Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Philebus · 斐勒布

Undated 未注日期

Philebus — Reading notes

Apple Notes

11b “what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted, and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing.” Knowing, understanding, remembering—right opinion and true calculations

11d already suspicious: pleasure or knowledge is said to be a “possession” or “state” of the soul—the status of experiencing in the moment and the omission of body

12a pleasure vs knowledge put on an axiological spectrum

12b the relinquish of dialogue; due to indolence or insolence (Callicles)? Revealed that truly “Eros” or “Beauty” is at question by naming the Goddess

13a—14b rejection of the false thesis that all pleasures/knowledges are alike insofar as they are pleasure/knowledge so therefore given it is the good they are all alike good; rather should sort out things of different kinds under the same genus, evaluate kind by kind if their opposition is defined by goodness, if they approach or distance themselves from goodness no matter whether goodness is pleasure/knowledge and if they approach badness instead, as goodness thereby is its own tertiary metric to which these contraries might belong, but more importantly it points to the fact that even a preliminary definition regarding the goodness-bearers in question is not reached yet, we don’t yet know what pleasure is, what are pleasures, how do they differ, how can we say absolutely that it is the good?; seems to be methodologically more concrete and instantiation oriented

14d “one and many”

15a ideal controversy of one and many instead of the merely sensible

15c Philebus “fell asleep,” perhaps not literally

15d logos brings the gathering and division, articulation; but problematic since it speaks of idealities as readymade in a way; and it doesn’t fully demarcate the essence of logos

16a intrinsic limits to logos: translation, violence, sleep; gang up with sleeping Philebus?

16d—17a famous presentation of the doctrine of one and many

17a precisely; charlatans of philosophy all too willingly yield to the temptation of non-analysis but wield either one or the many as sticks to crush others’ skulls without knowledge of the gentle touch of plurality

18a—b the obligation to account for pluralities and numbers; but thus is also evidence of the extreme ease one and many flip directly into each other, which is eclipsed by the epistemic-moral claim; Philebus speaks again

18d carve out discrete units from the continuum of infinity and from this plurality discover the one unity required since plurality can only be firmly grasped through unity; the ladder in between two poles as opposed to the immediate teleportation of the two poles, up to one or down to many

19a Philebus and Protarchus, the “dynamic duo,” or the indeterminate dyad

19c—20a a recap of backstory; but immediately obvious they are using scientific methods to determine if science should not be better than pleasure; this doesn’t turn to vicious circle, but it significantly reduces the likelihood of pleasure’s candidacy since it’s defenseless against science on its own means to justify itself in a societal setting; “we won’t let you go before the discussion reaches its satisfactory (pleasing?) limit (The Limit?)”

20b—c the ironic return to the “matter at hand,” the introduction of the third candidate

20e a certain kind of eidetic variation; hypothesis of negation to see essence

21d the conscience for self-worth or dignity or a mere sense of shame exceeds pursuit of pleasure

21e here is the prickly ruse: a life devoid of pleasure could be passable, but perhaps not if it’s suffused with pain

22b the relenting of the former stronger formula of “no one does evil knowingly” and retracts to the milder version: “no one does evil voluntarily”

22c “the divine reason” which supersedes the ratiocinative under the current discussion but is the good in itself

23a funny, “give pleasure pain”

23c the method of collecting and dividing; it already is at work in the earlier eidetic variation, dividing pleasure and knowledge and then mixing them

23d four kinds or five: limit, unlimited, mixture, cause for mixing, and potentially cause for separation; overlooking the potential fifth might be because, by the Timaeus, either the cause of mixing is not different from the cause of dividing, or separation will not occur causally as mixture is the product while idealities exist already in primordial separation

24a—27c crucial tract of the doctrine; cause dominates the caused in eternal generation; the “more or less” means the continuum where one overpowers the other and is continually overpowered by yet another, and therefore subsides and sweeps and where no measure obtains but in the Heraclitean flux measure is ignited and put out because time itself ought to be a measure and in this world of flux or mere perception one thing appears first as hot but then turns to cold when a new power approaches it, so this is a world where there are still things as perceived powers and becomings, and these powers can only be compared without being measured so they are never equalized—the minimum requirement of power and becoming is change from less to more or vice versa depending on contexts and circumstances of the comparison, so there’s still minimal intelligence that is Heraclitus’ Zeus; by necessity the flux also has to be “continuous” in the most degenerative sense because this continuum is due to the lack of measure and actual infinity of the more or less, not due to the comparison of the measures and the potentially infinite there contained, since there’s no real order with these bursting powers of becomings, so it comprises a “continuous” ordinal scale; so in all Plato is not fighting against some straw-man, but rather fighting a real worldview that’s self-consistent, the worldview of mere convoluted perceptions that only perceive the more and the less without calculation, number, or measure; the powers are not to be negated but to be sublated or mixed as it is a “self-consistent” way of living in that it doesn’t necessitate a practical egress from the position, in other words, a life without precision

27d the best life is the mixed life, but the mixture here is strange, since before the things to be mixed are opposites, but now are not at least directly opposites; they are opposites only if it’s granted that this mixed life is a temperate life, temperance is good, and pleasure belongs to the camp of the more or less, while knowledge to the limit; or we know the good life is a mixture, at least since it must be temperate, but so far it’s not yet pinned down what is the unlimited and the limited in this mixture, though the indication is clear; the casual and subtle hint at the other kind of mixture of elements (kinds) that might be even more secretly impactful; pleasure and wisdom as two parallel attributes are thus secretively replaced (by only indication) by the opposition and hierarchy of the limited versus the unlimited

27e to model good on pleasure is to model it on the unlimited, the infinite “encore!” of the divine vicious circle; so Philebus staunchly rejects the limited view of goodness, and Socrates counters with the short retort that pain is just as equally infinitely bad, with the undisclosed implication that since pleasure and pain are the more or less they can always be converted into each other and hence pleasure in the instant of experiencing it turns into pain, and hence the good is then undifferentiated from bad; but of course Philebus is too willfully ignorant to grasp or agree to this premise and they only talk past each other

29a the sailor line is funny

30a human body nourishes on world-body; therefore, since humans have souls, by epagoge, there’s a world-soul they nourish on; this is a cosmic digression from the question where it’s so casually answered already by a premise of the argument that knowledge is the cause of mixture, while what the tract does is to expand the analogy to a cosmic level

31c the immediate problematization: pleasure and pain always arise together in a mixture of limited and unlimited, where it was stated pleasure by itself is the unlimited; then is pain the limited? Not really, for opposites qua unlimiteds are brought together to limit each other, but the limit qua limit is independent of both “kinds.” Or rather the key word is “in the common kind” so pain-pleasure is either one thing that really is just the unlimited that is regulated by order imposed on it or it is epiphenomenon in something that is a harmony; in other words either pleasure and pain themselves directly contribute to making a harmony, or they are merely felt by a body as inside itself, for instance, which qua body is the said harmony, but this harmony is made of neither pleasure nor pain

31d seems like the latter option: pleasure and pain accompany harmony and its changes, but are not themselves disclosed as comprising a harmony

32c the present experience of memory and anticipation, which St. Augustine questionably questions, as the memory of a toothache does not cause literal aching in the present time; which Protarchus correctly points out its disentanglement from the body; but I’m not so confident about the purity of the pleasures of hope, as the soul must have a harmony too, if only with the body, and also the body is involved as it feels hope as much as hope involves the notion of body in its very content, such as anticipation of the next pleasure body will experience or anxiety of the next pain body’s gonna suffer

33c ironic; a divine life is second prize while a mixed life is first prize

34a non-perception and memory is the “preservation of perception”

34b recollection as opposed to memory; recollection is fully psychological and not somatic and active

35a desire: here the image is again surreptitiously altered, since before it’s restoration of a disturbed harmony, now it’s vulgarized to the filling of an emptiness

35b—d desire is desire for the thing that is memorized as able to fill the emptiness one currently experiences; since this filling is absent and only preserved in memory, it is in contact with the soul; and every animal if they desire they desire that they are not currently experiencing, hence their desires are all in the soul; and given thirst and hunger and so on are desires, they are not experienced by body but only by the soul

35e—36c as one human being desires, he always experiences hope and its pleasure in the soul alongside the pain in the body, or if he’s hopeless then a twofold pain

36e false pleasures as dreamt pleasures; but how is it different from “pure pleasures” of hope?

37b “real” judging speaks to the reality of the action, not the truth value of the content of the statement of the judgment; pleasure is really experienced in the same way, but can it have truth value, is the issue; as Kant says, sensibility never errs

39a interesting hypothetical, what if memory and perception and other impressions don’t concur? Is concurrence here a harmony? Then is falsehood a destitution of this harmony? But seems falsity doesn’t pertain to the psychic words’ interactions but solely to the thing written down. Another really funny thing: the writing of the heart after so many denigrations of writing as such in the Phaedrus

39b a very elaborate mechanism: writing of the heart, then reproducing of the image as described by the words written down; images reproduced from symbols

39c—40e since there are these images in our soul, we say our soul’s imagination reproduces sensation independent of body, and sensations include pleasure and pain; thus, imagination involves pleasure and pain; but imagination can be true or false at least in the moral sense, as imagination is always motivated by moral judgments of what is good, since imagination always presupposes the subject’s moral agency; we can also always attribute a cognitive agency to imagination, as it is always based on what we think we know; therefore the earlier clearcut separation between sensibility and judgment no longer holds, sensibility is no longer only passive, as imagination always is at work as we process our sensation, and pleasure is always already mediated by our imagination, hence by our judgment, and if there is true judgment, there will be founded pleasure, just as there will be unfounded pleasure, such as guilty pleasure, in this case, it is no more “I feel pleasure but I also know my judgment about this pleasure is false” but rather that “I feel both the pleasure and the pain of guilt” and this mixed and impure pleasure is a false pleasure whose cognitive and affective base does not allow simple reduction to pain and pleasure as if they are all homogenous like philistine utilitarian’s homogenous utility

41a Promarchus’ objection to the equivocation of falsity with badness

42a—c the equivalence between pleasure and pain and perception as they are always closely intertwined with judgment is firmly established; just as there are false perceptions, so are there false pleasures due to remoteness and closeness, etc.

42e the art of hypothesis

43a the consolidation of the hypothesis as being false since the eternal flux denies absence of destruction and restoration, hence by consequence denies absence of pleasure and pain

43b modification of the hypothesis: only great enough destruction and restoration bring notice and hence pleasure and pain, so a neutral life still is possible in some respects

44b is pleasure then escape from pain? Given the premise one is the restoration of the other, it overlooks the state in which destruction is simply hindered; if pleasure is escape from pain, it’s only negative and a “neutral” state is excluded from definition, though it might be false to equate this negativity with positive pleasure

45b this presupposes, even with the image of emptying and filling granted, a given harmony ready made and well-conceived, hence of the body and health; but some desires might be of quite a different nature, as they might be desires proper whereas the former ones are more properly called “needs” as these desires now don’t have readymade harmonies to go back to; such as a creative urge, for instance

45c number versus intensity

45e “nothing too much” is another oracle like “know thyself” I believe

46c a curious “contradiction” to the earlier assumption that soul in itself enjoys pure pleasures—now it can also enjoy mixed ones; but that’s because earlier the purity is to categorize the purity of psychic pleasures from body, here it’s the unmixed or mixed status of pleasure with pain

47a the bond where pleasure and pain seem to always go in tandem and be mixed in many proportions given the flux; but this also hearkens back to the harmony, now it’s likely that pain and pleasure themselves should maintain a proportion

48a a kindly reminder of the body’s role of weeping and laughing even in the case of supposedly purely psychic pleasures

48d—e comedic effects on the false taxonomy of ignorance (really, ignorance about money is not that important a category) right at the moment of discussing comedy

50a we feel malice towards comedic roles who are our “friends”, given we feel pleasure when seeing they are ridiculous in suffering from ignorance, which is a kind of misfortune and something bad, and are too weak to avenge themselves and won’t hurt us (hence they can be considered “friends”), but malice is also a kind of pain; so malice is at once a pain accompanied by pleasure; exactly like the case of guilty pleasure I brought up earlier

50b Socrates’ “argument” for equating the art of comedy with that of tragedy

51b—52b the employment of earlier established neutral state to give positivity to pleasures where the accompanied loss is imperceptible hence not painful; counterpoint to the Phaedrus’ account of the pain of the philosopher’s eros

52c what justifies this attribution? Moderation is previously equated with harmony, and here only the superficial sense of it as deprivation of sensation is used, as if imperceptible loss of the harmony is not still loss; but one could at least argue that the affect of pain will positively disturb the harmony even more than its loss; or there are two criteria, the loss be very small and also measured within bounds, so it neither oversteps cumulatively (in that case if the gap is cumulatively wide enough pain will still ensue) or instantaneously, but the pleasure of filling be quick so as to be perceptible; is this an instance uncritical equivocation of manyness and unlimitedness? But based on the earlier description of the multiform and violent pleasures it might be the “intensity” does not refer to the one-time quantity of “stuff” to fill the gap, but also the maddening feeling of persistence in pursuing pleasure, for pain and pleasure are in this picture mixed as flux; whereas these pure pleasures are measured insofar as they do not produce this flux but maintain some “proportion” of pain and pleasure, but this then does not explain how pain is somehow imperceptible here, and here is disclosed the tension between the filling-bucket image and the restoring harmony image, for such “multiform and violent” pleasures seem to really implicate the flux, which is disharmony, and the violent restoration of harmony is thereby really false—hence the falsity of these pleasures as they seek persistently to restore something they inevitably must disturb in order to perpetuate themselves; maybe it’s all three things together, the quantity of loss at one time, the quantity of loss cumulatively, and the proportion of pleasure also with regard to the proportion and harmony of everything else (i.e. the harmony of harmonies). Or the explanation could be that since pleasure directs toward the restoration of harmony, it directs toward moderation; but sometimes the pleasure itself cannot be moderate because it relies upon earlier destruction, hence immoderation; therefore, it is only fully moderate and pure moderation when the pain is imperceptible and the loss negligible. This way these “true” pleasures can be called really moderate as their moderation do not presuppose earlier immoderation

53b the royal sensibility of beauty that equals purity

53c—55c very questionable claim that pure pleasure is more pleasant than great pleasure, unless one opts for the new sense; the dual hierarchy of becoming for the sake of being, the admission that pleasure is always generation (this doctrine is said to be “passed down” but really should be a conclusion from earlier arguments, on how pleasure, even in its purest form, is still the restoration of some destruction, hence always involved in generation) then defeats its supposed identity with the good

56e ideal arithmetic

57c the overarching concern for precision in knowledge and science

59a the denigration of “natural philosophy” contra dialectic which is concerned singularly with being, which position is revised or elaborated by the truer natural philosophy of the Timaeus

62d Protarchus failed to observe the danger of a democratically“liberal” education

64d the mixture of pleasure and knowledge is itself a harmony (perhaps between opposites even) that needs to be cultivated and maintained through the harmonizing wisdom, as true science is directed at being, truth, precision and measure; pleasures, even when they are “true”, are still generation and becoming

65a the good itself; its unity with beauty, proportion and truth

66a we the equanimous with intelligence and reason see intense pleasure seekers as “ridiculous,” but recall here that the “ridiculous” is connected to comedic malice and a certain mixture of pleasure and pain, as previously established—the intellectual pleasure that intelligence eventually will overcome—and we take pleasure at laughing at pleasure itself; eventually intelligence brings us the sense of shame about all this ridiculousness and we thereby overcome even this remainder of a comedic malice as our laughter settles

66b surprising development as reason is expected to take the second prize but is here ranked the third, after the measure itself and the “self-sufficient” (another surprising diction as this word I thought was reserved for the divine and not for a human being’s good life, but it later turned out to be reasonable since the measure and the measured are indeed the divine, the first as kinds—including even the good—and the second as the totality mixed of kinds, whereas the third-prize goes to what is higher and divine in us, i.e. reason) measured harmony