Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Meno · 美诺

Persephone and Recollection in the Meno

Paper / 论文 · Date from document metadata / 日期据原稿文件信息 · Editorial title / 本版编拟标题

The poem around 81b 10 of Meno reads:

“1 From whom Persephone would accept for the ancient affliction requital in exchange,

2 In the ninth year back into the sun above souls of those she sends,

3 Out of them, noble kings and men swift in strength and great in wisdom grow,

4 And into the rest of time for men they are called sacred heroes.”

A few remarks are to be presented about this translation. First, this translation follows Mollin and Williamson’s suggestion, that οἷσιν (translated as “from whom” in line 1) should be referring to the same group of people as κείνων (translated as “of those” in line 2) does. Second, I try to express the respective aspects and tenses of the verbs where I am able to. As δέξεαι is an aorist subjunctive, I translate it as “would accept”, and I translate ἀνδιδοῖ as “sends” for it is a present indicative. I translate αὔξοντ’ as “grow” for it is passive, yet it does not mean grow as the coming to be of living things. Rather, it means to increase and wax. Nevertheless, I still choose to translate it as “grow” for it provides a nice ambiguity and it rhymes better. Third, I incorporate οἷσιν into this poem even though it is separate from the main body of the poem in the original text, for this word completes the structure and content of the poem. Otherwise the first line of the poem would be disconnected from the second line and the referent of “those” in the second line would not be manifested. As οἷσιν is in dative, it can supplement the word δέξεαι to indicate the source whence the requital comes from, hence completing the conditions under which the exchange is accepted by Persephone: namely, from whom, for what, and what it is that is accepted in exchange.

To appreciate any Platonic dialogue, one has to take the statement in Phaedrus seriously, namely that any good speech should be constructed like a living animal, with its appropriate head, extremities and middle(264c). Then, the magnitude, position, form and material are all important for any part of the whole text under consideration. What is to be first examined, therefore, is the position of this poetic snippet.

This poem is posited slightly off center with respect to the whole dialogue. The literally central part of Meno is the formal discussion on recollection, whereas this poem is placed just prior to it, perhaps poised there as an introduction to the “doctrine” of recollection. And as an introduction, it also transits from the part apropos of images, i.e. the torpedo fish and the counter-image episodes, to recollection. Then, as a transition, this poem has to partake of what lies on its both ends.

This poem harbors in itself a duality of kinds: that it is both mythical and poetical. Just prior to the reciting of these verses, the two tribes of people corresponding to this duality are brought up: the priests and priestesses who care about their speech, and the divine ones among poets. Yet it is to be noticed that the kinds of people brought up are not simply the priests or simply the poets. Rather, each is a dual mixture partaking of both sides: the priests need to be as eloquent as the poets, and the poets have to be divine too. In this sense, Socrates makes it difficult to determine the source of this poem. It might be one version of the account from the priests or priestesses, but it might also very well be a selected passage from a renowned poet. And it might also be the case that the whole point of this ambiguity is to show that this question of source should not be pursued, given Meno’s affection for hearsay and rumors from eminent people.

Despite the ambiguity, it is clear that this poem displays a dual character of poetry and mythology. But in what way does this dual character help accomplish the transitory role of the poem? An oversimplification might be that since poetry, as a form of imitation, deploys of rich imagery while mythology speaks of the divine, the poetical should then be more akin to the prior part on images whereas the mythological is closer to the “doctrine” of recollection. But as I say, this is only an oversimplification. For one thing, it has already been established that in this part of the dialogue at least the poetical and the mythological are not self-evidently independent from each other, since both the eloquent priests and the divine poets have been spoken of. Moreover, do myths not have rich imagery as well? At any rate, this poem is a transition and an introduction perhaps in this sense, that it concludes the part on imagery by pointing to what transcends the imagery, namely the divine, yet it retains that visibility of images which allows for the soul to “see” and “recollect”, so as to mediate between the two episodes.

Yet, these considerations only have to do with the formal aspect of this poem. Can the content of this poem also account for the transitory role it plays? At first glance, there seems to be no apparent connection between the content of the poem and the later unfolding of the dialogue, especially the “doctrine” of recollection. In what way does this poem have to do with recollection?

The “doctrine” of recollection is based on one assumption, that “the whole of nature is akin”(81d), so that the soul, which has learned everything, can proceed from one known thing to all other things unknown. Yet this assumption is already foreshadowed in the poem. The souls are sent from the house of Hades back to the sun above, so that the upper realm of illumination is connected to the under realm of darkness and these two most opposite realms are gathered inside one movement of the soul. In other words, in the movement of the soul the whole of nature, divided up into the upper realm and the under realm, seems interconnected. But not only that: the movement of the soul, according to the poem, is in fact a consequence of a divine action. Therefore, it is not through the movement of the soul that the two worlds are connected, but rather the articulation itself is first guaranteed by divinity.

If the poem is interpreted in that way, is it not perhaps itself a metaphor - or an image - for recollection? If recollection is a process for the soul to rediscover what it has already seen before, is the “being sent back” not a similar process? The souls are not said to be sent out or sent up to the sun, but rather to be returned to where they used to belong. And the place the souls are sent back to is a place illuminated, i.e. the realm of the sun, so that it is also a place of visibility and knowledge.

However, some crucial differences between the poem and the account of recollection proper need to be pointed out. First, in this poem, it is clear that the souls are passive in their movement, that they are merely sent back to the sun by the goddess from the underworld. But in the description of recollection, the soul itself seems to be an active agent. Moreover, it is to be argued that in the poem, the movement of the soul can only be carried out when the debt is paid, but this condition seems inconspicuous, if not altogether missing, in the account of recollection. It would be interesting for further discussion if this poem were treated as a thorough representation of the latter account about recollection, how would these discrepancies or differences harmonize. To address the first discrepancy, one possibility would be that the abrupt resort of divine intervention around the end of the dialogue is already foreshadowed in this poem by its reference to the action of Persephone, so that recollection and the regaining of knowledge really would be organized into a harmony of an active pursuit for which the soul is responsible and a passive undergoing of a divine intervention. And to address the second discrepancy, it is not enough to merely state that the reference to the payment of debt has a moral connotation, which connects the discussion of virtue from the beginning of the dialogue to the account of recollection: since this would only result in a random and coincidental connection. It would be immensely more interesting if one asks how, if the poem were really a thorough representation of the account of recollection, the moral element would condition the whole process of recollection. Does that mean the one who recollects has to be virtuous? Is virtue a consequence for recollection or is it a precondition? If virtue is a precondition, it is also a consequence, at least according to the poem, since from these souls who have paid the debt and have been returned to the sun, noble kings and other virtuous people grow. Either way, the relationship between virtue and recollection will be a question worthy of further inquiry, which unfortunately cannot be pursued here.