Plotinus · 普罗提诺
Enneads · 九章集
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九章集——散记
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普罗提诺是多么热爱诙谐剧啊!他也因此是戏剧本身的热爱者。而作为普罗提诺的背面,奥古斯丁从一开始就热爱悲剧,最终也不出所料地痛恨戏剧本身。
普罗提诺到灵魂的上升线索:质料-物体-诸器官-脑-统觉“图像”-记忆与想象-语言-知性-理性-灵魂-大写灵魂。
到了大写灵魂的阶段,日常生活中所意指的那种记忆就已经消失了,取而代之的将仅仅只是对理念进行思考的活动与潜能;潜能并不是遗忘,回忆也不是对已忘却之物的抓取,而将仅仅是注意力投注方向的改变。
没有实修就容易忽略沉思其实是超出语言表征的,灵魂之时间也是与单纯的内感时间完全不一样的,像内感时间就是单纯的语言符号的互相替代,很多人单纯把这个当成是实在的运动了
当普罗提诺的书写中出现了「理念-钟表」的影子的时候,我真切感到了一种知己的友谊。
当然准确来说是「灵魂-钟表」
普罗提诺那里灵魂的特殊性在于,其它可感领域的事物都以图像的方式被其理念领域的原型(非-)包含,但特殊的灵魂与普遍的灵魂之间却并非一个图像与原型的映照关系,而更像是一个连续的部分与整体之间的关系,两者之间被大写的灵魂本身直接通达。
通过对灵魂的反照,灵魂回溯追寻自己的起源,达到了灵魂之理念;但灵魂本身就是对一切事物的时间性沉思,达到灵魂之理念就意味着将一切事物的时间性沉思抬高到了无时的层面,一切事物也就在此与灵魂一同被抬升到了无时的层面而获得了自己的理念内容
也就是在这样的上升中,灵魂之理念被转化,而释放出全新的场域:即理智。
今天读完了,需要纠正一点,个体灵魂与大写灵魂间非是一个部分与整体的关系,而是同一性与其不同功能之间的关系,因为数学化或形而上学化的部分和整体之间依旧没有灵魂所特有的那种有机连续性和根本同一性
并且整体-部分的静态关系忽略了灵魂是一种根本活动,因此在特殊与普遍灵魂的内部含有抵抗与统一的张力
普罗提诺
普罗提诺的形式层次可以如下描述:多→综合→一
自然是对被弱理性限制过的复多个体由更高的理性(作为自然之部分)进行综合的“理念-活动”,而理念-活动是无质料的,其综合活动依赖于在质料杂多的运动中持存不动的理性原则,并在这个意义上是更根本的自然。换句话说,自然意味着一个聚集了对诸质料之理解的理念,并在弱理性的中介下间接与质料接触;然而,自然因此在内部被分裂成自然的综合活动与自然的统一原则,统一原则是更高的理性,也因此是属于自然的不动部分。所以自然内容的统一来自于更高的理性。而要达成自然之理念完满的一性,也就是除了自然内容的统一,还要达成自然内容与更高的理性原则这两者的统一,我们只能将其回溯到灵魂本身的统一原则上。但是,灵魂因此将会遭遇一次分裂,其底部成为自然理念(更高的理性)与自然内容的综合(时空),顶部则成为自然理念与自然内容的统一原则(持存在时空中的灵魂单子)。而灵魂之分裂,体现为时间与持存的对立,将再次要求一个统一原则,即非时的活动原则,也就是理智。然而,理智还会遇到一对悖反,即思者(无时之内容的统一原则)与被思者(被综合的无时内容本身)之间的对立。这个对立本身就是理智,而对这个对立的扬弃最后则到达了太一。
因此,用图示学可以这样表示太一的沉降或流溢:太一=太一(主动统一)+理智(被动综合),理智=思者(主动统一)+被思者(被动综合),被思者=灵魂=永恒(主动统一)+时间(被动综合),时间=自然理念=理性自然(主动统一)+弱理性(被动综合),弱理性=形式(主动统一)+质料(被动综合);需要注意的是,这并不是一个时间演进,而是永恒的活动,因此每个阶段其实是互相渗透的,因为每个阶段继承了上个阶段的活性。
普罗提诺论关于存在范畴
首先通过类比,普罗提诺将太一的运动转化到了智性或者思维的运动上,通过思维的self-predication得到了五个范畴。当中最矛盾的就是“存在”范畴。熟悉康德和亚里士多德就会意识到这里的问题,存在不能作为分开独立的谓语,哪怕是范畴这种普遍性谓语;“石头”可以有硬、有形、物质性等性质,但“存在”不能成为一个性质,否则剔除存在的石头的概念和添加存在的现实的石头将不等同,而且如果没有“存在”那石头一开始就不会存在,无论是概念还是感知;如果“存在”成为了一个范畴,那产生这个范畴的更高的“一”就不能认作是存在的,那“存在”这个范畴本身就不存在了。普罗提诺因此一边坚持存在不是独立范畴一边又将它列入范畴就显得很有问题了。他的理由是,“存在”虽然不能被列为范畴,但在“存在的存在就是去存在”这一个循环运动的语境下,可以发现存在的自我差异、自我谓述,也就可以被范畴化;类比于智性,就是“思考对思考本身进行思考”,此处思考既是主语也是谓语,既是思也是所思,如果存在不是一个范畴,不对所思进行规定,所思不被认为存在,那思也就无法被认作存在,那就没有任何事物存在;同样的,如果存在不对存在者进行规定,那存在本身就不存在。
所以就是,存在必须对特殊的存在者,比如范畴,比如存在本身(海哥激怒)成为特殊的规定,也就要求了其对一切存在者的范畴化,成为普遍的规定,否则思可以不是所思,就无法对应,存在可以不是存在者,就不存在;但一旦成为规定,它又暗示了其可以不被规定……所以同时要求最高的规定性,但最高的规定性却是不规定性……
康德的论证(如果我没记错的话):1.如果我们说存在是一个谓词,那就会碰到这个问题;主词可以是不存在的;也就是一个概念可以是不存在的。一个不存在的概念相当于是没有直观被给予的概念;那这个概念就是空的,没有内容的概念;而没有内容的概念无法对应有内容的概念(被给予的谓词)做出判断;那就无法对作为谓词的存在与否做出判断;就与前提矛盾了。也就是,你不能说“石头是存在的”是一个谓语判断,因为这要么相当于在说“不存在的石头是存在的”而矛盾,要么相当于在说“存在的石头是存在的”而是question begging的废话。
亚里士多德关于存在不能是范畴的论证:假设存在是范畴,这意味着存在是最高的genus,称T;之下有各特定的存在领域,称t1,t2,t3……t1≠T,t2≠T,尽管t1,t2被T包含。这意味着,t1、t2等各部分差异于总体的T。因此T是与t1、t2差异开的;然而T共同包含了t1和t2,因此这个差异并不内在于T,那就是外在于T;T因此不会是最高的genus。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
How Plotinus loves comedy! And for this reason he is a lover of drama itself. Augustine, as Plotinus’ reverse side, loves tragedy from the outset and, predictably enough, ends by hating drama itself.
Plotinus’ ascending path toward soul: matter–body–organs–brain–apperceptive ‘image’–memory and imagination–language–understanding–reason–soul–Soul.
At the stage of Soul with a capital S, memory in its everyday sense has already disappeared. In its place remain only the activity and potentiality of thinking Ideas. Potentiality is not forgetting, nor is recollection the grasping of something forgotten: it is merely a change in the direction of attention.
Without actual practice, it is easy to overlook that contemplation exceeds linguistic representation, and that the time of soul differs entirely from the mere time of inner sense. The time of inner sense is simply the mutual substitution of linguistic signs; many people simply take this for real movement.
When the outline of an ‘Idea-clock’ appeared in Plotinus’ writing, I truly felt the friendship of someone who understood me.
Though, to be precise, it is a ‘soul-clock.’
What is distinctive about soul in Plotinus is that everything else in the sensible domain is (not-)contained, as an image, by its archetype in the domain of Ideas. But the particular soul and universal Soul do not stand in this mirroring relation of image to archetype. Their relation is more like a continuous relation of part to whole, with Soul itself directly opening a passage between the two.
Through reflection upon soul, soul traces its origin backward and reaches the Idea of soul. Yet soul itself is the temporal contemplation of all things. To reach the Idea of soul is to raise the temporal contemplation of all things to a timeless level; all things are thereby raised together with soul to this timeless level and obtain their own ideal content.
It is in this ascent that the Idea of soul is transformed and releases an entirely new domain: Intelligence.
Having finished reading today, I need to correct one point. The relation between the individual soul and Soul is not that of part to whole, but that of an identity to its different functions. Mathematical or metaphysical parts and wholes still lack the organic continuity and fundamental identity peculiar to soul.
Moreover, the static relation of whole to part overlooks that soul is fundamentally an activity. Within particular soul and universal Soul there is therefore a tension between resistance and unity.
Plotinus
Plotinus’ levels of form can be described as follows: many → synthesis → one.
Nature is an ‘Idea-activity’ in which a higher Reason, as a part of nature, synthesizes multiple individuals already limited by a weaker Reason. This Idea-activity is immaterial. Its synthetic activity depends upon a rational principle that persists unmoved amid the movement of material multiplicity, and in this sense it is a more fundamental nature. In other words, nature means an Idea that gathers an understanding of various materials and comes into indirect contact with matter through the mediation of weaker Reason. Yet nature is thereby internally divided into its synthetic activity and its principle of unity. The principle of unity is higher Reason, and thus the unmoving part belonging to nature. The unity of nature’s content therefore comes from higher Reason. To attain the complete oneness of the Idea of nature—not only the unity of nature’s content, but also the unity of that content with the higher rational principle—we can only trace it back to soul’s own principle of unity. Soul, however, will thereby undergo a division. Its lower part becomes the synthesis of the Idea of nature, or higher Reason, with nature’s content: space and time. Its upper part becomes the principle unifying the Idea of nature and nature’s content: the soul-monad persisting in space and time. This division of soul, manifest as the opposition between time and persistence, again requires a principle of unity: a nontemporal principle of activity, namely Intelligence. Yet Intelligence encounters another antinomy, the opposition between the thinker, as the principle unifying timeless content, and the thought, as the synthesized timeless content itself. This opposition itself is Intelligence. Its sublation finally arrives at the One.
Diagrammatically, the descent or emanation of the One can therefore be represented as follows: the One = the One (active unification) + Intelligence (passive synthesis); Intelligence = the thinker (active unification) + the thought (passive synthesis); the thought = soul = eternity (active unification) + time (passive synthesis); time = the Idea of nature = rational nature (active unification) + weaker Reason (passive synthesis); weaker Reason = form (active unification) + matter (passive synthesis). Note that this is not a temporal progression but an eternal activity. Each stage therefore interpenetrates the others, because each inherits the activity of the preceding stage.
Plotinus on the categories of Being
First, through analogy, Plotinus transfers the movement of the One to the movement of Intelligence or thought, deriving five categories through thought’s self-predication. The most contradictory among them is the category of ‘Being.’ Anyone familiar with Kant and Aristotle will recognize the problem: Being cannot be a separate, independent predicate, not even a universal predicate such as a category. A ‘stone’ can have properties such as hardness, shape, and materiality, but ‘Being’ cannot be a property. Otherwise, the concept of a stone with Being removed would not be equivalent to the actual stone with Being added; moreover, without ‘Being,’ the stone would not exist in the first place, whether conceptually or perceptually. If ‘Being’ becomes a category, the higher ‘one’ producing that category cannot itself be regarded as existent, and the category of ‘Being’ itself would not exist. It therefore seems deeply problematic for Plotinus to insist that Being is not an independent category while nevertheless listing it among the categories. His reason is that although ‘Being’ cannot be listed as a category, in the context of the circular movement ‘the being of Being is to be,’ we discover Being’s self-differentiation and self-predication, and can thus categorize it. By analogy with Intelligence, this is ‘thinking thinking thinking itself.’ Thinking here is both subject and predicate, both thought and what is thought. If Being is not a category and does not determine what is thought, if what is thought is not regarded as existent, then thinking cannot be regarded as existent either, and nothing exists. Likewise, if Being does not determine beings, Being itself does not exist.
So Being must become a particular determination of particular beings—for example, categories, or Being itself (cue an enraged Heidegger). This requires its categorization with respect to all beings, making it a universal determination. Otherwise thinking could fail to be what is thought, and there would be no correspondence; Being could fail to be a being, and would not exist. Yet once it becomes a determination, it implies that it can also be undetermined… Thus the highest determinacy is required, but the highest determinacy is indeterminacy…
Kant’s argument, if I remember correctly: 1. If we say that existence is a predicate, we encounter this problem: the subject can be nonexistent, which is to say that a concept can be nonexistent. A nonexistent concept amounts to a concept to which no intuition is given. This would be an empty concept, a concept without content. A concept without content cannot correspond to a concept with content—the given predicate—in a judgment. We therefore could not judge whether existence, as a predicate, applies or not, contradicting the premise. In other words, you cannot say that ‘the stone exists’ is a predicative judgment, because this amounts either to saying ‘the nonexistent stone exists,’ a contradiction, or to saying ‘the existent stone exists,’ which is question-begging nonsense.
Aristotle’s argument that Being cannot be a category: suppose Being is a category. This means that Being is the highest genus, which we call T. Beneath it are particular domains of Being, called t1, t2, t3… t1 ≠ T, t2 ≠ T, even though t1 and t2 are contained by T. This means that the parts t1, t2, and so on differ from T as a whole. T is therefore differentiated from t1 and t2. Yet T contains t1 and t2 together, so this difference is not internal to T but external to it. T therefore cannot be the highest genus.