F. W. J. Schelling · 弗里德里希·谢林
On the History of Modern Philosophy · 论近代哲学的历史
2024年谢林散记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 28 June 2026
In this note / 篇目
谢林论笛卡尔:
1. 笛卡尔的伟大之处在于他为思想注入了一种“意气”,也就是哲学本质上所是的“起源之思”。他的怀疑论开启了哲学的「彻底怀疑之路」,尽管他本人在这条路上绊了好几跤。但不可否认的是,他与培根从两个方向共同创造了作为“实在哲学”的现代哲学:也即,并不从假定的最高范畴出发,而是从经验事实重新开始精神的抽象与怀疑之路。其与培根的区别无非是这条路是快快走还是慢慢走的区别:快快走就是扫清一切经验的理性主义,慢慢走则是对经验事实进行归纳组织的经验主义。
2. 笛卡尔的第一个问题是他的怀疑论并不彻底,也并不哲学。首先,他的怀疑仅仅推进到主体的「想象」,也就是一切可被我想象之物都是可怀疑的,但他却没有意识到一切的直接性之根据都是想象,而真正的思永远是中介性的,因此没有意识到哪怕是“我思”这一经验归根结底也是想象出来的。他的“我思故我在”,实际上指的是,“当我思的时候,我以思的方式存在着”或者“当我思时我「在思」”。这依旧是一个有条件的经验,而没有其内在的准则。而既然「思」本身是被反思之主体所经验着的,那「我思」也并没有什么无可辩驳的确定性。其次,他的怀疑论是非哲学的,因为他并没有哲学所必须的「悬置」的态度:在真正的思中,就连“怀疑”本身都应当被悬置。于是最终他的哲学就成为了虚构的、想象出来的主观哲学:任何被“我”想象出来的事物都因为我那被想象出来的确定性获得了确定性,又因为这一个确定性必须是直接无中介的,所以又是无内容的、抽象的,只是属于我的混乱无序的想象。因此,笛卡尔的哲学其实是属于白痴的哲学:我想象,所以以某种方式存在。
3. 在这个基础上,笛卡尔无法避免想象与存在本身的隔阂(我想象的东西仅仅以某种我不确定是否符合我想象的方式存在)。他因此必须引入一个外部的准则去确保想象与存在的同一,也就是上帝。他因此必须证明上帝的存在,也就是其本体论证明。与康德误解的版本不同,实际上,笛卡尔并不是把“存在”理解为上帝的谓词,而是把“存在的必然性”理解为上帝的谓词。因此他实际上证明的是,如果上帝存在,那祂必然存在。这并不等同于证明上帝存在。这就是笛卡尔的第二个错误。事实上,必然存在之物是「原在」,也就是一切谓词的主词自身所设定的绝对谓词。这一自我设定的存在是必然而盲目的,因此与上帝的绝对自由相抵触。因此笛卡尔所能证明的实际上是「原在」必然存在,可他希冀证明作为担保者和道德者的上帝必然存在,就只能在这上面陷入两难,(“如果上帝存在,那祂必须存在;可是上帝能够以不与自身概念矛盾的形式存在吗?不能。所以上帝不存在。”)最后只好勉强遮掩糊弄过去。
4. 通过上帝的担保,笛卡尔把真实的存在返还给了一切事物。可是如此被交还的存在是被上帝担保才能确定其真实的存在,与自我确证的精神有着质的不同。因此笛卡尔的身心二元论是必然的。世界对笛卡尔来说是「死的存在」,其存在的确证是在自身之外的,也因此物质之间的交互是纯粹外在的机制,尽管这个机制哪怕是最基础的部分也需要超越的上帝去担保。而且,这一种死并非是生命的陨落,而是根本上就排除了生命的可能性。外部世界是一个被上帝的精神充满却完全排斥一切精神的彻底机械论的世界。
对2.的补充:不太确定谢林想说的是,“笛卡尔的怀疑只贯彻到对所有事物作为可想象事物的怀疑,是因为他希望得到的其实只是对想象的确证,或者说对可想象之物的存在的确证”,还是,“正是因为笛卡尔的怀疑只贯彻到对想象的怀疑,所以他最终拯救的也只是对想象的确证”;也可能两者都是。结合他对笛卡尔数学怀疑论并非内在于数学本身的批评(即,数学真理可能是假的,因为有魔鬼欺骗我),似乎可以理解为,谢林认为笛卡尔的怀疑论实际上是一个外部的、强加的怀疑论,这也和笛卡尔“快快走”的那条路径相符合;正因为此,笛卡尔将最为抽象的“可想象性”视作了怀疑论的外在标准,最终拯救出来的(不提其论证本身的错误)也只是最抽象的“一般存在”罢了;更不用提因为这一标准的抽象性,实际上没有一个东西是不能被怀疑的,因为所有东西都是可以被想象的,因此他的哲学在最根本的地方就破灭了;这就是无内容的外在批评的后果,也是无论谢林还是黑格尔都在他们各自的「彻底怀疑之路」上都极力避免的。这一点我认为是谢林最有洞见的地方。
这个感觉就是法国人和德国人哲学上的气质不同了……当然谢林也承认,就是我觉得笛卡尔的天才或者意气其实就是这种「外在性」,他搞哲学就是真的是在搞发明创造,到处引入一些你想不到的谢林所言的「机械降神」。我对这点完全不反感。
谢林论斯宾诺莎,莱布尼茨和沃尔夫:
1. 谢林认为斯宾诺莎主义实际上是静寂主义,其所界说的实体(substance)是无活动的纯粹存在,因其不内涵否定性,也就无法自我展开,将自身设定为外部。这直接导致了斯宾诺莎依然需要依赖于经验为实体填充内容,却除了经验本身无法解释这些内容的必然性(两个被讨论的属性,「外延(Extension)」和「思想(Thought)」,只是人类经验中认知到的属性而已)。也就是说,在斯宾诺莎那里,实体是如何过渡到样式(mode),是无法解释的。哪怕实体和样式之间有属性(attribute)中介,属性是如何被实体设定,属性本身又是如何进入样式,依然是神秘的。所以说,属性作为中介实际上是不可能的中介,因为作为纯粹盲目的存在,一切确定性都在实体当中消解了。这一中介的不可能性也表现在「外延」和「思想」的关系上;在「思想」中,「外延」被重新把握,而这一重新把握的必然性是在哪里呢?而且,既然任何「重新把握」都是一种「扬弃」,那么为什么「思想」和「外延」还仅仅只是一个平行的关系呢?简而言之,谢林实际上拒绝了一种对斯宾诺莎的表达主义阐释(即德勒兹的阐释);表达主义的合理性在于其承认「太一-无限」的量的结构,也就是,从一当中可以直接推定其内蕴的多(一被多直接表达),而这一分化能被分为几个层次其实是不重要的,这一「太一-无限」的直接性用德勒兹爱用的语言就是「存在的单义性(univocity of being)」。而谢林拒斥这一设定,他不止一次强调「纯粹存在」与「特定存在」之间的本体论差异。「一」与「无限」之间是质的差异,因此「一」向「无限」必须有一个存在否定自身设定的过渡程序。这一程序在斯宾诺莎那里是缺失的。因此,他将斯宾诺莎的哲学称为「尚未展开的系统」,因为「系统」实际上的意义就是这一自身设定的程序。
2. 谢林对莱布尼茨的解读非常奇异。简而言之,他认为莱布尼茨实际上就是斯宾诺莎,单子论实际上就是翻版的斯宾诺莎主义。因此他取消了所有他人或莱布尼茨本人所宣称的相对于斯宾诺莎所取得的成果。第一个,单子实际上不过是斯宾诺莎处的任意一个本质,而最高的单子不过是实体,无非是更强调了本质作为「中心」的这一面向。所以,莱布尼茨同样无法避免从「太一」到「无限」的过渡问题,也无法解释为什么无限的「造者」会造出有限的「造物」,也就同样无法解释物质和精神的和谐,或混乱和秩序的和谐,或恶与善好的和谐。第二,关于上帝的道德与自由,莱布尼茨其实并没有成功反驳斯宾诺莎主义。因为上帝的意志是根据上帝的理解,而上帝的理解何尝不就是上帝存在的必然性?因此上帝的创造依然是上帝内在的必然性,上帝并没有真正的自由。如此,莱布尼茨的道德哲学与斯宾诺莎的伦理学其实是一模一样的:邪恶不存在,对全体的知识会取消恶与悲伤。至于所谓的神正论:莱布尼茨虽然嘴上反对,但实际上他依然只是在说,上帝无论意志做什么都是善的,因为上帝本身就是善;既然他无法给出到底什么是可以独立于上帝意志的善,他的道德学说在神正论中就是完全没有意义的。换句话说,你如果要问他,“为什么卢克莱西娅必须遭受强暴?这到底哪里善了?”,他只能回答,“如果上帝意愿,说明他知道这是善的,所以才意愿它”,这样的废话。他的这一个解读和德勒兹又有出入了,因为德勒兹那里,每个单子都既是平等的「中心」,又是有等级和程度差异的「质料」;这个面向是一样重要的,所以他才使用「褶子」这一个譬喻。巴洛克的房间有两层,每一层都有自己足以独立的结构。在谢林这里,莱布尼茨的平等的「中心」这一个结构就被取消了;他似乎忽略了在斯宾诺莎那里,实体并不是随便哪个「本质」,但在莱布尼茨这里,上帝确实是一个「单子」,哪怕这一个「单子」有绝对的清晰性和无限的流动性。
3. 谢林对沃尔夫的批评实际上是对教条主义的批评。教条主义把现成的属性拼贴给现成的概念,却忽视概念本身内在的辩证运动。之后谢林批评了经院哲学有名的三个神学证明。本体论证明的反驳已经提过了,关键是如何界定上帝这一概念。第二个是宇宙论证明,即亚里士多德的不动推动者证明。关于这一个证明谢林提出了很有意思的一个想法,就是,因果之间并不一定总是链式的关系,而如果不是链式关系的话,那自然也就不需要最终的不动推动者了。我们对因果链的认识因此是偏狭的,仅仅局限于有机自然的生育这一个模型。但哪怕是在有机自然,我们也没办法界定那最终因是自由的还是必然的,也就是无法界定其是否是上帝。第三个是目的论证明。可是这是一样的,因为目的永远是内在于物的目的,而不会是外在的强加于物的目的。上帝只会是外在目的,可外在目的的内容又是没有任何必然性的,自然不会是真正的目的。简而言之,一切目前为止的形而上学教条都头足颠倒了:上帝概念的界定还没完成,就先证明上帝存在;或者说,上帝被当成哲学要达成的结论(因此不可避免地被经验限制),而不是哲学的内容。哲学是对「一之内在」的展开,而非对「外在之多」的想象。
人从经验出发获得了上帝的概念,并把这个概念强加到三个证明上,无意识忽略了这三个证明得到的内容,绝对存在(将自身外化为对象的存在),绝对因(将自身设定为果的因),和绝对目的(将自身创造为质料的目的),都与通常意义上的上帝无涉;只是通过将形而上学的结论设定为上帝,把对上帝的理解留到了哲学的最后面,认为对上帝之理解依赖于更原初的经验,从而使哲学沦落为一种对经验的想象;教条主义因此不再是对上帝之概念的内在沉思,而是对人类经验的不断抽象。
上帝是哲学活的开端、活的概念,而不是死的结论;这个死有两个含义,一个是作为上帝被视作从经验里抽象出来的一个死的对象,一个是上帝的存在仅仅被视作一个证明或者一个哲学的结论,因此在根本上只是思的终结、思的产物,而非思的活生生的运动;这两个层次也是相互关联的,因为正是因为上帝的存在被视作一个论证,上帝才成为对象处在了对对象的经验当中。
所以谢林所批判的那种哲学进程就是,从上帝存在得出上帝是一个与“我”关联的对象,然后不加反思地接受了这一个对象性,接着说,要得到上帝的存在就是从“我”的经验中抽象;或者反过来,先得到抽象,然后把这一个抽象的经验放在对象那一头,接着说,那是“我”要到达的哲学的彼端;然而上帝不能是哲学的终结或彼岸或目的,不能外在于思,而必须是内在于思的思的生命本身。
对2.的补正:很重要的一点是,斯宾诺莎那里的「本质」作为「中心」是要让位于「共念(common notion)」并被消解在「共念」当中的,直到达到最高的共念,即上帝;但莱布尼茨那里,任何对「中心」的消解或是对模糊内容的阐述都不过是强化了「此单子」的「中心性」而已;斯宾诺莎那里「中心」并不是首要的,但莱布尼茨那里则相反。
谢林论康德和费希特:
1. 谢林对康德哲学的切入点是「物自体」的双重性,这一双重性被康德本人界定为「作为否定性界限的物自身」和「作为肯定性对象的物自身」之间的双重性。这一种双重性还可以被表述为「时-空内外翻转」的双重性,即空间所指示出的超越性实际上恰恰是时间性的原初综合:外在者恰恰是内在本身。
2. 这一双重性在康德处被决定为「原我(原初活动性)」和「原物(原初被动性)」的双重性,但康德没有对这两者的关系进行任何探讨,而仅仅是指出了这一种关系。在这个意义上,康德所指出的仍然是形而上学的根本问题,也就是「结合了原初活动性与被动性的对象是如何可能的?」这一问题(「物自体为什么会遵从主体的认识?」)。在这个意义上,康德哲学依然只是传统形而上学罢了,因为任何传统形而上学所说的无非也就是“对任何对象(posterious)的认识都必然设定了原初者(prius),而原初者超越对象”。也就是说,康德误解了传统形而上学的真正性质:实际上,传统形而上学并不是“证明原初者之对象化存在”的科学,而是那“对为对象之存在去奠基的原初者之思”的科学。康德真正的贡献因此并不是他重新规定了形而上学的目的,而是他为形而上学重新引入了提纯过的「否定性」或者「主体性」。与斯宾诺莎那里作为「原初被动性(原在)」的至高者不同,康德所引入的「原初主动性」是对此「被动性」的否定,因此将「自由」之哲学交棒给费希特。
3. 「现代哲学史」里,谢林对费希特的分析很简略,而且主要是为了说明谢林自己的思想历程。有意思的一个点是,谢林认为自己是对费希特和斯宾诺莎这两个极端的中介,并认为这一中介本身就是根本的哲学内容。他将这一个先验主体于先验自然中的展开过程譬喻成柏拉图的对话,即将原初的被动性“消融”在原初主动性当中,直到达到对二者统一性的认识的这一个过程。他认为自己是先于黑格尔使用这一个方法的,并认为自己是辩证法的发明者。这一点还挺可爱的。
谢林论自己的中期哲学(「自然哲学」):
1. 谢林的辩证法起始于自然,并最终升华至完全的精神。在完全的精神中,被动性终于在完成了的活动性中获得统一。这个完成可以从两个方面理解,一个是否定性的,即所有可能的「形式」都被耗尽了,但这种理解依然是不纯粹且外在的,毕竟我们如何确认这些就是所有的可能的形式呢?;因此第二种理解,即肯定性的理解更为重要。在这种理解中,每一个形式都因其自身的内容指向下一个形式,并且最终所达到的形式的内容自身作为绝对内容涵盖了绝对的形式。也就是,最后达到的形式与内容本身需要具有真实确定的「完成性」,这个就是作为大全主体的宗教之形式与作为大全客体的美学之内容。必须要在达到统一两者的哲学这一步之后能够确认不再有更高者。这个也是黑格尔为什么一定要梳理出「存在-自我确定性-自我认识-绝对知识」这样明晰确凿的路径,是为了确认最终得到的就是绝对至高者。
2. 但是谢林主张对这一序列的「完成」本身只是开启了真正都哲学,即「肯定哲学」。与「否定哲学」停留于结果不同,肯定哲学不能满足于最终的「完成」,也不能就只是抽象地、直接地接受结果与开端的同一性,而应当在这样的「思」的完成之后,从于思中完成了的「在」本身出发,将一切思的结构把握为一个无时的在的结构,并解释这一无时之在是如何开启有时之思的。谢林似乎将黑格尔的哲学解读为仅仅完成了「上升」的路径,但对于「下沉」着墨甚少,或者可以说谢林认为黑格尔处的「下沉」仅仅是作为「完成」的一个面向被设定的,但对其根本结构的展开和分析还没有开始。
谢林论黑格尔:
1. 谢林理解自己的哲学道路是,从对自然之思出发,以先验自然作为「主-客体联结」的内容生成过程,内在地抵达对作为终点的「绝对者之思」的完全充实;之后再从这「思中抵达的绝对者」出发,解释「思」本身是如何能在这个「绝对者」中获得奠基的。谢林所理解的黑格尔的哲学道路是,从最为抽象的概念出发,不断扬弃,直到抵达充实后的「绝对者的概念」(这里非常重要!谢林认为自己关注的是「概念中的绝对者」,不同于「绝对者的概念」),而后,抵达了充实过的「绝对者概念」后,又通过这一概念回归束缚了概念的实在自然。这里用简化的模型来说的话,可以说,谢林的第一阶段的否定哲学是一个「阶次结构」,而达到了「思中至高者」后,此「至高者」要被重新把握为「绝对者」,并如此达成肯定哲学对「思」与「在」,或者对「阶次整体」与「绝对」之关系的把握。黑格尔的哲学结构则是一个「斜圆」(大致上可以想象成托勒密的天体系统),他在思中所抵达的「绝对概念」需要自我外化成实在,因此在这个意义上需要完成一个首尾相连的工作,在他体系的最后一步,最末者要成为最先者。谢林最敏锐的洞察是,这一个结构上的差异并不是外在的,而恰恰是黑格尔的根本(无论是长处还是缺陷);因为黑格尔将「概念」或者「思」的运动把握为最根本的,他因此必须将「实在」完全消解在「思」中,「实在」本身必须成为「思」的一个环节,而不是「思」所抵触的背景或质料。因此,即使黑格尔意识到「绝对者的概念」本身必须已经设定实在为内容,这一概念依然要孜孜不倦地将这一设定重新消解为概念自身的外化过程。因此,尽管都是在讨论「无时性」与「时间」的统一,谢林认为自己提出的「绝对者」才是真正的「肯定的在」,而黑格尔那里的存在只不过是被消解了的思的环节。
2. 谢林所把握的根本差异因此奥秘就在黑格尔这一个「首尾相连」的结构上,所以谢林很自然地批评黑格尔哲学的开端和终结。黑格尔的开端是最抽象的概念,「有」「无」和「变」。但是纯粹概念本身一定预设了确定的实在,就像抽象本身一定预设了从什么里进行抽象。「有」本身并不是真正抽象或无内容的,因为「有」其实就是那要去自我设定的主体,而不是一个概念范畴。可是黑格尔忽略了那已经在自然中思着的主体,反而将这运动解读为概念自身的运动,因此错误地把主体与概念等同了。主体首先是「实在」的主体,然后是「思」的主体;但无论如何,主体都不会是概念。因此黑格尔把主体的内在运动解读成概念的内在运动是错误的。这也是黑格尔错误地把「思」视作等同于「实在」结出的恶果。
3. 黑格尔在他的哲学结处将自然把握为概念的自我外化,也就是,绝对精神的自我设定。可是既然「绝对者的概念」已经完成,这本就应该是「绝对精神」,这一「最高者」又为什么要外化成自然,外化成那作为开端的直接的「纯有」呢?「精神」为什么要不断变成「精神」呢?「最先者」为什么要成为「最末者」?谢林认为这里是没有任何必然性的。「绝对者」只与「大全」有必然关系,而与任何「大全」中的特殊的内容的关系都是“偶然”的。「纯粹存在」的创生活动于任何「确定存在」的关系也都是偶然的。黑格尔至少要承认这一必然的偶然性(绝对自由的造物主),而不是将这「首-尾关系」本身伪饰成必然。
4. 由此,谢林回应了黑格尔早先对他的批评。首先,黑格尔自己的哲学的开端也并不是无预设的。而如果他所言的无预设是最终达成的环形结构的话,那他依然预设了这些概念内容连接成环的必然性,甚至是「概念本身可以等同于主体」也是一个预设。其次,黑格尔错误理解了谢林的「理智直观」的意义。他批评谢林用「理智直观」证明「主-客体联结」的实存。实际上,谢林认为自己只是描述了「主-客体联结」作为内容的辩证发展罢了,而这一个描述恰恰是脱离了「理智直观」的。谢林唯一承认的「理智直观」的意义恰恰是反费希特的:「理智直观」并不是证实了「主-客体联结」,而是主题化了「在-思关系」作为根本的哲学问题,也就是,直观着的质料是如何被理智化的。
谢林论雅各比和神智学:
1. 雅各比的思想有两个阶段,第一个是比较高明的「知-信」二元论阶段,第二个是不怎么高明的庸俗理性主义阶段。第一个阶段的雅各比强调对信仰之经验和心灵感受。这时候的他是反对理性主义的先驱。但这种感受缺少内容,而只能作为对任意知识的否定,或者「无知」。第二个阶段的雅各比则首先把理性主义所得的知识直接等同于对(人格化)上帝的认识,而且更要命的是,他所接受的还不是黑格尔式的否定哲学和思辨理性主义,而是沃尔夫式的没有内在动力的庸俗理性主义。神智学在内容上虽然较雅各比的早期哲学更丰富,但形式上依然采用了那种卑琐的、喋喋不休的神秘主义。将自己的灵知等同于上帝的神智者实际上就是将自己完全化为客体,因此只能作为客体被其它主体把握。
2. 谢林自己则再次强调了自己立场:对否定哲学的完成抵达了思中的至高者,然后要从至高者向绝对者过渡,并通过把握绝对者之永恒启示与主体的历史创生的关系进入先验历史的自由领域,从而达到肯定哲学的境界。
补充2.:这里谢林与雅各比区别开来的地方就在于谢林需要通过哲学完成对知识的整体否定和对信仰的绝对设定;所以谢林认为自己不仅仅有「信」,还有「信」所必须的「做工」,也就是开显「在」的思的中介活动。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Schelling on Descartes:
1. Descartes’ greatness lies in his infusing thought with a certain “spirit,” namely, the “thinking of origins” that philosophy essentially is. His skepticism opened philosophy’s “path of thoroughgoing doubt,” although he himself stumbled several times along it. Yet it is undeniable that, approaching from opposite directions, he and Bacon jointly created modern philosophy as “real philosophy”: instead of starting from an assumed highest category, they began anew from empirical facts along the spirit’s path of abstraction and doubt. His difference from Bacon amounts to whether this path is traveled quickly or slowly: the quick route is the rationalism that sweeps away all experience; the slow route is the empiricism that inductively organizes empirical facts.
2. Descartes’ first problem is that his skepticism is neither thoroughgoing nor philosophical. First, his doubt extends only to the subject’s “imagination”: whatever I can imagine is dubitable. Yet he fails to recognize that imagination grounds every immediacy, whereas genuine thought is always mediated. He therefore fails to recognize that even the experience of “I think” is ultimately imagined. His “I think, therefore I am” actually means “when I think, I exist in the manner of thinking,” or “when I think, I am ‘in thought.’” This remains a conditional experience without an immanent criterion. And since “thinking” itself is experienced by a reflecting subject, “I think” has no incontrovertible certainty either. Second, his skepticism is unphilosophical because it lacks the attitude of “suspension” indispensable to philosophy: in genuine thought, even “doubt” itself must be suspended. His philosophy thus finally becomes a fictitious, imagined subjective philosophy: whatever is imagined by “me” acquires certainty from my imagined certainty; and because this certainty must be immediate and unmediated, it is also contentless and abstract, merely my own confused and disordered imagination. Descartes’ philosophy is therefore really a philosophy for idiots: I imagine, and therefore exist in some manner.
3. On this basis, Descartes cannot avoid the gulf between imagination and being itself: what I imagine exists only in some manner that I cannot be sure conforms to my imagination. He must therefore introduce an external criterion to guarantee the identity of imagination and being, namely, God. He must accordingly prove God’s existence: this is his ontological proof. Unlike the version Kant misunderstands, Descartes does not in fact understand “existence” as God’s predicate, but “the necessity of existence” as God’s predicate. What he actually proves, therefore, is that if God exists, he necessarily exists. This is not equivalent to proving that God exists. This is Descartes’ second error. In fact, what necessarily exists is “primal being”: the absolute predicate posited by the subject of all predicates itself. This self-positing being is necessary and blind, and therefore conflicts with God’s absolute freedom. What Descartes can actually prove, then, is that “primal being” necessarily exists. But in hoping to prove that God as guarantor and moral being necessarily exists, he can only become trapped in a dilemma: “If God exists, he must exist; but can God exist without contradicting his own concept? No. Therefore God does not exist.” In the end he can only cover it up and muddle through.
4. Through God’s guarantee, Descartes restores real existence to all things. Yet existence restored in this way is an existence whose reality can be ascertained only through God’s guarantee; it differs qualitatively from self-certifying spirit. Descartes’ mind–body dualism is therefore inevitable. For Descartes, the world is “dead being”: the confirmation of its existence lies outside itself. Interactions between material things are therefore purely external mechanisms, although even the most basic parts of this mechanism require the guarantee of a transcendent God. Moreover, this death is not the downfall of life, but fundamentally excludes the possibility of life. The external world is a thoroughly mechanistic world, filled with God’s spirit yet wholly excluding all spirit.
Supplement to 2: I am not quite sure whether Schelling means that “Descartes’ doubt extends only to all things as imaginable things because what he really hopes to obtain is merely a confirmation of imagination, or of the existence of imaginable things,” or that “precisely because Descartes’ doubt extends only to imagination, what he ultimately rescues is merely a confirmation of imagination”; perhaps both. Taken together with his criticism that Descartes’ mathematical skepticism is not internal to mathematics itself—that mathematical truths might be false because a demon deceives me—this seems to mean that Schelling regards Cartesian skepticism as an external, imposed skepticism. This also agrees with Descartes’ “quick route.” For this very reason, Descartes treats the most abstract “imaginability” as skepticism’s external standard, and what he ultimately rescues—leaving aside the errors in his argument—is only the most abstract “being in general.” Moreover, because this standard is abstract, there is in fact nothing that cannot be doubted, since everything can be imagined. His philosophy therefore collapses at its very foundation. This is the consequence of contentless external criticism, and what both Schelling and Hegel strive to avoid on their respective “paths of thoroughgoing doubt.” I think this is Schelling’s most insightful point.
This feels like a difference in philosophical temperament between the French and the Germans… Of course, Schelling acknowledges this too: I think Descartes’ genius or spirit is precisely this “externality.” When he does philosophy, he really is inventing things, introducing unexpected instances of what Schelling calls “deus ex machina” everywhere. I have no aversion to this at all.
Schelling on Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff:
1. Schelling considers Spinozism in fact a quietism: the substance it defines is pure being without activity, and because it contains no negativity, it cannot unfold itself or posit itself as external. This directly leaves Spinoza dependent on experience to fill substance with content, while making him unable to explain the necessity of that content apart from experience itself: the two attributes discussed, “Extension” and “Thought,” are merely attributes cognized in human experience. In other words, Spinoza cannot explain how substance passes into modes. Even if attributes mediate between substance and modes, how substance posits attributes, and how attributes themselves enter into modes, remain mysterious. Attributes as mediation are therefore actually an impossible mediation, since in substance as pure blind being all determinacy dissolves. This impossibility of mediation also appears in the relation between “Extension” and “Thought”: “Extension” is grasped anew within “Thought,” but where does the necessity of this renewed grasp lie? Moreover, since every “grasping anew” is a “sublation,” why do “Thought” and “Extension” still stand in a merely parallel relation? In brief, Schelling actually rejects an expressionist interpretation of Spinoza—that is, Deleuze’s interpretation. Expressionism is reasonable insofar as it acknowledges a quantitative structure of “the One–the infinite”: the many inherent in the one can be inferred directly from it; the many directly express the one. How many levels this differentiation can be divided into is actually unimportant. In Deleuze’s favored language, this immediacy of “the One–the infinite” is the “univocity of being.” Schelling rejects this postulate, repeatedly emphasizing the ontological difference between “pure being” and “determinate being.” “The one” and “the infinite” differ qualitatively, so the one’s passage into the infinite must involve a procedure whereby being negates its own positing. This procedure is absent in Spinoza. Schelling therefore calls Spinoza’s philosophy an “as yet unfolded system,” because the actual meaning of “system” is precisely this procedure of self-positing.
2. Schelling’s interpretation of Leibniz is exceedingly peculiar. In short, he thinks Leibniz is really Spinoza, and monadology a replica of Spinozism. He therefore cancels every achievement over Spinoza claimed by others or by Leibniz himself. First, a monad is actually nothing more than any particular essence in Spinoza, and the highest monad nothing more than substance, merely with greater emphasis on essence’s aspect as a “center.” Leibniz therefore likewise cannot avoid the problem of the passage from “the One” to “the infinite,” nor explain why an infinite “creator” creates finite “creatures.” He thus likewise cannot explain the harmony of matter and spirit, disorder and order, or evil and goodness. Second, concerning God’s morality and freedom, Leibniz has not successfully refuted Spinozism. For God’s will is based on God’s understanding, and what is God’s understanding if not the necessity of God’s existence? God’s creation thus remains God’s internal necessity, and God has no genuine freedom. Leibniz’s moral philosophy is accordingly exactly the same as Spinoza’s ethics: evil does not exist, and knowledge of the whole cancels evil and sadness. As for the so-called theodicy: despite his verbal objections, Leibniz is actually still only saying that whatever God wills to do is good because God himself is good. Since he cannot say what goodness might be independently of God’s will, his moral doctrine is utterly meaningless within the theodicy. In other words, if you ask him, “Why must Lucretia suffer rape? What is good about this?” he can only answer with nonsense such as, “If God wills it, that shows he knows it to be good, which is why he wills it.” This interpretation again differs from Deleuze’s, since for Deleuze every monad is both an equal “center” and “matter” differentiated in rank and degree. These aspects are equally important, which is why he uses the metaphor of the “fold.” The Baroque room has two levels, each with a structure sufficient for its own independence. In Schelling, Leibniz’s structure of equal “centers” is canceled. He seems to overlook that, in Spinoza, substance is not just any “essence,” whereas in Leibniz God really is a “monad,” even if this “monad” has absolute clarity and infinite fluidity.
3. Schelling’s criticism of Wolff is actually a criticism of dogmatism. Dogmatism pastes ready-made properties onto ready-made concepts while neglecting concepts’ own immanent dialectical movement. Schelling then criticizes the three famous theological proofs of scholastic philosophy. The refutation of the ontological proof has already been mentioned; the key is how to define the concept of God. The second is the cosmological proof, namely Aristotle’s proof of the unmoved mover. Here Schelling offers a very interesting thought: cause and effect need not always stand in a chain, and if their relation is not a chain, naturally no ultimate unmoved mover is required. Our understanding of causal chains is therefore narrow, restricted merely to the model of reproduction in organic nature. Yet even in organic nature, we cannot determine whether the ultimate cause is free or necessary, and thus cannot determine whether it is God. The third is the teleological proof. But the same applies, since an end is always immanent to a thing, never an end imposed externally upon it. God can only be an external end, yet the content of an external end has no necessity, and naturally cannot be a genuine end. In brief, every metaphysical dogma so far has stood on its head: God’s existence is proved before the concept of God has been defined. Or, God is treated as the conclusion philosophy must reach—and therefore inevitably restricted by experience—instead of philosophy’s content. Philosophy unfolds “the interiority of the one”; it does not imagine “the external many.”
People obtain the concept of God from experience and impose it on the three proofs, unconsciously overlooking that the contents obtained by these proofs—absolute being, which externalizes itself as an object; absolute cause, which posits itself as effect; and absolute end, which creates itself as matter—have nothing to do with God in the ordinary sense. By merely positing metaphysics’ conclusion as God, they leave the understanding of God until the very end of philosophy, regarding this understanding as dependent on more primordial experience, and thereby reducing philosophy to an imagination of experience. Dogmatism thus ceases to be an immanent meditation on the concept of God, becoming instead a continual abstraction from human experience.
God is philosophy’s living beginning and living concept, not its dead conclusion. This death has two meanings: first, God is regarded as a dead object abstracted from experience; second, God’s existence is regarded merely as the conclusion of a proof or a philosophy, and thus fundamentally as only the termination and product of thought, rather than thought’s living movement. These two levels are interconnected, since it is precisely because God’s existence is treated as an argument that God becomes an object situated within the experience of objects.
The philosophical procedure Schelling criticizes, then, is to infer from God’s existence that God is an object related to “me,” accept this objectivity without reflection, and then say that to obtain God’s existence is to abstract from “my” experience. Or, conversely, one first obtains an abstraction, places this abstracted experience on the side of the object, and then says that this is philosophy’s far shore, which “I” must reach. Yet God cannot be philosophy’s termination, other shore, or goal; he cannot be external to thought, but must be the very life of thought immanent to thought.
Correction and supplement to 2: One very important point is that, in Spinoza, “essence” as a “center” must yield to and dissolve within the “common notion,” until the highest common notion, God, is reached. In Leibniz, however, every dissolution of a “center” or explication of obscure content merely reinforces “this monad’s” “centrality.” In Spinoza, the “center” is not primary; in Leibniz, the opposite holds.
Schelling on Kant and Fichte:
1. Schelling approaches Kant’s philosophy through the duality of the “thing in itself,” which Kant himself defines as the duality between the “thing in itself as a negative boundary” and the “thing in itself as a positive object.” This duality can also be expressed as the duality of “space–time turned inside out”: the transcendence indicated by space is actually precisely temporality’s primordial synthesis. What is external is precisely the internal itself.
2. In Kant, this duality is determined as the duality of the “primal I”—primordial activity—and the “primal thing”—primordial passivity. But Kant does not investigate their relation at all, merely pointing it out. In this sense, what Kant points out remains metaphysics’ fundamental problem: “How is an object combining primordial activity and passivity possible?” Or: “Why does the thing in itself conform to the subject’s cognition?” Kantian philosophy in this sense remains merely traditional metaphysics, since what every traditional metaphysics says amounts to “the cognition of any object (posterious) necessarily posits something primordial (prius), and the primordial transcends the object.” In other words, Kant misunderstands the genuine nature of traditional metaphysics: it is actually not the science “proving the objectified existence of the primordial,” but the science “thinking the primordial that grounds the existence of objects.” Kant’s genuine contribution is therefore not that he redefines metaphysics’ aim, but that he reintroduces a purified “negativity” or “subjectivity” into metaphysics. Unlike Spinoza’s highest being as “primordial passivity”—primal being—the “primordial activity” Kant introduces negates this “passivity,” thereby handing the philosophy of “freedom” over to Fichte.
3. In On the History of Modern Philosophy, Schelling’s analysis of Fichte is very brief, and chiefly serves to explain the trajectory of Schelling’s own thought. One interesting point is that Schelling regards himself as mediating between the two extremes of Fichte and Spinoza, and considers this mediation itself philosophy’s fundamental content. He compares this unfolding of the transcendental subject within transcendental nature to Plato’s dialogues: the process of “dissolving” primordial passivity into primordial activity until knowledge of their unity is reached. He believes he employed this method before Hegel, and considers himself the inventor of dialectic. This is rather endearing.
Schelling on His Own Middle-Period Philosophy (“Philosophy of Nature”):
1. Schelling’s dialectic begins with nature and finally rises into complete spirit. In complete spirit, passivity finally finds unity within completed activity. This completion can be understood in two ways. One is negative: all possible “forms” have been exhausted. But this understanding remains impure and external—after all, how can we confirm that these are all the possible forms? The second, positive understanding is therefore more important. In this understanding, each form points toward the next through its own content, and the content of the form finally reached, as absolute content, encompasses absolute form. That is, the form and content finally attained must themselves possess genuine and definite “completeness”: the form of religion as the subject of the all, and the content of aesthetics as the object of the all. After reaching philosophy, which unifies the two, it must be possible to confirm that there is nothing higher. This is also why Hegel insists on working out so clear and definite a path as “being–self-certainty–self-knowledge–absolute knowledge”: to confirm that what is finally obtained is absolutely highest.
2. Schelling maintains, however, that this sequence’s “completion” itself merely opens genuine philosophy, namely “positive philosophy.” Unlike “negative philosophy,” which remains at the result, positive philosophy cannot be satisfied with final “completion,” nor merely accept abstractly and immediately the identity of result and beginning. Rather, after this completion of “thought,” it must start from “being” itself, completed in thought, grasp every structure of thought as a structure of timeless being, and explain how this timeless being opens temporal thought. Schelling seems to interpret Hegel’s philosophy as completing only the path of “ascent,” while saying little about “descent.” Or one could say that Schelling considers Hegel’s “descent” merely posited as an aspect of “completion,” while the unfolding and analysis of its fundamental structure have not yet begun.
Schelling on Hegel:
1. Schelling understands his own philosophical path as starting from thought about nature, taking transcendental nature as the process in which the content of the “subject–object connection” is generated, and immanently arriving at the complete fulfillment of the “thought of the absolute” as its endpoint. He then starts from this “absolute reached in thought” to explain how “thought” itself can be grounded within this “absolute.” Schelling understands Hegel’s philosophical path as starting from the most abstract concept and continually sublating until it reaches the enriched “concept of the absolute.” This is crucial: Schelling thinks his concern is “the absolute in the concept,” as distinct from “the concept of the absolute.” After attaining the enriched “concept of the absolute,” Hegel returns through this concept to real nature, which constrains the concept. In a simplified model, Schelling’s first stage, negative philosophy, can be described as a “structure of levels”: after the “highest in thought” has been reached, this “highest” must be grasped anew as the “absolute,” thereby achieving positive philosophy’s grasp of the relation between “thought” and “being,” or between “the whole of the levels” and “the absolute.” Hegel’s philosophical structure, by contrast, is an “oblique circle”—roughly imaginable as the Ptolemaic celestial system. The “absolute concept” he reaches in thought must externalize itself into reality, and must therefore accomplish the joining of beginning and end: in the last step of his system, what is last must become first. Schelling’s keenest insight is that this structural difference is not external but precisely Hegel’s foundation, whether as strength or defect. Because Hegel grasps the movement of “the concept” or “thought” as most fundamental, he must dissolve “reality” completely within “thought”: “reality” itself must become a moment of “thought,” rather than the background or material against which thought encounters resistance. Therefore, even when Hegel recognizes that “the concept of the absolute” must itself already posit reality as its content, this concept must tirelessly dissolve this positing anew into the concept’s own externalization. Thus, although both discuss the unity of “timelessness” and “time,” Schelling believes only his own “absolute” is truly “positive being,” whereas being in Hegel is merely a dissolved moment of thought.
2. The secret of the fundamental difference Schelling grasps therefore lies in Hegel’s structure of “joining beginning and end.” Schelling accordingly criticizes the beginning and conclusion of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel begins with the most abstract concepts: “being,” “nothing,” and “becoming.” Yet pure concepts themselves necessarily presuppose determinate reality, just as abstraction necessarily presupposes something from which one abstracts. “Being” itself is not genuinely abstract or contentless, because “being” is actually the subject that is to posit itself, rather than a conceptual category. Yet Hegel overlooks the subject already thinking within nature, interpreting this movement instead as the concept’s own movement, and thus mistakenly equating subject with concept. The subject is first the subject of “reality,” then the subject of “thought”; but in no case is the subject a concept. Hegel is therefore mistaken to interpret the subject’s immanent movement as the concept’s immanent movement. This is also the pernicious result of his mistakenly treating “thought” as identical with “reality.”
3. At the conclusion of his philosophy, Hegel grasps nature as the concept’s self-externalization, namely absolute spirit’s self-positing. But since “the concept of the absolute” is already complete, and should already be “absolute spirit,” why must this “highest” externalize itself into nature, into the immediate “pure being” that serves as the beginning? Why must “spirit” continually become “spirit”? Why must “the first” become “the last”? Schelling thinks there is no necessity here. The “absolute” has a necessary relation only to “the all”; its relation to any particular content within “the all” is “contingent.” The relation between the creative activity of “pure being” and any “determinate being” is likewise contingent. Hegel must at least acknowledge this necessary contingency—the absolutely free creator—instead of disguising this “beginning–end relation” itself as necessary.
4. Schelling thereby answers Hegel’s earlier criticisms of him. First, the beginning of Hegel’s own philosophy is not presuppositionless either. And if by presuppositionlessness he means the circular structure finally achieved, he still presupposes the necessity of these conceptual contents forming a circle; even the claim that “the concept itself can be equated with the subject” is a presupposition. Second, Hegel misunderstands the meaning of Schelling’s “intellectual intuition.” He criticizes Schelling for using “intellectual intuition” to prove the actual existence of the “subject–object connection.” In fact, Schelling thinks he merely describes the dialectical development of the “subject–object connection” as content, and this description precisely dispenses with “intellectual intuition.” The sole meaning of “intellectual intuition” Schelling accepts is precisely anti-Fichtean: “intellectual intuition” does not verify the “subject–object connection,” but thematizes the “being–thought relation” as the fundamental philosophical problem—how the material of intuition becomes intellectualized.
Schelling on Jacobi and Theosophy:
1. Jacobi’s thought has two stages: the first is the relatively sophisticated stage of “knowledge–faith” dualism; the second the less sophisticated stage of vulgar rationalism. In the first stage, Jacobi emphasizes the experience of faith and the heart’s feeling. At this point he is a pioneer in opposing rationalism. Yet this feeling lacks content and can function only as the negation of any knowledge, or as “ignorance.” In the second stage, Jacobi first directly equates the knowledge obtained by rationalism with knowledge of a personal God. More fatally, what he accepts is not Hegelian negative philosophy and speculative rationalism, but Wolffian vulgar rationalism without immanent impetus. Although theosophy is richer in content than Jacobi’s early philosophy, in form it still employs that petty, interminably chattering mysticism. Those who equate their own gnosis with God’s divine knowledge actually turn themselves wholly into objects, and therefore can be grasped only as objects by other subjects.
2. Schelling himself reiterates his position: completing negative philosophy reaches the highest in thought. One must then pass from the highest to the absolute, and, by grasping the relation between the absolute’s eternal revelation and the subject’s historical creation, enter the free domain of transcendental history, thereby attaining the realm of positive philosophy.
Supplement to 2: What distinguishes Schelling from Jacobi here is that Schelling needs philosophy to accomplish the total negation of knowledge and the absolute positing of faith. Schelling therefore thinks he has not only “faith,” but also the “works” faith requires: the mediating activity of thought that discloses “being.”