Plato · 柏拉图
Republic · 理想国
Undated 未注日期
理想国——散记
Reflections · Pages
我悟了啊,所以Glaucon真正的问题不仅仅是正义本身是不是好的,更是“智慧的人/哲学家是否或为什么会选择正义”,而这个问题则被他哥澄清为“哲学家所追求的好的生活当中包含了正义的生活,那正义的生活的奠基(而非其后果)是什么呢?”所以从一开始就决定了这个讨论必须引入哲学了,哲学而非正义才是理想国真正的主题啊
施论苏格拉底与城邦正义
理想国中的正义是双重性的:首先在城邦中它意味着“各人做各人的事”,而这城邦中的定义被转移到个人身上就意味着让“各官能做各官能的事”。可是,在这里我们意识到有一个根本上的不对称性,也就是我们只说到了城邦之内的正义,但城邦自身相对于其它城邦的正义呢?很明显,每一个城邦并不仅仅操心它自己所在行的技艺;相反的,一个城邦必然由多种的技艺组成。城邦在此种视角下,似乎其正义被局限于自身内部了。但同样的关系也能在人身上被发现吗?人的正义似乎可以分别被理想国中的几个人物所代表,而归根究底人的正义无非被划分成:1.听从法的正义,而这将同时暗示立法者的非-正义,或者超-正义;2.追求好的灵魂所自然伴随的正义,或者自足的正义。第一种是在城邦内生活所必要的外部的正义,而第二种则是内在的灵魂的正义。城邦是没有外部的正义的;相反的,其内部的正义恰恰是人所生活的外部正义。城邦的正义完全取决于技艺之间的统治与被统治关系。如果灵魂的结构与其直接对应,那灵魂自身也就是诸技艺的综合结构。
然而,正义并不仅仅只是诸技艺完成各自的事,而更要求诸技艺的完成是“好”的。“好”指向了永恒的事物之整体。因此,这在城邦中要求了统治者对智慧与永恒之物有所把握,因此要求了爱欲。爱欲是在统治者的职责之内却指向外部;外部因此被纳入了城邦内部的结构。正义因此要求了自身的外部,也就是哲学的正义。统治者需要认识到永恒之物,统治者需要成为哲学家。城邦的正义因此指向了它的外部。
这却并不同样在人身上发生。对于统治者来说,他所需要的是在技艺之外的使用并分配诸技艺的智慧。然而对于人来说,其理性所思的对象自然地就是朝向永恒的。只要进行沉思,哲学与永恒就已经发生了。对于一个城邦来说,其正义在于统治者成为哲学家;而对于人来说则是相反,因为是哲学家,所以自然是正义的。因此,相对于城邦,人还有另一层意义上的正义,也就是自足的、哲学的正义。城邦虽然是自足的,也就是它不需要与其它城邦的交流(这一假设似乎仅仅存在于古典政治哲学或者理想国中),但它无法意识到自己的自足,它的自足因此是沉默的、无意识的;它的自足是互相协调的技艺的结果,其正义隐含了统治者的智慧这一前提,然而统治者的智慧作为统治者职责的一部分,又再次导向了正义作为前提,导致智慧与正义互为前设的恶性循环。这也是为什么理想国是不可能的:正义的城邦要求智慧的统治者保证其正义,但智者能成为统治者又已经预先要求了城邦是正义的了。苏格拉底因此在理想国中用了非常狡猾的一步解决这个根本上的难题:他预先假设了一个哲学家刚好是王,或者一个王刚好是哲学家。
然而这样的难题在人身上是被避免的。因为人的正义是智慧的后果,而非智慧的前提。因为人的灵魂已经预先与知识和永恒之物亲近了,对知识的爱欲自然地会引导正义的发生。
而这可以从Glaucon和Admentius的对立与统一里面去思考:Glaucon要求苏格拉底证明“正义自身”是好的,这时他已经对正义进行抽象了,因为正义的前提是智慧;而相当于Glaucon,Admentius则只需苏格拉底证明“行使正义本身而非其后果是令人愉悦的”。这里两兄弟的根本区别在于,G,类似于康德,要求正义从它的一切所属条件中抽象出来独立存在;而A承认正义的具体范畴,而仅仅对其动机发出疑问。换句话说,G口中的“义人”是全然抽象的道德律令本身的化身,而A处的“义人”则是有能力与知识在正义与非正义之间做出选择的人。苏格拉底所要做的,就是得满足两者的要求:1.证明纯粹的正义本身是好的(对G的回应);2.指示正义需要相对应的能力与知识作为自身前提(对A的回应)
两兄弟都希望证明正义本身相对于非正义要好,而证明则暗示了知识、智慧与选择;但Glaucon处的智慧与知识是隐含的、未被专题化的,苏所做的除了完成证明之外就是在对话中把这个前提挖出来了
换句话说,G希望得到的是对正义本身的好处的证明,而A则希望得到对正义行为及其后果的奠基。一个是否定神学,一个是本体神学……
进行进一步阐明的话,就是说Glaucon虽然自己在沉思正义与非正义,却不允许他例子中的义人也进行沉思;在他看来,正义的行动和对正义的知识可以是分离的。尽管他自己追求着对正义的知识,但这不妨碍正义本身可以不要求任何相应的知识。而苏格拉底则需要将Glaucon这种旁观者的抽象视角给充实起来,并指明正义与知识是不可分离的。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Now I get it! Glaucon’s real question is not merely whether justice itself is good, but “whether, or why, the wise person or philosopher would choose justice.” His brother clarifies this as: “The good life pursued by the philosopher includes a just life; what, then, grounds the just life, as distinct from its consequences?” From the outset, therefore, this discussion must introduce philosophy. Philosophy, rather than justice, is the real subject of the Republic!
Strauss on Socrates and the Justice of the City
Justice in the Republic is twofold. First, in the city it means “each person doing their own work.” Transferred to the individual, this civic definition means letting “each faculty do its own work.” But here we recognize a fundamental asymmetry: we have spoken only of justice within the city. What of the city’s own justice relative to other cities? Clearly, each city concerns itself with more than the one art in which it is proficient; a city necessarily comprises many arts. From this perspective, its justice seems confined to its interior. Can the same relation be found in a person? Human justice seems representable by the different figures in the Republic, and ultimately divides into: 1. the justice of obeying law, which simultaneously implies the legislator’s nonjustice or suprajustice; 2. the justice naturally accompanying a soul’s pursuit of the good, or self-sufficient justice. The first is the external justice necessary for living within a city; the second is the soul’s internal justice. The city has no external justice. On the contrary, its internal justice is precisely the external justice within which people live. The city’s justice depends entirely on relations of ruling and being ruled among arts. If the soul’s structure corresponds directly to this, the soul itself is a composite structure of arts.
Justice, however, means not merely that the arts each accomplish their own work, but that their accomplishments are “good.” The “good” points toward the whole of eternal things. In the city, this requires the rulers to grasp wisdom and eternal things, and therefore requires eros. Eros falls within the ruler’s duty, yet points outside. The outside is thus incorporated into the city’s internal structure. Justice consequently requires its own outside: philosophical justice. The ruler must know eternal things; the ruler must become a philosopher. The city’s justice therefore points beyond itself.
The same does not happen in a person. The ruler needs a wisdom beyond the arts that uses and distributes them. For the human being, however, the object of rational thought is naturally directed toward the eternal. As soon as contemplation occurs, philosophy and eternity have already happened. For a city, justice lies in its ruler becoming a philosopher; for a person, the reverse holds: because one is a philosopher, one is naturally just. Compared with the city, the human being therefore has another level of justice: self-sufficient, philosophical justice. Although the city is self-sufficient, requiring no exchange with other cities—a supposition seemingly found only in classical political philosophy or the Republic—it cannot become conscious of its self-sufficiency. Its self-sufficiency is silent and unconscious, the result of mutually coordinated arts. Its justice implies the ruler’s wisdom as a premise. Yet the ruler’s wisdom, as part of the ruler’s duties, again points to justice as a premise, producing a vicious circle in which wisdom and justice presuppose each other. This is also why the ideal city is impossible: a just city requires a wise ruler to guarantee its justice, but a wise person’s becoming ruler already presupposes a just city. Socrates therefore makes a very cunning move in the Republic to resolve this fundamental difficulty: he presupposes that a philosopher happens to be king, or a king happens to be a philosopher.
This difficulty is avoided in the human being, however, because human justice is the consequence of wisdom, not its premise. The human soul is already close to knowledge and eternal things; eros for knowledge naturally guides justice’s emergence.
This can be considered through the opposition and unity of Glaucon and Adeimantus. Glaucon asks Socrates to prove that “justice itself” is good. He has already abstracted justice, since justice presupposes wisdom. Compared with Glaucon, Adeimantus asks Socrates only to prove that “exercising justice itself, rather than its consequences, is pleasant.” The brothers’ fundamental difference is that G, like Kant, demands that justice be abstracted from all the conditions to which it belongs and exist independently. A acknowledges justice’s concrete domain and questions only its motive. In other words, G’s “just person” is the wholly abstract embodiment of the moral imperative itself, whereas A’s “just person” possesses the capacity and knowledge to choose between justice and injustice. Socrates must satisfy both demands: 1. prove that pure justice itself is good, responding to G; 2. indicate that justice requires corresponding capacities and knowledge as its own premises, responding to A.
Both brothers want proof that justice itself is better than injustice, while proof implies knowledge, wisdom, and choice. But in Glaucon these remain implicit and unthematized. Besides completing the proof, Socrates brings this premise to light through the dialogue.
In other words, G wants proof of the goodness of justice itself, whereas A wants a grounding of just action and its consequences. One is negative theology; the other is ontotheology…
To clarify further: although Glaucon himself contemplates justice and injustice, he does not permit the just person in his example to contemplate as well. For him, just action and knowledge of justice can be separate. Although he himself pursues knowledge of justice, this does not prevent justice itself from requiring no corresponding knowledge. Socrates must enrich Glaucon’s abstract perspective as an observer and indicate that justice and knowledge are inseparable.