Plato · 柏拉图
Theaetetus · 泰阿泰德
Undated 未注日期
Theaetetus — Reading notes
Reflections · Apple Notes
Revised 3 May 2023
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142a danger war and disease, a peculiar setting
142c Socrates’ dead, but prophesied
143a a putting off, an accumulated recollection; why did Socrates remember so clearly?
143c an explanation of the style; does it need explanation?
144e a tuning; reminds me of the soul
145c to self-praise
146b the out of age of geometrician
146d the same argument appears in Meno; but fully fledged, first it’s not what’s asked, second it’s circular, third it’s tedious and infinite
147b ignorant of knowledge
148b why is this definition an excellent definition?
149a pregnancy, art of midwife but a secret art
149c Artemis a virgin but the patron of childbearing; human nature requires experience to acquire skill
150b difference between art of midwife and art of Socrates: has to tell what’s true or untrue
150e teaching as inspiring; where is the seed/sperm/father? Art composes of telling truth from untruth, inspiring wisdom and delivery. Those who try to deliver themselves fail.
151b are those wise gentlemen fathers?
151e knowledge is perception
152e things are coming to be
153b the hot, fire, governs everything else; that is, change and becoming governs
153d the sun’s motion preserves; but change being good does not indicate change being all that there is, he is already operating under the assumption of all-binding-good, and about its preserving; what is preservation if not a non-change? So: coming to be-good-preservation-being
154c so with perception being the measure, things themselves must be in flux; whereas if the things are measuring, it won’t be changed by other things
155a the examinations of the appearings within us
155d wonder
155e uninitiates
156c story; perception and the perceived thing as twins
156d slow things approach and contact and generate fast things which transform the slow things instantaneously
157b a metaphysically laden language
157d nothing is good, but comes to be so; Socrates is reticent on his opinion
158a another sense of appearance; appearance as false dissimulation; a miscarriage?
158d dream or awake
160b being is again stealthily introduced
163a an argument not founded on plausibility
163c what we perceive when not learning language is just letters but not the meaning
164b memory as knowledge but not perception
164d logical consistency is not the most appropriate method to refute a theory
165a a bit too soon, untimely
165e a war in speech
166 memory can be just the same as original perception; and one can know and not know; but the main thesis that knowledge is perception for each is still not refuted
167a the direction of change is most important ; there’s only good and bad, no true and untrue
168a Protagoras in this image also separates dialectic from controversy
168e why is Theodorus always backing up?
172c what is bigger is when justice is involved
172e peace
173c an interruption, a branching off; speeches are slaves to speakers
174c is philosopher pursuing invisible imperceptible truth? Or is he perceiving something farther off? Then is he having “a different measure” than everyone else?
175e Odysseus is a noble man(?) but he can outdo farming than anybody else
177c that’s something fitting for my age
177e a tension in politics of advantages outweighing justice
178c futurity
179d again a war in speech; but isn’t a philosopher always at peace?
180b what is always moving gets to no where
180c parallax view; perspectival split
183d immediately back up after the agreement is accomplished
184d perceive with and perceive by means of are different; one means sense to be internal within; the other means an instrument outside that’s put to use
185d no means of perception can get in touch with ideas, ideas can only be thought “with” mind
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187b opining
187c an eagerness is instilled
187d a digression onto false judgement, which is utmost crucial for the later development
188a but learning and forgetting are crucial
188d not believe in sth one knows or doesn’t know, but believe in sth that is or is not
189b but there’s no possibility in believing things that are not
190 else-opine is refuted, since one never opines one to be another when thinking of both or one
191a wrestle with speech
191e learning and memory are introduced
192 impossible to be falsely identified:
(km-p)1=(km-p)2;
k=-k-m;
(-k)1=(-k)2;
-k=k;
p1=p2;
p=-p;
(-p)1=(-p)2;
-p=p;
(kpm)1=(kpm)2;
(kpm)1=k2;
(kpm)1=p2;
-k-p=kp;
-k-p=-k;
-k-p=-p
192d possible to be falsely identified:
k=kp;
k=-kp
kp1=kp2
196 five and seven themselves; mistakes thus can be made in thoughts themselves
197d an acquired capacity(power) to hold knowledge, but not necessarily to have ready at hand
198b this definition of teaching as passing down knowledge is suspicious
199b to have and to possess, analogous to to know and to learn; to know is to have knowledge at hand, to learn is to recover the possessed knowledge at hand. This argument presumes that knowledges are in movement.
199d the problem here is how should possessed knowledge ever be out of hand? Doesn’t the mind know knowledge? and if a knowledge can be interchanged and made thus false can it still be called knowledge? and how is it possible for knowledge to result in ignorance?
199e Theaetetus proposes to introduce non-knowledges into the soul
200b but the problem recurs that if one can possess non-knowledges as well as knowledges and treat non-knowledges as if knowledges, then how do you know knowledge and non-knowledge are the same or different? And in that way, how do you again have true or false opinions?; unless you know what are non-knowledges that you can tell what are false opinions; but then we’re back at the start
200c infinite regress; always need another aviary to contain(possess) the knowledge for knowledge and non-knowledges; but since there’s always false judgement, there’s always non-knowledge to be already known, there’s always a larger aviary
201e dream
202b Name as opposed to account; reason as founded upon unreasonable primary things
203e but that would not be knowledge if the elements are without speech; except the elements are held together into one single idea that can be known; so when we know a syllable, we know its idea but not its elements
204b the All vs the Whole
204c the All vs the all things
204 delineates the following relationship: the whole can have parts since the whole and all the parts differs; but it turns out the whole as the All does not differ from all things, thus the whole and all parts do not differ; thus, if the syllable is knowable it has to have no parts and stop being a whole so as to not have elements
205d but if speech is also non-composite then the speech itself will be unaccountable
206b rather the contrary, the elements themselves are experienced, hence learned and knowable; but then it’s crucial to ask what is this speech of elements: are they still elements and are there still elements?
208a knowing every element does not guarantee a knowledge of the whole; so I can rightly opine one part without knowing why it’s there or how it’s connected to other parts; but is this due to not going through elements small enough? But then it requires a standard for what to call speech proper, and that standard again has to be known through a standard, ad infinitum.
208d a speech is that which distinguishes; the difference that delineates a realm of beings, and a commonness that gathers them
209c echoes the overture
209d but to have an opinion of something, that something already stands out as different; so opinion is already a difference laid out
210b are we still pregnant; but how is Socrates included?
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
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142a 危险、战争与疾病,一个特殊的场景
142c 苏格拉底已死,却曾作出预言
143a 推延,积累而成的回忆;苏格拉底为何记得如此清楚?
143c 对文体的解释;它需要解释吗?
144e 调音;让我想到灵魂
145c 自我赞颂
146b 几何学家已经过了年龄
146d 同样的论证出现在《美诺》中;但这里更充分:首先,这不是所问的问题;其次,它是循环的;第三,它冗长而无限
147b 对知识的无知
148b 为什么这个定义是优秀的定义?
149a 怀孕,助产术,却是一门秘密技艺
149c 阿尔忒弥斯是处女,却是生育的守护神;人的本性要求通过经验获得技艺
150b 助产术与苏格拉底的技艺之间的差别:必须分辨真假
150e 教导作为启发;种子/精子/父亲在哪里?技艺由辨别真假、激发智慧与助产构成。那些试图自行分娩的人失败了。
151b 那些智慧的绅士是父亲吗?
151e 知识就是知觉
152e 事物正在生成
153b 热者,火,支配其它一切;也就是说,变化与生成支配着
153d 太阳的运动保存着;但变化为善并不意味着变化就是一切在者,他已经在联结一切的善及其保存作用这一预设下进行讨论;保存如果不是某种不变,又是什么?所以:生成—善—保存—在
154c 因此,以知觉为尺度,事物本身就必然处于流变中;而如果以事物为尺度,它就不会被其它事物改变
155a 考察我们内部的显现
155d 惊异
155e 未入秘仪者
156c 故事;知觉与被知觉事物是孪生者
156d 缓慢的事物接近、接触,生成迅速的事物,而后者瞬间改变前者
157b 负载着形而上学的语言
157d 没有什么是善的,而是生成善;苏格拉底对自己的意见保持缄默
158a 显现的另一种含义;显现作为虚假的伪装;流产?
158d 梦或醒
160b 在再次被悄悄引入
163a 一个不建立在似真性之上的论证
163c 未学会语言时,我们感知到的只是字母,而非意义
164b 记忆作为知识,却不是知觉
164d 逻辑一致性不是反驳一个理论的最恰当方法
165a 有些太快了,不合时宜
165e 言说中的战争
166 记忆可以与原初知觉完全相同;人也可以既知又不知;但知识对每个人来说就是知觉这一主要论题仍未被反驳
167a 变化的方向最为重要;只有好坏,没有真假
168a 这一形象中的普罗泰戈拉同样把辩证法与争辩区分开
168e 西奥多罗斯为什么总在退让?
172c 涉及正义时,问题更大
172e 和平
173c 中断,分岔;言辞是言说者的奴隶
174c 哲人是在追求不可见、不可感的真理吗?还是在感知更遥远的事物?那么他是否拥有不同于所有其他人的“另一种尺度”?
175e 奥德修斯是一位贵族(?),但他的农耕技术胜过任何人
177c 那是适合我这个年纪的事
177e 政治中利益压过正义的张力
178c 未来性
179d 又是言说中的战争;但哲人不总是和平的吗?
180b 永远运动者哪里也到不了
180c 视差之见;视角的分裂
183d 达成一致后立刻退回
184d 以……感知与借助……感知不同;前者意味着感觉内在于其中,后者意味着被拿来使用的外部工具
185d 没有任何知觉工具能够接触理念,理念只能“以”心灵来思考
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187b 形成意见
187c 一种热切被注入
187d 转向错误判断的岔路,对后续发展至关重要
188a 但学习与遗忘至关重要
188d 不是相信自己知道或不知道的东西,而是相信在或不在的东西
189b 但不可能相信不在的事物
190 异见说被反驳,因为人在思考两者或其中一者时,从不会把一者认为是另一者
191a 与言说角力
191e 学习与记忆被引入
192 不可能被错误认同的情况:
(km-p)1=(km-p)2;
k=-k-m;
(-k)1=(-k)2;
-k=k;
p1=p2;
p=-p;
(-p)1=(-p)2;
-p=p;
(kpm)1=(kpm)2;
(kpm)1=k2;
(kpm)1=p2;
-k-p=kp;
-k-p=-k;
-k-p=-p
192d 可能被错误认同的情况:
k=kp;
k=-kp
kp1=kp2
196 五与七本身;因此,错误也可以发生在思想本身之中
197d 一种习得的持有知识的能力(力量),但不一定随时把它拿在手边
198b 将教导定义为传递知识,这一点可疑
199b 拿在手里与拥有,类比于知道与学习;知道是把知识拿在手边,学习是重新把已拥有的知识取到手边。这个论证预设知识处在运动中。
199d 问题在于,已拥有的知识怎么会不在手边?难道心灵不知道知识吗?而如果知识可以被调换并因此变假,它还能叫知识吗?知识又怎么可能产生无知?
199e 泰阿泰德提议把非知识引入灵魂
200b 但问题再次出现:如果人可以同时拥有非知识与知识,并把非知识当成知识,那你又如何知道知识与非知识相同还是不同?这样,你又如何拥有真或假的意见?除非你知道什么是非知识,才能分辨什么是假意见;但这样我们又回到了起点
200c 无限倒退;总需要另一个鸟舍来容纳(拥有)关于知识与非知识的知识;但既然总有错误判断,就总有需要预先知道的非知识,也就总有更大的鸟舍
201e 梦
202b 名称与论述相对立;理性奠基于无理性的原初事物
203e 但如果元素没有言说,那就不会是知识;除非元素被聚合为一个可以被认识的单一理念;所以,当我们知道一个音节时,我们知道的是它的理念,而不是它的元素
204b 大全与整体
204c 大全与一切事物
204 刻画出如下关系:整体可以有部分,因为整体不同于所有部分;但结果却是,作为大全的整体并不不同于一切事物,因此整体与所有部分并无区别;所以,音节若是可知的,就必须没有部分、不再是整体,从而不具有元素
205d 但如果言说同样是非复合的,那言说本身就无法被论述
206b 恰恰相反,元素本身被经验,因此被学习且是可知的;但这样就必须追问,关于元素的言说是什么:它们还是元素吗?还存在元素吗?
208a 知道每一个元素,并不能保证知道整体;所以,我可以对一个部分形成正确意见,却不知道它为何在此或如何与其它部分相联;但这是否因为没有遍历足够微小的元素?然而这又要求一个标准,用来确定何为真正的言说,而这一标准又必须通过一个标准被认识,如此以至无穷。
208d 言说就是作出区分者;差异划定一个存在者的领域,共同性则把它们聚集起来
209c 呼应序曲
209d 但要对某物形成意见,这某物就已经作为有差异者凸显出来;所以意见已经是被铺陈出来的差异
210b 我们还怀孕着吗;但苏格拉底是如何被包括进来的?