Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Phaedrus · 斐德若

Undated 未注日期

Phaedrus — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 19 May 2022

In this note / 篇目

1

227c erotic speech

228c a facade of not speaking

228e sit down and read

229a get foot wet: cleansing and crossing; plane tree, Plato

229c playing sophist

229e Socrates has not yet known himself, much less willing to straighten out alien things like myths

230a are you a wild animal or a simple one?

230d Phaedrus guides Socrates the guest out-of-place to country

231e with calculation love is not beneficial; but he is actually competing for love as a non-lover

232c love is described as possessive so that if one is loved one is bereft by the lover of friends

233d love is characterized as a lack

234c a secret equivalence between lovers and non-lovers

235a Socrates only focused on rhetoric

235d “I have been filled like a jar through hearing from alien sources”

236a the arrangement of speech praising non-lovers is different; the discovery is not

236b why is Socrates backing up?

236d force and violence to force out speech!

236e an oath

237a veil and shame

237b a twisted introduction

238b a division of reason and (various) desires

238c love is the desire of the pleasure of beauty or beautiful bodies unruled by reason

239a lovers will want to sap the intellectual capacities of the beloveds

239d lovers will love effeminate bodies

240c for the beloved, the lover is neither beneficial nor pleasant (even immediately); compulsion and frenzy cause beloveds no pleasure

241d as wolves cherish lambs, so do lovers love boys

242a pass the river; but has to stay in the shade

242c a prophet for oneself

242e the speech by you through my mouth when bewitched by drugs

243a could speech about lovers be bad about Love?

244a just like with the first speech, the second speech defines love but forgets about madness

244c art of madness is divination; there are also purification and poetry as deeds of madness arising from gods

245c the demonstration will not be trustworthy to the terribly clever but to the wise

245d the soul for Plato seems to be self-moving; different from Aristotle

245e absolute distance between the coming to be and the beginning

246a what the soul is is not spoken of; what the soul is like is spoken of

246b the soul is structured like a charioteer with chariot team; there are different kinds of souls, human ones have one opposite horse

246d we fashion gods to have bodies, which seems inadequate

246d the wings of souls pertain to body

247a Hestia remains home

247c things outside the heavens

247d true beings occupy this place

248c the soul and its wings are nourished by true beings

248d the first generation of soul embodied

249a living lives souls philosophizing without fraud receive wings in 3000 years while others wait for 10000 years; between each life the soul will be judged and pass time respectively

249b every thousandth year the souls will be at the lottery and choice of next life; there souls can become animals for next life

249c to become a human being a soul has to know true beings for humans can understand in reference to form from perceptions, namely recollection; and by nearing divine god is he able to perfectly recollect

249d the fourth madness; a madness to be near the divine and furnish wings; this is love and the best madness

250a every human soul has seen the truth; but not every human soul can fully recollect

250b one might not recognize what the experience of truth is here for lack of clarity; why we following Zeus?

250c happy appearances

250d beauty is the most glistening thing here through the brightest sense; it shines forth when it’s there

250e why is beauty so special among things that are?

251a the newly initiated is quicker to go to beauty itself from its image; the old initiated is old in the sense that the contact with beauty is no longer afresh, but is tainted and worn by time; this seems to be actually said in reverse, not that the new is quicker, but rather the presentation of beauty itself is always new, or only the new can give a sense of true beauty

251b beauty seems to be the easiest to nourish wings

251e when beauty is present the soul in love feels pleasure; when beauty is gone it’s bittersweet

252b wing-growing necessity, Winged, is the name of Love used by God

252c followers of different gods have different reactions encountering love

252e the beloved is constructed as an imitation of the god the lover’s soul follows; and in his presence the lover can recollect; beauty itself and other memories are stimulated in ways corresponding to the choruses, so that from the beautiful people with certain traits are picked out

The question is, what really is the beloved an imitation of: of things themselves or of gods? Another twist of the question would be: if by recollection can souls recover wings, why should souls be divine in deed too? How closely related really are of the two images of wings and chariots?

254d the charioteer and the good horse pretend to be unmindful of beauty; the ignoble horse reminds them

255c longing as a flow of beauty fills the beloved too; is the source of the flow beauty itself? What is the “mechanism” of this back flow?

255d the beloved is seeing in the lover himself; this is where the back flow comes from, seeing his own beauty

255e this back flow is called an image of love, named friendship, so as to have a lesser degree of intensity than the love of the lover’s

256d two possibilities: the charioteer and the noble horse are mastering, or the two horses occasionally become equal friends without the mastery from the charioteer; for the former the soul becomes winged, for the latter the soul has started its journey for getting wings and is never sent back down in earth

256e mortal moderation is different from divine moderation

257b erotic art

2

It is most strange that it is Socrates who pays or seems to pay no attention to the things said in Lysias’ writing, and it is also him who criticizes it for not guiding the soul or knowing things. Yet what’s even more peculiar is that this actually harmonizes with his position that writing should not be taken seriously. The other criticism is that it’s too pretentious and not fun.

257e a statesman who reviles speech or sophistry

258b the poet, the composer - rejoicing in the theatre

258d the writing of speeches is itself not shameful: Plato writes, why doesn’t Socrates write?

258e “we have leisure”

259a the imagery of cicadas conversing at high noon bewitching people

259c cicadas come from men enjoying too much in singing that forget about their bodily needs

259d the introduction of Muses

260d the art of speech says “knowledge of things that really are shall precede speech of these things; but without speech no one would be persuaded by the knower’s art”

260e Socrates seems suspicious about the idea of an art of speech as separate from the grasping of truth

261a speeches as beautiful creatures and as beautiful children

261c Phaedrus seems to accuse Socrates of taking up ancient appearances to cover for present references

261e the words in parentheses already suggest some important qualifications

262d are the gods cause of speaking true things or leading listeners astray by jokes? Or both? Is humor a gift of honor?

263e love is not defined in beginning the palinode either; or is not needed?

264c a speech composed of many parts into a whole according to necessity is good speech

264e one could learn much from looking at patterns in a bad speech by not imitating them

265c other things are for play but the two forms are not

265d the first form: the gathering of speech

265e the second form: the dividing of speech; is there some unnatural way of dividing up?

266a a common form of thought’s folly, or madness, is divided into halves by the two speeches

266d this seems a bit sly; Phaedrus is asking about the rhetorical, yet Socrates replies as if he were asking about only one remaining part of the rhetorical

268c the human being that claims to be a teacher of doctors who knows only technicalities is mad

269a such a man only knows things prior to the art but not the art itself; the priority meant here can be under discussion, as prior in what sense

270a an art of rhetoric should apply what is high above onto speeches; as speech and rhetoric deal with souls -

270c - and the nature of the soul cannot be understood without first understanding nature of the whole, which is the ultimate source

271c what is said later will not be the words themselves, but only how to be as artful as the situation allows

271e a progression from thinking about souls and speeches abstractly to observing the action being performed to perceiving and recognizing on one’s own each soul and speech to performing the art in deed to seeing the critical times for speaking or not speaking to knowing the time suitable for each kind of speech

272b a beautiful meta-commentary: the speaker who speaks about rhetoric is also using rhetoric, so the question is if the content is not wrong but the method is, how is this speech considered?

272d seems to echo with the souls being led up on high and going round seeing things; what are “these things”? Are these souls? Or are these parts of rhetoric?

273a what is the necessity of bringing this question up yet again?

274c again heard from earlier times; they know the truth, but Socrates who is recounting the speech knows not the truth, hence it’s not enough to know the words

275a opposite sides taken on writing

275c a tree and a rock now does speak, but speak only for simple people

275d Plato couldn’t have not noticed the irony of writing about the inferiority of writing; yet it still harmonizes with his position that writing is a reminder of things one already knows

275e images and speeches are living beings in solemn silence

276a the written speech is a certain image of the speech “written” with intelligence

276d writing as a play; sowing for fun in writing; and another kind of serious “writing” and sowing, as teaching; the paradox of being unserious about the necessity of being unserious, writing about writing

Can writing be considered a special kind of speech effectuating on a special sort of soul? The text seems negligent to this possibility.

277e he whoever takes writing seriously is to be reproached; statesmen take writing seriously, and should be reproached; how should we take the speeches Socrates makes in this dialogue then, the speeches whose joking nature seems to be said to be caused by gods?

It seems sophistry and writing as arts are different but similar things; sophistry is knowing about truth but saying falsehoods, whereas writing is knowing about truth but making plays as a reminder of truths.

There seems to be a division of two parts of this half of dialogue: before is about the artfulness and artlessness of speech or rhetoric, later is about the seemliness and unseemliness of writing. The subtle disjointedness is that the first part seems more general and the second part more specific; yet their relationship is not merely this, but rather writing here seems altogether impossible to be art (the question is, is writing an art? can play be art?), much less be judged as artful or artless. Lysias’ speech is criticized on both fronts. Yet it can’t be, for if it already were writing, it couldn’t be treated as something artful.