Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Sophist · 智者

Undated 未注日期

Sophist — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 31 January 2022

In this note / 篇目

1

216a a stranger, very much a philosopher

216b kind of god? God of strangers, so Zeus?

216c measured, divine

216d apparitions in the city

217d a speech of submission

218b another Socrates

218c name apart from speech

218e the smaller as a paradigm for the greater; hunt down

219c art of acquisition

219d art of acquisition can be divided into exchange and mastery

221d sophistry as an art

221e hunter; but aren’t you hunting down sophist as well?

222d conviction producing; how is this different from making?

222e an erotic art

223c apparition; it should be mastery vs exchange not hunting vs exchange

223d a different definition of exchange

224e can you retail learning?

225d garrulity seems to point to philosophy

226d diacritics; to differentiate

226e purification

227c speech leads and pursues

228 ugliness vs illness of the soul; ugliness is a lack of measure to hit outside, but illness is a conflict inside; ignorance vs vice

230a rough and smooth paths; philosopher seems to haunt the speech

231a resemblance of philosopher to sophist

231b noble sophistics, or nobler than sophistics? Do philosophy and sophistics share the same bloodline?

232a but isn’t it the case that name is unaccountable? But perhaps exactly because its non-composite we need one feature after all; but is this the same with one speech?

233c Knowledge without truth

233d maker of all(panta); All and All Things; belong to the All; imitation and child’s play

234e stand even further away from the true experience of standing far in speech and near in truth

235c can genera move?

236b an apparition; non-resemblance; power to see things; but is it still imitation? Isn’t it to know the beautiful itself and make beautiful things thereof?

236e appearance vs appearance; false things are

237b a transition; but still originated from the nature of sophistics and mimetics

239d the definition of sophist as an image-maker of that which is fails(phantastics); but Theaetetus tries to defend another definition of image, that of resemblance(eikastics)

242d myth

243b now the stranger and Theaetetus become the many

2

245 that which is if affected by one to be one whole, then it’s not the same as one, thus is more than one; and itself is altogether without a whole, thus not really that which is. In this sense, both one and all fail to be what they should be. Or if there’s not a whole, that which is neither becomes something nor is something, and cannot be counted.

246a gigantomachy

246b dragging invisible to earth, being is body(not the same as matter)

246c from the invisible heights, being is intelligible; body is sweeping becoming(more like matter)

246d become better, those savage ones

247e that which is is that which possesses power? A definition: the things which are are power; but perhaps yet a shoddy definition

248b becoming vs being; we share both of them; but do we share in being through affecting and affection?

248e a repose at odds with motion

249a is life motion intelligence lacking in that which is(mind here it’s being that’s talked about, not men)

249b motion in soul; motion has to be accompanied by rest

249d the philosopher; a go-between; power to the being

250c being beyond motion and rest

252c powerless

253c a science, not an art, to mix genera; does not the mixing require a receptacle?; the philosopher!

253e is this relationship of ideas more spatial or more temporal? Are they being mixed or are they so mixed already?

254b a fugitive into the dark realm(moving?) as the sophist and a dweller in the brilliant divine as the philosopher(does he possess a steady gaze?)

255 same and other have to be different from motion and rest as whichever of the two is same the other will be other, which is impossible; same cannot be being because motion and rest are utterly other; other cannot be being because something is not accounted for by anything else, but is not in relation to anything else, thus other cannot be being

256b same to itself, other than another

256e other than being but be; being is extensive, non-being is infinite; different participations and different ways for those

257c negative provides a non-exclusive expression; thus it implies non-being means other than being, not contrary to being; whatever is not beautiful can share in the beautiful

258c in this way non-being is established as in opposition but held up by being; the way of argument proceeds in the following manner: (ontic level)first whatever is not beautiful is still a being; not beautiful is other than beautiful, thus shares in the other; thus whatever is not is other than that class of being but is also itself a being; and, (ontological level) the other itself is not contrary to being itself but also shares in being; and we can establish that non-being in itself means other than being itself; (on the all-comprehensive level) we can thus conclude that non-being as a whole is. If it were contrary to being, then it cannot possess any being and cannot share in being, which is impossible.

259d it’s non-philosophical to draw only general conclusions without detailed description

260c a new mixture of being, non-being, opinion and speech

261c a war at sophists

262c being only comes to be when a thing is in action/inaction; mere verbs or names cannot signify being

265a expose sophists to the philosophers; but a further problem thrusts up its head: if false opinion is, then what is the philosopher sticking to? The differentiation is again blurred: philosophers know how to mix and look at each species; but sophists look at what is not true but still is......

265e divine making; but is not proven

Diving making of things themselvesHuman making of things themselves
Divine making of imagesHuman making of images