not create subjectivity, nor is it violence aimed at conquering or competing for something good—‘this is good; I desire it.’ It begins from ugliness and weakness to defile the good: ‘you must be as ugly as I am, or even uglier’; ‘if I cannot have it, neither can you.’ The two forms of ressentiment: violent ressentiment, the destruction of the good, or self-mutilation; deceptive ressentiment, the dissolution of difference, or self-attachment.
The last man sacrifices all things for something, Overman sacrifices all things for the all.
Perhaps I can finally state my position on suffering simply.
Suffering is the human destiny. If this is true, as I believe it is, then different modes of existence also have their own destinies. Since it is destiny, we cannot demand that those not yet called by it understand it. What kind of person receives what kind of calling requires judgment and examination. A deficiency of judgment appears when the content of this synthetic process is mistaken or its scope insufficiently precise. We must be especially careful with expressions such as ‘everyone.’ Everyone certainly suffers, so when we say ‘everyone ought to look at suffering,’ we can only mean ‘everyone ought to look at a particular kind of suffering’; otherwise we are saying nothing. Yet is the ‘particular suffering’ everyone looks at not precisely the cheapest, most kitschy, most vulgar? ‘Great things for the great, abysses for the profound, delicacy and shuddering for the sensitive; in sum, precious things are for precious people.’
Conversely, if we acknowledge suffering as the human destiny, we cannot escape it. We cannot pretend there is some place without suffering, containing only romantic ‘adventures’ as smooth as a trip through the market. Devaluing suffering means devaluing destiny, and also the will that pursues destiny. Valuing suffering expresses our valuation of the life that struggles and grows within it. We may pretend not to know that suffering is there, to rest briefly or keep ourselves alive, but we cannot pretend forever. Destiny cannot be stopped.
Simply put, one’s attitude toward suffering is one’s attitude toward destiny. To love suffering—not to aestheticize ‘suffering’!—is to love destiny; it is eros itself. Amor fati is eros.
The portrait of the Last Man
He is indifferent to anything, his life is reduced to bare existence, because he believes and is always busy at confirming this is really so, by confirming the unchangeability of things, that the system is complete and the perfect. This means he’s busy at conserving himself, he is willing to sacrifice everything for just one single comfort, that he is the final, ultimate truth. He is indifferent to anything, nothing makes a difference to him because he believes he has secured the essential thing. Even if what he used to believe so dearly, even God, the unconditional truth par excellence, may be sacrificed, he still believes there must be something out there that secures his current life which is no better than dead. This something could be anything, no matter a TV program, a chic song, a popcorn blockbuster or a piece of knowledge. He just needs something to hang him over there whiling away. But he necessarily fails since nothing can fill his lack. He’s only fantasizing about his fulfillment and he always needs a placeholder for his fantasy, God, Philosophy, Talk Show, Revolution......
Who is the Übermensch?
Overman is always not satisfied. But he never fails: he wants to do it wrong in order to do it again and again. He conserves himself only to spend it later at a more rapid and precipitous challenge. He doesn’t worry about losing what he has since he knows from the start he doesn’t want to keep it at all. He gives and asks for no return: since he is too high above to desire things none could give him back. He is not indifferent even when he affirms everything: he affirms because he desires the good and wants it to return forever and ever in everything. He destroys what’s bad and sick but not totally, only to discipline those under his pleasure. He approves of difference and domination: he chases after Talk Show, Philosophy, Music, even God, not because he wants to remain indifferent and objective as long as security allows, viz to find a new master after the old one is failing; but to kill the old with the new and kill the new with the newer; to let the forces run through him and activates, again and again and again......
Letzte Menschen und Übermenschen
The last man is the inverted image of the Overman, just like the ape and Zarathustra. With the same phenomenon, the same text, we could have arrived at two interpretations: that of the last man and that of Overman. The last man babbles about morality and(!) immorality, stability, truth. Overman has passed through morality, beyond good and evil, and no longer intends to be either moral or immoral. He becomes too great to be discussed in these terms. Would we talk of God if he sins or not? Is God moral? Overman is artistic, creative, and genetic: he’s beyond the origin, the forgotten future, the Promise. Thus even if we look at the Last Man and the Overman and judge them exactly doing the same thing, their motivations are completely different: one wants to conserve himself, one wants to spend himself.
Christianity
Christianity asks all to spend everything and passes down the teaching of a higher Being; this is a contradiction in terms. If there’s something higher, one must not make do with everything for the sake of that, since it would stop being higher at that very moment. One should instead try everything to mark that something higher. Christianity has nurtured the possibility of Overman and destroyed its soil at the same time: one could reach higher and look further, but is imprisoned and mutilated. The unconditional good waters down everything to the same plane and the only security left is this Omnipotence. When this Omnipotence called God is failing in power we substitute it with Science, Hegelianism, Humanity so on so forth. This is exactly the consequence of Christian teaching, the teaching of the unconditional and the truth: we are mutilated by the unconditional, and have to lean on the staff it parsimoniously offers. When we can’t beat it, we thought we could join it or make a truce with it to stay alive for a while, but that only kept us sick. A make-shift choice: death or disease. Lured into this trap, what could be expected other than Chance, Strength, Promise, a Messiah as Zarathustra?
The new world of the affirmation of affirmation.
A few ways of grasping this: 1. Affirmation and difference produce ‘becoming.’ Yet if this becoming itself is to be continually willed, it needs to be affirmed and differentiated again; this higher affirmation must itself be affirmed again—the vicious circle of God.
2. ‘Being’ cannot be abstracted from ‘becoming’; Being must also flow into becoming. Being, that is, what is affirmed, must therefore reenter eternal return. Smaller returns are nested within greater returns, and must therefore be affirmed and differentiated again.
3. The affirmation of affirmation also performs a selection. Everything that cannot be repeatedly affirmed and willed, every congealment of nothingness, will perish in eternal return. Only things that can be affirmed, and whose affirmation can repeatedly be affirmed, can therefore remain in the return.
非中文段落由 AI 翻译,中文原文保持不变。中英混合原稿可通过“原文”按钮查看。
尼采对主谓关系的批判并不是对其真实有效性的批判,而是对其原始动机的批判。像亚里士多德早就意识到了有些主词和谓词是本质上必然联系在一起的,彼此之间甚至不仅仅存在单向依赖性,而是双向依赖的。但主谓关系的句法允许这样的表达不代表其在动机上是“好”的。因为既然你知道有这样的本质上互相依赖的主谓关系,为什么还要把它拆成主与谓呢?是一种什么样的道德精神在驱动这一种句法的扩张?
怨恨:将差异视作待消灭的敌人。差异是第一性的,怨恨因此是对差异的被动反应。强者不怨恨,因为强者不是消灭差异,而是主动制造差异,肯定差异。强者施加自己的意志不是为了消灭承受意志的质料,而是为了创造并改变质料的形式。怨恨的政治将政治对象视作同质化的二元论阵营,并将一方对另一方的消灭视作最终目标;同时,这个目标被认为是绝对善好的。对怨恨的政治的批判基于两个理由:一个是尼采式的对主人道德的推崇,对强者政治的认同,这是伦理学意义上的;一个是怨恨政治的非真实性,也就是政治世界的本质并非是二元阵营的一方消灭另一方,这是本体论意义上的。对民族主义或者种族主义的怨恨政治批判因此可以有两处着眼点:一是诉诸怨恨者的软弱,二是诉诸怨恨本身是受蛊惑煽动而无力解决政治问题的事实。因此我们可以批判无容忍和霸权实际上是对自身软弱的恐惧,也可以批判种族屠杀等手段是由领袖煽动进行的掠夺而无助于其普遍参与者的政治处境。暴力在怨恨政治中的使用并非创造式、肯定式的,而是摧毁式、否定式的。怨恨的暴力并不是创造主体性的暴力,也不是为了征服或争夺善好(“这个很好,我欲求它”)的暴力,而是从丑恶和软弱出发的对善好的玷污(“你必须和我一样丑恶,甚至变得比我更丑恶”“我得不到你也别想得到”)。怨恨的两种形态:暴力的怨恨,即对善好的摧毁,或自戕;欺骗的怨恨,即对差异的消解,或自执。
末人为某物牺牲一切,超人为全体牺牲一切。
或许终于可以简单地表述对苦难这个问题的立场了。
苦难是人的命运;如果这是真的(我相信这是真的),那各存在样态也各有各自的命运。既然是命运,那必然不能要求还未受其呼召的人去理解这种命运。什么样的人受什么样的呼召,这要求判断和审视。判断力不足的表现,就是这样的综合过程其内容发生谬误或者其覆盖范围不够准确:尤其要小心“所有人”这样的用法;所有人当然都有苦难,那当我们说“所有人都应该去看苦难”的时候,我们只可能意味着“所有人都应该去看某一种特定的苦难”,否则就是在说一句废话;可是所有人都去看的“特定的苦难”难道不正是最廉价、最刻奇、最媚俗的?“伟大的事物留给伟大的人,深渊留给深刻的人,细微和战栗留给敏感的人;总而言之,珍贵之物是留给珍贵之人的。”
但相反,假如我们承认,苦难是人的命运;那我们就不可能去逃脱苦难。我们不能假装仿佛有一个地方是没有苦难,只有浪漫的、菜市场般顺滑的“冒险经历”的;对苦难的贬值意味着命运的贬值,也意味着追逐命运的意志的贬值。对苦难的估值就代表了对在苦难当中挣扎、生长的生命的估值。尽管我们可以假装不知道那里有苦难,为了短暂地休息、为了让自己活下去,但我们不能永远这样假装;命运是无法阻挡的。
简而言之,对苦难的态度就是对命运的态度。爱苦难(并不是审美“苦难”!)就是爱命运;就是爱欲本身。amor fati就是eros。
末人的肖像
他对任何东西都漠不关心,他的生命被缩减为赤裸的存在,因为他相信事情确实如此,并且总是忙于通过确认事物的不可改变性、确认系统的完备与完美,来证实这一点。这意味着他忙于保存自己,愿意牺牲一切,只为一个单一的慰藉:他就是最后的、终极的真理。他对任何东西都漠不关心,没有什么对他造成差异,因为他相信自己已经确保了最本质的东西。即便他曾无比珍视的信仰,甚至神——最典型的无条件真理——也可以被牺牲,他依旧相信必定有什么东西存在于外面,保障着他当下这不比死亡更好的生命。这某物可以是任何东西,无论是一个电视节目、一首时髦的歌、一部爆米花大片,还是一条知识。他只需要某种东西把自己悬在那里,消磨时光。但他必然失败,因为没有什么能填补他的匮乏。他只是在幻想自己的充实,并且总是需要一个幻想的占位符:神、哲学、脱口秀、革命……
谁是超人?
超人总是不满足。但他从不失败:他想把事情做错,好一遍又一遍地重做。他保存自己,只为后来在更迅疾、更险峻的挑战中耗费自己。他不担心失去所拥有的,因为他从一开始就知道自己根本不想保留它。他给予而不求回报:因为他高得太远,不会欲求那些无人能回报给他的东西。即便他肯定一切,他也并非漠不关心:他肯定,是因为他欲求善,并希望善在一切之中永远归来。他毁灭恶劣与病态的东西,却不彻底毁灭,只为训诫那些受他欢愉支配的东西。他赞同差异与支配:他追逐脱口秀、哲学、音乐,甚至神,并不是因为他想在安全所允许的范围内保持漠然与客观,也就是在旧主人衰落后寻找一个新主人;而是为了用新者杀死旧者,再用更新者杀死新者;让诸力流过自身,并一次又一次地激活……
末人与超人
末人是超人的倒像,就像猿猴与查拉图斯特拉一样。面对同一个现象、同一个文本,我们本可以达到两种解读:末人的解读与超人的解读。末人喋喋不休地谈论道德与(!)不道德、稳定、真理。超人已经穿越道德,越出善恶,不再打算成为道德的或不道德的。他变得过于伟大,无法再用这些词语讨论。我们会讨论神是否犯罪吗?神是道德的吗?超人是艺术性的、创造性的、生成性的:他超越起源、被遗忘的未来、许诺。因此,即便我们看着末人与超人,判断他们做的完全是同一件事,他们的动机也截然不同:一个想保存自己,一个想耗费自己。
Christianity
基督教要求所有人耗费一切,却又传下一个更高存在者的教诲;这在措辞上是矛盾的。如果有某种更高者,人就不能为了它而将就一切,因为就在那一刻,它便不再更高。相反,人应当尝试一切,来标明那个更高者。基督教培育了超人的可能性,却同时毁坏了它的土壤:人本可以攀得更高、看得更远,却被囚禁、被残损。无条件的善把一切冲淡到同一个平面,唯一剩下的保障就是这一全能。当这一被称为神的全能力量衰落时,我们就用科学、黑格尔主义、人性等等来替代它。这恰恰是基督教教诲的后果,是关于无条件者与真理的教诲的后果:我们被无条件者残损,只能倚靠它吝啬地提供的手杖。当我们无法击败它时,我们以为可以加入它,或者与它休战,好再活一阵;但这只让我们继续病下去。一个权宜的选择:死亡或疾病。被诱入这个陷阱之后,除了机遇、力量、许诺,以及像查拉图斯特拉那样的弥赛亚,还能期待什么?
肯定之肯定的新世界。
幾個把握:1.肯定與差異產生了“becoming”,但是這個“becoming”本身如果要被不斷地意願,就需要被再次肯定並差異化,而這個高階的肯定本身又需要再次被肯定——神之惡性循環
2.無法從“becoming”中抽象出“Being”,“Being”必須同樣匯入“becoming”之中;因此“Being”,也就是被肯定者,必須重新進入永恆輪回,小輪回嵌套在大輪迴裡,因此要被再次肯定和差異化
3.肯定之肯定同時發揮了篩選的作用;所有無法被一再肯定意願的、所有虛無凝結者都將在永恆輪回中消亡;因此只有能被肯定,並且其肯定能一再被肯定的事物才能留存在輪迴中。