Arthur Schopenhauer · 阿图尔·叔本华
Will and representation · 意志与表象
Undated 未注日期
意志与表象——散记
Reflections · Pages
bernet论的叔本华
不悟啊,几个问题1.纯一的意志是如何转化为现象的杂多的?
bernet解的是,纯一的意志是纯粹行动力,而行动就会产生诸行动的诸后果,现象即后果(尽管并非是从因果律来谈的后果);两者之间被理念中介
2.纯一的意志为何“想要”转化为杂多?
从意志的视角来看没有理由,意志是超出理由律的;从现象的事后视角来看,因为纯粹行动需要溢出
3.意志与现象如何交涉?
现象是意志行动的境况而非条件,意志是现象的无根而非根据
4.理性发挥了什么作用?
按bernet的解法,理性只在现象中起作用;而由于理性是将诸表征对象联结起来的官能,而联结是一个行为,可知理性对象由非-理性的意志(无根地)奠基;由于理性预设了对象的杂多,因此冲突只能来自于理性,也就是现象和理性才是矛盾冲突的源泉,而不是非理性。所以理性是痛苦的(苦恼意识),非理性是平静的。
???
我觉得最重要的问题在于理性的根源。假如理性是将杂多关联成整体的冲动和能力,那这个“一个整体”与“纯一”的关系该如何刻画
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Schopenhauer as Discussed by Bernet
I don’t get it. A few questions: 1. How does the purely one will turn into the manifold of phenomena?
Bernet’s interpretation is that the purely one will is pure power of action, and action produces the various consequences of various acts. Phenomena are these consequences, although not consequences in the sense of the law of causality. Ideas mediate between the two.
2. Why does the purely one will “want” to turn into the manifold?
From the will’s perspective there is no reason: the will exceeds the principle of reason. From the retrospective perspective of phenomena, it is because pure action needs to overflow.
3. How do will and phenomena interact?
Phenomena are the circumstances of the will’s action, not its conditions. The will is the groundlessness of phenomena, not their ground.
4. What role does reason play?
On Bernet’s reading, reason operates only among phenomena. Reason is the faculty that connects objects of representation, and connecting is an act; we can therefore see that the objects of reason are grounded, groundlessly, by the nonrational will. Because reason presupposes a manifold of objects, conflict can arise only from reason. Phenomena and reason, rather than the nonrational, are thus the source of contradiction and conflict. Reason is therefore painful, the unhappy consciousness; the nonrational is tranquil.
???
I think the most important question concerns the origin of reason. If reason is the impulse and capacity to connect the manifold into one whole, how should the relation between this “one whole” and the “purely one” be characterized?