Plato · 柏拉图
Philebus · 斐勒布
Undated 未注日期
Desire to Truth
Reflections · Pages
All desires are desires to happiness. This needs no further elucidation as the foundation of ethics. Yet it seems not so clear as how desire to happiness comes to be equated to a desire to truth. What is essentially in truth that seems to make it the core, or even the essence, of happiness?
One possible answer is that, truth is but a means to the pursuit of happiness. This is most evident in the role played by technological knowledge. Technological knowledge is nothing but an understanding of the world that helps humanity establish an hospitable environment within a presumedly hostile nature. We build shelters with architectural knowledge, and are benefitted by other changes brought about by technological advances, which we moderns would like to call components of “progress”. Yet this cannot be the most essential meaning we attribute to truth when we say truth is happiness. For one thing, technological advances seem not satisfy every desire as some ideologues have promised. Rather, a lot of the unnecessary needs and desires fostered by technological expansion make modernity an especially unhappy time. How many nostalgic men and women have been so distressed as to convince themselves to an aura from the good old days? Moreover, we often tend to think that technological advances have nothing to do with our spiritual needs but only tend to our most basic, material necessities, whether bodily or practically, though the truth of this statement is better left undecided. In a word, the desire to truth as the desire to happiness describes a much more profound relationship than what the common conception of technological progress can permit.
If we resort to Plato and Aristotle, the question seems less resolved than sharpened. In various places Plato has treated the problem of happiness and truth in relation to another integral element in the problematic: pleasure. What he has to say on this issue, it will suffice if I only draw an outline here, seems to me mysterious and ambivalent. There is no question that truth should be weighed over against pleasure as intrinsically more valuable: he speaks of truth, or thoughtfulness, as a “second prize” in Philebus. Yet his reason is too manyfold and convoluted. I will only try to convey some main arguments I think he is making. First, since pleasure, or a debased kind of it, is always inevitably involved with pain, avoiding pain implicates avoiding pleasure as well. Yet this does not directly support the superiority of truth over pleasure, for a life of thoughtfulness devoid of pleasure seems as well unacceptable. For that, to consider a thoughtful life worthier of being lived, the thoughtful life itself must generate or be accompanied by some kind of pleasure; yet this pleasure has to be strictly differentiated from any other kind of pleasure that is to be criticized. As the matter stands, Plato decides, no doubt influenced by his Pythagorean heritage, that a pleasure is produced when the mixed pleasure and pain agree on a certain ratio. What he calls the “ratio” he also calls the “limit” or the “one”, though it seems still to be determined if the ratio is only a product of the mixing of one with many, or is itself the one. On the other hand, pleasure and pain as a pair is called the indeterminate dyad. This seemingly logistical account is not so inscrutable if we accept how for Aristotle even the sense organs, in their beings, are simply ratios.
For people already living in an age ruled by mathematical physics, this worldview is not altogether unfamiliar. And for people already steeped in some modern-day psychology theories influenced by psychoanalysis, the idea that pain and pleasure can interpenetrate each other to an astounding degree is not uncalled for. And it makes sense for us to say that since every pleasure is, to some extent, an excitation for our soul to suffer, what matters really is how pleasure and pain are mixed, and not their qualitative purity. Of course, this is also based on the observation that pleasure and pain, no matter how intricately involved, are qualitatively two different things. Otherwise, we might speak of a spectrum on which pleasure can transition to pain, and vice versa.
When we read books or watch a tragedy, inevitably we feel both pain and pleasure. Yet the fact is, these feelings and excitations of the soul are regulated in a harmonious way so that we feel neither repelled nor elated. In other words, we maintain a “good sense”. This good sense, as Aristotle would say, is much nobler than an excessive feeling. Pleasure and pain are thus the material for a governing good sense, and excessive pleasure is never the end goal of the pursuit.
At this point, the focus of the discussion is re-centered. First we introduced a different kind of pleasure, and it turned out to be something entirely different from pleasure that is always yoked together with pain. And this pleasure is goodness.
Goodness is set apart from the dyad of pain and pleasure, and for a good reason. It is well acknowledged that even if something is painful, as long as it is good, it is worth pursuing. However, we have to ask, is goodness a kind of elevated pleasure, a pleasure purified of pain? Or is goodness something totally independent of pain and pleasure?
Plato is ambivalent on this point. At times, like in Republic, he seems to say that what wisdom has to offer is a pure pleasure. Yet at other times, he seems to insinuate a possibility of a divine intelligence contemplating its own good without joy or bitterness. As for Aristotle, he seems to be more tolerant of pleasure and does speak of a pleasure derived from contemplation. Despite the ambivalences, a new dimension is introduced for our consideration: the mortal and the divine.
Most of the time, when we speak of a desire for happiness, we speak of our humanly existence. Gods and the divine, good as they are, can never desire happiness. Without desire, there is no pleasure and pain produced by reaching out for something else. Thus, Plato would ask, do gods feel pleased if they do not need pleasure?
Pleasure is not needed for pleasure comes from the outside, and is an excitation of the soul. For gods and the divine, all good is immanent and thus any possibility of being pleased is obliterated. In this sense, it is not wrong to deduce that pleasure and pain are entirely excluded from goodness, of which gods are the representatives. However, if we assume that even within the gods there is an immanent transcendence, or an immanent self-split, we can speak of a divine auto-erotism that pleases. This would be a divine pleasure that would be worlds apart from the human pleasure. And happiness cannot be aspired to without a desire, and desire necessitates an encounter with pleasure and pain. Thus, Plato, though ambivalent on the divine, is not hesitant to say that the mixed life of thoughtfulness and pleasure is the best life.
Yet our discussion seems to be assuming an identity between thoughtfulness and good. How can truth be identical to good, when we can meaningfully say we desire something “truly good”? Wouldn’t this common phrase seem tautological, once the identity is established?
This is an urgent issue, and it signifies a thorough shift in the way in which we think about truth. First, allow me to aver that, for Plato at least, truth is one. There are many truths and every truth can be meant in more than one sense, but ultimately what is true is what is eternally self-same, thus one. And let me relate this to another thesis: what is one is the Good. The second thesis is not so unbecoming if we consider how we require everything people choose to do to have a good reason. If something is only one and not any other, its necessity can only be grounded in its goodness. Contingency reveals only the irrational side of the world, and what is irrational is unharmonious with other components within the cosmos, and hence bad. For accustomed readers of classical tragedies or ardent believers of Nietzsche, this conception of truth seems strange and suspicious. Let’s speak of Oedipus Tyrannus. Wouldn’t Oedipus be immensely happier if he were denied his “unclever” desire to truth? To be sure, it remains a question whether it is his unrestrained desire to truth that ruins his fortune, or his arrogance and incontinence about his capabilities. It is also doubtful if he would be happier at all if he did not know the truth. These aside, the tragedy thoroughly reveals another side of the Janus’ face truth carries on its neck: what if truth is not good at all, but rather toxic and harmful?
Plato is not ignorant of this other possibility. Quite on the contrary, he speaks of the danger of truth all the time. The trial of Socrates, the blinding effect the Good could have, or his reservations on love and madness all speak resoundingly of that danger. Yet for him, this danger is not the reason at all to quit the pursuit of truth. Despite of the danger, or exactly because of it, mortals are to be spurred on the way to truth.
The desire to truth is inseparable from the human condition. Because there is always the danger to be led astray, the pursuit of truth obtains its utmost importance. As Heidegger quite succinctly puts it: the essence of truth is its untruth. Yet it is not to say that truth now becomes unessential or loses its essence to untruth, but that the need of the truth’s saving power is all the more urgent.
In the time we live in, it becomes a question, and Nietzsche is the first to formulate it: why do we desire truth, and not untruth? His clairvoyance is unparalleled on this issue. For this question of motivation seems uninitiated, or at least unguarded, in the hands of more and more professional seekers of truth. They have advanced too far in decoding the world to return and ask: why do we desire truth in the first place? And all the answers given are either superficial or ungrounded. However, we could attempt to give some proposals for the possibilities and examine each of them.
First proposal: we desire truth, for happiness is good, and good is one, thus truth. The statement that happiness is good is undebatable. What remains an issue is the equivalence between good and truth. This equivalence, as the undergone discussion makes clear, is mediated by oneness. However, for those who deny the superiority of oneness, a dilemma of relativism will ensue as the stage on which they battle against their enemies: a battle of Titans indeed.
Second proposal: we desire truth, for we simply desire. In this formulation, truth is but a feeding fuel for the incessant will to power. In this world view, truth is but a variant of untruth apart from untruth, and the desire for it is nothing but a manifestation of the will’s exertion. Yet it does not mean that truth is not privileged: truth is the claim to tyranny on universal nature. This is the counterpart to the first proposal, as here truth is not necessity, but contingence par excellence. The conception of truth as contingence, however, cannot gain purchase without a prior conception of contingent truth. Truth becomes contingent in modern times, largely as a consequence of the development of mathematical physics, as Klein so rightfully observes. In this sense, Nietzsche’s anti-modernism or post-modernism is itself prepared for by modern science, which is not a problem at all, considering one of his most famous works is named after Science.
The establishment of the contingence of truth leads to the modern nihilism, for people have lost the firm conviction that truth is married to happiness. As it is, the truth being conceived as one and only is but a manifestation of the desire to happiness, and there is no evidence whatsoever to say that there is only one truth. Much worse, it is not even self-evident that necessity invokes goodness, for the line between necessity and contingency is much too blurred. To be sure, the line has never been clear even in Plato’s days, yet the conviction sustains itself nonetheless. What Nietzsche’s reversal amounts to is a reversal of the poles on which the desire to happiness is centered: before him it is centered on necessary truth, and he turns it toward the contingent. He calls this reversal his “transvaluation”. What he sees is this simple fact: what is one cannot be one without the many. In terms of the talk on happiness, happiness is only achieved and maintained in transport. The state of happiness has to be opened up to its suffering. If not so, the corresponding experience is well known: it’s called boredom.
Essentially, what Plato and Nietzsche manage to see in each other (with Plato looking to his future, and Nietzsche to his past) is how the question of truth and happiness is still to be thought. And this thinking is weighing heavily on us.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
一切欲望都是对幸福的欲望。作为伦理学的基础,这一点无须进一步阐明。但对幸福的欲望究竟如何等同于求真欲,似乎并不那么清楚。真理之中究竟有什么本质性的东西,使它显得是幸福的核心,甚至是幸福的本质?
一个可能的回答是,真理不过是追求幸福的手段。这在技术知识所扮演的角色中最为明显。技术知识无非是对世界的一种理解,帮助人类在一个被假定为敌对的自然中,建立宜居的环境。我们凭建筑知识修建居所,也受惠于技术进步带来的其他变化;我们这些现代人愿意把它们称作“进步”的组成部分。但当我们说真理就是幸福时,这不可能是我们赋予真理的最本质意义。首先,技术进步似乎并未像某些意识形态家所许诺的那样满足一切欲望。相反,技术扩张催生了许多不必要的需要和欲望,使现代性成为一个格外不幸福的时代。多少怀旧的男男女女如此苦恼,以至于说服自己相信美好旧日的灵光?而且,我们常常倾向于认为,技术进步与我们的精神需要无关,只照料最基本的物质必需,无论是身体上的还是实践上的,尽管这句话是否为真最好暂不裁定。总之,求真欲作为对幸福的欲望,描述的是一种远比技术进步的通常观念所能容许的更深刻的关系。
如果求助于柏拉图和亚里士多德,问题与其说得到了解决,不如说变得更尖锐了。柏拉图在许多地方,都是联系着这一问题结构中另一个不可或缺的要素——快乐——来处理幸福与真理的问题。关于他在这个问题上的论述,此处只勾勒一个轮廓就足够了;在我看来,它是神秘而暧昧的。毫无疑问,相较于快乐,真理因其内在价值更高而应更受重视:他在《斐勒布》中,把真理或思虑称作“第二等奖赏”。但他的理由太过多重而曲折。我只尝试传达我认为他提出的几个主要论证。首先,既然快乐,或某种低下的快乐,总是不可避免地与痛苦纠缠,那么避免痛苦也就意味着避免快乐。但这并不直接支持真理优于快乐,因为没有快乐的思虑生活似乎同样不可接受。因此,要认为思虑的生活更值得过,这种生活本身就必须产生某种快乐,或伴有某种快乐;但这种快乐又必须与其他受到批评的快乐严格区分。面对这种情况,柏拉图无疑受其毕达哥拉斯传统影响,判定当混合着的快乐与痛苦符合某种比例时,就产生了快乐。他所谓的“比例”,也被他称作“界限”或“一”,尽管仍须确定:比例究竟仅仅是一与多混合的产物,还是它本身就是一。另一方面,快乐与痛苦这一对被称作不定的二。这种看似算学式的解释,若我们接受亚里士多德甚至把感觉器官的存在本身都视为比例,也就不那么难以理解了。
对已经生活在数理物理学统治时代的人们来说,这种世界观并不全然陌生。对已经浸润于某些受精神分析影响的当代心理学理论的人们来说,痛苦与快乐能够彼此渗透到惊人程度的想法,也并非突如其来。我们说,既然每一种快乐在某种程度上都是灵魂所承受的一种刺激,那么真正重要的就是快乐与痛苦如何混合,而非它们在性质上的纯粹性,这也是说得通的。当然,这还基于一个观察:快乐与痛苦无论纠缠得多么复杂,在性质上仍是两种不同的东西。否则,我们或许会谈论一个谱系,快乐可以沿它转变成痛苦,反之亦然。
当我们读书或观看悲剧时,不可避免地同时感到痛苦和快乐。但事实是,灵魂的这些感受和激动受到和谐的调节,使我们既不厌拒,也不狂喜。换句话说,我们保持着一种“良好的感受”。如亚里士多德会说的,这种良好感受远比过度的感受高贵。因此,快乐与痛苦是那起统治作用的良好感受的质料,而过度的快乐从来不是追求的最终目的。
到这里,讨论的重心转移了。我们起初引入另一种快乐,结果它变成了与那总和痛苦捆在一起的快乐完全不同的东西。而这种快乐,就是善好。
善好被从痛苦与快乐的二元中区分出来,而且有充分的理由。众所周知,即使某事令人痛苦,只要它是好的,就值得追求。然而,我们必须问:善好是一种升华的快乐、一种剔除了痛苦的快乐吗?还是说,善好完全独立于痛苦与快乐?
柏拉图在这一点上是暧昧的。有时,比如在《理想国》中,他似乎说智慧所能给予的是纯粹的快乐。但在另一些时候,他似乎暗示了一种可能:神圣的理智不带喜悦或苦涩地观照自己的善好。至于亚里士多德,他似乎对快乐更为宽容,也确实谈到由观照而来的快乐。尽管有这些暧昧,一个新的维度还是被引入了我们的思考:凡人与神圣。
大多数时候,当我们谈论对幸福的欲望,谈论的是我们作为人的存在。诸神与神圣者,既然已经善好,就永远不可能欲求幸福。没有欲望,也就没有因伸向别的事物而产生的快乐与痛苦。因此,柏拉图会问:如果诸神不需要快乐,他们还会感到快乐吗?
不需要快乐,是因为快乐来自外部,是对灵魂的刺激。对诸神和神圣者来说,一切善好都是内在的,因而任何感到快乐的可能都被取消了。在这个意义上,推论快乐与痛苦完全被排除在善好之外,并没有错,而诸神就是善好的代表。然而,如果我们假定,即便诸神内部也存在一种内在超越性,或一种内在的自我分裂,那么我们就可以谈论一种带来快乐的神圣自体爱欲。这将是一种与人的快乐天差地别的神圣快乐。而没有欲望就无法渴求幸福,欲望又必然要求与快乐和痛苦相遇。因此,柏拉图虽然对神圣有所暧昧,却毫不犹豫地说,思虑与快乐混合的生活是最好的生活。
但我们的讨论似乎一直在假定思虑与善好的同一。如果我们还能有意义地说,我们欲求某种“真正好的”东西,那么真理怎么会与善好同一?一旦确立了这种同一,这句常见的话岂不显得是同义反复?
这是一个迫切的问题,它意味着我们思考真理的方式发生彻底转变。首先,请允许我断言,至少对柏拉图来说,真理是一。真理有很多,每一个真理都可以有不止一种意义,但最终,真的就是那永恒地自我同一的东西,因此是一。再让我把这点与另一个命题联系起来:一就是善。只要考虑到,我们要求人们选择做的每件事都有一个好的理由,第二个命题也就不那么不合适了。如果某物只是它这一个,而不是其他任何一个,那么它的必然性只能奠基于它的善好。偶然性只揭示世界非理性的一面,而非理性的东西与宇宙中的其他组成部分不和谐,因而是坏的。对熟读古典悲剧的人,或尼采的热烈信徒来说,这种真理观显得奇怪而可疑。就说《俄狄浦斯王》吧。如果俄狄浦斯那“不聪明”的求真欲被阻止了,他难道不会幸福得多吗?诚然,毁掉他命运的究竟是他不受限制的求真欲,还是他对自身能力的傲慢与无节制,仍是个问题。如果不知道真相,他究竟会不会更幸福,也值得怀疑。但撇开这些,悲剧彻底揭示了真理脖子上那副雅努斯面孔的另一面:如果真理根本不好,反而有毒、有害呢?
柏拉图并非不知道另一种可能。恰恰相反,他始终在谈真理的危险。苏格拉底的审判、善可能具有的致盲作用,或他对爱与迷狂的保留,都响亮地诉说这种危险。但对他来说,这种危险根本不是放弃追求真理的理由。尽管有危险,或者正因为有危险,凡人才应当被催促着走向真理。
求真欲与人的根本处境不可分。正因为始终有被引入歧途的危险,追求真理才获得其至高的重要性。正如海德格尔极为简洁地说的:真理的本质是其非真理。但这并不是说真理如今变得无关紧要,或将自己的本质丧失给非真理,而是说,对真理之拯救力量的需要更加迫切。
在我们生活的时代,这成了一个问题,而尼采首先把它表述出来:为什么我们欲求真理,而非非真理?在这个问题上,他的洞见无可比拟。因为在越来越多职业求真者手中,这个关于动机的问题似乎从未被提出,或者至少未受到防备。他们在解码世界的道路上走得太远,已经无法回头发问:我们起初为什么欲求真理?而给出的答案,要么肤浅,要么没有根据。但我们可以尝试提出几种可能,并逐一考察。
第一种提议:我们欲求真理,因为幸福是善的,善是一,因此是真理。幸福是善的,这句话无可争议。仍有问题的是善与真理的等同。如前面的讨论已经说明,这种等同由一性中介。然而,对那些否认一性之优越性的人来说,相对主义的困境就会随之而来,成为他们与敌人交战的舞台:这确实是一场泰坦之战。
第二种提议:我们欲求真理,因为我们就是欲求着。在这种表述中,真理不过是不断喂养权力意志的燃料。在这种世界观中,真理不过是从非真理中分化出来的一种非真理,而对它的欲望无非是意志施展自身的表现。但这并不意味着真理没有特权:真理是对普遍自然施行暴政的权利要求。这是第一种提议的对应面,因为这里的真理不是必然性,而是最典型的偶然性。然而,如果没有一个在先的关于偶然真理的概念,真理作为偶然性的观念便无从立足。正如克莱因准确指出的,真理在现代变得偶然,很大程度上是数理物理学发展的后果。在这个意义上,尼采的反现代主义或后现代主义本身,也由现代科学预备。这完全不是问题,毕竟他最著名的著作之一就是以科学命名的。
真理之偶然性的确立导向现代虚无主义,因为人们失去了真理与幸福结为一体的坚定确信。如此看来,把真理理解为唯一者,不过是对幸福的欲望的一种表现,没有任何证据能证明真理只有一个。更糟的是,甚至必然性会唤起善好这一点也并非自明,因为必然与偶然之间的界线太过模糊。诚然,即便在柏拉图的时代,这条界线也从未清楚,但那份确信仍然维持着自身。尼采的颠倒,归根结底是对幸福欲望之重心所在的两极进行颠倒:在他之前,它以必然的真理为中心,而他把它转向偶然者。他把这种颠倒称作自己的“价值重估”。他看到的只是这样一个简单事实:没有多,一就不可能是一。用幸福讨论的语言来说,幸福只能在迁转中达成并维持。幸福的状态必须向其承受的痛苦开放。否则,相应的经验我们早已熟知:它叫作无聊。
根本上,柏拉图与尼采能够在彼此那里看见的——柏拉图望向自己的未来,尼采望向自己的过去——就是:真理与幸福的问题仍有待思考。而这一思考正沉重地压在我们身上。