Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Symposium · 会饮

Undated 未注日期

Symposium — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 12 February 2024

In this note / 篇目

I

172a how Glaucon is called in republic he calls apollodorus

172b an unclear memory, a hear-say

173a before and after philosophy

173d is apollodorus a Socratic thrasymachs?

175b interesting relationship to the servants

175e wisdom as continuous shareable entity

176c a drinking party without much drink, like in republic there’s not food or torch race promised; substitute drunkenness with a speech on drunkenness; but this truth of being drunk is merely a medicine discourse

176e no compulsion; woman is again excluded, music substituted with musical speech

177b Eros; 177d Phaedrus is the father then who is the mother?

177e “I who claim to know nothing but love matters”

178a again blurry memory

178b love on account of his becoming; the oldest, second to chaos, together with earth; devised first of all gods by Becoming

178c a suspicious statement, oldest is not necessarily the best

178d love beautifully imparts shame and ambition

179a a best city very different from that in republic

179b a god within; is love being passed from god to lovers the same as the former reference of wisdom being passed from one to another? Inspired toward virtue, not taught.

179c is the lover honored because of his virtue led to by love or because of the very fact that it’s led to by love? This virtue related to love is honored; because it’s virtue or because it’s related to love? Is orpheus not out of love?

180b if lover is more divine why is beloved conferred more benefits?

180d love is more than one

181a nobility comes from the noble way not the noble action since action is neutral

182a compulsion should be imposed upon common lovers and woman is the corrupter

183a the same action done as a lover is noble; a lover’s oath is no oath

184c slavery to virtue and love; a lover is not reproached, but for a beloved to not be reproached(as he usually is) virtue and love must go together

184e deception is not inimical to virtue or wisdom; and isn’t the lover pardoned for all his actions? So a noble lover is who is enslaved to his darling, and a noble beloved is who makes the lover enslaved to himself and is himself enslaved to virtue

Aristophanes’ turn is hijacked by hiccups, which speaks to a discontinuity and disorder from the previous conversation

186b body and medicine is brought up, not only about souls; medicine is knowledge about love matters, and Socrates really a doctor?

187c a temporal lapse between difference and harmony

187e why the common love only arises when applied to humans? And what is this common love if love is defined as that which induces concord? And heavenly love is not between lover and beloved only

188d divination brings friendship between gods and humans but only pertains to human love matters

189d an important correction: what is oldest perhaps is not noblest since what’s old might change including human nature

190c hubris

191b here not only heavenly love is not with boys; is there still heavenly love? Every love is equally a pursuit of what is desired as a nature

192e no, but this if really hammered out would be horrifying, just as the ancient creatures are comical

193c but this cannot be done; and is love thus absent once a whole is achieved?

194d socrates interrupted in exchange of words

195a love is known, divine knowledge?

195b the youngest, a direct opposition to first two speeches; but youth is characterized by an old saying

196c love is not touched and does not do violence

196d can one willingly do injustice? Can one pleasure master another pleasure? Isn’t Ares not really a strong god? And isn’t virtue being teachable or not a question; is wisdom of love an art?

197b the beautiful

II

198c Gorgias and rhetoric

199b not a competition

201b Love is somehow treated as it self a lover, is this justified? love is a movement toward beauty but is not beauty itself

201d a recounted speech again, but recounted from a woman with a name, a teacher of love matters; shift it from a speech to a dialogue

202e a demonic love

203e love, an image of Socrates? Or reverse?

204a the aporia of meno; recollection is substituted by love

204c loving and loved

205b a separated part is a whole; how to connect love as giving birth to the former definition of love as desire of good things?

206b why call her stranger in 204d? If he visits her regularly?

206e love is not just possession of the beautiful, but the giving birth in the beautiful

207a there seems to be only one side of the argument; as giving birth in the beautiful is different from giving birth to the beautiful or to the good; we know there’s immortality, but is there good in giving birth? Or is it good because it is divine matter? And isn’t it established that love as a giving birth is portion of love as desiring of good?

208a knowledge is not immobile

208d human being are no different as it might seem at first

210 a spiritual ladder of the beautiful; then isn’t love still a love of the beautiful? And where does that continuous progress come from? Is it like the reverse of republic’s degeneration?

212a why can giving birth in the beautiful and in the true(not to ask if beautiful is the true) give birth to truest thing or virtue? What is this “in”? Who is the mother and who is the father? Where is the other part? And immortality has degrees that there’s a true immortality?

212d refers to Aristophanes in 205e

214a real drinking starts

215d a meta-remark on the whole play

Isn’t socrates continuous silence remarkable?

217a what’s that one time?

221d the likeness of socrates is drawn to a demigod or demon

222a socrates speaks about shoe makers but does he speak to them?

222b pretend to be a lover but actually a darling

223a it’s not set up to be about praising the one on the right side; but if Agathon is in between alcibiades and socrates, Alcibiades will ask agathon to praise socrates again; Alcibiades is not prescribing for socrates but socrates himself is doing it