Gui Ruiyan

Plato · 柏拉图
Theaetetus · 泰阿泰德

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Theaetetus — Reading notes

Reflections · Apple Notes

Revised 3 May 2023

In this note / 篇目

1

142a danger war and disease, a peculiar setting

142c Socrates’ dead, but prophesied

143a a putting off, an accumulated recollection; why did Socrates remember so clearly?

143c an explanation of the style; does it need explanation?

144e a tuning; reminds me of the soul

145c to self-praise

146b the out of age of geometrician

146d the same argument appears in Meno; but fully fledged, first it’s not what’s asked, second it’s circular, third it’s tedious and infinite

147b ignorant of knowledge

148b why is this definition an excellent definition?

149a pregnancy, art of midwife but a secret art

149c Artemis a virgin but the patron of childbearing; human nature requires experience to acquire skill

150b difference between art of midwife and art of Socrates: has to tell what’s true or untrue

150e teaching as inspiring; where is the seed/sperm/father? Art composes of telling truth from untruth, inspiring wisdom and delivery. Those who try to deliver themselves fail.

151b are those wise gentlemen fathers?

151e knowledge is perception

152e things are coming to be

153b the hot, fire, governs everything else; that is, change and becoming governs

153d the sun’s motion preserves; but change being good does not indicate change being all that there is, he is already operating under the assumption of all-binding-good, and about its preserving; what is preservation if not a non-change? So: coming to be-good-preservation-being

154c so with perception being the measure, things themselves must be in flux; whereas if the things are measuring, it won’t be changed by other things

155a the examinations of the appearings within us

155d wonder

155e uninitiates

156c story; perception and the perceived thing as twins

156d slow things approach and contact and generate fast things which transform the slow things instantaneously

157b a metaphysically laden language

157d nothing is good, but comes to be so; Socrates is reticent on his opinion

158a another sense of appearance; appearance as false dissimulation; a miscarriage?

158d dream or awake

160b being is again stealthily introduced

163a an argument not founded on plausibility

163c what we perceive when not learning language is just letters but not the meaning

164b memory as knowledge but not perception

164d logical consistency is not the most appropriate method to refute a theory

165a a bit too soon, untimely

165e a war in speech

166 memory can be just the same as original perception; and one can know and not know; but the main thesis that knowledge is perception for each is still not refuted

167a the direction of change is most important ; there’s only good and bad, no true and untrue

168a Protagoras in this image also separates dialectic from controversy

168e why is Theodorus always backing up?

172c what is bigger is when justice is involved

172e peace

173c an interruption, a branching off; speeches are slaves to speakers

174c is philosopher pursuing invisible imperceptible truth? Or is he perceiving something farther off? Then is he having “a different measure” than everyone else?

175e Odysseus is a noble man(?) but he can outdo farming than anybody else

177c that’s something fitting for my age

177e a tension in politics of advantages outweighing justice

178c futurity

179d again a war in speech; but isn’t a philosopher always at peace?

180b what is always moving gets to no where

180c parallax view; perspectival split

183d immediately back up after the agreement is accomplished

184d perceive with and perceive by means of are different; one means sense to be internal within; the other means an instrument outside that’s put to use

185d no means of perception can get in touch with ideas, ideas can only be thought “with” mind

2

187b opining

187c an eagerness is instilled

187d a digression onto false judgement, which is utmost crucial for the later development

188a but learning and forgetting are crucial

188d not believe in sth one knows or doesn’t know, but believe in sth that is or is not

189b but there’s no possibility in believing things that are not

190 else-opine is refuted, since one never opines one to be another when thinking of both or one

191a wrestle with speech

191e learning and memory are introduced

192 impossible to be falsely identified:
(km-p)1=(km-p)2;
k=-k-m;
(-k)1=(-k)2;
-k=k;
p1=p2;
p=-p;
(-p)1=(-p)2;
-p=p;
(kpm)1=(kpm)2;
(kpm)1=k2;
(kpm)1=p2;
-k-p=kp;
-k-p=-k;
-k-p=-p

192d possible to be falsely identified:
k=kp;
k=-kp
kp1=kp2

196 five and seven themselves; mistakes thus can be made in thoughts themselves

197d an acquired capacity(power) to hold knowledge, but not necessarily to have ready at hand

198b this definition of teaching as passing down knowledge is suspicious

199b to have and to possess, analogous to to know and to learn; to know is to have knowledge at hand, to learn is to recover the possessed knowledge at hand. This argument presumes that knowledges are in movement.

199d the problem here is how should possessed knowledge ever be out of hand? Doesn’t the mind know knowledge? and if a knowledge can be interchanged and made thus false can it still be called knowledge? and how is it possible for knowledge to result in ignorance?

199e Theaetetus proposes to introduce non-knowledges into the soul

200b but the problem recurs that if one can possess non-knowledges as well as knowledges and treat non-knowledges as if knowledges, then how do you know knowledge and non-knowledge are the same or different? And in that way, how do you again have true or false opinions?; unless you know what are non-knowledges that you can tell what are false opinions; but then we’re back at the start

200c infinite regress; always need another aviary to contain(possess) the knowledge for knowledge and non-knowledges; but since there’s always false judgement, there’s always non-knowledge to be already known, there’s always a larger aviary

201e dream

202b Name as opposed to account; reason as founded upon unreasonable primary things

203e but that would not be knowledge if the elements are without speech; except the elements are held together into one single idea that can be known; so when we know a syllable, we know its idea but not its elements

204b the All vs the Whole

204c the All vs the all things

204 delineates the following relationship: the whole can have parts since the whole and all the parts differs; but it turns out the whole as the All does not differ from all things, thus the whole and all parts do not differ; thus, if the syllable is knowable it has to have no parts and stop being a whole so as to not have elements

205d but if speech is also non-composite then the speech itself will be unaccountable

206b rather the contrary, the elements themselves are experienced, hence learned and knowable; but then it’s crucial to ask what is this speech of elements: are they still elements and are there still elements?

208a knowing every element does not guarantee a knowledge of the whole; so I can rightly opine one part without knowing why it’s there or how it’s connected to other parts; but is this due to not going through elements small enough? But then it requires a standard for what to call speech proper, and that standard again has to be known through a standard, ad infinitum.

208d a speech is that which distinguishes; the difference that delineates a realm of beings, and a commonness that gathers them

209c echoes the overture

209d but to have an opinion of something, that something already stands out as different; so opinion is already a difference laid out

210b are we still pregnant; but how is Socrates included?