Plato · 柏拉图
Symposium · 会饮
Undated 未注日期
Symposium — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 12 February 2024
I
172a how Glaucon is called in republic he calls apollodorus
172b an unclear memory, a hear-say
173a before and after philosophy
173d is apollodorus a Socratic thrasymachs?
175b interesting relationship to the servants
175e wisdom as continuous shareable entity
176c a drinking party without much drink, like in republic there’s not food or torch race promised; substitute drunkenness with a speech on drunkenness; but this truth of being drunk is merely a medicine discourse
176e no compulsion; woman is again excluded, music substituted with musical speech
177b Eros; 177d Phaedrus is the father then who is the mother?
177e “I who claim to know nothing but love matters”
178a again blurry memory
178b love on account of his becoming; the oldest, second to chaos, together with earth; devised first of all gods by Becoming
178c a suspicious statement, oldest is not necessarily the best
178d love beautifully imparts shame and ambition
179a a best city very different from that in republic
179b a god within; is love being passed from god to lovers the same as the former reference of wisdom being passed from one to another? Inspired toward virtue, not taught.
179c is the lover honored because of his virtue led to by love or because of the very fact that it’s led to by love? This virtue related to love is honored; because it’s virtue or because it’s related to love? Is orpheus not out of love?
180b if lover is more divine why is beloved conferred more benefits?
180d love is more than one
181a nobility comes from the noble way not the noble action since action is neutral
182a compulsion should be imposed upon common lovers and woman is the corrupter
183a the same action done as a lover is noble; a lover’s oath is no oath
184c slavery to virtue and love; a lover is not reproached, but for a beloved to not be reproached(as he usually is) virtue and love must go together
184e deception is not inimical to virtue or wisdom; and isn’t the lover pardoned for all his actions? So a noble lover is who is enslaved to his darling, and a noble beloved is who makes the lover enslaved to himself and is himself enslaved to virtue
Aristophanes’ turn is hijacked by hiccups, which speaks to a discontinuity and disorder from the previous conversation
186b body and medicine is brought up, not only about souls; medicine is knowledge about love matters, and Socrates really a doctor?
187c a temporal lapse between difference and harmony
187e why the common love only arises when applied to humans? And what is this common love if love is defined as that which induces concord? And heavenly love is not between lover and beloved only
188d divination brings friendship between gods and humans but only pertains to human love matters
189d an important correction: what is oldest perhaps is not noblest since what’s old might change including human nature
190c hubris
191b here not only heavenly love is not with boys; is there still heavenly love? Every love is equally a pursuit of what is desired as a nature
192e no, but this if really hammered out would be horrifying, just as the ancient creatures are comical
193c but this cannot be done; and is love thus absent once a whole is achieved?
194d socrates interrupted in exchange of words
195a love is known, divine knowledge?
195b the youngest, a direct opposition to first two speeches; but youth is characterized by an old saying
196c love is not touched and does not do violence
196d can one willingly do injustice? Can one pleasure master another pleasure? Isn’t Ares not really a strong god? And isn’t virtue being teachable or not a question; is wisdom of love an art?
197b the beautiful
II
198c Gorgias and rhetoric
199b not a competition
201b Love is somehow treated as it self a lover, is this justified? love is a movement toward beauty but is not beauty itself
201d a recounted speech again, but recounted from a woman with a name, a teacher of love matters; shift it from a speech to a dialogue
202e a demonic love
203e love, an image of Socrates? Or reverse?
204a the aporia of meno; recollection is substituted by love
204c loving and loved
205b a separated part is a whole; how to connect love as giving birth to the former definition of love as desire of good things?
206b why call her stranger in 204d? If he visits her regularly?
206e love is not just possession of the beautiful, but the giving birth in the beautiful
207a there seems to be only one side of the argument; as giving birth in the beautiful is different from giving birth to the beautiful or to the good; we know there’s immortality, but is there good in giving birth? Or is it good because it is divine matter? And isn’t it established that love as a giving birth is portion of love as desiring of good?
208a knowledge is not immobile
208d human being are no different as it might seem at first
210 a spiritual ladder of the beautiful; then isn’t love still a love of the beautiful? And where does that continuous progress come from? Is it like the reverse of republic’s degeneration?
212a why can giving birth in the beautiful and in the true(not to ask if beautiful is the true) give birth to truest thing or virtue? What is this “in”? Who is the mother and who is the father? Where is the other part? And immortality has degrees that there’s a true immortality?
212d refers to Aristophanes in 205e
214a real drinking starts
215d a meta-remark on the whole play
Isn’t socrates continuous silence remarkable?
217a what’s that one time?
221d the likeness of socrates is drawn to a demigod or demon
222a socrates speaks about shoe makers but does he speak to them?
222b pretend to be a lover but actually a darling
223a it’s not set up to be about praising the one on the right side; but if Agathon is in between alcibiades and socrates, Alcibiades will ask agathon to praise socrates again; Alcibiades is not prescribing for socrates but socrates himself is doing it
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
I
172a 他称呼阿波罗多洛斯的方式,与《理想国》中格劳孔被称呼的方式一样
172b 不清晰的记忆;传闻
173a 哲学之前与之后
173d 阿波罗多洛斯是苏格拉底式的色拉叙马霍斯吗?
175b 与仆人的关系很有意思
175e 智慧是一种连续的、可分享的实体
176c 没有多少酒的酒会,正如《理想国》中没有承诺过的食物或火炬赛;以论醉的言说替代醉;但这种关于醉的真理仅仅是医学话语
176e 没有强迫;女性再次被排除,音乐被有乐性的言说取代
177b 爱欲;177d 斐德若是父亲,那谁是母亲?
177e “我自称除了爱欲之事外一无所知”
178a 又是模糊的记忆
178b 依据爱神的生成来谈爱;最年长者,仅次于混沌,与大地同时;生成最先构想出的神
178c 可疑的论断;最古老不一定最好
178d 爱美好地赋予羞耻与雄心
179a 一个与《理想国》很不同的最佳城邦
179b 内在之神;爱从神传给爱者,是否与先前提到的智慧从一人传给另一人相同?被激发而趋向德性,而非受教。
179c 爱者受到尊崇,是因为爱引向了他的德性,还是因为德性由爱引出的这一事实?这与爱相关的德性受到尊崇,是因为它是德性,还是因为它与爱相关?俄耳甫斯难道不是出于爱吗?
180b 如果爱者更神圣,为什么被爱者获赐更多好处?
180d 爱不止一种
181a 高贵来自高贵的方式,而非高贵的行动,因为行动是中性的
182a 应对庸俗的爱者施加强制,而女性是败坏者
183a 同一个行动,以爱者身份做出就是高贵的;爱者的誓言不是誓言
184c 对德性与爱的奴役;爱者不受责备,但要使被爱者不像通常那样受责备,德性与爱必须相伴
184e 欺骗并不敌对于德性或智慧;而爱者的一切行为不都被宽恕了吗?因此,高贵的爱者是受爱人奴役者,而高贵的被爱者则使爱者受自己奴役,同时自己受德性奴役
阿里斯托芬的发言轮次被打嗝打断,表明与先前对话之间的不连续和无序
186b 身体与医学被提出,不再只谈灵魂;医学是爱欲之事的知识,苏格拉底真是医生吗?
187c 差异与和谐之间的时间间隔
187e 为什么庸俗的爱只有在应用于人时才出现?若爱被定义为促成和谐者,那这种庸俗的爱又是什么?而天上的爱也并不仅在爱者与被爱者之间
188d 占卜带来神与人之间的友谊,却只关乎人的爱欲之事
189d 一个重要修正:最古老者或许并非最高贵,因为古老者可能改变,包括人的自然
190c 僭越
191b 这里不仅天上的爱不再是与男孩的爱;还有天上的爱吗?每一种爱都同等地是对自然上所欲求之物的追求
192e 不,但这若真被锤成一体,会很可怕,正如那些远古生物是滑稽的
193c 但这无法完成;而一旦达成整体,爱是否就因此缺席?
194d 苏格拉底的话语交锋被打断
195a 爱被认识了;神圣的知识?
195b 最年轻者,与前两篇言说直接对立;但年轻却由一句古老谚语刻画
196c 爱既不受暴力触及,也不施行暴力
196d 人能自愿行不义吗?一种快乐能支配另一种快乐吗?阿瑞斯难道并不真是强大的神?而德性是否可教,难道不是一个问题?关于爱的智慧是一门技艺吗?
197b 美
II
198c 高尔吉亚与修辞学
199b 不是比赛
201b 爱在某种意义上被当作一个爱者,这正当吗?爱是朝向美的运动,却并非美本身
201d 又是一篇转述的言说,但转述自一位有名字的女性,一位爱欲之事的老师;从言说转为对话
202e 精灵式的爱
203e 爱是苏格拉底的图像?还是相反?
204a 《美诺》的疑难;回忆被爱替代
204c 爱与被爱
205b 一个分离的部分是一个整体;如何把爱作为生育,与先前爱作为对善物的欲望的定义联系起来?
206b 如果他经常拜访她,为什么在204d称她为异乡人?
206e 爱不只是对美的占有,而是在美中生育
207a 论证似乎只有一面;因为在美中生育不同于生育美或善;我们知道其中有不朽,但生育中有善吗?还是因为它是神圣之事才是善?而不是已经确立了,生育之爱是欲求善之爱的一部分吗?
208a 知识不是不动的
208d 人类并不像最初看起来那样不同
210 美的精神阶梯;那爱不仍然是对美的爱吗?而这种连续进展从何而来?是否像《理想国》中衰败的反向过程?
212a 为什么在美中、在真中生育,先不问美是否就是真,可以生出最真的事物或德性?这个“在……中”是什么?谁是母亲,谁是父亲?另一部分在哪里?而不朽有程度之分,因而有一种真正的不朽?
212d 呼应205e中的阿里斯托芬
214a 真正的饮酒开始
215d 对整个场景的元评论
苏格拉底持续的沉默难道不值得注意吗?
217a 那一次是什么?
221d 将苏格拉底比作半神或精灵
222a 苏格拉底谈论制鞋匠,但他与他们说话吗?
222b 假装是爱者,实际上却是被爱者
223a 原先并未规定要赞颂右手边的人;但如果阿伽通在阿尔基比亚德与苏格拉底之间,阿尔基比亚德就会要求阿伽通再次赞颂苏格拉底;不是阿尔基比亚德在替苏格拉底立规矩,而是苏格拉底自己在这样做