Plato · 柏拉图
Images, number, and the Good · 图像、数与善
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图像、数与善——散记
Reflections · Pages
在柏拉图将理念-现实的关系比作实物-镜像的关系的时候,我们必须追问在何种意义上这个类比是成立的:1.首先,关于时间,因为实物与镜像永远是在共时关系中的(假如我们姑且忽略物理科学与光的传播速度),我们能假设永恒理念与历时现实之间是一个“共时”关系吗?永恒与时间的“共时”是什么意思?2.柏拉图刻意地混淆了对镜子的“使用”与对镜像的“制作”,那是否可以说现实也是一种对理念的“使用”?这一可能在「蒂迈欧」里面已经被探索过了。3.镜像依托于镜子这一实物,那现实是否也有其所依托的理念?我觉得有,而这一解读将成为彻底沟通理念与物质世界的出发点。4.镜像是对现实性的单纯视觉化的精准“刻画”(也就是说,镜像除了其非现实性,其它方面皆与现实一模一样),可能否说现实与理念有同样的关系?我觉得不能。5.镜像仅仅充当着模仿性指示物的作用,但现代的艺术本身已经成为一种理念内容,这种情况下还能否将诗歌与艺术贬斥为对哲学的模仿?我觉得这一点比较含混,似乎不能给出任何普遍性的结论。
至于第一点,一个有趣的探索是我最近一直在思考的关于电影的本质。仅仅从摄影的切口来说,可以说在摄影中已经必然涵盖着一种时间性的颠倒,也就是在摄影中一个原型被指示,可是这个原型在时间上可能已经消失了,比如被拍摄的对象已经去世了,等等。这个原型本身已经“不存在”了。那在何种意义上可以说原型的实在性要超出于图像的实在性呢?难道说受时间影响的那种实在性与因果确证的那种实在性不一样吗?我觉得其实不是的。其实和我在「蒂迈欧」那篇论文里处理的问题一样,时间的本质就是指向性,在当下内部被激活的当下之起源造成了当下的分裂,而这就是时间性本身的展示。
第三点是个大问题,所以到后面柏拉图与普罗提诺似乎就开始使用“光”而非“镜像”来解释理念与现实的关系了
然后这几点结合起来遭遇的问题是:将“玩耍”视作“模仿”,而同时将“模仿”视作“技术再生产”,“技术再生产”视作“生产镜像”,就取消了“实践”与“自由”的维度,此后诗歌与艺术失去了“实践”的地位,而仅仅只有哲学与政治活动依旧保有“自由”的尊严。
这一部分其实柏拉图在后期,尤其是异乡人三部曲里,有非常深刻的自我批判。
因为数学数的完全随机性,其作为“诸多”的特性是未决定的且无限制的。也就是说,任何一个群都可以被变更。但是被变更的同时,其“数”本身只是离开了质料,因此这个“数”本身必然要求一个自身限定的内容,而这个内容不能依旧是同质化的、无限定的数学单位。这就要求了异质性内容与异质性单位,也就促成了理念数的诞生。
为什么这个规定是自身的,而不是来自数之间的关系(0和后继)呢
为什么对柏拉图来说,说3就是2加1行不通;但我觉得这其实是来自他一贯的立场,算学(logistics)得依靠数学(arithmetics)的奠基
其实就是,因为每“一”个数学数(已经被预先确定为一个整体)的质料都是一样的,要区分数学数只能依靠其形式/理念,而理念是根本上自身关联的,因此其理念必须自身获得差异性的内容。
或者换句话说,这些限制不是内在于无差异的质料单位内部的,而是外在于单位被强加上去的。
柏拉图的数学与算学是严格意义上彼此关联、互相构成的,数与数的关系内在于数本身构成了数,而关系又将数视作基本的单位。尽管在这一个整体中,柏拉图认为数学的面向更为根本,似乎因为其关乎于数本身而更为理念化。数学与算学的定义(「高尔吉亚」和「查米底斯」)可以被运用于实践和理论,但只有在理论中才能获得清晰显白的理解。在这些层面上,新柏拉图主义者的数学思想与柏拉图本人的思想是有着相当一段距离的。
一就是善,善就是一。
如果事物是一,说明各个部分都没有离开的意愿和可能性,而每个部分都和谐统一在必然的整体中。如果是善,那则不需要任何其它事物,因为其它的事物只会是更坏的,因此只会聚拢为一。
当然,这不是存在的逻辑。也不是查拉图斯特拉的教导。
理念数与算数
一与不定之二是最开始的理念数。两者在交互中互相奠基。一意味着善,而二意味着存在。一与二的交互作用是世界之源。
由于二的创生性(亚里士多德非常反对这一点,对他来说,二作为质料是需要被耗尽,而不是创造性的),新的数诞生,并继承了理念内容,在一的作用下保持了独一性。比如,三可以意味着中介,等等。但由于不定之二的推动创生,新的数距离最初的太一越来越远,与源头联系的切断带来了意义的模糊,每一个理念数自身的独一性由此被丧失。在这种情况下,理念数最终成为了暧昧的“多”,而“多”则只能包含中立抽象的“数性”。在这里,数性被重构为一般单位,算数就诞生了。尽管日常生活中可以见到一与二,但此时的一与二已经成为了“多中之一”或“多中之二”,也就是成为了一般的一与一般的二。尽管仍然是一,也依旧保留着原型太一的意义残留,但如果并非通过回忆,这样的意义残留是无法重新激活理念数的意义的。
我这里其实是说的亚对柏的批评,就是亚先说柏那里的二其实就是质料,然后进行批判;但其实他也说过,质料不一定要是一个数
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
When Plato compares the relation of Ideas and actuality to that of actual things and mirror images, we must ask in what sense the analogy holds. 1. First, concerning time: actual things and their mirror images always stand in a synchronous relation, if we provisionally ignore physical science and the speed of light. Can we suppose a “synchronous” relation between eternal Ideas and diachronic actuality? What does the “synchrony” of eternity and time mean? 2. Plato deliberately confuses the “use” of a mirror with the “production” of a mirror image. Can actuality therefore also be called a “use” of Ideas? This possibility has already been explored in the Timaeus. 3. A mirror image depends on the actual thing that is the mirror. Does actuality likewise have an Idea on which it depends? I think it does, and this interpretation would be a starting point for thoroughly connecting Ideas and the material world. 4. A mirror image is a precise, purely visual “delineation” of actuality: apart from its nonactuality, it is exactly like actuality in every other respect. Can we say actuality has the same relation to Ideas? I think not. 5. A mirror image serves merely as an imitative indicator, but modern art itself has become eidetic content. Under these circumstances, can poetry and art still be disparaged as imitations of philosophy? I find this rather ambiguous; no universal conclusion seems possible.
As for the first point, an interesting inquiry concerns the nature of cinema, which I have been thinking about lately. Even from photography alone, one can say that photography necessarily involves a temporal inversion. A photograph indicates an original, yet this original may already have vanished in time: the photographed person may have died, for example. The original itself “no longer exists.” In what sense, then, can the original’s reality be said to exceed the image’s reality? Is reality subject to time different from reality confirmed by causation? I do not really think so. This is the same problem I address in my essay on the Timaeus. Time’s essence is directedness: the origin of the present, activated within the present, splits the present. This is the exhibition of temporality itself.
The third point is a major problem, which is why Plato and Plotinus later seem to begin using “light,” rather than the “mirror image,” to explain the relation between Ideas and actuality.
Together, these points encounter the following problem: treating “play” as “imitation,” “imitation” as “technical reproduction,” and “technical reproduction” as “producing mirror images” cancels the dimensions of “praxis” and “freedom.” Poetry and art then lose the status of “praxis,” while only philosophy and political activity retain the dignity of “freedom.”
Plato actually offers very profound self-criticism on this point in his later works, especially the Stranger trilogy.
Because mathematical numbers are wholly arbitrary, their character as “many” is undetermined and unlimited. Any group can be changed. Yet in being changed, its “number” itself has merely departed from matter. This “number” must therefore require a self-delimiting content, and this content cannot remain homogeneous, undelimited mathematical units. Heterogeneous contents and units are required, bringing about eidetic numbers.
Why is this determination intrinsic, rather than arising from relations between numbers, zero and successor?
Why does saying that 3 is 2 plus 1 not work for Plato? I think this actually follows from his consistent position: calculation, logistikē, must rely on a foundation in the science of number, arithmētikē.
The point is that because the matter of each “one” mathematical number, already predetermined as a whole, is the same, mathematical numbers can be distinguished only through their forms or Ideas. Ideas are fundamentally self-related, so their Ideas must acquire differentiated content within themselves.
Or, in other words, these limits are not internal to undifferentiated material units, but externally imposed upon them.
Plato’s science of number and calculation are, strictly speaking, interrelated and mutually constitutive. Relations between numbers are internal to numbers and constitute them, while the relations in turn treat numbers as basic units. Within this whole, however, Plato considers the science-of-number aspect more fundamental, apparently because it concerns number itself and is more eidetic. The definitions of the science of number and calculation, in the Gorgias and Charmides, can be applied in practice and theory, but only in theory can they be understood clearly and distinctly. In these respects, the mathematical thought of the Neoplatonists is quite distant from Plato’s own.
The One is the Good; the Good is the One.
If something is one, none of its parts has the desire or possibility of departing: every part is harmoniously unified in the necessary whole. If it is good, it needs nothing else, because other things would only be worse; it therefore only gathers into one.
This, of course, is not the logic of being. Nor is it Zarathustra’s teaching.
Eidetic Numbers and Arithmetic Numbers
The One and the Indefinite Dyad are the first eidetic numbers. They ground each other in their interaction. One means goodness; two means being. Their interaction is the source of the world.
Through the Dyad’s generativity—something Aristotle strongly opposes, since for him the Dyad as matter must be exhausted rather than being creative—new numbers are born, inheriting eidetic content and preserving uniqueness through the One’s activity. Three, for instance, can mean mediation, and so on. Yet through the Indefinite Dyad’s generative impetus, new numbers move ever farther from the original One. Their severed connection to the source brings obscurity of meaning, and each eidetic number loses its uniqueness. Eidetic numbers thus ultimately become an ambiguous “many,” while the “many” can contain only neutral, abstract “numericality.” Numericality is here reconstructed as generic units, and arithmetic numbers are born. Although one and two are encountered in daily life, they have now become “one-among-many” or “two-among-many,” generic one and generic two. Though still one, retaining residual meaning from the archetypal One, these residues cannot reactivate the meaning of eidetic numbers except through recollection.
What I am actually discussing here is Aristotle’s criticism of Plato: Aristotle first says that Plato’s Dyad is really matter, then criticizes it. But he also says that matter need not be a number.