Gui Ruiyan

Miscellaneous · 杂记
Quantum mechanics and phenomenology · 量子力学与现象学

Quantum Phenomenology

Paper / 论文

All physics prior to quantum mechanics is based on one premise: objective reality is independent from subjective acts. This is due to the complex historical process of idealization that grounds science as such (ἐπιστήμη): physicists believe, with more or less certainty, not only that nature is thoroughly mathematizable, but also only the mathematizable aspect of it is the proper subject matter of an exact natural science like physics. In a sense, physics as a science is not purely conceptual, as metaphysics is, but is rather based on idealized perceptive intuitions within space-time purified from empirical imprecisions, which idealization is accomplished by the mathematical disciplines such as geometry and arithmetics. Then, this idealization is sufficiently generalized through algebra, since for modern algebraists the mathematical object is no longer any determinate intuited thing despite its purity, but rather the general unknown object, the “anything whatsoever” that is indeterminate but equally pure and a priori. Only when it puts algebra to universal good use can the task of physics truly begin: physics is now understood to be the science of formulae, i.e. mathematical laws relating any natural property of any natural thing to any natural property of any natural thing. And insofar as all these natural properties and things are idealized through mathematics, they are objective, i.e. independent from subjectivity.

Yet mathematics only grounds physics formally. The material that provides physics with its determinate content is in nature. This nature is not the purely idealized nature, but the nature actually perceived empirically. In other words, this nature is the natural world we live in. However, through mathematical physics, this world is divided into two aspects. First, the mathematizable aspect to which physicists are attracted like magnets to a pole, trying to attain the idealized nature as approximately as possible. Second, the non-mathematizable aspect that has to do with recalcitrant material (such as “air resistance” is this for Galileo). Yet, as mathematization gradually propagates throughout every sphere of nature, it is believed more and more that nothing in nature is in principle or in itself non-mathematizable. Is it not evident that everything natural is spatial-temporal, hence directly or indirectly mathematizable? Via this conviction, it is understood that whatever is not mathematizable is spiritual and subjective. “Air resistance” is in itself mathematizable even as everything else in nature. It is only due to our subjective finitude that we have slight (thus negligible) deviations from it.

This helps us locate the revolution of quantum mechanics. Between the two aspects of nature, a mediating institution is established. This institution is called practical physics or the art of experiments. This institution contains multiple branches, e.g. the art of managing disturbances, the art of attaining precise measurements, and the art of devising exemplary experiments. Yet the dominant premise is that this institution is indifferent to either side of the relation. Since the nature being investigated is supposedly objective and idealized, it remains unaffected by the means of investigation. But if so, the results this investigation obtains should be equally objective for the investigator and independent of him, since supposedly he has measured only the idealized aspect of nature. The current theory of quantum mechanics questions the universal validity of this premise and reveals the fundamental ground of physics. Since physics is a science conducted by scientists really embodied in nature, their conduct and their subjective acts precisely affect this nature they investigate. The mathematical “nature in itself” is therefore an ideality that is imposed onto nature. This is not to say that this ideality is invalid, but only that it is an achievement in the ideal realm (such is Schrödinger’s Wave Function), while in the world we live in this ideality is necessarily mediated and disturbed by our subjective acts. Heisenberg’s division between mathematical determination and space-time description is precisely a division between the ideal and the real, and it also describes how one is related to the other through statistical relations (approximations). In other words, what quantum mechanics interpreted in this way has revealed is none other than the fact that physics, keeping its impetus to become the concrete and total science of nature, needs to change its objectivistic agenda and reincorporate the subjective lifeworld which grounds it at a fundamental level. Since physics fundamentally is concerned with the totality of nature, it is not to disregard either its formal aspect of objective ideality or its material aspect of subjective reality. Instead, it must accomplish full clarity on its task of a concretization of both: how the ideal aspect is involved in the real, and how the material is recapitulated by the formal. So far, lacking a more detailed account of subjectivity and defining its technical terms such as “observation” and “measurement” only vaguely, quantum mechanics remains obscure in its precise general significance. Though in each experiment the significance might be more or less clarified, and one understands more or less what is being observed or measured in the experiment, a more general account is still missing. Moreover, the proposal of hypotheses such as “complementarity” is not treated as a starting point to raise more important questions, such as how in general do subjective acts and objective configurations in the experiment affect such and such aspects of the observed particle?, how do particles “know” they are observed in this and not that way?, etc.; rather, it is taken to be the closure of inquiries, as if saying light can sometimes be a wave and sometimes be a particle explains why or how it is so. Insofar as quantum mechanics remains this way, it is not a “complete” science: it is not incomplete in the sense that there is still some variable missing from it, but incomplete in the sense that it has not attained full self-evidence.