Miscellaneous · 杂记
Quantum mechanics and phenomenology · 量子力学与现象学
Quantum Phenomenology
Paper / 论文
All physics prior to quantum mechanics is based on one premise: objective reality is independent from subjective acts. This is due to the complex historical process of idealization that grounds science as such (ἐπιστήμη): physicists believe, with more or less certainty, not only that nature is thoroughly mathematizable, but also only the mathematizable aspect of it is the proper subject matter of an exact natural science like physics. In a sense, physics as a science is not purely conceptual, as metaphysics is, but is rather based on idealized perceptive intuitions within space-time purified from empirical imprecisions, which idealization is accomplished by the mathematical disciplines such as geometry and arithmetics. Then, this idealization is sufficiently generalized through algebra, since for modern algebraists the mathematical object is no longer any determinate intuited thing despite its purity, but rather the general unknown object, the “anything whatsoever” that is indeterminate but equally pure and a priori. Only when it puts algebra to universal good use can the task of physics truly begin: physics is now understood to be the science of formulae, i.e. mathematical laws relating any natural property of any natural thing to any natural property of any natural thing. And insofar as all these natural properties and things are idealized through mathematics, they are objective, i.e. independent from subjectivity.
Yet mathematics only grounds physics formally. The material that provides physics with its determinate content is in nature. This nature is not the purely idealized nature, but the nature actually perceived empirically. In other words, this nature is the natural world we live in. However, through mathematical physics, this world is divided into two aspects. First, the mathematizable aspect to which physicists are attracted like magnets to a pole, trying to attain the idealized nature as approximately as possible. Second, the non-mathematizable aspect that has to do with recalcitrant material (such as “air resistance” is this for Galileo). Yet, as mathematization gradually propagates throughout every sphere of nature, it is believed more and more that nothing in nature is in principle or in itself non-mathematizable. Is it not evident that everything natural is spatial-temporal, hence directly or indirectly mathematizable? Via this conviction, it is understood that whatever is not mathematizable is spiritual and subjective. “Air resistance” is in itself mathematizable even as everything else in nature. It is only due to our subjective finitude that we have slight (thus negligible) deviations from it.
This helps us locate the revolution of quantum mechanics. Between the two aspects of nature, a mediating institution is established. This institution is called practical physics or the art of experiments. This institution contains multiple branches, e.g. the art of managing disturbances, the art of attaining precise measurements, and the art of devising exemplary experiments. Yet the dominant premise is that this institution is indifferent to either side of the relation. Since the nature being investigated is supposedly objective and idealized, it remains unaffected by the means of investigation. But if so, the results this investigation obtains should be equally objective for the investigator and independent of him, since supposedly he has measured only the idealized aspect of nature. The current theory of quantum mechanics questions the universal validity of this premise and reveals the fundamental ground of physics. Since physics is a science conducted by scientists really embodied in nature, their conduct and their subjective acts precisely affect this nature they investigate. The mathematical “nature in itself” is therefore an ideality that is imposed onto nature. This is not to say that this ideality is invalid, but only that it is an achievement in the ideal realm (such is Schrödinger’s Wave Function), while in the world we live in this ideality is necessarily mediated and disturbed by our subjective acts. Heisenberg’s division between mathematical determination and space-time description is precisely a division between the ideal and the real, and it also describes how one is related to the other through statistical relations (approximations). In other words, what quantum mechanics interpreted in this way has revealed is none other than the fact that physics, keeping its impetus to become the concrete and total science of nature, needs to change its objectivistic agenda and reincorporate the subjective lifeworld which grounds it at a fundamental level. Since physics fundamentally is concerned with the totality of nature, it is not to disregard either its formal aspect of objective ideality or its material aspect of subjective reality. Instead, it must accomplish full clarity on its task of a concretization of both: how the ideal aspect is involved in the real, and how the material is recapitulated by the formal. So far, lacking a more detailed account of subjectivity and defining its technical terms such as “observation” and “measurement” only vaguely, quantum mechanics remains obscure in its precise general significance. Though in each experiment the significance might be more or less clarified, and one understands more or less what is being observed or measured in the experiment, a more general account is still missing. Moreover, the proposal of hypotheses such as “complementarity” is not treated as a starting point to raise more important questions, such as how in general do subjective acts and objective configurations in the experiment affect such and such aspects of the observed particle?, how do particles “know” they are observed in this and not that way?, etc.; rather, it is taken to be the closure of inquiries, as if saying light can sometimes be a wave and sometimes be a particle explains why or how it is so. Insofar as quantum mechanics remains this way, it is not a “complete” science: it is not incomplete in the sense that there is still some variable missing from it, but incomplete in the sense that it has not attained full self-evidence.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
量子力学之前的一切物理学,都建立在一个前提上:客观实在独立于主观活动。这源于为科学本身(ἐπιστήμη)奠基的复杂理念化历史过程:物理学家或多或少确信,自然不仅可以被彻底数学化,而且,只有其可数学化的方面,才是物理学这样的精确自然科学的恰当对象。在某种意义上,作为科学的物理学并不像形而上学那样纯粹是概念性的,而是建立在时空中经过理念化的知觉直观之上,这些直观已经被净化,摆脱了经验的不精确性;这种理念化由几何学和算术等数学学科完成。随后,这种理念化又通过代数得到充分的普遍化,因为,对于现代代数学家而言,数学对象不再是某个确定的被直观之物,无论它多么纯粹,而是一般的未知对象,是那个不确定却同样纯粹而先天的“任何东西”。只有当物理学把代数普遍地应用起来时,它的任务才真正开始:物理学现在被理解为公式的科学,也就是把任何自然事物的任何自然性质,同任何自然事物的任何自然性质联系起来的数学法则的科学。而且,所有这些自然性质与事物,只要通过数学而被理念化,就是客观的,也就是独立于主体性的。
然而,数学只是从形式上为物理学奠基。为物理学提供确定内容的材料,则在自然之中。这个自然并非纯粹理念化的自然,而是实际在经验中被知觉的自然。换句话说,这个自然就是我们生活于其中的自然世界。然而,通过数学物理学,这个世界被分成了两个方面。首先是可数学化的方面,物理学家像磁铁被磁极吸引一样受它吸引,试图尽可能近似地达到理念化的自然。其次是不可数学化的方面,它与顽抗的材料有关,例如“空气阻力”对伽利略而言便是如此。然而,随着数学化逐渐扩展到自然的每个领域,人们越来越相信,自然中没有任何东西在原则上或在自身中是不可数学化的。一切自然之物都是时空性的,因此可以直接或间接地被数学化,这不是显而易见的吗?通过这一信念,一切不可数学化的东西便被理解为精神性的、主观的。“空气阻力”本身与自然中的其它一切一样,都可以被数学化。我们之所以稍稍偏离它——因而这种偏离可以忽略——只是由于我们的主观有限性。
这有助于我们定位量子力学的革命。在自然的两个方面之间,建立了一种中介性的建制。这个建制被称为实践物理学,或者实验的技艺。它包含多个分支,例如处理干扰的技艺、获得精确测量的技艺,以及设计典范实验的技艺。然而,占主导地位的前提是:这个建制对关系的任何一端都无所影响。既然所研究的自然被设想为客观的、理念化的,它就不受研究手段的影响。但如果如此,研究所得的结果,对于研究者而言也应当同样客观,并且独立于他,因为按此设想,他测量的只是自然的理念化方面。当前的量子力学理论质疑了这个前提的普遍有效性,并揭示了物理学的根本基础。既然物理学是一门由实际具身于自然中的科学家开展的科学,他们的行为与主观活动,就恰恰影响着他们所研究的这个自然。因此,数学的“自在自然”是一种被施加于自然的理念性。这并不是说这种理念性无效,而只是说,它是理念领域中的一项成就,例如薛定谔波函数;而在我们生活的世界中,这种理念性必然受到我们主观活动的中介与扰动。海森堡对于数学规定与时空描述的区分,恰恰是理念者与实在者之间的区分;它也描述了一方如何通过统计关系,也就是近似关系,同另一方发生关联。换句话说,如此理解的量子力学所揭示的,无非是这样一个事实:物理学如果保持着成为具体而总体的自然科学的冲动,就必须改变其客观主义的纲领,重新纳入那个在根本层面为它奠基的主观生活世界。既然物理学在根本上关心自然的总体性,它就不能忽视其客观理念性的形式方面,也不能忽视其主观实在性的材料方面。相反,它必须对二者具体化这一任务达到充分的清晰:理念方面如何包含于实在之中,以及材料如何由形式加以统摄。到目前为止,由于缺乏对主体性更详细的说明,并且只是模糊地定义“观察”与“测量”等技术术语,量子力学在其确切的一般意义上仍然晦暗。尽管在每个实验中,这一意义都可能或多或少得到澄清,人们也或多或少理解实验中被观察或被测量的是什么,但仍然缺少一种更一般的说明。此外,“互补性”等假说的提出,并没有被当作提出更重要问题的出发点,例如:一般而言,实验中的主观活动与客观配置,如何影响被观察粒子的这些或那些方面?粒子如何“知道”自己正以这种而非那种方式被观察?等等。相反,它被当作探究的终结,仿佛只要说光有时是波、有时是粒子,就已经解释了它为什么如此,或者如何如此。只要量子力学仍然如此,它就不是一门“完整”的科学:它的不完整,并不意味着它还缺少某个变量,而是意味着它尚未达到充分的明见性。