Miscellaneous · 杂记
The Foundations of Modern Political Thought · 现代政治思想的基础
25年笔记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 27 June 2026
Reading / 研读:Quentin Skinner · The Foundations of Modern Political Thought 现代政治思想的基础
In this note / 篇目
现代政治思想在文艺复兴时期的奠基:
1. 修辞学和经院哲学,罗马和希腊:两个对立的中心;从前者诞生了人文主义对公民和统治者的美德教育,从后者诞生了对体制进行考察的政治科学;两者在对彼此的批评和融合中共同构成了现代政治的根本源流。
2. 修辞学的形式与内容与共和主义的亲缘:修辞学从一开始的教学形式,为了教学用例的目的,逐渐演变成对君主和公民全体建言和对具体政治事务评论的形式。这一形式本身就预设了一种普遍的可以进行政治评论的自由场所,并被意大利本有的共和主义实践传统所发扬。内容上,修辞学逐渐从一种纯粹说服和论辩的技艺向修辞家西塞罗所代表的共和精神靠拢。文艺复兴时期,意大利的人文主义者们便逐渐将城邦视作罗马共和理想的继承者。
3. 经院哲学的形式与内容与共和主义的亲缘:内容上,经院哲学的政治倾向虽然在一开始就被阿奎那定在偏王权的一方,但意大利的共和主义者们从亚里士多德处重新找到城邦自治和自主共和的正当性。形式上,经院哲学在思考哲学之为哲学与政治的关系的时候,引入了后期人文主义很重要的议题,即otium(闲暇)与negotium(劳作)的对立;首先,闲暇使政治哲人的思辨足以从城邦的政治生活中抽离,再从闲暇立足处强调劳作的积极政治介入。这两者的整合使得一种共和主义的政治实践被视作可能的,闲暇之抽离弱化了固有的政制,而积极政治介入则强调了要培养公民之为公民的德性。
4. 因此,在政治的理论和实践上,我们有了两个新的方向。一个是经院哲学提供的对政治体制的审视视角,一个是人文主义提供的对教育与公民德性的强调。前者带来的后果是,随着对罗马法研究的深入,罗马法逐渐不再被认作是自然法,而被认作是历史的、地域的,这就是政治科学中的历史主义和相对主义方法论的源流。后者则同样为这一趋向作出了贡献:假如重要的是公民的德性,那好的政制就不是以其本质为好,而是以其对公民有良好的教化作用,并足以培养并保证公民的德性不受腐败。由此,政制不再是对善好理念或者上帝之城的在世模仿,而变成了可以支撑国家持存的机器。反之,政制不再是诸理念的混合,而是“人们互相打交道的方式”,这打交道的方式自然是依赖于人们在世与界中的位置。任何自然善好的政制都因此被取消了,剩下的只有可以支撑人们继续彼此“打交道”的政治舞台。
5. 所以,我们最后来到了马基雅维利。马基雅维利就是这一切的聚合点:政制是为了公民的德性不受腐败,而没有别的意义,反而,所有政制最终都是可以为了维护德性而根据时运去变更的。可到最后,德性(virtù)本身是什么?不是什么别的,反而就是那可以不断重新为既存的政治舞台注入活力的创造性。这一创造性不再有具体的内容,也不再贴合任何道德学说,因为任何道德学说所依赖的具体善好的那个政制已经被取消。德性是一群人能够持续“打交道”,不断自我更新以适应时运,并继续维持着“打交道”的动态的这一特质。当僭主登基并奴役了所有人之后,人们就不再打交道,而仅仅只是彼此奴役的关系了。这是马基雅维利的共和思想。但是,他同时也承认,僭主与民众之间依然还是有着处在极限位置上的交互动态:这一戏剧,若有高潮,那就是或者在对僭主的刺杀中,或者在僭主的自我罢黜中完成。
6. 文艺复兴来到北方,最后被路德等宗教改革者继承。但首先,这一脉络通过伊拉斯谟等人,汇流到托马斯·莫尔和他的「乌托邦」。莫尔最先捕捉到文艺复兴真正的思想内涵,并将其捕捉在激进平等的乌托邦中。需要注意的是,在文艺复兴这一思潮里永远潜在的问题是,一个人文主义者们构想出来的人们仅仅彼此去“打交道”的社会似乎无法避免人们打交道的多种样式:当人们有了打交道的自由,就难免会陷入混乱,尤其是当人们不仅仅想要城邦,而想要帝国的时候。因此,治与乱逐渐占据了政治话语的中心,如何“治理”一个共和国因此成了所有共和主义者必须面对的难题,也是5.所描述的马基雅维利同样面对的问题。
宗教改革的前夕
1. 路德的改革思想并非是无中生有,而是相当依赖于广阔的历史语境和恒久传统的。首先,对他思想进行简单提炼的话,就是说,人深切认识到自己的堕落,但同时也知道,既然神已经预定了哪些人被拣选,这就意味着,哪怕人再堕落,神也施人以恩典。通过对耶稣救主此等慈爱的观想,人获得了信,且这信回溯性地自我确证着:我信,因我被拣选;而我被拣选,因为我信。这一自我确证的“恶性”循环即是神的永恒恩典。
2. 这一基本思想带来的后果对罗马教廷来说是致命的。首先,这一内观的自我循环直接否决了教廷有任何中介神与人关系的作用,而缺少了这一性灵上的功用,那教廷任何在世俗上权力的合法性就都被抹消了,因为教廷的世俗权力合法性完全奠基于性灵世界的权柄对世俗世界的权柄的压制上。其次,不仅罗马教廷失去了性灵和世俗世界权柄的合法性,甚至教廷本身的同一性都被抹消了。有教徒处即是教廷,在这个意义上,如果罗马教廷只是众多可能教廷的其中一个的话,那教皇也不再是教徒诸众性灵上的首脑。
3. 路德的思想有很多的渊源。首先,在思想上,他继承了晚期教会哲学家们,如奥卡姆和司各脱,对早期教会哲学及托马斯主义的批评;人的理性不足以认识神的创制,也不足以认识自然律。人的理性,与其说是不足,不如说是完全虚无的。同样,人是不可能通过行善业去获得拯救的,那只是堕落者的虚荣和愚妄。实际上,人获得拯救的方式只有一种,那就是完全将自己的虚无放置在神的意志之下,并以此去被动地感受神恩。同时,尽管对路德本人并没有什么直接影响,但人文主义对罗马教廷的批评在多地对路德思想的最终接受也起了重要作用。
4. 除此以外,对教廷威权的瓦解还有四处重要的源流。一个是被教廷认作异端的外部的宗教反对,比如胡斯主义,对教廷世俗化的批评。一个是教廷内部,尤其是在裂教时期,在几个教皇分立的现实情境里,诸教会成员对教皇权威的批评,以及在实际政治上,因为要重新遴选教皇的需求从而推动的对新的教廷治理模式的探讨。教廷由此开始从绝对君主制的模式向君主立宪制的模式摇摆,而罢黜教皇这一行动的合法性也从宗教方面逐渐转移向政治方面;教皇可能被罢黜的原因不再仅仅只是他的异端罪,甚至连他在位时的昏庸无能现在都成了可能导致他被罢黜的原因。还有一个是世俗界对教廷的税权、豁免权和单独立法权的批评,这一方面继承自人文主义式的对宗教特权阶层的腐败的批评,一方面,改革前夕方兴未艾的民族主义也推动了对宗教特权阶层其存在本身的批评。最后一个源流自然就是世俗国家的君主本身与教廷之间的权力斗争,尤其针对于缩减教廷征取领土、税收的权力,以及教廷那甚至意图统辖君主本人的过于广大的司法权力。也因此,路德改革甫一发生,便迅速结集了强大广泛的群众支持。
罗马教廷那时候卖赎罪券的合理化也挺好笑的,说,因为耶稣的恩典已经超出了对人类全体的拯救,所以可以通过教会作中介来分配这多出来的神恩。
民族主义对宗教阶层之存在本身的批评其实就是Marsiglius或者霍布斯对一个国家两个首脑,一个内脑,一个外脑(境外势力)分裂国家的批评。
宪政主义的奠基:
1. 宪政主义是对绝对君主制的反叛。绝对君主制滥觞于路德改革所提出的这一种思路,即,因为人是无能无知而神是全能全知的,所以任何事实上的统治都是神的命定,也是基督徒道义上必须遵从的统治,哪怕统治者是暴君,那也是人所应该承受的惩罚。人不能去建立独立的精神国度,即教廷,去反抗世俗权威,而至多只能在精神和良心上消极抵抗。
2. 对路德改革所推动的这一保守思想的反叛有三处源流,一处是改革内部,一处是现实政治实践,一处是教廷。在改革内部,我们可以看到路德本人及他最早的信徒,在面对了一些世俗统治者的不友善后,也开始宣说依据良心去反抗威权的正当性。同时,从路德宗大流里独立出来的重浸会众(Anabaptists),一派宣说基督教圣战的正当性,并威胁如果世俗威权不支持圣战,民众可以将其罢黜的思想,另一派则强调基督徒精神体的至高性,宣说一种友爱无政府主义。这三派虽然并不是主流,但对路德宗对绝对君主制先前的无条件支持构成了一定挑战。
3. 在现实政治实践里,有两处源流值得在意。一处是本就早有传统的教廷内部的会议至上主义(Conciliarism),为了削弱教皇本人的势力,在将教廷比附为主权国家的同时把世俗政治体的主权也重构为共和式的主权。另一处来源则是罗马法,尽管绝大多数对罗马法的评论都将皇帝视作帝国的绝对主宰,但同时,也有一脉从罗马法对以暴力抗辩不公义之类行为的豁免里发掘出了行使暴力反抗暴政的正当性,以至于甚至消解了皇帝本人的绝对权威。
4. 最后,则是宗教改革直接挑战的罗马教廷内也终于诞生了足以与路德宗抗衡的理论,也就是多玛派(Thomists)对古典经院哲学的复兴。路德改革宣说的思想最重要的无非两点,一点是真正性灵上的教会的不可见性,一点是教廷秩序的非必要性。多玛派一方面从圣彼得那里找到了对教廷传统的辩护,并且,有趣的是,恰恰是通过对圣经的细致解释,他们得以批评改革者的圣经唯一救赎论,即,只有通过对圣经的研读,而非通过教廷的中介,基督徒才能获得性灵的救赎;一方面也同样维护了教皇的权威。但多玛派也清楚,路德改革真正的威胁在于,它通过否定人的理性作用,否定了过去自然法传统所建立的等级秩序,同样也就否定了公共性灵的可能性。这才是真正可能瓦解教廷,这一公共性灵之建制,的威胁,而仅仅从经学上对其进行辩护肯定是不足的。
5. 多玛派因此必须完整地重构出在自然法传统中的古典经院政治哲学所秉承的世界图景。首先是神法,同时,结合了圣多玛和圣奥古斯丁,多玛派宣称神法就是神意。神法之下是启示法,这是神向人开示的律法,包括了旧约与新约。启示法之下是自然法,这就是人之为人所有的基本理性所开显的律法。自然法之下是人法,也就是世俗国家为了更好的维持根据习俗所设定的法律。这里,任何一层法,只要是正当的,都不能也不应该反驳上一层。但是,这个图景中包含了一处挑战,也就是,像私有产权这种普遍习俗,一方面无法从自然法里完全推定,一方面又足够普遍,到底是应该视作自然法般基本,还是应该视作一种普遍人法,也就是一种“虽然可以变更,但因为已经作为建制存在太久,还是理应保留”的习俗呢?这个问题在之后的现代政治史中会成为最大的争论点,也会带来最重要的后果。然后,这一普遍人法的层次也为格劳秀斯等人提供了创制国际法(并非人权法)的最初材料。
6. 但多玛派对现代政治及宪政主义带来的最大理论贡献有两个,一个是「自然状态」,一个是「社会契约」。因为不接受新教式的政制神创论,他们复兴了亚里士多德的自然政治人观念;同时,要在创世纪设定的框架下,即亚当夏娃获罪被逐出伊甸园,在堕落的地上游荡的情形下,回应政制神创论的挑战,他们必须解决亚里士多德不需要解决的问题,也就是,解释自然人是怎么在背负原罪的情形下结成政治联盟的。因为假如人是堕落的,他们又如何一起生活,不妨害彼此呢?一种正当的政治生活如何是可能的?多玛派给了非常聪明的回答。他们颠倒了这整个问题的预设,也就是说,问题并不是堕落的人该如何一起生活,反而恰恰是因为人是堕落的,政治才是可能且正当的。因为人的堕落,人失去了完备,才需要他人;同时,因为堕落,人才需要结成政治,在自己之上设立权威。权威的设立也并不是,比如亚里士多德说的那样,为了指引城邦向更高的善好进展,而是为了防止人在自然状态对自己和他人的妨害。如果政治是正当的,那一定是因为人自愿交出了自己的自由和自然权利,那一定是因为人虽然自然地有自由,但这一自由平等地受原罪腐蚀妨害,而必须要通过建立政制,取消部分自由,去保证更重要的自由。因为原罪,亚当作为父亲的权威不再永恒正当,他的孩子都会四散开叶,各自独立,“各自耕种自己的田地”,所以才需要政治权威。这一构想带来的后果是,一方面,宪政主义的拼图都已齐全,另一方面,世俗国家获得了主权上的平等独立,任一国家都不能以任何理由奴役另一国家。由此,反而是教廷最早向帝国主义西班牙发出了反殖民的先声。
7. 所以,我们可以说,多玛派勾勒的完整图景是,平等堕落的人为了避免伤害自己与他人,运用他的理性,自愿交让了他自然拥有的自由,以保守他更重要的自由。这虽然已经有了宪政主义的雏形,但离完整的宪政主义还有距离。一方面,多玛派虽然强调了世俗国家主权的独立和平等,但他们同样也强调教廷性灵上的宰制。直接或间接的,教皇依旧有着极高的权威和极大的权力,哪怕性灵的和世俗的事物要分开。另一方面,多玛派虽然承认人最初的自然自由,也承认自然状态的诸众是政治同意的源头,但他们同样认为,后承圣多玛,前启霍布斯,自然状态的诸众,以其所是,是不足够达成政治同意的。相反,任何政治同意在最开始就已经预设了一种神秘暧昧的政治共同体了,而这一政治体又绝对是要在政治主权者的塑造之下才能成型的。在霍布斯那里,这一悖论就是,“假如没有预先设定一个利维坦,那又有什么能保证自然状态下的人会遵从社会契约,去创造一个利维坦?”苏亚雷斯和霍布斯在这个悖论上采取了惊人相似的策略。他们都认为,正是因为任何政治建制都已经预设权威,权威因此是自我设定的,也就是,任何政制都预设了主权者,没有主权者就没有政制;那这样实际上就意味着,政制就是主权者,主权者就是政制,这两者不可拆分。所以,没有什么不可分割的自然权利;自然权利恰恰是可分割的。一旦你处在政制里,你就必须承认并遵从主权者的权威,你无权再把你之前交付的权利回收,因为一旦回收,你就取消了你作为这一个政制下的政治人的身份,也就同样取消了你在这个政制下的任何权利。这时候,如果你认为你对权利的回收也是整个政制下许可的权利,那你就是自相矛盾了,因为你业已取消了所有权利。换句话说,诸众从来不能是主权者,因为假如诸众要从主权者那里回收主权,那诸众就会直接堕入自然状态,而不再是一个完整统一的政治体,也自然不会有统一的回收主权这一政治决定,这一决定也不会有任何政治正当性了。任何创制,对多玛派和霍布斯来说,都是直接的、绝对的、整全的,一旦设立社会契约,就必然会有利维坦,而一旦有利维坦,任何对利维坦的反抗就都是政治层面上不正当的,因为这一反抗行动本身就已经将反抗者完完全全地抛出政制以及创立这一政制的政治共同体了,哪怕这一反抗者是整个诸众本身。这也意味着,宪政主义最重要的预设,就是诸众拥有着对国家不可质疑不可分割的主权这一点,在多玛派的学说里是缺失的,甚至是被反对的。
对「革命无罪论」的奠基:
1. 由于路德宗对积极反抗的态度暧昧,加尔文宗试图为自己的反抗行动寻找更激进的正当化方案。加尔文宗对路德宗的立场进行三点改造。首先,路德宗从公法的立场上,认定只有直接从属于上级并由神拣选的下级可以反抗上级,比如,只有诸侯可以合法地为了保护民众去反抗上级,而一般民众是不被允许的;加尔文宗做的改造是,现在不仅仅是被神拣选的官员或牧师可以合法反抗,哪怕是被民众选举出的代表也被认为合法的反抗者。然后,路德宗从私法的角度,认定民众可以反抗不义的君主,但这却又与他们奥古斯丁式的君主神选论和消极抵抗论相矛盾,一方面,他们认定任何政制都是神的意志,而神的意志从长远来看总是正义的,那这样,任何反抗就都是不义,所以路德宗没有一个积极抵抗的合理立场;加尔文宗在这里则完全取消了君主神选论,而认为尽管神选的君主永远是正义的,但被蒙骗蛊惑的民众会忽视神的信号,而出于自己的堕落去选择一个不义的君主,如同在选择大卫之前,犹太人选择了扫罗。最后,加尔文宗认为,由于神与亚当、诺亚、摩西都立了约,后又以耶稣与世人立了新约,这意味着在任何时代,任何群体,只要是义人,就能与神沟通。但这同样意味着,任何反抗,只要是正义的,就是神所首肯的,是为了遵循与神的约定,发起的正当的反抗。这三点一方面让革命合法化了,一方面让革命甚至成为了一种信众的职责。
2. 在法国的加尔文宗胡格诺派,作为少数派,要抵抗天主教廷,需要巧妙利用敌友。在早期,他们的朋友是试图平息宗教战争的凯瑟琳·美第奇,在政治和道义上支持宗教宽容的知识分子群体(他们认为,首先,世上所有宗教都分享着共同的普遍真理;然后,没有任何宗教可以虚荣到完全肯定自己的真理优于其它真理),以及在认识到宗教战争会对国家带来毁灭性影响因此愿意妥协的天主教徒。但是,在大屠杀过后,胡格诺派清晰地看到继续期待凯瑟琳政府的宗教宽容政策生效是无济于事的。他们于是需要一个新的敌友划分。
3. 胡格诺派的盟友是在绝对君主制崛起的同时被孤立的群体。这些群体首先是贵族,因为他们作风奢靡,在新君主为了增加收入而选择卖官鬻爵,招入更多新兴阶级进入朝廷后,贵族固有的特权逐渐受剥蚀。然后是国会政府,因为绝对君主制的崛起,在让·博丹等人的支持下,逐渐开始消解过去约束君主的三大机制,即la police,la justice,la religion;也就是社会习俗,法律机构,以及神的正义。社会习俗一方面包括过去传统上君主需要遵循的法律,一方面包括固有的社会阶级之间作为一个有机整体的互相交互。法律机构一方面包括国会法庭对君主的传唤权,以及大法官等官职的终生不可任免制度。神的正义则一方面包括自然法,如君主不可侵犯民众私有财产,不可出卖国家土地等。这些机制都在绝对君主制的崛起中逐渐被剥蚀,君主一方面被重新视作罗马法或者早期路德宗所规定的神选无上皇帝,一方面被视作国家主权的凝结点,也就是主权者。既然没有主权者就没有主权,那么政制就仅仅依据主权者人数的多少被分为君主制、贵族制和民主制;而博丹更通过人文主义式的历史考察,确认君主制为最优制度,那自然只有君主是真正神选正义的主权者。而主权者作为国家的创立者,整个国家都是他意志的造物,因此,主权者有的并非只是依据自然正义的执法权,更是立法权。当君主既是绝对的立法意志,又是神选的地上统治的时候,任何对君主的反对都失去了正当性。在这里,「君权神授」这一观念才真正获得了完整的内容。胡格诺派除了绝对君主制的支持者这些敌人以外,还有另一批以蒙田为首的斯多亚主义者。出于对内乱的厌恶和狂信者的偏激自信的怀疑,蒙田提出了一种极其保守的政治意识形态,即,任何革新,因其带来未知的坏处,都不如旧的制度,至少我们已经知道并习惯于忍受旧制度的坏处,而确定的坏总比未知的坏要好上些。胡格诺派在与这些敌友的周旋中,逐渐发扬了内在于加尔文运动、甚至是加尔文本人的人文主义立场(加尔文自己就经常援引希腊和罗马的历史典故,从不迟疑为自己的神学染上现实政治的色彩),而逐渐让他们的反抗行动脱离了宗教神学语境,而进入了群众政治的领域。宗教上的「反抗的责任」也逐渐转变为政治上的「反抗的权利」。
像早期路德宗的一个论点其实是很不融贯的,也就是,他们认为,如果根据私法的立场,“天子犯法,与庶民同罪”,那其实他们可以说,自己的反抗并非是反抗神创政制,而只是根据君主本人立的法来合法反抗君主罢了。但是这里有很多问题,一个是,这很大程度上是一种诡辩,也就是,既然你说到底依然还是反抗,那如果君主镇压你的反抗,哪怕你的反抗合法,也不能说合君主的意志,这样还是违反了路德宗所认定的神的正义。一个是,这只适用于罗马法,那如果不建立于罗马法或者脱离了罗马法的政制呢?这时候反抗还正当吗?然后,这一立场,因其私法性质,既然将不义的君主视作被褫夺了君位的罪犯,就允许了任何公民对他行使暴力的权利。而把这一危险的权利交给一般公民是相对保守的路德宗尽全力也要去规避的。加尔文宗拒绝了路德宗奥古斯丁式的君主神选论,而选择了更融贯且更激进的立场,甚至不是将不义的君主视作法律意义上的罪犯,而是视作宗教意义上的恶人,因此允许了暴力革命的可能。
现代政治奠基的完成:
1. 为了强调自己反抗的正当性,胡格诺派一方面坚持自己的建制派立场,一方面则在道德上斥责凯瑟琳·美第奇和马基雅维利之间的关联(马基雅维利的「君主论」即是献给了凯瑟琳的父亲)。但是,坚持建制立场的胡格诺派在援引他们的三个「革命无罪」的论点时依然发现每个论点都有难以解决的问题。首先,为了讨好建制中间派,胡格诺派不可能深刻援引私法论中最激进的部分,即公民对君主的反抗权。然后,为了讨好中间派天主教徒,他们也不能援引加尔文宗的反抗神学,即,任何与神契约的义人都要为了帮扶唯一正确的宗教(即加尔文宗)而反抗君主。最后,若是援引公法论,那他们也无法说服已经将法典从罗马法里分立出来的各国去承认在国家起源时君主就是被民众选举出来的。由于这些因素,最终,胡格诺派反而倒向了天主教廷在与新教论战中重振的自然法理论。
2. 胡格诺派基本上从自己过去的敌人那里原封不动地抄回来了一整个自然法理论。只是在他们的理论中,君主受到两个契约限制。首先是与神的契约,不得行不义。然后是与民众的诸代表,以及诸代表与民众,所签订的三方契约。在这两重契约的制约下,君主如果行不义,就要受到宗教的审判,而执行这一审判的道德责任就落在了民众代表的身上。但这一反抗的理论传播到苏格兰,因为在苏格兰加尔文宗有着广泛的群众基础,所以反而不需要强调以民众代表领头去反抗不义的道德义务,而只需要确立民众直接反抗不义的政治权利就行了。正因为群众基础足够广泛,所以无需请求护民官的道德庇护,而只需要激发民众的反抗激情。所以,苏格兰加尔文宗的理论家如布坎南得以省略胡格诺派这一反抗理论的宗教面向,而仅仅提出了在政治上,与君主直接契约(而非通过下级代表的代理)的民众有着反抗的权利;这时候,过去的基于宗教的客观权利概念(即由神授予的、由理性或习俗确立的施行具体行动的权利)也被现在基于经济的主观权利概念(即由人对属于自己的某物进行随意处置的权利)代替,君主不再是为了引导民众向善好进展的领头人,而仅仅是民众财产和生命安全的代理和保护者。民众也同时不再是亚里士多德式的自然的政治生物,而是斯多亚式的自我保存的动物,为了自我保存而同意了与君主签订的契约。到了这里,我们就有了完整的现代自由主义政治的图景。而新教徒布坎南勾画的这一图景之后也被法国天主教徒马里亚纳采纳,反过来作为反抗法国新教君主的武器。这以后,新教和天主教便逐渐合流,无论宗教的意识形态站在哪里,都开始援引同一套脱离于宗教话语的政治意识形态系统去正当化自己对君主的反抗行为。就是此时,我们可以说现代政治获得了完整的奠基,让政治话语从宗教话语里独立了出来。
3. 现代政治的奠基就是国家的诞生,而国家的诞生就是指政治从宗教下能独立出来。这一方面依赖于对亚里士多德的重新发现,得以反抗圣奥古斯丁将宗教强加于政治的传统影响;而在之后几代法学家、神学家和哲学家的努力下,政治逐渐重新被视作独立的科学,并在马基雅维利那里获得了完成。另一方面,这要求了任一政制都必须是内部同质的,不能允许罗马教廷的干预,而这则在人文主义、宗教改革、绝对主义等思想的世俗化汇流中完成。最后,我们要让主权者(无论是君主还是民主)从宗教的桎梏里解脱出来,这则在对主权者权利和义务的重新定义中完成,此后,君主不再是神在地上的代行,其义务也不是让所有臣民都获得救赎,向善好进展,而是维护臣民的自由和利益。这里,我们已经能清楚看到独立于君主也独立于任一特定群体的现代国家的概念雏形,毕竟无论是君主还是隶属,都无法囊括完整的国家;如果君主只是主权允许的执行代表,而如果群众又只有在君主的行使下才能获得主权者的形式,那君主就只是国家的形式,民众也只是国家的质料,却都不是完整的国家。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
The Renaissance Foundations of Modern Political Thought:
1. Rhetoric and scholastic philosophy, Rome and Greece: two opposed centers. From the former arose humanist education in the virtues of citizens and rulers; from the latter arose political science’s examination of institutions. Through mutual criticism and integration, the two jointly constituted the fundamental sources of modern politics.
2. The affinity of rhetoric’s form and content with republicanism: beginning as a form of instruction, rhetoric gradually developed, for the purposes of teaching by example, into advice addressed to rulers and the citizenry as a whole, and commentary on concrete political affairs. This form itself presupposed a general free space for political commentary, and was developed further by Italy’s existing tradition of republican practice. In content, rhetoric gradually moved from a pure art of persuasion and disputation toward the republican spirit represented by the rhetorician Cicero. During the Renaissance, Italian humanists thus gradually came to regard their city-states as heirs to Rome’s republican ideal.
3. The affinity of scholastic philosophy’s form and content with republicanism: in content, although Aquinas initially placed scholastic philosophy’s political orientation on the side of kingship, Italian republicans rediscovered in Aristotle the legitimacy of civic autonomy and independent republican government. In form, when scholastic philosophy considered the relation between philosophy as philosophy and politics, it introduced a question crucial to later humanism: the opposition between otium, leisure, and negotium, work. First, leisure allows political philosophers’ speculation to withdraw from the city’s political life; then, from the standpoint of leisure, they emphasize work’s active political intervention. Integrating the two makes republican political practice conceivable: the detachment of leisure weakens established regimes, while active political intervention emphasizes the cultivation of citizens’ virtues as citizens.
4. We therefore acquire two new directions in political theory and practice: scholastic philosophy provides a perspective from which to examine political institutions, while humanism emphasizes education and civic virtue. The consequence of the former is that, as the study of Roman law deepens, Roman law gradually ceases to be regarded as natural law and comes to be regarded as historical and regional. This is the source of historicist and relativist methods in political science. The latter contributes to the same tendency: if what matters is civic virtue, a good regime is good not by its essence, but because it educates citizens well and can cultivate their virtue and protect it from corruption. A regime thus ceases to be an earthly imitation of the idea of the good or the City of God, becoming instead a machine capable of sustaining the state. Conversely, a regime is no longer a mixture of ideas, but “the way people deal with one another,” and this manner of dealing naturally depends on people’s positions in their worlds and domains. Every naturally good regime is thereby canceled; what remains is only a political stage capable of sustaining people’s continued “dealings” with one another.
5. We therefore finally arrive at Machiavelli. Machiavelli is the point where all this converges: regimes exist to protect civic virtue from corruption and have no other meaning. Rather, every regime can ultimately be altered according to fortune in order to preserve virtue. But what, finally, is virtù itself? Nothing other than the creativity capable of continually infusing the existing political stage with new vitality. This creativity no longer has determinate content or conforms to any moral doctrine, since the specifically good regime on which any moral doctrine depends has already been canceled. Virtù is the quality by which a group can continue “dealing with one another,” continually renewing itself to adapt to fortune and maintaining the dynamic of these “dealings.” Once a tyrant takes the throne and enslaves everyone, people cease dealing with one another and stand only in relations of mutual enslavement. This is Machiavelli’s republican thought. Yet he also acknowledges that a dynamic interaction remains between tyrant and people, situated at the limit: if this drama has a climax, it comes either in the tyrant’s assassination or in his self-deposition.
6. The Renaissance reaches the north and is finally inherited by Luther and other reformers. First, however, through Erasmus and others, this current converges on Thomas More and his Utopia. More is the first to capture the Renaissance’s true intellectual content, embodying it in a radically egalitarian utopia. We should note a question always latent within Renaissance thought: a society imagined by humanists in which people merely “deal with one another” seemingly cannot avoid the multiple forms these dealings take. Once people have the freedom to deal with one another, disorder becomes difficult to avoid, especially when they want not merely a city-state but an empire. Order and disorder thus gradually occupy the center of political discourse. How to “govern” a republic becomes a difficulty every republican must confront, and the same problem Machiavelli faces in point 5.
On the Eve of the Reformation
1. Luther’s reformist thought did not arise from nothing; it depended considerably on a broad historical context and enduring traditions. To distill his thought briefly: people recognize their own fallen condition profoundly, yet also know that, since God has already predestined those to be elected, God bestows grace upon people however fallen they may be. Through contemplating such love in Jesus the Savior, people acquire faith, and this faith retroactively confirms itself: I believe because I am elected, and I am elected because I believe. This self-confirming “vicious” circle is God’s eternal grace.
2. The consequences of this basic thought are fatal to the Roman Church. First, this inward, self-circling contemplation directly denies the Church any role in mediating between God and humanity. Without this spiritual function, every legitimacy of the Church’s temporal power is erased, since that legitimacy rests entirely on spiritual authority’s supremacy over temporal authority. Second, the Roman Church loses not only the legitimacy of its spiritual and temporal authority, but even its own identity. Wherever there are believers, there is the Church. In this sense, if the Roman Church is merely one among many possible churches, the pope is no longer the spiritual head of the community of believers.
3. Luther’s thought has many sources. Intellectually, he inherits later ecclesiastical philosophers’ criticisms—such as those of Ockham and Scotus—of earlier ecclesiastical philosophy and Thomism. Human reason is insufficient to know God’s institutions or natural law. Rather than merely insufficient, human reason is completely nothing. Likewise, people cannot attain salvation by performing good works; that is merely the vanity and folly of the fallen. In fact, there is only one way to attain salvation: to place one’s nothingness completely beneath God’s will and thereby passively receive divine grace. Meanwhile, although it had little direct influence on Luther himself, humanist criticism of the Roman Church played an important role in the eventual reception of Luther’s ideas in many places.
4. Beyond this, the dismantling of ecclesiastical authority has four important sources. One is external religious opposition deemed heretical by the Church, such as Hussitism’s criticism of the Church’s secularization. Another is internal to the Church, especially during the schism: amid the actual division between several popes, church members criticized papal authority, and the practical political need to select a pope anew encouraged discussion of new forms of church government. The Church thus began oscillating from the model of absolute monarchy toward constitutional monarchy, while the legitimacy of deposing a pope gradually shifted from religious to political grounds. Heresy was no longer the only possible reason for deposition; even his incompetence and incapacity in office could now justify it. Another source is secular criticism of the Church’s powers of taxation, immunity, and separate legislation. This partly inherits humanist criticism of the corruption of the privileged religious class; meanwhile, nationalism, gathering momentum on the eve of the Reformation, also encouraged criticism of that class’s very existence. The final source is naturally the power struggle between secular monarchs themselves and the Church, especially over restricting the Church’s powers to acquire territory and collect taxes, and its excessively broad judicial authority, which even aspired to jurisdiction over monarchs themselves. For these reasons, as soon as Luther’s Reformation began, it rapidly gathered powerful and widespread popular support.
The Roman Church’s rationalization for selling indulgences at the time is rather funny: because Jesus’ grace already exceeded what was needed to save all humanity, the Church could mediate the distribution of this surplus divine grace.
Nationalism’s criticism of the religious class’s very existence is actually the criticism made by Marsiglius or Hobbes of a state divided by two heads: one internal, the other external—a foreign power.
The Foundations of Constitutionalism:
1. Constitutionalism is a rebellion against absolute monarchy. Absolute monarchy originates in this line of thought proposed by Luther’s Reformation: because human beings are powerless and ignorant while God is omnipotent and omniscient, every de facto rule is ordained by God and is a rule Christians must morally obey. Even if the ruler is a tyrant, this is punishment people ought to endure. People cannot establish an independent spiritual kingdom, the Church, to resist secular authority; at most they can resist passively in spirit and conscience.
2. Rebellion against this conservative thought promoted by Luther’s Reformation has three sources: within the Reformation, in actual political practice, and within the Church. Within the Reformation, Luther himself and his earliest followers, after encountering hostility from certain secular rulers, also began asserting the legitimacy of resisting authority on grounds of conscience. Meanwhile, among the Anabaptists who separated from the Lutheran mainstream, one faction proclaimed the legitimacy of Christian holy war and threatened that the people could depose secular authorities if they did not support it. Another emphasized the supremacy of the Christian spiritual body, preaching a fraternal anarchism. Although these three positions were not mainstream, they posed a certain challenge to Lutheranism’s previously unconditional support for absolute monarchy.
3. In actual political practice, two sources deserve attention. One is conciliarism, already a long-standing tradition within the Church. In order to weaken the pope personally, it compared the Church to a sovereign state while reconstructing the sovereignty of secular political bodies as republican sovereignty. Another source is Roman law. Although most commentaries on Roman law regard the emperor as the empire’s absolute master, another current discovers in Roman law’s exemptions for acts such as violent defense against injustice a legitimacy for violent resistance to tyranny, even dissolving the emperor’s own absolute authority.
4. Finally, within the Roman Church directly challenged by the Reformation, a theory capable of opposing Lutheranism at last emerged: the Thomists’ revival of classical scholastic philosophy. The Reformation’s most important claims amounted to two: the invisibility of the genuinely spiritual Church, and the dispensability of ecclesiastical order. The Thomists found in Saint Peter a defense of church tradition. Interestingly, it was precisely through close scriptural interpretation that they could criticize the reformers’ doctrine of salvation through scripture alone: that Christians attain spiritual salvation only by studying scripture, not through the Church’s mediation. They likewise defended papal authority. Yet the Thomists also understood that the Reformation’s genuine threat lay in its denial of human reason’s role: this denied the hierarchical order established by the natural-law tradition, and thus also the possibility of public spiritual life. This was the threat truly capable of dismantling the Church as the institution of public spiritual life, and a merely scriptural defense was certainly insufficient.
5. The Thomists therefore had to reconstruct completely the worldview upheld by classical scholastic political philosophy within the natural-law tradition. First comes divine law; combining Saint Thomas and Saint Augustine, the Thomists proclaim divine law to be divine will. Beneath divine law is revealed law, the law God discloses to humanity, including the Old and New Testaments. Beneath revealed law is natural law, disclosed by the basic reason people possess as human beings. Beneath natural law is human law: laws secular states establish according to custom in order to maintain themselves better. Here, every level of law, insofar as it is legitimate, cannot and ought not contradict the level above. Yet this picture contains a challenge: universal customs such as private property cannot be entirely deduced from natural law, but are nevertheless sufficiently widespread. Should they be regarded as fundamental like natural law, or as universal human law: a custom that “can be changed, but ought to be retained because it has already existed so long as an institution”? This question will become the greatest point of contention in subsequent modern political history and have the most important consequences. This level of universal human law also provides Grotius and others with the initial materials for establishing international law—not human-rights law.
6. The Thomists’ greatest theoretical contributions to modern politics and constitutionalism, however, are two: the “state of nature” and the “social contract.” Rejecting the Protestant doctrine of the divine creation of regimes, they revive Aristotle’s notion of the naturally political human being. At the same time, to answer that doctrine’s challenge within the framework established by Genesis—Adam and Eve, guilty and expelled from Eden, wandering the fallen earth—they must solve a problem Aristotle did not have to solve: how natural human beings form political associations while bearing original sin. For if people are fallen, how can they live together without harming one another? How is legitimate political life possible? The Thomists give a very clever answer. They reverse the entire question’s presupposition: the issue is not how fallen people can live together; rather, it is precisely because people are fallen that politics is possible and legitimate. Through the Fall, people lose their completeness and thus need others; likewise, because they are fallen, they need to form political associations and establish authority above themselves. Authority is established not, as Aristotle says, to guide the city toward a higher good, but to prevent people in the state of nature from harming themselves and others. If politics is legitimate, it must be because people voluntarily surrender their freedom and natural rights. It must be because, although naturally free, their freedom is equally corrupted and obstructed by original sin, making it necessary to establish regimes and cancel some freedoms to safeguard more important ones. Because of original sin, Adam’s paternal authority is no longer eternally legitimate: his children disperse and branch out independently, “each cultivating their own field.” Political authority is therefore needed. The consequence of this conception is that, on the one hand, all the pieces of constitutionalism are now present; on the other, secular states acquire sovereign equality and independence, and no state can enslave another for any reason. Thus, it is instead the Church that first voices an anticolonial challenge to imperial Spain.
7. We can therefore say that the Thomists’ complete picture is this: equally fallen people, to avoid harming themselves and others, use their reason voluntarily to relinquish their natural freedom so as to preserve more important freedoms. Although constitutionalism is already present in outline, this remains some distance from complete constitutionalism. On the one hand, while emphasizing secular states’ sovereign independence and equality, the Thomists also emphasize the Church’s spiritual supremacy. Directly or indirectly, the pope still possesses extremely high authority and immense power, even if spiritual and temporal affairs must be separated. On the other hand, while acknowledging people’s original natural freedom and the multitude in the state of nature as the source of political consent, the Thomists also hold—following Saint Thomas and anticipating Hobbes—that the multitude in the state of nature, as it is, cannot sufficiently achieve political consent. Rather, every political consent already presupposes from the outset a mysterious, ambiguous political community, yet this political body absolutely requires a political sovereign’s shaping to acquire form. In Hobbes, this paradox is: “Without presupposing a Leviathan, what can guarantee that people in the state of nature will obey the social contract to create a Leviathan?” Suárez and Hobbes adopt strikingly similar strategies toward this paradox. Both hold that, precisely because every political institution already presupposes authority, authority is self-positing. Every regime presupposes a sovereign; without a sovereign, there is no regime. This actually means that the regime is the sovereign and the sovereign is the regime: the two cannot be separated. There are therefore no inalienable natural rights; natural rights are precisely alienable. Once within a regime, you must acknowledge and obey the sovereign’s authority. You have no right to reclaim the rights previously entrusted, since in reclaiming them you cancel your identity as a political person under this regime and thereby every right you possess within it. If you then consider your reclamation of rights itself a right permitted by the whole regime, you contradict yourself, since you have already canceled all your rights. In other words, the multitude can never be sovereign: if it seeks to reclaim sovereignty from the sovereign, it falls directly into the state of nature and ceases to be a complete, unified political body. There can naturally be no unified political decision to reclaim sovereignty, nor any political legitimacy for such a decision. For the Thomists and Hobbes, every institution is immediate, absolute, and entire. Once the social contract is established, there must be a Leviathan; once there is a Leviathan, every resistance to it is politically illegitimate, because the act of resistance itself has already cast the resister wholly outside both the regime and the political community founding it—even if the resister is the entire multitude. This means constitutionalism’s most important presupposition, that the multitude possesses unquestionable, inalienable sovereignty over the state, is absent from, and even opposed by, Thomist doctrine.
Establishing That “Revolution Is No Crime”:
1. Because Lutheranism’s attitude toward active resistance is ambiguous, Calvinism seeks more radical justifications for its own resistance. Calvinists modify the Lutheran position in three ways. First, from the standpoint of public law, Lutherans hold that only divinely elected inferiors directly subordinate to a superior can resist that superior: for instance, only princes can legitimately resist their superior to protect the people; ordinary people are not permitted to do so. Calvinists modify this by allowing not merely divinely elected officials or ministers, but even representatives elected by the people, to count as legitimate resisters. Then, from the standpoint of private law, Lutherans hold that people may resist an unjust ruler, but this contradicts their Augustinian doctrines of divinely elected rulers and passive resistance. They consider every regime God’s will, and God’s will always just in the long run; accordingly, every resistance is unjust, leaving Lutheranism without a reasonable position supporting active resistance. Here Calvinists wholly cancel the doctrine of divinely elected rulers: although a ruler elected by God is always just, a deceived and beguiled people may overlook God’s signs and, through its own fallen condition, choose an unjust ruler—just as the Jews chose Saul before choosing David. Finally, Calvinists hold that, because God made covenants with Adam, Noah, and Moses, and later a new covenant with humanity through Jesus, in every age any group, insofar as it is righteous, can communicate with God. But this also means that any just resistance is endorsed by God: legitimate resistance undertaken to honor the covenant with him. These three points both legitimate revolution and even make it a duty of the faithful.
2. As a minority resisting the Catholic Church, the French Calvinist Huguenots need to make skillful use of friends and enemies. Their early friends are Catherine de’ Medici, who seeks to pacify the religious wars; intellectuals who support religious toleration politically and morally—they believe, first, that all religions share a common universal truth, and second, that no religion can be so vain as to affirm completely the superiority of its truth over other truths; and Catholics willing to compromise after recognizing the religious wars’ devastating effects on the state. After the massacre, however, the Huguenots clearly see the futility of continuing to expect the Catherine government’s policy of religious toleration to work. They therefore need a new division of friend and enemy.
3. The Huguenots’ allies are groups isolated during the rise of absolute monarchy. First are the nobles: extravagant in their way of life, they see their established privileges progressively eroded as new monarchs, seeking increased revenues, sell offices and titles and admit more members of emerging classes to court. Next are the parliamentary institutions. With support from Jean Bodin and others, the rise of absolute monarchy gradually begins dissolving the three mechanisms that previously constrained monarchs: la police, la justice, and la religion—social custom, legal institutions, and divine justice. Social custom includes both laws monarchs traditionally had to follow and established social classes’ interactions as an organic whole. Legal institutions include the parliamentary courts’ power to summon monarchs, as well as lifetime tenure and security against dismissal for offices such as the chancellorship. Divine justice includes natural law: a monarch may not violate the people’s private property, sell off the state’s lands, and so on. All these mechanisms are gradually eroded by the rise of absolute monarchy. The monarch is reinterpreted both as the divinely elected supreme emperor stipulated by Roman law or early Lutheranism and as the concentration of the state’s sovereignty: the sovereign. Since there is no sovereignty without a sovereign, regimes are divided into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy solely by the number of sovereigns. Bodin further confirms monarchy as the best regime through humanist historical investigation; naturally, only the monarch is then the truly divinely elected, just sovereign. As the state’s founder, the sovereign makes the entire state a creation of his will. He therefore possesses not merely the executive power to enforce natural justice, but legislative power. When the monarch is both absolute legislative will and divinely elected earthly rule, any opposition loses legitimacy. Only here does the “divine right of kings” acquire its full content. Besides supporters of absolute monarchy, the Huguenots have another set of enemies: Stoics led by Montaigne. From revulsion at civil disorder and suspicion of fanatics’ extreme self-confidence, Montaigne proposes an exceedingly conservative political ideology: every innovation, because it brings unknown evils, is inferior to the old institutions. At least we already know and are accustomed to enduring the old institutions’ evils; certain evil is somewhat better than unknown evil. In maneuvering among these friends and enemies, the Huguenots gradually develop the humanist position immanent in the Calvinist movement, and even in Calvin himself—Calvin frequently cites historical examples from Greece and Rome and never hesitates to give his theology a practical political coloring. Their resistance thus gradually leaves the religious-theological context and enters the domain of popular politics. The religious “duty to resist” likewise gradually becomes the political “right to resist.”
One early Lutheran argument, for instance, is actually quite incoherent. They hold that, from the standpoint of private law, “when the ruler breaks the law, he is guilty on the same terms as a commoner.” They can therefore say their resistance is not resistance to a divinely created regime, but merely lawful resistance to the monarch according to laws he himself established. Yet this raises many problems. First, it is largely sophistry: since it ultimately remains resistance, if the monarch suppresses it, its legality does not make it conform to his will. It therefore still violates the divine justice recognized by Lutherans. Second, this applies only to Roman law. What about regimes not founded on Roman law, or separated from it? Is resistance still legitimate there? Moreover, because this position belongs to private law, regarding an unjust monarch as a criminal stripped of kingship gives any citizen the right to use violence against him. The relatively conservative Lutherans do everything possible to avoid entrusting ordinary citizens with this dangerous right. Calvinists reject Lutheranism’s Augustinian doctrine of divinely elected monarchs and choose a more coherent, more radical position: they regard the unjust monarch not merely as a legal criminal but as a religiously wicked person, thereby allowing the possibility of violent revolution.
Completing the Foundations of Modern Politics:
1. To emphasize the legitimacy of their resistance, the Huguenots maintain their establishment position while morally condemning the connection between Catherine de’ Medici and Machiavelli—Machiavelli’s The Prince was dedicated to Catherine’s father. Yet when invoking their three arguments that “revolution is no crime,” the establishment-minded Huguenots still find each beset by difficult problems. First, to appeal to establishment moderates, they cannot draw deeply on the most radical part of private-law theory: citizens’ right to resist their ruler. Then, to appeal to moderate Catholics, they cannot invoke Calvinist resistance theology: that every righteous person covenanted with God must resist the ruler in support of the sole true religion, Calvinism. Finally, if they invoke public-law theory, they cannot persuade countries whose codes have already separated from Roman law to acknowledge that monarchs were elected by the people at the state’s origin. Because of these factors, the Huguenots ultimately turn instead toward the natural-law theory revived by the Catholic Church in its polemics against Protestantism.
2. The Huguenots essentially copy an entire natural-law theory unchanged from their former enemies. In their theory, however, the ruler is constrained by two covenants. First is the covenant with God, forbidding injustice. Then comes a tripartite covenant between the ruler and the people’s representatives, and between those representatives and the people. Under these two covenants, an unjust ruler must face religious judgment, and the moral responsibility to execute that judgment falls upon the people’s representatives. But when this theory of resistance reaches Scotland, Calvinism’s broad popular base there makes it unnecessary to emphasize a moral duty to resist injustice under representatives’ leadership. It is enough to establish the people’s political right to resist injustice directly. Precisely because the popular base is broad enough, there is no need to request tribunes’ moral protection; only the people’s passion for resistance needs to be aroused. Scottish Calvinist theorists such as Buchanan can therefore omit the religious dimension of Huguenot resistance theory and simply propose that, politically, a people covenanted directly with its ruler—rather than through the agency of subordinate representatives—has a right to resist. At this point, the older religious concept of objective right—a divinely granted right, established by reason or custom, to perform a specific action—is replaced by an economic concept of subjective right: a person’s right freely to dispose of something belonging to them. The ruler ceases to be a leader guiding the people toward goodness, becoming merely the agent and protector of their property and personal safety. The people likewise cease to be Aristotelian naturally political beings, becoming Stoic self-preserving animals who consent to a covenant with the ruler for self-preservation. Here we have the complete picture of modern liberal politics. This picture drawn by the Protestant Buchanan is later adopted by the French Catholic Mariana, who turns it into a weapon of resistance against France’s Protestant ruler. Thereafter, Protestantism and Catholicism gradually converge: wherever they stand in religious ideology, both begin invoking the same political ideological system, detached from religious discourse, to justify resistance to rulers. At this moment, we can say modern politics acquires complete foundations, allowing political discourse to become independent of religious discourse.
3. The foundation of modern politics is the birth of the state, and the birth of the state means politics becoming independent of religion. This depends, on the one hand, on the rediscovery of Aristotle, which enables resistance to the traditional influence of Saint Augustine’s imposition of religion upon politics. Through the efforts of subsequent generations of jurists, theologians, and philosophers, politics gradually comes to be regarded again as an independent science, reaching completion in Machiavelli. On the other hand, it requires every regime to be internally homogeneous, permitting no interference from the Roman Church. This is accomplished through the secularizing convergence of humanism, the Reformation, absolutism, and related currents. Finally, the sovereign—whether a monarch or a democracy—must be freed from religion’s fetters. This is accomplished by redefining the sovereign’s rights and duties. Henceforth the monarch is no longer God’s deputy on earth, nor is his duty to bring every subject to salvation and progress toward goodness; it is to preserve subjects’ freedom and interests. Here we can already clearly see the outline of the modern state as independent both of the monarch and of any particular group. Neither ruler nor ruled can encompass the entire state. If the ruler is merely the executive representative authorized by sovereignty, and if the people can acquire the form of the sovereign only through the ruler’s exercise of power, then the ruler is merely the state’s form and the people merely its matter: neither is the complete state.