Plato · 柏拉图
Timaeus · 蒂迈欧
Undated 未注日期
蒂迈欧——散记
Reflections · Pages
我怀疑色彩的特殊性在于其无限的可混合性,因此蒂迈欧才说“只有神可以决定色彩的比例”。色彩因此和气味不一样,气味是完全没有比例的,而色彩则是有无限的可能比例,而每一个比例都对应一个确定的色度;因此任何一个色彩都可能是无限的色彩的混合。对色彩的比例的决定困难在色彩实在太过清晰了,因此每一个色度都是无限的其它色度的混合。气味由于其没有任何确定的本体,其混合是完全没有比例的,因此对气味的决定困难在其彻底的模糊性。而味道和声音则处于一个清晰与模糊的中间位置,也就是可以分辨出几个基本的味型或声音的尺度,因此是有限的,其它的“程度”则因其无关任何具体的层次可以被忽略。因此为了决定味道和声音的比例,只需要决定几个基本型彼此间的大概尺度就可以了。换句话说,色彩处于一个认知的平面上,任意色彩都无限关联于其它色彩(没有所谓的基本色彩之说,或者说一个抽象的基本色彩不能给我们想要的关于色彩的信息,光是说“红”满足不了我们的判断力,因为每个色彩都是同样明晰的);而味道则处在一个垂直的阶级里,任意味道都处于一个基本味型的统御下,而有意义的是这几个基本味型之间的比例关系,我们的判断力只通过澄清几个味型之间的关系就可以满足。
我们看到的从来不是某种抽象的基本色彩,而永远是个体的、独立的此色彩;但我们尝到的却因其模糊性只能被决定为某种抽象出的基本味型
Khora是阴影之地;这是在说Khora类似于壶。壶承接了来自天的雨水,在自己的边缘中汇聚了雨水,又把阳光的暴晒挡在自己的体表之外,从唯一且永恒的光中拯救了无限的、柔和的雨;而在这样对光的抵御中,光并不被其损耗或伤害,而穿过了壶向天敞开的孔隙进入壶的内部,也就是进入了阴影的内部,投射成光斑在壶的内壁,成众多的显像。光因此在壶中被拥有,自己却不消散;壶因此同时持守了沉重的雨水与轻盈的光,并同时拥有了这两者于期间;而壶是空的,它的空要先于雨水或阳光对它的占据,在雨水和阳光在其内部的掩映中被再次刻画、涂抹出来。同时敞开的,是光的游戏和雨水的缓慢蒸发;当雨水逐渐耗竭,壶的空朝向天空的迎接将更明晰地在光中被开显;而光的无休止与永恒在阴影的包围中被拥有。在壶的使命的开端,开端自己已经被开始在壶的制造与耗损中了;终结同样如此。壶所占据的场所,Khora,是在永恒之前的时间,也因此是终结之后的时间,也因此是一切时间,是永恒之永恒的时间;是内部和外部空间的共有,在任何物被给予之前就允许了它的被给予、限制了它的被给予的“那个地方”;也因此,它不是“是”,不是“那个”,也不是任何地方。
场所(korah)并不同于物质或质料,因为1.物质仍然是在知与非知的范围之内,作为未知的存在;或者2.在存在与非存在的范围内,物质标识的是自我构成的潜在;并且3.物质永远与观念相应和,也永远脱离不开知与非知、在与非在的双重性范围。
而场所(korah)并不强调这种双重性,而相反它是绝对的给予性。场所或者空间当然可以成为一个存在者内部的属性,当且仅当场所被建立在一个具体的坐标系之内并由一个具体的存在者承载;这时的场所参与了存在的构成,但是是作为一个具体的、被填充的位置。也就是,这里的具体的场所要求了形式与质料的双重结构去进行锚定。然而当我们获得一个具体场所,或者被刻画出的空间的同时,我们不得不再次回到场所本身,也就是那个不定的、在其中事物发生而自身却可以不发生的空间性去。这是因为,当我们得到一个具体位置的时候,比如我现在在中国,中国在与我的并置和联系中获得了意义确定性,然而在同样的这种并置中,我也溢出了这片划定的疆域(我可以不在中国);而这样的溢出将进入一个更新的未定场域。这样的场所Korah可以与物质(观念之物质)交互,却不能被消解为物质,而总是在物质发生之前就被敞开并存守事物于其内部了。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
I suspect color’s peculiarity lies in its infinite mixability, which is why Timaeus says, “Only a god can determine the proportions of colors.” Color therefore differs from smell. Smell has no proportions at all, whereas color has infinitely many possible proportions, each corresponding to a determinate hue. Any color can therefore be a mixture of infinitely many colors. Determining color proportions is difficult because colors are simply too clear: every hue is a mixture of infinitely many others. Smells, lacking any determinate substance, mix without proportions at all; determining smells is therefore difficult because of their utter obscurity. Taste and sound occupy an intermediate position between clarity and obscurity. Several basic types of taste or scales of sound can be distinguished, so they are finite; other “degrees” can be ignored because they correspond to no concrete level. To determine the proportions of tastes and sounds, one therefore needs only to determine the approximate scales between a few basic types. In other words, colors occupy one cognitive plane: every color is infinitely related to other colors. There are no so-called basic colors, or an abstract basic color cannot give us the information we want about color. Merely saying “red” does not satisfy our faculty of judgment, since every color is equally clear. Tastes, however, occupy a vertical hierarchy. Every taste falls under a basic type, and what matters is the proportional relation among these basic types. Our faculty of judgment can be satisfied simply by clarifying the relations among them.
What we see is never some abstract basic color, but always this individual, independent color. What we taste, however, can only be determined as some abstracted basic type because of its obscurity.
Khōra is the place of shadow. This means that khōra resembles a jug. The jug receives rain from the sky and gathers it within its rim, while keeping the sun’s scorching light outside its surface. It rescues infinite, gentle rain from the one eternal light. Yet in this resistance to light, the light is neither depleted nor harmed. It passes through the jug’s opening toward the sky into the jug’s interior, into the interior of shadow, projecting patches of light on the inner wall as manifold appearances. Light is thus held within the jug without itself dissipating. The jug simultaneously preserves heavy rainwater and weightless light, holding both within it. Yet the jug is empty: its emptiness precedes its occupation by rainwater or sunlight and is delineated, painted forth anew in their interplay of concealment and illumination within it. What opens simultaneously is the play of light and the slow evaporation of rainwater. As the rainwater is gradually exhausted, the jug’s empty welcome toward the sky is disclosed more clearly in light, while light’s ceaselessness and eternity are held amid surrounding shadows. At the beginning of the jug’s vocation, the beginning itself has already begun in the jug’s making and wearing away; the same holds for its end. The place occupied by the jug, khōra, is time before eternity, and therefore time after the end, and therefore all time, the time of eternity’s eternity. It is the sharing of inner and outer space, “that place” which, before any thing is given, already permits and limits its givenness. It is therefore not an “is,” not a “that,” and not any place.
Place, khōra, differs from matter or material because 1. matter remains within the domain of knowing and not-knowing, as unknown being; or 2. within the domain of being and nonbeing, matter marks the potentiality of self-constitution; and 3. matter always corresponds to ideas and can never escape the dual domains of knowing and not-knowing, being and nonbeing.
Place, khōra, does not emphasize this duality. On the contrary, it is absolute givenness. Place or space can certainly become a property within a being, if and only if place is established within a concrete coordinate system and borne by a concrete being. Place then participates in the constitution of being, but as a concrete, filled position. A concrete place thus requires the dual structure of form and matter for its anchoring. Yet when we obtain a concrete place, or a delineated space, we must simultaneously return to place itself: indeterminate spatiality, within which things happen while it need not itself happen. This is because, when we obtain a concrete position—for example, I am now in China—China acquires a determinate meaning through its juxtaposition and connection with me. Yet in this very juxtaposition I also overflow this delimited territory: I could be outside China. This overflow enters a new, undetermined field. Such place, khōra, can interact with matter, the matter of ideas, but cannot be dissolved into matter. It always already opens before matter occurs, preserving things within itself.