Plato · 柏拉图
Meno · 美诺
Undated 未注日期
美诺——散记
Reflections · Pages
米诺篇结尾的梳理:
米诺所赞同的对德性的定义:“神所启发的正确的意见”,这里有几处容易被忽视的重要的点
1.“正确的意见”只有在知识的侧映下才彰显为自身,如果没有知识其正确性将无从证实,而同样如果没有知识其身为“意见”而非知识的区别也将被抹消
2.因此正确的意见本身已经是一个矛盾的概念,其总是已经预设知识,或者说,对知识的知识
3.米诺并不理解上述问题的复杂性,因此当苏格拉底明显地自相矛盾或者循环论证的时候(“正确的意见总是会成功,只要它是正确的”“正确的意见可能会停留下来,但并不长久”)他无法进行质询,他的记忆只允许他关注于部分,即“正确的意见”,而不能进入规制着“正确的意见”的整体
4.因为是意见而非知识,要确保其正确性,只能仰赖于外界的担保,也就是神或者神圣者;因为神知道什么是好的,所以神对人的启发也都是好的,这担保了德性的integrity
5.然而,米诺并没有发现这里隐含的矛盾,也就是他的定义所涵盖的重点是“正确的意见”;既然已经知道这是正确的意见,为什么还需要神的担保呢?同时,假设确实神给予了德性或“正确的意见”其可能性,让人依照着正确的意见行动;而神的启发就代表着什么是正确,那这里有着根本的不和谐:到底是人认为的德性被神所担保了,还是神给予(也相应地可以不给予甚至给予相反的事物)的就是德性?
6.我们显然认为不公义与不节制不是德性,但如果神给予了不公义与不节制于人,这能够算是德性吗?这显然是荒谬的
7.但我们可以在这里给出一个等式,也就是我们知道有这样一个事物是德性,神只会给予它于人而非相反
8.但这里我们不仅预设了对德性的知识,还同时预设了对神的知识;这正是米诺所赞同的对德性定义的全部内涵展开后的后果
9.我们回到了对德性作为一个整体“是什么”的问题。而且,因为米诺预设了这个问题已经被解答,他还同时预设了自己对神的知识:因此这最后成为了hubris
10.事实上米诺并不知道什么是神;苏格拉底最后的讨论“就像诗人……祭司……一样”与他的开头对米诺的询问非常相似,仿佛是在说“米诺,你说德性是神的启发,但你并不知道什么是神圣作为一个整体;你只是给了我许多不同的’神圣’而已”;因而米诺出于他对整体的忽视,总是错过苏格拉底真正的问题
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Sorting Out the Ending of the Meno:
The definition of virtue Meno endorses is “right opinion inspired by a god.” Several important points here are easily overlooked.
1. “Right opinion” manifests as itself only in the light cast by knowledge. Without knowledge, its correctness cannot be verified; likewise, without knowledge, its distinction as “opinion” rather than knowledge is effaced.
2. Right opinion is therefore already a contradictory concept, always already presupposing knowledge, or knowledge of knowledge.
3. Meno does not understand the complexity of these problems. Thus, when Socrates manifestly contradicts himself or argues in circles—“Right opinion always succeeds, so long as it is right”; “Right opinion may stay, but not for long”—Meno cannot question him. His memory lets him attend only to the part, “right opinion,” and prevents him from entering the whole that governs it.
4. Because it is opinion rather than knowledge, its correctness can be secured only by an external guarantee: a god or something divine. Because a god knows what is good, the god’s inspirations in human beings are also good. This guarantees virtue’s integrity.
5. Meno, however, does not notice the implicit contradiction. The focus of his definition is “right opinion.” If we already know the opinion is right, why do we still need a god’s guarantee? At the same time, suppose a god does grant the possibility of virtue or “right opinion,” letting people act according to it, and divine inspiration represents what is right. A fundamental discord arises: is what human beings consider virtue guaranteed by a god, or is whatever the god gives—and can accordingly withhold, or even replace with its opposite—virtue?
6. We clearly think injustice and intemperance are not virtues. But if a god gives people injustice and intemperance, can these count as virtues? This is clearly absurd.
7. We can nevertheless offer an equation here: we know there is such a thing as virtue, and a god will give it to human beings, never its opposite.
8. But here we presuppose not only knowledge of virtue, but also knowledge of the divine. This is the consequence of fully unfolding the content of the definition of virtue Meno endorses.
9. We have returned to the question of “what virtue is” as a whole. Moreover, because Meno presupposes that this question has been answered, he also presupposes his own knowledge of the divine. This ultimately becomes hubris.
10. In fact, Meno does not know what a god is. Socrates’ concluding discussion, “like poets… priests…,” closely resembles his opening questions to Meno, as though saying, “Meno, you say virtue is divine inspiration, but you do not know what the divine is as a whole. You have merely given me many different ‘divine things.’” Because of his neglect of the whole, Meno always misses Socrates’ real question.