Plato · 柏拉图
Republic · 理想国
The Irony of Plato’s Cave
Paper / 论文 · Date from document metadata / 日期据原稿文件信息 · Editorial title / 本版编拟标题
To fully grasp the significance of the cave imagery in Republic, it is utmost crucial to see first the irony contained in it. In this paper, I will pursue the question how is irony structured into this cave image? thus problematizing any easy interpretation of the cave imagery.
The cave allegory is ironical in its very being. First, we might question what is the function of this image. An easy answer might claim its function being to clarify the preceding exposition of the divided line. However, is not the divided line itself a clear exposition? Does Glaucon not say he understands and fully agrees with the exposition? So why is the cave imagery necessary? And, another problem with this interpretation is the fact that, after establishing the invisible and visible realm as being respectively clearer and obscurer in the previous section, is it still appropriate to clarify something via an image, which is branded as the obscurer? Under the attack of these two objections, the original interpretation cannot hold and has to be supplemented. First, it has to be established, that an image made in speech is not the same as an image in the visible realm. Second, it is also the case that in Republic, imagination is more ambiguous than the capacity to produce images; rather, it is more like a recognition of images being images, thus also recognizing the originals by virtue of which images are. By these standards, it seems reasonable now to say that the cave imagery can potentially further clarify the previous exposition, since it is an image in speech that can reflect the original. However, the irony remains, as the cave imagery is also said to be made “of our nature in its education and want of education”. That is, if the original is, in a certain way, known through the previous exposition, then what is the purpose of making an image now? Or does this image purport to be about something other than the previous exposition?
The passage is not short of irony even in its details. In 515d, Socrates describes the release and healing of one of the prisoners from his bonds. His exact wording is quoted here: “Now consider [...] what their release and healing from bonds and folly would be like if something of this sort were by nature to happen to them.” This sentence expresses a supposition. However, “by nature” is a very interesting phrase to be used in here, as it denotes a certain necessity and seems to go against the hypothetical nature of this scenario. Does Socrates mean that the event later described is to happen by outside necessity, or by those prisoners’ inherent nature? It seems that the former interpretation is confirmed later by the depiction of the released prisoner being “compelled to stand up” and go out. However, ambiguity still remains as this outside necessity does not seem universally applicable to everyone, but only pertains to that one particular prisoner being released. Other prisoners seem to have remained in the cave and are exempt from the compulsion to leave. Then is this outside necessity selective? The problem becomes even more difficult when we observe how at the end of this passage, the remaining prisoners ridicule the one who goes out that “he went up and came back with his eyes corrupted”, and claim that “it’s not even worth trying to go up”. In this new version, the prisoner seems to entertain the opportunity to “try” to get out of the cave out of his own motivation. The outside compulsion is no longer present.
Then, how do we reconcile these two accounts? Is it possible for the prisoner to be both under “natural” compulsion and yet out of his own “natural” inclination? Which “naturalness” is meant by Socrates at the start of this passage? I believe it to be crucial at this point to note that different stages are present in the allegory. At the beginning, the prisoner is said to be suffering pain when dragged into the sun for the first time, hence it would be no wonder that the prisoner has to be compelled, as it seems perfectly “natural” for human beings to avoid pain. Nevertheless, during his time outside, he gradually adjusts his eyes to the illumination and can progressively recognize shadows, phantoms, images, things and so on till he can finally encounter the sun, i.e. the light source, in itself. From here, his attitude changes from being “distressed” and “annoyed” to being “happy” about staying out there. And this shift of the attitude might also influence how he views his initiation. As he has finally seen the truth through the realm of light, he also recognizes himself as belonging to this realm of light. Now since he has accustomed himself, he no longer feels alien to truth, and accordingly that compulsive force is no longer foreign to him; rather, it has become part of himself, and has thus become his very nature. In this way, he stops viewing himself as being “dragged out” into the sun, but incorporates that external necessity into his self-knowledge: retroactively, he sees how this outside force really comes from his most immanent nature and thus belongs to himself. And from this interpretation, we might conclude that the seemingly ironical and self-contradictory remarks in Republic are least likely to be merely a negligence on Plato’s part, but are the very place where a deeper understanding might take root.
Just in the passing of my previous remark, another irony which is more susceptible to be overlooked is brought up. When talking about the adjustment of the eye to the sunlit realm, the progression of the seer’s eyesight culminates in that object through which everything is illuminated, i.e. the sun. It is said how the sun “itself by itself in its own region” can be made out. However, we certainly know to make out the sun itself by itself is a most reckless act: the sun, by virtue of its intensity and radiance, is blinding. No human being can behold the sun in its own region without feeling pain in the eye except for relatively short and extraordinary periods like sunrise or sunset. But sunrise and sunset are always mixed with the coming and going of night; it seems thus inappropriate to say that the sun is, during those times, in its own region of day.
It seems, then, Plato has something to express, but is at the same time withholding it. We should certainly not forget that the sun, in the discussion of the divided line, is said to be the offspring or the image of the good. In the cave imagery, the good seems to be not mentioned explicitly, but we do have reasons to suspect this analogy still holds. But analogy is always an ambiguous relationship. Can we say the good is also endangering to the soul as the sun is endangering to the eye? Considering the fact that the risk of looking directly at the sun is not brought up, is Plato (or Socrates?) not putting forward the good as worthy of pursuit, yet only implying at the same time the danger involved as well? This will largely depend on the interpretation, but is not at all unimportant.
Up to now in this paper, I have given three examples of ironies in the cave imagery. These examples follow a certain order of inverse progression, from its most general relationship with the surrounding text to a correspondence between the start and the end within the passage itself, and finally down to one minute detail. The purpose is to show how irony shapes this passage from head to toe and is interspersed to every dimension. And, I hope it is clear how the ironies are indispensable for readers to gain a more viable interpretation of the text, taking care with the rich ambiguity involved. Republic, so to speak, is not a philosophical treatise for a reason. Some nuances can only be expressed through the playful exchanges among interlocutors, and the ironical distance placed between the “dramatist” and the audience. Can we not say, though in a preliminary manner, that the irony is made use of strictly for the sake of ergon, for invoking deeds? By provoking the audience to participate in interpretation, is the audience not thus educated and aroused into the love of wisdom? And is Republic not a book portraying that very attempt of leading those interlocutors into philosophy?
By this interpretation, irony is that performative instrument for education. So is Republic itself: it is meant to be a challenge, a provocation, an eternal question mark.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
要充分把握《理想国》中洞穴意象的意义,首先看清其中所包含的反讽至关重要。本文将追问:反讽是如何被构造进这个洞穴意象中的?由此,对洞穴意象的任何轻易解读都将成为问题。
洞穴寓言在其存在本身中就是反讽的。首先,我们可以问:这一意象的功能是什么?一个轻易的回答或许会说,它的功能是澄清此前关于分线的阐述。然而,分线本身难道不已经是清楚的阐述了吗?格劳孔不是说,他理解并完全赞同这一阐述吗?那么,为什么还需要洞穴意象?而且,这种解释还面临另一个问题:上一部分既已把不可见领域与可见领域分别确立为更清晰与更晦暗的领域,那么,通过被归为更晦暗之物的意象来澄清什么,还合适吗?在这两项反驳的攻击下,原有解释无法成立,必须得到补充。首先,必须明确,在言说中制作的意象,不同于可见领域中的图像。其次,《理想国》中的想象,也比制造图像的能力更为暧昧;它更像是认出图像之为图像,从而也认出图像凭之而存在的原本。按照这些标准,现在说洞穴意象有可能进一步澄清此前的阐述,似乎是合理的,因为它是言说中能够反映原本的意象。然而,反讽仍然存在,因为洞穴意象又被说成是“关于我们在受教育与未受教育状态下的本性”的意象。也就是说,如果原本已经通过先前的阐述以某种方式得到认识,那么,现在制作意象又有什么目的?还是说,这一意象意在讨论不同于此前阐述的东西?
即使在细节上,这一段落也不乏反讽。在515d,苏格拉底描述一名囚徒如何被解除束缚并得到治愈。他的原话是:“现在考虑一下……如果此类事情依自然而发生在他们身上,他们从束缚与愚昧中得到释放和治愈,会是什么样子。”这句话表达了一种假设。然而,“依自然”用在这里十分有趣,因为它指向某种必然性,似乎与这一情境的假设性质相违背。苏格拉底是说,随后描述的事件会由于外在的必然性而发生,还是由于那些囚徒内在的本性而发生?后来,被释放的囚徒被描绘为“被迫站起”并走出去,这似乎确认了前一种解释。然而,歧义仍然存在,因为这一外在必然性似乎并不普遍适用于每一个人,而只涉及那个被释放的特定囚徒。其他囚徒似乎仍留在洞穴中,不受离开的强迫。那么,这种外在必然性是有选择性的吗?当我们注意到这一段的结尾时,问题变得更加困难:留下的囚徒嘲笑走出去的人,说“他上去了一趟,回来时眼睛却坏了”,并声称“甚至不值得尝试上去”。在这个新版本中,囚徒似乎拥有一种机会,可以出于自己的动机,“尝试”走出洞穴。外在的强迫不再出现。
那么,我们如何调和这两种说法?囚徒是否可能既受到“自然的”强迫,又同时出于自己的“自然”倾向?苏格拉底在这一段开头所指的,是哪一种“自然性”?我认为,此时至关重要的是注意到,寓言中存在不同的阶段。最初,囚徒第一次被拖到阳光下时,被说成是痛苦的;因此,他必须受到强迫并不奇怪,因为人逃避痛苦似乎是完全“自然的”。然而,在外面的时间里,他逐渐让双眼适应光照,逐步辨认出影子、幻象、图像、事物等等,直到最后能够面对太阳本身,即光源本身。于是,他的态度从“痛苦”和“烦恼”,转变为因留在外面而感到“快乐”。这种态度的转变,也可能影响他对自己最初启蒙过程的看法。当他终于通过光明的领域看见了真理,他也认出自己属于这一光明领域。既然已经习惯了这一领域,他就不再觉得真理是陌生的,相应地,那种强迫性的力量对他也不再是外来的;相反,它已成为他自身的一部分,因而成为他的本性本身。这样,他便不再把自己看作被“拖出”到太阳底下,而是把那种外在必然性纳入自我认识:回溯地看,他发现这一外在力量其实来自自己最为内在的本性,因此属于自己。由这一解读,我们或许可以得出结论:《理想国》中那些看似反讽而自相矛盾的话,最不可能仅仅是柏拉图的疏忽;它们恰恰是更深入的理解可能扎根之处。
方才的评论在不经意间,又引出了另一种更容易被忽视的反讽。谈到眼睛适应阳光照耀的领域时,观看者视力的进展,最终抵达那个使一切得到照明的对象,即太阳。据说,人能够辨认太阳“在其自身领域中、它自身就其自身”的样子。然而,我们当然知道,要辨认太阳自身就其自身,是一种极为鲁莽的行为:太阳凭借它的强度与光辉,会使人目盲。除了日出日落这样相对短暂而特殊的时段之外,没有人能注视太阳自身的领域,而不感到眼睛疼痛。但日出日落总与黑夜的来临和离去混合在一起;因此,说这些时刻的太阳处在它自己的白昼领域中,似乎又不合适。
那么,柏拉图似乎有某种东西要表达,却又同时把它保留下来、不予明说。我们当然不应忘记,在分线的讨论中,太阳被说成是善的后裔或图像。洞穴意象中似乎并未明确提及善,但我们确有理由怀疑,这一类比仍然成立。然而,类比总是一种暧昧的关系。我们能否说,善也会危及灵魂,正如太阳会危及眼睛?考虑到直视太阳的风险并未被提出,柏拉图——还是苏格拉底?——难道不正是在把善呈现为值得追求的东西,同时又仅仅暗示其中涉及的危险吗?这一点很大程度上取决于解读,却绝非无关紧要。
到目前为止,本文给出了洞穴意象中反讽的三个例子。它们遵循某种逆向推进的次序:从这一段落与周围文本最为一般的关系,到段落内部开头与结尾之间的对应,最后深入一个细微的细节。其目的是表明,反讽从头到尾塑造着这一段落,并散布于每一个维度。我也希望已经说明,要使读者获得一种更站得住脚的文本解读,并谨慎对待其中丰富的歧义,反讽是不可或缺的。可以说,《理想国》之所以不是一部哲学论著,是有缘故的。某些微妙之处,只能通过对话者之间游戏般的往来,以及“剧作家”与观众之间被设置的反讽距离,才能表达出来。我们是否可以初步地说,反讽之所以被使用,严格说来是为了ergon,为了唤起行动?通过激发观众参与解读,观众难道不正由此受到教育,被唤醒而去爱智慧吗?《理想国》难道不正是一部描绘这种尝试的书,即把那些对话者引向哲学的尝试?
按照这一解读,反讽就是那种用于教育的施行性工具。《理想国》本身亦然:它意在成为一个挑战,一种激发,一个永恒的问号。