Plato · 柏拉图
Philebus · 斐勒布
Undated 未注日期
Philebus — Reading notes
Apple Notes
11b “what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted, and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing.” Knowing, understanding, remembering—right opinion and true calculations
11d already suspicious: pleasure or knowledge is said to be a “possession” or “state” of the soul—the status of experiencing in the moment and the omission of body
12a pleasure vs knowledge put on an axiological spectrum
12b the relinquish of dialogue; due to indolence or insolence (Callicles)? Revealed that truly “Eros” or “Beauty” is at question by naming the Goddess
13a—14b rejection of the false thesis that all pleasures/knowledges are alike insofar as they are pleasure/knowledge so therefore given it is the good they are all alike good; rather should sort out things of different kinds under the same genus, evaluate kind by kind if their opposition is defined by goodness, if they approach or distance themselves from goodness no matter whether goodness is pleasure/knowledge and if they approach badness instead, as goodness thereby is its own tertiary metric to which these contraries might belong, but more importantly it points to the fact that even a preliminary definition regarding the goodness-bearers in question is not reached yet, we don’t yet know what pleasure is, what are pleasures, how do they differ, how can we say absolutely that it is the good?; seems to be methodologically more concrete and instantiation oriented
14d “one and many”
15a ideal controversy of one and many instead of the merely sensible
15c Philebus “fell asleep,” perhaps not literally
15d logos brings the gathering and division, articulation; but problematic since it speaks of idealities as readymade in a way; and it doesn’t fully demarcate the essence of logos
16a intrinsic limits to logos: translation, violence, sleep; gang up with sleeping Philebus?
16d—17a famous presentation of the doctrine of one and many
17a precisely; charlatans of philosophy all too willingly yield to the temptation of non-analysis but wield either one or the many as sticks to crush others’ skulls without knowledge of the gentle touch of plurality
18a—b the obligation to account for pluralities and numbers; but thus is also evidence of the extreme ease one and many flip directly into each other, which is eclipsed by the epistemic-moral claim; Philebus speaks again
18d carve out discrete units from the continuum of infinity and from this plurality discover the one unity required since plurality can only be firmly grasped through unity; the ladder in between two poles as opposed to the immediate teleportation of the two poles, up to one or down to many
19a Philebus and Protarchus, the “dynamic duo,” or the indeterminate dyad
19c—20a a recap of backstory; but immediately obvious they are using scientific methods to determine if science should not be better than pleasure; this doesn’t turn to vicious circle, but it significantly reduces the likelihood of pleasure’s candidacy since it’s defenseless against science on its own means to justify itself in a societal setting; “we won’t let you go before the discussion reaches its satisfactory (pleasing?) limit (The Limit?)”
20b—c the ironic return to the “matter at hand,” the introduction of the third candidate
20e a certain kind of eidetic variation; hypothesis of negation to see essence
21d the conscience for self-worth or dignity or a mere sense of shame exceeds pursuit of pleasure
21e here is the prickly ruse: a life devoid of pleasure could be passable, but perhaps not if it’s suffused with pain
22b the relenting of the former stronger formula of “no one does evil knowingly” and retracts to the milder version: “no one does evil voluntarily”
22c “the divine reason” which supersedes the ratiocinative under the current discussion but is the good in itself
23a funny, “give pleasure pain”
23c the method of collecting and dividing; it already is at work in the earlier eidetic variation, dividing pleasure and knowledge and then mixing them
23d four kinds or five: limit, unlimited, mixture, cause for mixing, and potentially cause for separation; overlooking the potential fifth might be because, by the Timaeus, either the cause of mixing is not different from the cause of dividing, or separation will not occur causally as mixture is the product while idealities exist already in primordial separation
24a—27c crucial tract of the doctrine; cause dominates the caused in eternal generation; the “more or less” means the continuum where one overpowers the other and is continually overpowered by yet another, and therefore subsides and sweeps and where no measure obtains but in the Heraclitean flux measure is ignited and put out because time itself ought to be a measure and in this world of flux or mere perception one thing appears first as hot but then turns to cold when a new power approaches it, so this is a world where there are still things as perceived powers and becomings, and these powers can only be compared without being measured so they are never equalized—the minimum requirement of power and becoming is change from less to more or vice versa depending on contexts and circumstances of the comparison, so there’s still minimal intelligence that is Heraclitus’ Zeus; by necessity the flux also has to be “continuous” in the most degenerative sense because this continuum is due to the lack of measure and actual infinity of the more or less, not due to the comparison of the measures and the potentially infinite there contained, since there’s no real order with these bursting powers of becomings, so it comprises a “continuous” ordinal scale; so in all Plato is not fighting against some straw-man, but rather fighting a real worldview that’s self-consistent, the worldview of mere convoluted perceptions that only perceive the more and the less without calculation, number, or measure; the powers are not to be negated but to be sublated or mixed as it is a “self-consistent” way of living in that it doesn’t necessitate a practical egress from the position, in other words, a life without precision
27d the best life is the mixed life, but the mixture here is strange, since before the things to be mixed are opposites, but now are not at least directly opposites; they are opposites only if it’s granted that this mixed life is a temperate life, temperance is good, and pleasure belongs to the camp of the more or less, while knowledge to the limit; or we know the good life is a mixture, at least since it must be temperate, but so far it’s not yet pinned down what is the unlimited and the limited in this mixture, though the indication is clear; the casual and subtle hint at the other kind of mixture of elements (kinds) that might be even more secretly impactful; pleasure and wisdom as two parallel attributes are thus secretively replaced (by only indication) by the opposition and hierarchy of the limited versus the unlimited
27e to model good on pleasure is to model it on the unlimited, the infinite “encore!” of the divine vicious circle; so Philebus staunchly rejects the limited view of goodness, and Socrates counters with the short retort that pain is just as equally infinitely bad, with the undisclosed implication that since pleasure and pain are the more or less they can always be converted into each other and hence pleasure in the instant of experiencing it turns into pain, and hence the good is then undifferentiated from bad; but of course Philebus is too willfully ignorant to grasp or agree to this premise and they only talk past each other
29a the sailor line is funny
30a human body nourishes on world-body; therefore, since humans have souls, by epagoge, there’s a world-soul they nourish on; this is a cosmic digression from the question where it’s so casually answered already by a premise of the argument that knowledge is the cause of mixture, while what the tract does is to expand the analogy to a cosmic level
31c the immediate problematization: pleasure and pain always arise together in a mixture of limited and unlimited, where it was stated pleasure by itself is the unlimited; then is pain the limited? Not really, for opposites qua unlimiteds are brought together to limit each other, but the limit qua limit is independent of both “kinds.” Or rather the key word is “in the common kind” so pain-pleasure is either one thing that really is just the unlimited that is regulated by order imposed on it or it is epiphenomenon in something that is a harmony; in other words either pleasure and pain themselves directly contribute to making a harmony, or they are merely felt by a body as inside itself, for instance, which qua body is the said harmony, but this harmony is made of neither pleasure nor pain
31d seems like the latter option: pleasure and pain accompany harmony and its changes, but are not themselves disclosed as comprising a harmony
32c the present experience of memory and anticipation, which St. Augustine questionably questions, as the memory of a toothache does not cause literal aching in the present time; which Protarchus correctly points out its disentanglement from the body; but I’m not so confident about the purity of the pleasures of hope, as the soul must have a harmony too, if only with the body, and also the body is involved as it feels hope as much as hope involves the notion of body in its very content, such as anticipation of the next pleasure body will experience or anxiety of the next pain body’s gonna suffer
33c ironic; a divine life is second prize while a mixed life is first prize
34a non-perception and memory is the “preservation of perception”
34b recollection as opposed to memory; recollection is fully psychological and not somatic and active
35a desire: here the image is again surreptitiously altered, since before it’s restoration of a disturbed harmony, now it’s vulgarized to the filling of an emptiness
35b—d desire is desire for the thing that is memorized as able to fill the emptiness one currently experiences; since this filling is absent and only preserved in memory, it is in contact with the soul; and every animal if they desire they desire that they are not currently experiencing, hence their desires are all in the soul; and given thirst and hunger and so on are desires, they are not experienced by body but only by the soul
35e—36c as one human being desires, he always experiences hope and its pleasure in the soul alongside the pain in the body, or if he’s hopeless then a twofold pain
36e false pleasures as dreamt pleasures; but how is it different from “pure pleasures” of hope?
37b “real” judging speaks to the reality of the action, not the truth value of the content of the statement of the judgment; pleasure is really experienced in the same way, but can it have truth value, is the issue; as Kant says, sensibility never errs
39a interesting hypothetical, what if memory and perception and other impressions don’t concur? Is concurrence here a harmony? Then is falsehood a destitution of this harmony? But seems falsity doesn’t pertain to the psychic words’ interactions but solely to the thing written down. Another really funny thing: the writing of the heart after so many denigrations of writing as such in the Phaedrus
39b a very elaborate mechanism: writing of the heart, then reproducing of the image as described by the words written down; images reproduced from symbols
39c—40e since there are these images in our soul, we say our soul’s imagination reproduces sensation independent of body, and sensations include pleasure and pain; thus, imagination involves pleasure and pain; but imagination can be true or false at least in the moral sense, as imagination is always motivated by moral judgments of what is good, since imagination always presupposes the subject’s moral agency; we can also always attribute a cognitive agency to imagination, as it is always based on what we think we know; therefore the earlier clearcut separation between sensibility and judgment no longer holds, sensibility is no longer only passive, as imagination always is at work as we process our sensation, and pleasure is always already mediated by our imagination, hence by our judgment, and if there is true judgment, there will be founded pleasure, just as there will be unfounded pleasure, such as guilty pleasure, in this case, it is no more “I feel pleasure but I also know my judgment about this pleasure is false” but rather that “I feel both the pleasure and the pain of guilt” and this mixed and impure pleasure is a false pleasure whose cognitive and affective base does not allow simple reduction to pain and pleasure as if they are all homogenous like philistine utilitarian’s homogenous utility
41a Promarchus’ objection to the equivocation of falsity with badness
42a—c the equivalence between pleasure and pain and perception as they are always closely intertwined with judgment is firmly established; just as there are false perceptions, so are there false pleasures due to remoteness and closeness, etc.
42e the art of hypothesis
43a the consolidation of the hypothesis as being false since the eternal flux denies absence of destruction and restoration, hence by consequence denies absence of pleasure and pain
43b modification of the hypothesis: only great enough destruction and restoration bring notice and hence pleasure and pain, so a neutral life still is possible in some respects
44b is pleasure then escape from pain? Given the premise one is the restoration of the other, it overlooks the state in which destruction is simply hindered; if pleasure is escape from pain, it’s only negative and a “neutral” state is excluded from definition, though it might be false to equate this negativity with positive pleasure
45b this presupposes, even with the image of emptying and filling granted, a given harmony ready made and well-conceived, hence of the body and health; but some desires might be of quite a different nature, as they might be desires proper whereas the former ones are more properly called “needs” as these desires now don’t have readymade harmonies to go back to; such as a creative urge, for instance
45c number versus intensity
45e “nothing too much” is another oracle like “know thyself” I believe
46c a curious “contradiction” to the earlier assumption that soul in itself enjoys pure pleasures—now it can also enjoy mixed ones; but that’s because earlier the purity is to categorize the purity of psychic pleasures from body, here it’s the unmixed or mixed status of pleasure with pain
47a the bond where pleasure and pain seem to always go in tandem and be mixed in many proportions given the flux; but this also hearkens back to the harmony, now it’s likely that pain and pleasure themselves should maintain a proportion
48a a kindly reminder of the body’s role of weeping and laughing even in the case of supposedly purely psychic pleasures
48d—e comedic effects on the false taxonomy of ignorance (really, ignorance about money is not that important a category) right at the moment of discussing comedy
50a we feel malice towards comedic roles who are our “friends”, given we feel pleasure when seeing they are ridiculous in suffering from ignorance, which is a kind of misfortune and something bad, and are too weak to avenge themselves and won’t hurt us (hence they can be considered “friends”), but malice is also a kind of pain; so malice is at once a pain accompanied by pleasure; exactly like the case of guilty pleasure I brought up earlier
50b Socrates’ “argument” for equating the art of comedy with that of tragedy
51b—52b the employment of earlier established neutral state to give positivity to pleasures where the accompanied loss is imperceptible hence not painful; counterpoint to the Phaedrus’ account of the pain of the philosopher’s eros
52c what justifies this attribution? Moderation is previously equated with harmony, and here only the superficial sense of it as deprivation of sensation is used, as if imperceptible loss of the harmony is not still loss; but one could at least argue that the affect of pain will positively disturb the harmony even more than its loss; or there are two criteria, the loss be very small and also measured within bounds, so it neither oversteps cumulatively (in that case if the gap is cumulatively wide enough pain will still ensue) or instantaneously, but the pleasure of filling be quick so as to be perceptible; is this an instance uncritical equivocation of manyness and unlimitedness? But based on the earlier description of the multiform and violent pleasures it might be the “intensity” does not refer to the one-time quantity of “stuff” to fill the gap, but also the maddening feeling of persistence in pursuing pleasure, for pain and pleasure are in this picture mixed as flux; whereas these pure pleasures are measured insofar as they do not produce this flux but maintain some “proportion” of pain and pleasure, but this then does not explain how pain is somehow imperceptible here, and here is disclosed the tension between the filling-bucket image and the restoring harmony image, for such “multiform and violent” pleasures seem to really implicate the flux, which is disharmony, and the violent restoration of harmony is thereby really false—hence the falsity of these pleasures as they seek persistently to restore something they inevitably must disturb in order to perpetuate themselves; maybe it’s all three things together, the quantity of loss at one time, the quantity of loss cumulatively, and the proportion of pleasure also with regard to the proportion and harmony of everything else (i.e. the harmony of harmonies). Or the explanation could be that since pleasure directs toward the restoration of harmony, it directs toward moderation; but sometimes the pleasure itself cannot be moderate because it relies upon earlier destruction, hence immoderation; therefore, it is only fully moderate and pure moderation when the pain is imperceptible and the loss negligible. This way these “true” pleasures can be called really moderate as their moderation do not presuppose earlier immoderation
53b the royal sensibility of beauty that equals purity
53c—55c very questionable claim that pure pleasure is more pleasant than great pleasure, unless one opts for the new sense; the dual hierarchy of becoming for the sake of being, the admission that pleasure is always generation (this doctrine is said to be “passed down” but really should be a conclusion from earlier arguments, on how pleasure, even in its purest form, is still the restoration of some destruction, hence always involved in generation) then defeats its supposed identity with the good
56e ideal arithmetic
57c the overarching concern for precision in knowledge and science
59a the denigration of “natural philosophy” contra dialectic which is concerned singularly with being, which position is revised or elaborated by the truer natural philosophy of the Timaeus
62d Protarchus failed to observe the danger of a democratically“liberal” education
64d the mixture of pleasure and knowledge is itself a harmony (perhaps between opposites even) that needs to be cultivated and maintained through the harmonizing wisdom, as true science is directed at being, truth, precision and measure; pleasures, even when they are “true”, are still generation and becoming
65a the good itself; its unity with beauty, proportion and truth
66a we the equanimous with intelligence and reason see intense pleasure seekers as “ridiculous,” but recall here that the “ridiculous” is connected to comedic malice and a certain mixture of pleasure and pain, as previously established—the intellectual pleasure that intelligence eventually will overcome—and we take pleasure at laughing at pleasure itself; eventually intelligence brings us the sense of shame about all this ridiculousness and we thereby overcome even this remainder of a comedic malice as our laughter settles
66b surprising development as reason is expected to take the second prize but is here ranked the third, after the measure itself and the “self-sufficient” (another surprising diction as this word I thought was reserved for the divine and not for a human being’s good life, but it later turned out to be reasonable since the measure and the measured are indeed the divine, the first as kinds—including even the good—and the second as the totality mixed of kinds, whereas the third-prize goes to what is higher and divine in us, i.e. reason) measured harmony
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
11b “对一切生灵而言,善就是享乐,感到快乐和欣喜,以及一切与这类事情相伴的东西。”认识、理解、记忆——正确的意见与真实的计算
11d 已经值得怀疑:快乐或知识被说成灵魂的一种“拥有物”或“状态”——当下体验的地位,以及身体的缺席
12a 快乐与知识被置于一个价值论的光谱之上
12b 放弃对话;是由于怠惰,还是傲慢无礼(卡利克勒斯)?通过说出女神的名字,显露出真正成问题的是“爱欲”或“美”
13a—14b 拒斥这样一个错误论题:一切快乐/知识,就其是快乐/知识而言都是一样的,因此,如果它就是善,那么它们也就都同样是善;毋宁应当从同一个属中分辨出不同种的事物,逐种评价:它们的对立是否由善来规定;不论善究竟是快乐还是知识,它们是在接近善还是远离善,抑或反而接近恶;由此,善自身成为这些相反者可能归属的第三种尺度。但更重要的是,这指出了一个事实:对于正在讨论的善的承担者,我们甚至还没有达到一个初步定义。我们尚不知道快乐是什么,有哪些快乐,它们有何差别,又怎能绝对地说它就是善?在方法上,似乎更为具体,也更面向实例
14d “一与多”
15a 一与多在理念层面的争议,而非仅仅在可感层面的争议
15c 斐勒布“睡着了”,或许不是字面意义上的
15d logos 带来聚合与划分、分节与表达;但这也有问题,因为它在某种程度上将理念性事物说成现成之物;而且它并未充分划定 logos 的本质
16a logos 的内在限度:翻译、暴力、睡眠;要和睡着的斐勒布结伙吗?
16d—17a 对一与多学说的著名陈述
17a 正是如此;哲学骗子太过乐意屈从于不作分析的诱惑,却将一或多当作棍棒,打碎别人的头颅,而全然不懂复多性的轻柔触碰
18a—b 说明复多性与数目的义务;但这也证明,一与多极易直接翻转为彼此,而这一点却被那项认识论—道德要求遮蔽了;斐勒布又开口了
18d 从无限的连续统中划出离散单元,再从这一复多性中发现所必需的那个统一,因为唯有通过统一,才能稳固地把握复多性;这是两极之间的阶梯,而非在两极之间直接瞬移,向上直达一,或向下直达多
19a 斐勒布与普罗塔库斯,这对“活力搭档”,或者说不定的二
19c—20a 对前情的回顾;但立刻就显而易见,他们正在用科学的方法,判定科学是否应当优于快乐。这并不构成恶性循环,但它大大降低了快乐作为候选者的胜算,因为在社会性的场合中,快乐若仅凭自身的手段为自己辩护,面对科学便毫无招架之力;“在讨论达到令人满意的(令人快乐的?)限度(那个限度?)之前,我们不会让你走”
20b—c 反讽地回到“眼前的问题”,引入第三位候选者
20e 某种本质变更;通过否定的假设来察看本质
21d 对自我价值或尊严的自觉,乃至仅仅羞耻之感,都超出了对快乐的追求
21e 这里有个棘手的诡计:一种没有快乐的生活,或许还过得去;但若它充满痛苦,恐怕就不行了
22b 放松了先前更强的表述“没有人明知而作恶”,退回到较温和的版本:“没有人自愿作恶”
22c “神圣理性”超出了目前讨论中的推理性理性,却是善本身
23a 好笑,“让快乐受苦”
23c 聚合与划分的方法;它已经在此前的本质变更中起作用:将快乐与知识分开,再把它们混合
23d 四种,或五种:限度、无限定者、混合、混合之因,以及可能的分离之因。忽略潜在的第五种,或许是因为,按照《蒂迈欧》,混合之因与划分之因并无不同;或者,因为混合才是产物,而理念性事物早已处于原初的分离之中,所以分离并非因果作用的结果
24a—27c 学说的关键段落;在永恒的生成中,因支配被造成者。“更多或更少”意味着一个连续统,其中一种力量压倒另一种,又不断被另一种力量压倒,因而消退与涌起。在这里,没有任何尺度能够成立;在赫拉克利特式的流变中,尺度被点燃,又被熄灭,因为时间本身就应当是一种尺度。在这个流变或仅仅感知的世界里,同一事物起初显得热,但当一种新的力量逼近,它便转而显得冷。因此,在这个世界中,仍有作为被感知的力量与生成的事物;这些力量只能被比较,却不能被测量,因此它们永远不能被等量化。力量与生成的最低要求,是随着比较的语境与情境而从少变多,或从多变少;因此,仍有最低限度的智性,也就是赫拉克利特的宙斯。流变也必然在最退化的意义上是“连续的”,因为这种连续性来自尺度的缺失,以及更多与更少的实无限,而不是来自尺度之间的比较及其所包含的潜无限;因为这些迸发的生成力量并无真正秩序,所以它构成一种“连续的”次序尺度。因此,总的说来,柏拉图所反对的不是某个稻草人,而是一种真实而自洽的世界观:仅由纠缠的感知构成,只感知更多与更少,而没有计算、数目或尺度的世界观。这些力量不应被否定,而应被扬弃或混合,因为这是一种“自洽”的生活方式,在实践上并不必然要求人退出这一立场;换言之,一种没有精确性的生活
27d 最好的生活是混合的生活,但这里的混合很奇怪,因为此前需要混合的东西是相反者,如今却至少并非直接的相反者。唯有承认这种混合生活是节制的生活,节制是善,快乐属于更多与更少的阵营,而知识属于限度,它们才是相反者。或者说,我们知道好的生活是一种混合,至少因为它必须是节制的;但迄今尚未确定,在这一混合中,什么是无限定者,什么是有限定者,尽管暗示已经很清楚。这里随意而微妙地暗示了另一种元素(种类)的混合,它或许在暗中更具影响力。于是,快乐与智慧这两个并列属性,仅仅通过暗示,就被悄悄替换成有限定者与无限定者之间的对立和等级关系
27e 以快乐为善的范型,就是以无限定者为范型,就是神圣恶性循环中无穷无尽的“再来一次!”因此,斐勒布坚决拒绝关于善的有限定观点。苏格拉底则简短地反驳:痛苦同样也是无限地坏。未被说出的含义在于,既然快乐与痛苦属于更多与更少,它们就总能转化为彼此,因此,快乐在被体验的那一刻就转为痛苦,于是善也就与恶无从区分。但当然,斐勒布太过执意无知,不肯把握或同意这一前提,他们只是在各说各话
29a 关于水手的那句话很好笑
30a 人的身体从世界身体获得滋养;因此,既然人有灵魂,经由 epagoge,就有一个供人的灵魂汲取滋养的世界灵魂。这是偏离问题的一段宇宙论岔论:论证的一个前提已经如此随意地回答了问题,即知识是混合之因;而这段论述所做的,是将类比扩展到宇宙层面
31c 立刻出现的问题:快乐与痛苦总是在有限定者与无限定者的混合中一同产生,而此前又说快乐自身就是无限定者。那么,痛苦就是有限定者吗?并不尽然,因为相反者作为无限定者被聚在一起,彼此限制,但限度作为限度,独立于这两个“种类”。或者,关键词其实是“在共同的种类中”:痛苦—快乐要么是同一个东西,实质上只是被施加于其上的秩序所规整的无限定者;要么,它是在某个本身是一种和谐的东西之中的附带现象。换言之,或者快乐与痛苦自身直接参与构成和谐,或者它们仅仅被某物——例如身体——感受到,仿佛在其内部;而这一身体作为身体,就是所说的和谐,但这种和谐既不是由快乐,也不是由痛苦构成的
31d 似乎是后一种情形:快乐与痛苦伴随着和谐及其变化,但并未显露为自身构成一种和谐
32c 记忆与预期的当下体验。圣奥古斯丁对此提出的疑问也值得怀疑:记忆中的牙痛,并不在当下引发字面意义上的疼痛。普罗塔库斯正确地指出了它与身体的脱离。但我对于希望之快乐的纯粹性,并不那么有把握,因为灵魂必定也有一种和谐,哪怕只是与身体之间的和谐;而且身体也参与其中,因为身体感受到希望,正如希望的内容本身也包含身体的概念,例如预期身体将体验的下一次快乐,或焦虑身体即将遭受的下一次痛苦
33c 反讽:神圣的生活得第二等奖,而混合的生活得第一等奖
34a 无感知,以及记忆是“感知的保存”
34b 回忆与记忆相对;回忆完全属于灵魂,而非身体,并且是主动的
35a 欲望:这里的图像又被悄悄改换了。此前是对受扰动的和谐的恢复,如今则被庸俗化为对空缺的填充
35b—d 欲望所欲求的,是记忆中能够填补一个人此刻所体验之空缺的东西;既然这种填充不在场,而仅被保存在记忆中,它就与灵魂相接触。每一个动物若有所欲求,所欲求的都是它此刻并未体验的东西,因此,它们的欲望全都在灵魂之中;既然口渴、饥饿等等也是欲望,那么体验它们的就不是身体,而只是灵魂
35e—36c 当一个人有所欲求,他总是一面体验身体的痛苦,一面在灵魂中体验希望及其快乐;或者,如果他没有希望,就体验双重的痛苦
36e 虚假的快乐,例如梦中的快乐;但它与希望的“纯粹快乐”有何不同?
37b “真实地”判断,说的是行动的实在性,而不是判断所陈述之内容的真值。快乐同样被真实地体验,但问题是:它能有真值吗?正如康德所说,感性从不犯错
39a 有趣的假设:如果记忆、感知与其他印象并不一致,会怎样?这里的一致是一种和谐吗?那么,虚假就是这种和谐的匮乏吗?但虚假似乎并不涉及灵魂中词语之间的相互作用,而只涉及所写下的东西。还有一件很好笑的事:《斐德若》中如此贬低书写本身之后,这里却出现了内心的书写
39b 一个十分精细的机制:先在内心书写,再依照写下的词语所作的描述,重现图像;从符号中重现图像
39c—40e 既然我们的灵魂中有这些图像,我们便说,灵魂的想象独立于身体而重现感觉,而感觉包括快乐与痛苦;因此,想象涉及快乐与痛苦。但想象至少在道德意义上可以是真或假的,因为想象总是受到关于何为善的道德判断所推动,总已预设了主体的道德能动性;我们也总能赋予想象以认识的能动性,因为它总是以我们自以为知道的东西为基础。因此,此前感性与判断之间的鲜明分隔就不再成立,感性也不再只是被动的:我们在处理感觉时,想象总已在起作用,快乐也总已通过想象、从而通过判断获得中介。如果有真实的判断,就会有有根据的快乐;正如也会有无根据的快乐,例如带有罪疚感的快乐。在这种情况下,就不再是“我感到快乐,但我也知道,我对这种快乐的判断是假的”,而是“我同时感到快乐与罪疚的痛苦”。这种混合而不纯的快乐是一种虚假的快乐;它的认识与情感基础,不允许我们简单地将其还原为痛苦和快乐,仿佛它们全都是同质的,如庸俗功利主义者的同质效用一般
41a 普罗马库斯(Promarchus)反对将虚假与坏混为一谈
42a—c 快乐与痛苦,同感知一样,总与判断紧密交织;它们之间的这一等同性得到牢固确立。正如存在虚假感知,也存在因远近等缘故而产生的虚假快乐
42e 假设的技艺
43a 进一步确立该假设为假:永恒流变否定了破坏与恢复的缺席,因此也就否定了快乐与痛苦的缺席
43b 修改假设:只有足够大的破坏与恢复才会引起注意,从而带来快乐与痛苦,因此,一种中性的生活在某些方面仍然是可能的
44b 那么,快乐就是摆脱痛苦吗?既然其前提是,一方是对另一方的恢复,这就忽略了破坏仅仅被阻止的状态。如果快乐就是摆脱痛苦,它就只是消极的,而一个“中性”状态被排除在定义之外;尽管将这种消极性等同于积极的快乐,可能是错误的
45b 即便认可排空与填充的图像,这里也预设了一种既定的、现成而被妥善理解的和谐,也就是身体与健康的和谐。但有些欲望可能具有全然不同的性质,它们才可能是严格意义上的欲望,而前面那些更适合被称作“需要”;因为现在这些欲望,并没有一种现成的和谐可供返回,例如创造的冲动
45c 数量与强度的对照
45e 我想,“凡事勿过度”也是一句神谕,就像“认识你自己”一样
46c 与此前灵魂自身享有纯粹快乐的假定之间,出现了一个奇怪的“矛盾”:现在,灵魂也可以享有混合的快乐。但这是因为,此前的纯粹性,是为了区分灵魂快乐相对于身体的纯粹性;而此处则涉及快乐与痛苦是否混合
47a 在流变之中,快乐与痛苦似乎总是相伴,并以各种比例相混合,这就是它们的纽带;但这也重新呼应了和谐:如今,痛苦与快乐自身似乎也应维持一种比例
48a 一个温和的提醒:即使在被认为纯属于灵魂的快乐中,身体也仍然承担着哭泣和大笑的作用
48d—e 恰恰在讨论喜剧之时,对无知的错误分类产生了喜剧效果(说真的,对金钱的无知并不是那么重要的一个类别)
50a 我们对那些作为我们“朋友”的喜剧角色怀有恶意:看到他们因无知而显得可笑时,我们感到快乐;而无知是一种不幸,也是一种坏东西。他们又太过软弱,无力报复,也伤害不了我们(因此,他们可以被视为“朋友”)。但恶意也是一种痛苦;所以,恶意同时就是一种伴随着快乐的痛苦。正如我前面提出的带有罪疚感的快乐的情形
50b 苏格拉底将喜剧技艺与悲剧技艺等同起来的“论证”
51b—52b 运用此前确立的中性状态,使那些伴随之损失不可感知、从而不造成痛苦的快乐获得积极性;这与《斐德若》关于哲学家爱欲之痛苦的论述构成对位
52c 这种归属凭什么得到辩护?此前,适度被等同于和谐,而这里采用的,却仅仅是它作为感觉之缺失的表面含义,仿佛不可感知的和谐损失就不再是损失。但至少可以说,痛苦这一情感会积极地扰乱和谐,甚于和谐的损失本身;或者说,这里有两个标准:损失必须非常小,而且被度量在限度以内,因此无论累积起来(若差距累积到足够大,痛苦仍然会随之而来),还是就瞬间而言,都不越界;而填充的快乐则必须足够迅速,才能被感知。这是不是未经批判地将多与无限定混为一谈的一个例子?但依据此前对多形而剧烈的快乐的描述,这里的“强度”或许不仅指一次用来填补空缺的“东西”的数量,还指持续追逐快乐时令人发狂的感受,因为在这幅图像中,痛苦与快乐作为流变混合在一起;而这些纯粹快乐之所以有尺度,是因为它们不产生这种流变,而维持痛苦与快乐的某种“比例”。但这仍未说明,为什么此处痛苦竟然不可感知。这里显露出填满水桶的图像与恢复和谐的图像之间的张力:这些“多形而剧烈”的快乐,似乎真正涉及的是流变,也就是不和谐,而对和谐的剧烈恢复因而实际上是虚假的。因此,这些快乐之所以虚假,就在于它们不断试图恢复某种东西,但为了使自己持续下去,又不可避免地扰乱它。也许是这三件事共同起作用:一次损失的数量、累积损失的数量,以及快乐的比例——这一比例也涉及其他一切事物的比例与和谐(即和谐之和谐)。或者,解释也可能是:既然快乐指向和谐的恢复,它就指向适度;但有时快乐自身却无法适度,因为它依赖此前的破坏,从而依赖不适度。因此,只有当痛苦不可感知,损失微不足道时,它才是完全适度的,是纯粹的适度。这样,这些“真实的”快乐便可以被称为真正适度的,因为其适度并不预设先前的不适度
53b 将美等同于纯粹性的高贵感受力
53c—55c 声称纯粹快乐比巨大的快乐更令人快乐,是很值得怀疑的,除非采用那种新的意义。生成为了存在而存在的二重等级关系,加上对快乐总是生成这一点的承认(这项学说被说成是“传承下来”的,但实际上应当是此前论证的结论:快乐即使在最纯粹的形式中,仍是对某种破坏的恢复,因此总是涉及生成),便推翻了它与善之间被设想的同一性
56e 理念性的算术
57c 贯穿始终的关切:知识与科学中的精确性
59a 相对于仅仅关乎存在的辩证法,对“自然哲学”的贬低;这一立场在《蒂迈欧》更真实的自然哲学中得到修正或展开
62d 普罗塔库斯未能察觉一种民主式“自由”教育的危险
64d 快乐与知识的混合本身就是一种和谐(甚至可能是相反者之间的和谐),需要通过使之和谐的智慧来培育和维持,因为真正的科学指向存在、真理、精确性与尺度;而快乐,即便是“真实的”快乐,也仍然是生成与变易
65a 善本身;它与美、比例及真理的统一
66a 我们这些拥有智性与理性、心态平和的人,将追逐强烈快乐的人看作“可笑的”;但应在此回想,正如此前确立的,“可笑”与喜剧性的恶意,以及快乐与痛苦的某种混合联系在一起——这是智性最终将克服的一种智性快乐——而我们也以嘲笑快乐本身为乐。最终,智性使我们对这一切可笑之事感到羞耻;随着笑声平息,我们也就克服了喜剧性恶意的这一残余
66b 令人惊讶的发展:理性本来被预期获得第二等奖,此处却被列为第三,排在尺度本身与“自足的”、经过度量的和谐之后。“自足”也是一个令人惊讶的用词,我原以为它专用于神圣者,而不用于人的美好生活;但后来发现这又是合理的,因为尺度与被度量者确实就是神圣者,前者作为种类——甚至包括善——后者作为由诸种类混合而成的总体;而第三等奖则归于我们之中较高而神圣的东西,也就是理性