Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Republic · 理想国

The Irony of Plato’s Cave

Paper / 论文 · Date from document metadata / 日期据原稿文件信息 · Editorial title / 本版编拟标题

To fully grasp the significance of the cave imagery in Republic, it is utmost crucial to see first the irony contained in it. In this paper, I will pursue the question how is irony structured into this cave image? thus problematizing any easy interpretation of the cave imagery.

The cave allegory is ironical in its very being. First, we might question what is the function of this image. An easy answer might claim its function being to clarify the preceding exposition of the divided line. However, is not the divided line itself a clear exposition? Does Glaucon not say he understands and fully agrees with the exposition? So why is the cave imagery necessary? And, another problem with this interpretation is the fact that, after establishing the invisible and visible realm as being respectively clearer and obscurer in the previous section, is it still appropriate to clarify something via an image, which is branded as the obscurer? Under the attack of these two objections, the original interpretation cannot hold and has to be supplemented. First, it has to be established, that an image made in speech is not the same as an image in the visible realm. Second, it is also the case that in Republic, imagination is more ambiguous than the capacity to produce images; rather, it is more like a recognition of images being images, thus also recognizing the originals by virtue of which images are. By these standards, it seems reasonable now to say that the cave imagery can potentially further clarify the previous exposition, since it is an image in speech that can reflect the original. However, the irony remains, as the cave imagery is also said to be made “of our nature in its education and want of education”. That is, if the original is, in a certain way, known through the previous exposition, then what is the purpose of making an image now? Or does this image purport to be about something other than the previous exposition?

The passage is not short of irony even in its details. In 515d, Socrates describes the release and healing of one of the prisoners from his bonds. His exact wording is quoted here: “Now consider [...] what their release and healing from bonds and folly would be like if something of this sort were by nature to happen to them.” This sentence expresses a supposition. However, “by nature” is a very interesting phrase to be used in here, as it denotes a certain necessity and seems to go against the hypothetical nature of this scenario. Does Socrates mean that the event later described is to happen by outside necessity, or by those prisoners’ inherent nature? It seems that the former interpretation is confirmed later by the depiction of the released prisoner being “compelled to stand up” and go out. However, ambiguity still remains as this outside necessity does not seem universally applicable to everyone, but only pertains to that one particular prisoner being released. Other prisoners seem to have remained in the cave and are exempt from the compulsion to leave. Then is this outside necessity selective? The problem becomes even more difficult when we observe how at the end of this passage, the remaining prisoners ridicule the one who goes out that “he went up and came back with his eyes corrupted”, and claim that “it’s not even worth trying to go up”. In this new version, the prisoner seems to entertain the opportunity to “try” to get out of the cave out of his own motivation. The outside compulsion is no longer present.

Then, how do we reconcile these two accounts? Is it possible for the prisoner to be both under “natural” compulsion and yet out of his own “natural” inclination? Which “naturalness” is meant by Socrates at the start of this passage? I believe it to be crucial at this point to note that different stages are present in the allegory. At the beginning, the prisoner is said to be suffering pain when dragged into the sun for the first time, hence it would be no wonder that the prisoner has to be compelled, as it seems perfectly “natural” for human beings to avoid pain. Nevertheless, during his time outside, he gradually adjusts his eyes to the illumination and can progressively recognize shadows, phantoms, images, things and so on till he can finally encounter the sun, i.e. the light source, in itself. From here, his attitude changes from being “distressed” and “annoyed” to being “happy” about staying out there. And this shift of the attitude might also influence how he views his initiation. As he has finally seen the truth through the realm of light, he also recognizes himself as belonging to this realm of light. Now since he has accustomed himself, he no longer feels alien to truth, and accordingly that compulsive force is no longer foreign to him; rather, it has become part of himself, and has thus become his very nature. In this way, he stops viewing himself as being “dragged out” into the sun, but incorporates that external necessity into his self-knowledge: retroactively, he sees how this outside force really comes from his most immanent nature and thus belongs to himself. And from this interpretation, we might conclude that the seemingly ironical and self-contradictory remarks in Republic are least likely to be merely a negligence on Plato’s part, but are the very place where a deeper understanding might take root.

Just in the passing of my previous remark, another irony which is more susceptible to be overlooked is brought up. When talking about the adjustment of the eye to the sunlit realm, the progression of the seer’s eyesight culminates in that object through which everything is illuminated, i.e. the sun. It is said how the sun “itself by itself in its own region” can be made out. However, we certainly know to make out the sun itself by itself is a most reckless act: the sun, by virtue of its intensity and radiance, is blinding. No human being can behold the sun in its own region without feeling pain in the eye except for relatively short and extraordinary periods like sunrise or sunset. But sunrise and sunset are always mixed with the coming and going of night; it seems thus inappropriate to say that the sun is, during those times, in its own region of day.

It seems, then, Plato has something to express, but is at the same time withholding it. We should certainly not forget that the sun, in the discussion of the divided line, is said to be the offspring or the image of the good. In the cave imagery, the good seems to be not mentioned explicitly, but we do have reasons to suspect this analogy still holds. But analogy is always an ambiguous relationship. Can we say the good is also endangering to the soul as the sun is endangering to the eye? Considering the fact that the risk of looking directly at the sun is not brought up, is Plato (or Socrates?) not putting forward the good as worthy of pursuit, yet only implying at the same time the danger involved as well? This will largely depend on the interpretation, but is not at all unimportant.

Up to now in this paper, I have given three examples of ironies in the cave imagery. These examples follow a certain order of inverse progression, from its most general relationship with the surrounding text to a correspondence between the start and the end within the passage itself, and finally down to one minute detail. The purpose is to show how irony shapes this passage from head to toe and is interspersed to every dimension. And, I hope it is clear how the ironies are indispensable for readers to gain a more viable interpretation of the text, taking care with the rich ambiguity involved. Republic, so to speak, is not a philosophical treatise for a reason. Some nuances can only be expressed through the playful exchanges among interlocutors, and the ironical distance placed between the “dramatist” and the audience. Can we not say, though in a preliminary manner, that the irony is made use of strictly for the sake of ergon, for invoking deeds? By provoking the audience to participate in interpretation, is the audience not thus educated and aroused into the love of wisdom? And is Republic not a book portraying that very attempt of leading those interlocutors into philosophy?

By this interpretation, irony is that performative instrument for education. So is Republic itself: it is meant to be a challenge, a provocation, an eternal question mark.