Plato · 柏拉图
Sophist · 智者
Undated 未注日期
Sophist — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 31 January 2022
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216a a stranger, very much a philosopher
216b kind of god? God of strangers, so Zeus?
216c measured, divine
216d apparitions in the city
217d a speech of submission
218b another Socrates
218c name apart from speech
218e the smaller as a paradigm for the greater; hunt down
219c art of acquisition
219d art of acquisition can be divided into exchange and mastery
221d sophistry as an art
221e hunter; but aren’t you hunting down sophist as well?
222d conviction producing; how is this different from making?
222e an erotic art
223c apparition; it should be mastery vs exchange not hunting vs exchange
223d a different definition of exchange
224e can you retail learning?
225d garrulity seems to point to philosophy
226d diacritics; to differentiate
226e purification
227c speech leads and pursues
228 ugliness vs illness of the soul; ugliness is a lack of measure to hit outside, but illness is a conflict inside; ignorance vs vice
230a rough and smooth paths; philosopher seems to haunt the speech
231a resemblance of philosopher to sophist
231b noble sophistics, or nobler than sophistics? Do philosophy and sophistics share the same bloodline?
232a but isn’t it the case that name is unaccountable? But perhaps exactly because its non-composite we need one feature after all; but is this the same with one speech?
233c Knowledge without truth
233d maker of all(panta); All and All Things; belong to the All; imitation and child’s play
234e stand even further away from the true experience of standing far in speech and near in truth
235c can genera move?
236b an apparition; non-resemblance; power to see things; but is it still imitation? Isn’t it to know the beautiful itself and make beautiful things thereof?
236e appearance vs appearance; false things are
237b a transition; but still originated from the nature of sophistics and mimetics
239d the definition of sophist as an image-maker of that which is fails(phantastics); but Theaetetus tries to defend another definition of image, that of resemblance(eikastics)
242d myth
243b now the stranger and Theaetetus become the many
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245 that which is if affected by one to be one whole, then it’s not the same as one, thus is more than one; and itself is altogether without a whole, thus not really that which is. In this sense, both one and all fail to be what they should be. Or if there’s not a whole, that which is neither becomes something nor is something, and cannot be counted.
246a gigantomachy
246b dragging invisible to earth, being is body(not the same as matter)
246c from the invisible heights, being is intelligible; body is sweeping becoming(more like matter)
246d become better, those savage ones
247e that which is is that which possesses power? A definition: the things which are are power; but perhaps yet a shoddy definition
248b becoming vs being; we share both of them; but do we share in being through affecting and affection?
248e a repose at odds with motion
249a is life motion intelligence lacking in that which is(mind here it’s being that’s talked about, not men)
249b motion in soul; motion has to be accompanied by rest
249d the philosopher; a go-between; power to the being
250c being beyond motion and rest
252c powerless
253c a science, not an art, to mix genera; does not the mixing require a receptacle?; the philosopher!
253e is this relationship of ideas more spatial or more temporal? Are they being mixed or are they so mixed already?
254b a fugitive into the dark realm(moving?) as the sophist and a dweller in the brilliant divine as the philosopher(does he possess a steady gaze?)
255 same and other have to be different from motion and rest as whichever of the two is same the other will be other, which is impossible; same cannot be being because motion and rest are utterly other; other cannot be being because something is not accounted for by anything else, but is not in relation to anything else, thus other cannot be being
256b same to itself, other than another
256e other than being but be; being is extensive, non-being is infinite; different participations and different ways for those
257c negative provides a non-exclusive expression; thus it implies non-being means other than being, not contrary to being; whatever is not beautiful can share in the beautiful
258c in this way non-being is established as in opposition but held up by being; the way of argument proceeds in the following manner: (ontic level)first whatever is not beautiful is still a being; not beautiful is other than beautiful, thus shares in the other; thus whatever is not is other than that class of being but is also itself a being; and, (ontological level) the other itself is not contrary to being itself but also shares in being; and we can establish that non-being in itself means other than being itself; (on the all-comprehensive level) we can thus conclude that non-being as a whole is. If it were contrary to being, then it cannot possess any being and cannot share in being, which is impossible.
259d it’s non-philosophical to draw only general conclusions without detailed description
260c a new mixture of being, non-being, opinion and speech
261c a war at sophists
262c being only comes to be when a thing is in action/inaction; mere verbs or names cannot signify being
265a expose sophists to the philosophers; but a further problem thrusts up its head: if false opinion is, then what is the philosopher sticking to? The differentiation is again blurred: philosophers know how to mix and look at each species; but sophists look at what is not true but still is......
265e divine making; but is not proven
| Diving making of things themselves | Human making of things themselves |
| Divine making of images | Human making of images |
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
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216a 一个异乡人,很是个哲学家
216b 某种神?异乡人之神,所以是宙斯?
216c 有尺度的,神圣的
216d 城邦中的幻象
217d 一篇表示顺从的言说
218b 另一个苏格拉底
218c 脱离言说的名称
218e 以较小者为较大者的范型;猎取
219c 获取的技艺
219d 获取的技艺可以分为交换与支配
221d 智术作为一种技艺
221e 猎人;但你们不也在猎取智者吗?
222d 产生确信;这与制作有什么区别?
222e 一门爱欲的技艺
223c 幻象;应当是支配与交换,而非狩猎与交换
223d 对交换的另一个定义
224e 学问可以零售吗?
225d 絮叨似乎指向哲学
226d 分辨术;作出区分
226e 净化
227c 言说引导并追寻
228 灵魂的丑与病;丑是缺乏尺度而偏离目标,病则是内部冲突;无知与恶德
230a 崎岖与平坦的道路;哲学家似乎萦绕在言说中
231a 哲学家与智者的相似
231b 高贵的智术,还是比智术更高贵?哲学与智术是否同宗同源?
232a 但名称难道不是无法加以说明的吗?或许恰恰因为它并非复合,我们终究需要一个特征;但这与一篇言说相同吗?
233c 没有真理的知识
233d 一切的制作者(panta);全体与一切事物;属于全体;模仿与儿童的游戏
234e 更进一步远离那种真实经验,即在言说中远离、在真理中接近的经验
235c 类可以运动吗?
236b 幻象;不相似;看见事物的能力;但这还是模仿吗?难道不是认识美本身,并据此制作美的事物吗?
236e 显现与显现;虚假之物是在的
237b 一个转折;但仍然起源于智术与模仿术的自然
239d 将智者定义为在者的图像制作者失败了(幻象术,phantastics);但泰阿泰德试图维护另一种图像定义,即相似的图像(摹像术,eikastics)
242d 神话
243b 此时异乡人与泰阿泰德成了多数人
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245 在者若受一作用而成为一个整体,那它就不等同于一,因此多于一;而它自身又全然没有整体,因此并不真正在。在这个意义上,一与全体都未能成为其应是者。或者,如果没有整体,在者就既不生成某物,也不是某物,并且无法被计数。
246a 巨人之战
246b 将不可见者拖向大地;在是身体,而身体不同于质料
246c 从不可见的高处出发,在是可理解的;身体是席卷的生成,更像质料
246d 让那些野蛮的人变得更好
247e 在者是拥有力量者?一个定义:诸在者是力量;但或许仍是粗陋的定义
248b 生成与在;我们分有两者;但我们是否通过作用与受作用分有在?
248e 与运动相冲突的安止
249a 在者缺少生命、运动与理智吗?注意,这里谈的是在,而非人
249b 灵魂中的运动;运动必须伴随静止
249d 哲学家;中介者;赋予在以力量
250c 超出运动与静止的在
252c 无力
253c 混合诸类是一门科学,而非技艺;混合难道不需要容受者吗?哲学家!
253e 理念的这种关系更偏空间还是时间?它们正在被混合,还是已经如此混合?
254b 智者是逃入黑暗领域的人,正在运动?哲学家则是居于明亮神圣领域的人,他是否拥有稳定的凝视?
255 同与异必须不同于运动和静止,因为若两者中任一者是同,另一者就会是异,而这是不可能的;同不能是在,因为运动与静止完全相异;异不能是在,因为某物并不由别物说明,而也不与别物处在关系中,因此异不能是在
256b 同于自身,异于另一者
256e 异于在,却是在的;在是广大的,不在是无限的;不同的分有,以及分有的不同方式
257c 否定给出一种非排他的表达;因此它意味着不在是异于在,而非与在相反;凡不美者都可以分有美
258c 这样,不在被确立为与在相对立、却由在支撑。论证按如下方式推进:(存在者层面)首先,凡不美者仍是一个在者;不美异于美,因此分有异;所以,凡不在者都异于那一类在者,但自身仍是一个在者;然后,(存在论层面)异本身并非与在本身相反,而也分有在;由此可以确立,不在本身意味着异于在本身;最后,(涵盖全体的层面)我们因此可以得出结论,不在作为整体是在的。如果它与在相反,它就不能拥有任何在,也不能分有在,而这是不可能的。
259d 只下普遍结论而没有细致描述,是非哲学的
260c 在、不在、意见与言说的一种新混合
261c 对智者之战
262c 只有当某物行动或不行动时,在才产生;仅仅动词或名称无法意指在
265a 向哲学家揭露智者;但一个更深的问题探出头来:如果虚假意见是在的,那哲学家究竟坚持什么?区分再次模糊:哲学家知道如何混合并观看每个种;但智者观看的虽不真,却仍然是在的……
265e 神的制作;但未经证明
| 神制作事物本身(原文作“Diving”) | 人制作事物本身 |
| 神制作图像 | 人制作图像 |