Plato · 柏拉图
Phaedrus · 斐德若
Undated 未注日期
Phaedrus — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 19 May 2022
1
227c erotic speech
228c a facade of not speaking
228e sit down and read
229a get foot wet: cleansing and crossing; plane tree, Plato
229c playing sophist
229e Socrates has not yet known himself, much less willing to straighten out alien things like myths
230a are you a wild animal or a simple one?
230d Phaedrus guides Socrates the guest out-of-place to country
231e with calculation love is not beneficial; but he is actually competing for love as a non-lover
232c love is described as possessive so that if one is loved one is bereft by the lover of friends
233d love is characterized as a lack
234c a secret equivalence between lovers and non-lovers
235a Socrates only focused on rhetoric
235d “I have been filled like a jar through hearing from alien sources”
236a the arrangement of speech praising non-lovers is different; the discovery is not
236b why is Socrates backing up?
236d force and violence to force out speech!
236e an oath
237a veil and shame
237b a twisted introduction
238b a division of reason and (various) desires
238c love is the desire of the pleasure of beauty or beautiful bodies unruled by reason
239a lovers will want to sap the intellectual capacities of the beloveds
239d lovers will love effeminate bodies
240c for the beloved, the lover is neither beneficial nor pleasant (even immediately); compulsion and frenzy cause beloveds no pleasure
241d as wolves cherish lambs, so do lovers love boys
242a pass the river; but has to stay in the shade
242c a prophet for oneself
242e the speech by you through my mouth when bewitched by drugs
243a could speech about lovers be bad about Love?
244a just like with the first speech, the second speech defines love but forgets about madness
244c art of madness is divination; there are also purification and poetry as deeds of madness arising from gods
245c the demonstration will not be trustworthy to the terribly clever but to the wise
245d the soul for Plato seems to be self-moving; different from Aristotle
245e absolute distance between the coming to be and the beginning
246a what the soul is is not spoken of; what the soul is like is spoken of
246b the soul is structured like a charioteer with chariot team; there are different kinds of souls, human ones have one opposite horse
246d we fashion gods to have bodies, which seems inadequate
246d the wings of souls pertain to body
247a Hestia remains home
247c things outside the heavens
247d true beings occupy this place
248c the soul and its wings are nourished by true beings
248d the first generation of soul embodied
249a living lives souls philosophizing without fraud receive wings in 3000 years while others wait for 10000 years; between each life the soul will be judged and pass time respectively
249b every thousandth year the souls will be at the lottery and choice of next life; there souls can become animals for next life
249c to become a human being a soul has to know true beings for humans can understand in reference to form from perceptions, namely recollection; and by nearing divine god is he able to perfectly recollect
249d the fourth madness; a madness to be near the divine and furnish wings; this is love and the best madness
250a every human soul has seen the truth; but not every human soul can fully recollect
250b one might not recognize what the experience of truth is here for lack of clarity; why we following Zeus?
250c happy appearances
250d beauty is the most glistening thing here through the brightest sense; it shines forth when it’s there
250e why is beauty so special among things that are?
251a the newly initiated is quicker to go to beauty itself from its image; the old initiated is old in the sense that the contact with beauty is no longer afresh, but is tainted and worn by time; this seems to be actually said in reverse, not that the new is quicker, but rather the presentation of beauty itself is always new, or only the new can give a sense of true beauty
251b beauty seems to be the easiest to nourish wings
251e when beauty is present the soul in love feels pleasure; when beauty is gone it’s bittersweet
252b wing-growing necessity, Winged, is the name of Love used by God
252c followers of different gods have different reactions encountering love
252e the beloved is constructed as an imitation of the god the lover’s soul follows; and in his presence the lover can recollect; beauty itself and other memories are stimulated in ways corresponding to the choruses, so that from the beautiful people with certain traits are picked out
The question is, what really is the beloved an imitation of: of things themselves or of gods? Another twist of the question would be: if by recollection can souls recover wings, why should souls be divine in deed too? How closely related really are of the two images of wings and chariots?
254d the charioteer and the good horse pretend to be unmindful of beauty; the ignoble horse reminds them
255c longing as a flow of beauty fills the beloved too; is the source of the flow beauty itself? What is the “mechanism” of this back flow?
255d the beloved is seeing in the lover himself; this is where the back flow comes from, seeing his own beauty
255e this back flow is called an image of love, named friendship, so as to have a lesser degree of intensity than the love of the lover’s
256d two possibilities: the charioteer and the noble horse are mastering, or the two horses occasionally become equal friends without the mastery from the charioteer; for the former the soul becomes winged, for the latter the soul has started its journey for getting wings and is never sent back down in earth
256e mortal moderation is different from divine moderation
257b erotic art
2
It is most strange that it is Socrates who pays or seems to pay no attention to the things said in Lysias’ writing, and it is also him who criticizes it for not guiding the soul or knowing things. Yet what’s even more peculiar is that this actually harmonizes with his position that writing should not be taken seriously. The other criticism is that it’s too pretentious and not fun.
257e a statesman who reviles speech or sophistry
258b the poet, the composer - rejoicing in the theatre
258d the writing of speeches is itself not shameful: Plato writes, why doesn’t Socrates write?
258e “we have leisure”
259a the imagery of cicadas conversing at high noon bewitching people
259c cicadas come from men enjoying too much in singing that forget about their bodily needs
259d the introduction of Muses
260d the art of speech says “knowledge of things that really are shall precede speech of these things; but without speech no one would be persuaded by the knower’s art”
260e Socrates seems suspicious about the idea of an art of speech as separate from the grasping of truth
261a speeches as beautiful creatures and as beautiful children
261c Phaedrus seems to accuse Socrates of taking up ancient appearances to cover for present references
261e the words in parentheses already suggest some important qualifications
262d are the gods cause of speaking true things or leading listeners astray by jokes? Or both? Is humor a gift of honor?
263e love is not defined in beginning the palinode either; or is not needed?
264c a speech composed of many parts into a whole according to necessity is good speech
264e one could learn much from looking at patterns in a bad speech by not imitating them
265c other things are for play but the two forms are not
265d the first form: the gathering of speech
265e the second form: the dividing of speech; is there some unnatural way of dividing up?
266a a common form of thought’s folly, or madness, is divided into halves by the two speeches
266d this seems a bit sly; Phaedrus is asking about the rhetorical, yet Socrates replies as if he were asking about only one remaining part of the rhetorical
268c the human being that claims to be a teacher of doctors who knows only technicalities is mad
269a such a man only knows things prior to the art but not the art itself; the priority meant here can be under discussion, as prior in what sense
270a an art of rhetoric should apply what is high above onto speeches; as speech and rhetoric deal with souls -
270c - and the nature of the soul cannot be understood without first understanding nature of the whole, which is the ultimate source
271c what is said later will not be the words themselves, but only how to be as artful as the situation allows
271e a progression from thinking about souls and speeches abstractly to observing the action being performed to perceiving and recognizing on one’s own each soul and speech to performing the art in deed to seeing the critical times for speaking or not speaking to knowing the time suitable for each kind of speech
272b a beautiful meta-commentary: the speaker who speaks about rhetoric is also using rhetoric, so the question is if the content is not wrong but the method is, how is this speech considered?
272d seems to echo with the souls being led up on high and going round seeing things; what are “these things”? Are these souls? Or are these parts of rhetoric?
273a what is the necessity of bringing this question up yet again?
274c again heard from earlier times; they know the truth, but Socrates who is recounting the speech knows not the truth, hence it’s not enough to know the words
275a opposite sides taken on writing
275c a tree and a rock now does speak, but speak only for simple people
275d Plato couldn’t have not noticed the irony of writing about the inferiority of writing; yet it still harmonizes with his position that writing is a reminder of things one already knows
275e images and speeches are living beings in solemn silence
276a the written speech is a certain image of the speech “written” with intelligence
276d writing as a play; sowing for fun in writing; and another kind of serious “writing” and sowing, as teaching; the paradox of being unserious about the necessity of being unserious, writing about writing
Can writing be considered a special kind of speech effectuating on a special sort of soul? The text seems negligent to this possibility.
277e he whoever takes writing seriously is to be reproached; statesmen take writing seriously, and should be reproached; how should we take the speeches Socrates makes in this dialogue then, the speeches whose joking nature seems to be said to be caused by gods?
It seems sophistry and writing as arts are different but similar things; sophistry is knowing about truth but saying falsehoods, whereas writing is knowing about truth but making plays as a reminder of truths.
There seems to be a division of two parts of this half of dialogue: before is about the artfulness and artlessness of speech or rhetoric, later is about the seemliness and unseemliness of writing. The subtle disjointedness is that the first part seems more general and the second part more specific; yet their relationship is not merely this, but rather writing here seems altogether impossible to be art (the question is, is writing an art? can play be art?), much less be judged as artful or artless. Lysias’ speech is criticized on both fronts. Yet it can’t be, for if it already were writing, it couldn’t be treated as something artful.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
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227c 爱欲的言说
228c 不肯言说的表象
228e 坐下来读
229a 沾湿双脚:洁净与渡越;悬铃木,柏拉图
229c 扮演智者
229e 苏格拉底尚未认识自己,更不愿去理清神话之类外来的事物
230a 你是野兽,还是单纯的动物?
230d 斐德若带领苏格拉底这位不适其所的客人来到乡间
231e 按算计来说,爱并无益处;但他实际上正以非爱者的身份争夺爱
232c 爱被描述为占有性的,因此一个人若被爱,就会被爱者剥夺朋友
233d 爱被刻画为匮乏
234c 爱者和非爱者之间隐秘的等同
235a 苏格拉底只注意了修辞
235d “我从外来的源头听闻,像罐子一样被灌满”
236a 赞美非爱者的言说,其安排不同,发现却并无不同
236b 苏格拉底为什么退缩?
236d 用强力和暴力逼出言说!
236e 一个誓言
237a 面纱与羞耻
237b 曲折的引入
238b 理性与各种欲望的划分
238c 爱是不受理性统治、追求美或美的身体所带来快乐的欲望
239a 爱者会想削弱被爱者的智性能力
239d 爱者会爱柔弱的身体
240c 对被爱者来说,爱者既无益处,也不令人愉快——即便是当下也不愉快;强迫与狂热不会给被爱者带来快乐
241d 爱者爱少年,如同狼珍爱羊羔
242a 渡河;但必须留在阴凉处
242c 为自己作先知
242e 被药物蛊惑时,你借我的口说出的言说
243a 关于爱者的言说,能够说爱神的坏话吗?
244a 如同第一篇言说,第二篇言说也定义了爱,却忘记了迷狂
244c 迷狂的技艺是占卜;净化和诗歌也都是由诸神引起的迷狂行为
245c 这个证明不会使那些极其聪明的人信服,却会使智慧者信服
245d 对柏拉图来说,灵魂似乎是自我运动的;与亚里士多德不同
245e 生成与开端之间的绝对距离
246a 没有说灵魂是什么,而说灵魂像什么
246b 灵魂的结构如同御者与马队;灵魂有不同种类,人的灵魂有一匹反向的马
246d 我们把诸神塑造成有身体的,这似乎并不恰切
246d 灵魂的翅膀属于身体
247a 赫斯提亚留在家中
247c 天穹之外的事物
247d 真正的存在者占据这一处所
248c 灵魂及其翅膀受到真正存在者的滋养
248d 灵魂具身后的第一代
249a 在一生一生中不欺诈地从事哲学的灵魂,三千年后获得翅膀,其他灵魂则须等待一万年;在每一生之间,灵魂受到审判,并分别度过时日
249b 每到第一千年,灵魂就参加抽签,选择来生;在那里,灵魂可以选择下一生成为动物
249c 要成为人,灵魂就必须认识真正的存在者,因为人可以从知觉参照形式来理解,也就是回忆;而通过接近神圣的神,他才能完满地回忆
249d 第四种迷狂:接近神圣、长出翅膀的迷狂;这就是爱,也是最好的迷狂
250a 每个人的灵魂都见过真理,但并非每个人的灵魂都能完全回忆
250b 由于缺乏清晰性,人可能认不出此处对真理的经验是什么;我们为什么跟随宙斯?
250c 幸福的显现
250d 美是这里通过最明亮的感官所见的最闪耀之物;它在那里时,就放出光来
250e 为什么美在存在着的事物中如此特殊?
251a 新近入秘仪者更快从美的图像走向美本身;旧日入秘仪者之所以旧,是因为与美的接触不再新鲜,而被时间污染、磨损;这似乎实际上是倒过来说的:并非新近者更快,而是美本身的呈现总是新的,或者只有新的才能给出真正美的感受
251b 美似乎最容易滋养翅膀
251e 美在场时,恋爱的灵魂感到快乐;美离去时,则苦乐交织
252b 使翅膀生长的必然性,“有翼者”,是神所使用的爱神之名
252c 跟随不同神的人,遇到爱时有不同反应
252e 被爱者被构造成爱者灵魂所追随之神的模仿;在被爱者面前,爱者得以回忆;美本身以及其他记忆,以与各个歌队相对应的方式被激发,因此从美的人们中拣选出具有某些特征的人
问题是,被爱者究竟模仿什么:事物本身,还是诸神?问题的另一种转折是:如果灵魂可以通过回忆重新获得翅膀,为什么灵魂还必须在行为中神圣?翅膀和战车这两个意象究竟有多紧密的关联?
254d 御者和良马假装不在意美;卑劣的马提醒他们
255c 渴望作为美的流也灌满了被爱者;这道流的源头是美本身吗?这种回流的“机制”是什么?
255d 被爱者在爱者中看见自己;回流正来自这里:看见自己的美
255e 这种回流被称作爱的图像,被命名为友爱,因此其强度低于爱者的爱
256d 两种可能:御者和高贵的马掌权,或者两匹马偶尔成为平等的朋友,不受御者统治;在前者,灵魂长出翅膀;在后者,灵魂已经开始了获得翅膀的旅程,永远不会被送回地下
256e 凡人的节制不同于神圣的节制
257b 爱欲的技艺
2
最奇怪的是,正是苏格拉底不在意、或者显得不在意吕西阿斯文本里说的东西,也正是他批评这篇文本不引导灵魂、不认识事物。但更奇特的是,这实际上又与他认为不应认真对待书写的立场相和谐。另一个批评则是,它太做作,而且不好玩。
257e 辱骂言说或智术的政治家
258b 诗人、作者——在剧场中欢欣
258d 写下言说本身并不可耻:柏拉图书写,苏格拉底为什么不书写?
258e “我们有闲暇”
259a 正午鸣谈、蛊惑人们的蝉的意象
259c 蝉来自那些过分沉醉于歌唱、忘记身体需求的人
259d 缪斯的引入
260d 言说的技艺说:“关于真正存在之物的知识,应先于对这些事物的言说;但没有言说,便无人会被知者的技艺说服”
260e 苏格拉底似乎怀疑,言说的技艺可以独立于对真理的把握
261a 言说作为美的生灵,也作为美的孩子
261c 斐德若似乎指责苏格拉底借用古时的形象,来遮掩对当下的指涉
261e 括号里的话已经暗示了一些重要的限定
262d 诸神是说出真话的原因,还是借玩笑把听者引入歧途的原因?或者两者都是?幽默是一份尊荣的礼物吗?
263e 翻悔之歌的开头也没有定义爱;还是说不需要定义?
264c 按照必然性,把许多部分组织成一个整体的言说,是好的言说
264e 观察坏言说中的样式,并且不去模仿它们,也能学到很多
265c 其他东西是为了游戏,但这两种形式不是
265d 第一种形式:言说的聚集
265e 第二种形式:言说的划分;有没有某种不自然的划分方式?
266a 思的愚妄,或迷狂,这一共同形式被两篇言说分成两半
266d 这似乎有点狡猾;斐德若问的是修辞,苏格拉底回答时却仿佛他只在问修辞仅剩的某一部分
268c 那个只懂技术细节、却自称是医生之师的人,是疯的
269a 这样的人只知道先于技艺的东西,而不知道技艺本身;这里所谓的在先性可以讨论:究竟在什么意义上在先?
270a 修辞的技艺应将高处的东西用于言说;因为言说和修辞处理灵魂——
270c ——而若不先理解作为最终源头的整体之自然,就无法理解灵魂的自然
271c 接下来所说的不会是话语本身,而只是如何在情境允许的范围内尽可能有技艺
271e 一个进程:从抽象地思考灵魂和言说,到观察正在进行的行动,到亲自感知并辨认每一种灵魂和言说,到实际施行技艺,到看出说或不说的关键时刻,再到知道适合每一类言说的时机
272b 一段优美的元评论:谈论修辞的言说者也在使用修辞,因此问题是,如果内容没错而方法错了,该怎样看待这番言说?
272d 似乎呼应着灵魂被引到高处、环行观看事物;“这些事物”是什么?是这些灵魂?还是修辞的这些部分?
273a 再次提出这个问题的必然性是什么?
274c 又是从古时听来的;他们知道真理,但复述这番言说的苏格拉底不知道真理,因此仅仅知道话语还不够
275a 对书写采取的相反立场
275c 现在,树和石头确实说话了,但只对单纯的人说话
275d 柏拉图不可能没有注意到,以书写来谈论书写之低下的反讽;但这仍与他的立场相和谐:书写是对人已经知道之事的提醒
275e 图像和言说,是庄严地沉默着的生灵
276a 写下的言说,是以理智“写下”的言说的某种图像
276d 书写作为游戏;在书写中为取乐而播种;以及另一种严肃的“书写”和播种,即教导;不认真对待“不认真的必然性”的悖论,关于书写的书写
书写能否被视作一种特殊的言说,对某类特殊的灵魂起作用?文本似乎忽略了这种可能性。
277e 无论谁认真对待书写,都应受到责备;政治家认真对待书写,因此应受责备;那么,我们该怎样对待苏格拉底在这篇对话里作出的那些言说——那些玩笑的性质似乎被说成由诸神引起的言说?
作为技艺,智术和书写似乎是不同却相似的东西;智术是知道真理却说假话,书写则是知道真理,却作出游戏来提醒真理。
这半篇对话似乎又分为两部分:前面讨论言说或修辞有无技艺,后面讨论书写是否适宜。微妙的脱节在于,第一部分似乎更普遍,第二部分更特殊;但两者的关系不止如此,因为这里的书写似乎根本不可能成为技艺——问题是,书写是技艺吗?游戏可以是技艺吗?——更不用说被判断为有技艺或无技艺了。吕西阿斯的言说在两方面都受到批评,但这不可能,因为如果它已经是书写,就不能再被当作有技艺的东西来对待。