Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Philebus · 斐勒布

Undated 未注日期

Desire to Truth

Reflections · Pages

All desires are desires to happiness. This needs no further elucidation as the foundation of ethics. Yet it seems not so clear as how desire to happiness comes to be equated to a desire to truth. What is essentially in truth that seems to make it the core, or even the essence, of happiness?

One possible answer is that, truth is but a means to the pursuit of happiness. This is most evident in the role played by technological knowledge. Technological knowledge is nothing but an understanding of the world that helps humanity establish an hospitable environment within a presumedly hostile nature. We build shelters with architectural knowledge, and are benefitted by other changes brought about by technological advances, which we moderns would like to call components of “progress”. Yet this cannot be the most essential meaning we attribute to truth when we say truth is happiness. For one thing, technological advances seem not satisfy every desire as some ideologues have promised. Rather, a lot of the unnecessary needs and desires fostered by technological expansion make modernity an especially unhappy time. How many nostalgic men and women have been so distressed as to convince themselves to an aura from the good old days? Moreover, we often tend to think that technological advances have nothing to do with our spiritual needs but only tend to our most basic, material necessities, whether bodily or practically, though the truth of this statement is better left undecided. In a word, the desire to truth as the desire to happiness describes a much more profound relationship than what the common conception of technological progress can permit.

If we resort to Plato and Aristotle, the question seems less resolved than sharpened. In various places Plato has treated the problem of happiness and truth in relation to another integral element in the problematic: pleasure. What he has to say on this issue, it will suffice if I only draw an outline here, seems to me mysterious and ambivalent. There is no question that truth should be weighed over against pleasure as intrinsically more valuable: he speaks of truth, or thoughtfulness, as a “second prize” in Philebus. Yet his reason is too manyfold and convoluted. I will only try to convey some main arguments I think he is making. First, since pleasure, or a debased kind of it, is always inevitably involved with pain, avoiding pain implicates avoiding pleasure as well. Yet this does not directly support the superiority of truth over pleasure, for a life of thoughtfulness devoid of pleasure seems as well unacceptable. For that, to consider a thoughtful life worthier of being lived, the thoughtful life itself must generate or be accompanied by some kind of pleasure; yet this pleasure has to be strictly differentiated from any other kind of pleasure that is to be criticized. As the matter stands, Plato decides, no doubt influenced by his Pythagorean heritage, that a pleasure is produced when the mixed pleasure and pain agree on a certain ratio. What he calls the “ratio” he also calls the “limit” or the “one”, though it seems still to be determined if the ratio is only a product of the mixing of one with many, or is itself the one. On the other hand, pleasure and pain as a pair is called the indeterminate dyad. This seemingly logistical account is not so inscrutable if we accept how for Aristotle even the sense organs, in their beings, are simply ratios.

For people already living in an age ruled by mathematical physics, this worldview is not altogether unfamiliar. And for people already steeped in some modern-day psychology theories influenced by psychoanalysis, the idea that pain and pleasure can interpenetrate each other to an astounding degree is not uncalled for. And it makes sense for us to say that since every pleasure is, to some extent, an excitation for our soul to suffer, what matters really is how pleasure and pain are mixed, and not their qualitative purity. Of course, this is also based on the observation that pleasure and pain, no matter how intricately involved, are qualitatively two different things. Otherwise, we might speak of a spectrum on which pleasure can transition to pain, and vice versa.

When we read books or watch a tragedy, inevitably we feel both pain and pleasure. Yet the fact is, these feelings and excitations of the soul are regulated in a harmonious way so that we feel neither repelled nor elated. In other words, we maintain a “good sense”. This good sense, as Aristotle would say, is much nobler than an excessive feeling. Pleasure and pain are thus the material for a governing good sense, and excessive pleasure is never the end goal of the pursuit.

At this point, the focus of the discussion is re-centered. First we introduced a different kind of pleasure, and it turned out to be something entirely different from pleasure that is always yoked together with pain. And this pleasure is goodness.

Goodness is set apart from the dyad of pain and pleasure, and for a good reason. It is well acknowledged that even if something is painful, as long as it is good, it is worth pursuing. However, we have to ask, is goodness a kind of elevated pleasure, a pleasure purified of pain? Or is goodness something totally independent of pain and pleasure?

Plato is ambivalent on this point. At times, like in Republic, he seems to say that what wisdom has to offer is a pure pleasure. Yet at other times, he seems to insinuate a possibility of a divine intelligence contemplating its own good without joy or bitterness. As for Aristotle, he seems to be more tolerant of pleasure and does speak of a pleasure derived from contemplation. Despite the ambivalences, a new dimension is introduced for our consideration: the mortal and the divine.

Most of the time, when we speak of a desire for happiness, we speak of our humanly existence. Gods and the divine, good as they are, can never desire happiness. Without desire, there is no pleasure and pain produced by reaching out for something else. Thus, Plato would ask, do gods feel pleased if they do not need pleasure?

Pleasure is not needed for pleasure comes from the outside, and is an excitation of the soul. For gods and the divine, all good is immanent and thus any possibility of being pleased is obliterated. In this sense, it is not wrong to deduce that pleasure and pain are entirely excluded from goodness, of which gods are the representatives. However, if we assume that even within the gods there is an immanent transcendence, or an immanent self-split, we can speak of a divine auto-erotism that pleases. This would be a divine pleasure that would be worlds apart from the human pleasure. And happiness cannot be aspired to without a desire, and desire necessitates an encounter with pleasure and pain. Thus, Plato, though ambivalent on the divine, is not hesitant to say that the mixed life of thoughtfulness and pleasure is the best life.

Yet our discussion seems to be assuming an identity between thoughtfulness and good. How can truth be identical to good, when we can meaningfully say we desire something “truly good”? Wouldn’t this common phrase seem tautological, once the identity is established?

This is an urgent issue, and it signifies a thorough shift in the way in which we think about truth. First, allow me to aver that, for Plato at least, truth is one. There are many truths and every truth can be meant in more than one sense, but ultimately what is true is what is eternally self-same, thus one. And let me relate this to another thesis: what is one is the Good. The second thesis is not so unbecoming if we consider how we require everything people choose to do to have a good reason. If something is only one and not any other, its necessity can only be grounded in its goodness. Contingency reveals only the irrational side of the world, and what is irrational is unharmonious with other components within the cosmos, and hence bad. For accustomed readers of classical tragedies or ardent believers of Nietzsche, this conception of truth seems strange and suspicious. Let’s speak of Oedipus Tyrannus. Wouldn’t Oedipus be immensely happier if he were denied his “unclever” desire to truth? To be sure, it remains a question whether it is his unrestrained desire to truth that ruins his fortune, or his arrogance and incontinence about his capabilities. It is also doubtful if he would be happier at all if he did not know the truth. These aside, the tragedy thoroughly reveals another side of the Janus’ face truth carries on its neck: what if truth is not good at all, but rather toxic and harmful?

Plato is not ignorant of this other possibility. Quite on the contrary, he speaks of the danger of truth all the time. The trial of Socrates, the blinding effect the Good could have, or his reservations on love and madness all speak resoundingly of that danger. Yet for him, this danger is not the reason at all to quit the pursuit of truth. Despite of the danger, or exactly because of it, mortals are to be spurred on the way to truth.

The desire to truth is inseparable from the human condition. Because there is always the danger to be led astray, the pursuit of truth obtains its utmost importance. As Heidegger quite succinctly puts it: the essence of truth is its untruth. Yet it is not to say that truth now becomes unessential or loses its essence to untruth, but that the need of the truth’s saving power is all the more urgent.

In the time we live in, it becomes a question, and Nietzsche is the first to formulate it: why do we desire truth, and not untruth? His clairvoyance is unparalleled on this issue. For this question of motivation seems uninitiated, or at least unguarded, in the hands of more and more professional seekers of truth. They have advanced too far in decoding the world to return and ask: why do we desire truth in the first place? And all the answers given are either superficial or ungrounded. However, we could attempt to give some proposals for the possibilities and examine each of them.

First proposal: we desire truth, for happiness is good, and good is one, thus truth. The statement that happiness is good is undebatable. What remains an issue is the equivalence between good and truth. This equivalence, as the undergone discussion makes clear, is mediated by oneness. However, for those who deny the superiority of oneness, a dilemma of relativism will ensue as the stage on which they battle against their enemies: a battle of Titans indeed.

Second proposal: we desire truth, for we simply desire. In this formulation, truth is but a feeding fuel for the incessant will to power. In this world view, truth is but a variant of untruth apart from untruth, and the desire for it is nothing but a manifestation of the will’s exertion. Yet it does not mean that truth is not privileged: truth is the claim to tyranny on universal nature. This is the counterpart to the first proposal, as here truth is not necessity, but contingence par excellence. The conception of truth as contingence, however, cannot gain purchase without a prior conception of contingent truth. Truth becomes contingent in modern times, largely as a consequence of the development of mathematical physics, as Klein so rightfully observes. In this sense, Nietzsche’s anti-modernism or post-modernism is itself prepared for by modern science, which is not a problem at all, considering one of his most famous works is named after Science.

The establishment of the contingence of truth leads to the modern nihilism, for people have lost the firm conviction that truth is married to happiness. As it is, the truth being conceived as one and only is but a manifestation of the desire to happiness, and there is no evidence whatsoever to say that there is only one truth. Much worse, it is not even self-evident that necessity invokes goodness, for the line between necessity and contingency is much too blurred. To be sure, the line has never been clear even in Plato’s days, yet the conviction sustains itself nonetheless. What Nietzsche’s reversal amounts to is a reversal of the poles on which the desire to happiness is centered: before him it is centered on necessary truth, and he turns it toward the contingent. He calls this reversal his “transvaluation”. What he sees is this simple fact: what is one cannot be one without the many. In terms of the talk on happiness, happiness is only achieved and maintained in transport. The state of happiness has to be opened up to its suffering. If not so, the corresponding experience is well known: it’s called boredom.

Essentially, what Plato and Nietzsche manage to see in each other (with Plato looking to his future, and Nietzsche to his past) is how the question of truth and happiness is still to be thought. And this thinking is weighing heavily on us.