Baruch Spinoza · 巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎
Ethics · 伦理学
2024年笔记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 28 June 2026
Reading / 研读:Gilles Deleuze · Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 斯宾诺莎与表现问题
In this note / 篇目
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, I:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, II:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, III:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, IV:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, V:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VI:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VII:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VIII:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, IX:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, X:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XI:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XII:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIII:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIV:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XV:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVI:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVII:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVIII:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIX:
- Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XX:
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, I:
1. The two Cartesian misconceptions: attribute is a property of the thing’s changing, or attribute is a ground for modification and diversification of the substance itself; any idea conceived clearly and distinctly corresponds to an individual thing.
2. The consequences of these two misconceptions are: first, since attribute is only a ground for diversification, any modification should distinguish one substance from all others with the same attribute, and any modification delineates a numerically different substance; second, since any idea conceived corresponds to an individual, any real distinction results in a numerical distinction in things themselves.
3. The problem is, the necessity of existence of any substance, due to these two misconceptions, is no longer secured. The first part of this problem is that, because the same attribute can hold multiple substances within it, moreover any modification is due to external causes, substance itself becomes contingent upon other substances and is caused by other substances.
4. The second part of this same problem is that, because each attribute limits one singular substance, substance in itself becomes a genus that is divided by all attributes. But a genus is only external to the differentia, so the substance itself is external to the attribute and the specific substance, the existence of any specific substance, therefore, is only possible, but not necessary. Since any specific substance is dependent upon either an external genus of substance or a specific difference being applied to the genus.
5. Spinoza reverses the Cartesian conception, and differentiates numerical difference from real or substantial difference. This consists in two steps. The first step here he takes is that, what is numerically different is only different in modes, but not in substance, and in this way any mode in a substance is caused by the substance itself necessarily, though the cause is external to the mode thus caused. Any mode is caused or limited only by a mode that inheres in the same substance. This he achieves through the first eight propositions, which culminate in the conclusion, “no two substances can share the same attribute”. The result is that, any attribute expresses an infinite and indivisible essence.
6. The second step he takes is that, what is substantially different, that is, conceived as distinctly and clearly different, cannot be numerically different. In this way, one substance is necessarily expressed through attributes as many essences united within one singular substance. He achieves this first by establishing the possibility for one substance to have many attributes. Because each attribute is self-caused and the existence of its essence self-posited, each is absolutely independent from the other. As there is no dependence of one upon the other, there is no negation of one against the other. In other words, there is no possible contradiction between attributes. Hence one substance can have multiple attributes.
7. Then, he argues, there must be only one absolute substance for all attributes. For if there were many substances, the same problem in 4. would result, these many substances would be nothing but species of a general substance, which speciation would only be contingent. Rather, there is only one substance that expresses itself through the expressions of the attributes and expressed as essences, which essences are only qualitatively different. Only if there is one is there absolute necessity. Here we derive a different kind of infinite, the infinity of attributes. Infinite intensity within the attribute, infinite number of attributes, infinity unity of the substance.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, II:
1. The problematical status of attributes for Spinoza can be observed in his seemingly contradictory characterizations: on the one hand, attributes posit existences of essences, yet on the other hand, they should not have separate existences, apart from the substance. Spinoza solves this paradox by emphasizing the fact that, an attribute only posits the existence of its essence in its own point of view: that is, as expression, an attribute only posits the existence of the expressed. But then the existence of its essence is dependent upon the expression, while the expression in turn upon the expressed. They are therefore mutually dependent for their existence, and neither is by itself absolute. Only that which expresses itself as the expressed in an expression is absolutely independent, that which is self-caused, viz substance. In conceiving a substance by itself, its existence necessarily follows from the conception of its essence, hence the attribute posits the existence of its own essence through and only through the environing of its substance.
2. Then, Spinoza transforms the problem of the triad itself into a problem of the unity of all such triads. It’s only because there is one singular substance that all attributes are “attributive” and not “attributed”. If the one substance is dispersed into many, attributes become simply things attributed to this or that substance; the converse also holds. Now let’s consider the inverse. If there is only one substance, then all attributes are the expressions of this one self-expressive thing, and are thereby implicated within the same substance. Hence all become dependent to “that which is other” and shall refer to this “other thing”. That’s why they are dynamical and “attributive”. In other words, attributes all point beyond mere expressions to the thing that expresses itself; so long as this thing is singular, attributes would not stop pointing, but as soon as the substance is dispersed to many, the center to which each attribute points is lost, and all expressions remain dead.
3. Attributes belong to the asymmetrical yet common border shared by substance and modes. It’s asymmetrical because God is different from men in both essence and existence and their relation. Attributes are convertible with God, but only involved by modes. Yet God is not separate from men. For if ever such separation obtains, God can only be conceived through analogy. Either God has a perfection extrinsic to man, or God has a perfection that man only possesses in bare character. Either way, one has to project one’s own attributes onto God, and confuse both. That is, one might say “God thinks better (eminence) than we can conceive” or “God thinks differently (equivocation)”, but one essentially is saying no different than “God, like us, thinks”. Spinoza on the other hand does not deny the shared form or univocity between substance and modes. This gives him the advantage to entertain a third term, not as mediation, but “immediation”. With the analogical method, there are only two terms in a relation, and some sort of projection is inevitable. With Spinozism, however, one neither abstracts and mediates from modes to higher modes and gets stuck in the infinite process, nor projects directly onto the substance. Rather, one reconceives the attributes involved, which “ground” the finite modes, in the context of the infinite. In other words, Deleuze sees Spinoza to be one of the first to propose the “ground” of things, as different from the “ladder” or the “order/proportion” of things.
4. Spinoza differentiates property from attribute. An attribute is that which is directly convertible with substance and is thus its Word or Name. A property only characterizes the word as an Adjective, such as “eternal” or “infinite”, as in “eternal power”. Or it depicts how God should cause modes in an attribute. Or how mortals imagine God to be.
A clarification on 2.: simply, if different attributes express different essences that belong to different substances, each substance that goes beyond and transcends each singular expression becomes inexhaustible, and hence the substance remains an abyss, a darkness that breaches the expression. This is the problem Aristotle is faced with. Any expression always points to something more than expressed, beyond expression, a “more than” and “in itself”. But if one singular substance comprehends all the infinite attributes, there is no beyond. Rather, God becomes the immanent God who is the horizon of all expressions himself. In a word, God is the world. This is where the Spinozist pantheism comes in.
A further remark on 2.: this very same problem has been stated already in Chapt I, as the problem of the highest genus. If one attribute limits one substance, these will be the species of “THE substance”, but then the Aristotelian paradox of the highest substance. Aristotle tries to resolve the paradox through analogy, but as we state here Spinoza detects a problem with analogy. Analogy does not account for the ground that supports the proportion. To be done with the whole Aristotelian problematic once and for all, Spinoza claims that there is a highest unity, but this unity is not a genus divisible into species, but a transitive substance. The other cast of the same problem focuses not on the grand picture of totality of being, but simply on the being of an individual. A substance that exceeds the expressed of the expression condemns the expression as inadequate and denies any necessity of the “attributed” expression, if the substance is not that which necessarily expresses itself in all possible ways, in whose totality the current expression is necessarily included. Therefore only an “attributive” expression can be adequate since it points to the nexus where all possible excesses are drained into other expressions, to its own necessary horizon. Moreover, only under such a schema is substance expressible and conceivable. Otherwise the substance cannot be conceived at all, much less be conceived by itself; that would be self-contradiction, since substance by definition is that which is conceived by itself.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, III:
1. Expression is different from signification. Through expression the expressed is posited and affirmed, in which there is no privation, no negation, and no excess as its counterpart. Expression is the expressing of the expressed. But in signification the signified always escapes the signifier. The signifier is a face that points away into the black hole of subjectivity, the signified.
2. Both analogical theology and negative theology suppose the negativity of a transcendent God. Analogical theology affirms the properties negatively, while negative theology negates the properties affirmatively. Either case, a privation is supposed.
3. Why do these privations all relate to properties, but not to attributes? Properties are only perceived through imagination, via the operation of abstraction. That which divides and separates eventually yields the black hole of subjectivity, and this is due to imagination and the process of transcending imagination. In negative theology, imagination denies all the images and abstracts from them; in analogical theology, imagination projects images onto the screen of imagination itself. Such operation is reasoning, which is the process of transcending imagination.
4. But for Spinoza, there is a direct access to the forms through understanding, since all thoughts, in their grounds of grounds, are indivisible. A direct conception of the infinite, therefore, is possible, without the labor of infinite abstraction, and without the ungrounded projection, which posits the ground as an abyss. Rather, the grounding is always already underway, and understanding always starts from the middle: from the attributes, and not from only finite modes. This is because the world of understanding is univocal, so that from one end one always directly arrives the other in one continuous passage.
5. Therefore, theologians always start from morality in their imagination, and project these figments of the mind onto God, because they misunderstand the method by which scriptures are supposed to be read. Revelation is not expression, for revelation only clears in imagination an assemblage of properties, which always conceal their ground; but expression does not conceal. Expression, therefore, has nothing to do with subjectivity; only morality requires its moral subject who is to enter into the world of death, responsibility and labor, which revolves around the question “how should I act?”. Expression, however, is the joy of vision, the play of innocence.
6. Descartes advanced near enough, only to relinquish everything in a more unfortunate fiasco. It is through Descartes that a reduction in conception, and not just an abstraction in imagination, becomes possible. Through the Cartesian method, a substance in its infinite attributive essence is first conceived. But he obscures this natural light all over again by introducing multiple possible substances that deprive the substance of its univocity, and eventually reduces the substance into a mode of itself. This is also why he remains for a large part a theologian, not because he moralizes philosophy, but because he posits God to be infinite perfection, which is only a property and not an attribute of God. A property like this is always only deduced in comparison to our finitude, and hence through abstraction or analogy. He imagines God to be different from us, and hence deprive God of its content and us of our grounding.
7. Any such property is a product of the imagination. The modality of essences, such as infinitude, omnipresence, omniscience, etc., is only viewed in contrast to our finitude. The conducts of causality of God’s are in contrast to us being merely the caused. The imaginary properties need no elaboration. In all, all properties are products of negation through imagination, and they therefore constitute the ontological difference, i.e. the abyss. All attributes, however, compose the grounding in understanding.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, IV:
1. The Cartesian ontological argument: “there is something infinitely perfect that which can be conceived by my finite intelligence as clear and distinct.”; “God is infinite perfection, and existence is a perfection, hence God exists.” Spinoza criticizes this argument the same way Leibniz criticizes it: before one moves to ascertain the existence of an idea clear and distinct, one must first explain if it is “adequate”, that is, if it, when fully unfolded, contains any contradiction. Just as it’s nonsensical to state there exists an infinite velocity, it might be the same to speak of an infinite perfection.
2. But this criticism does not hinge on a mere technicality. Rather, it has everything to do with the Spinozist anti-Cartesianism and the fundamental disagreement between Spinoza and Descartes.
3. As was explained before, Descartes grounds his ontological proof on the ontological difference between finite and infinite, imperfect and perfect. The Cartesian ontological proof therefore only employs imagination and reason. Because infinite perfection is only an imaginary posit, it always involves in its own idea an obscurity. “That which is infinitely perfect” is therefore not an adequate idea at all, but only a figment that feigns to be clear and distinct. It is not a real definition that fully expresses itself, but a mere concept-image that is posited unitary and enfolded. In other words, what Descartes perceives in his mind is nothing but a property that is projected across the abyss onto a dark subjectivity, and he mistakes it for the nature of God; but what Spinoza wants is the articulation of attributes themselves in their full expression of their own essence, which grounds this property. Because Descartes only projects the concept of God, he evades the reality of this concept, and if God really conforms to our conception is not left for us to know; thus he can know the nature of this concept no more than stop at the screen of projection, beyond which is but darkness and obscurity. Only by starting from the understanding of attributes and leaving aside the imagination of properties, therefore, is Spinoza able to overcome this difficulty and first elucidate the reality of this concept: God is not infinite perfection, but the Absolute.
4. Thus both Spinoza and Leibniz start from the middle, from attributes and the understanding of these attributes. It is because these attributes are all infinite and self-determined that they don’t contradict each other, and it becomes possible for them to be unified in one substance, i.e. God. This is how God as a concept is possible, and how by his nature he can be real. Only after this is established does Spinoza resort to imagination: because God is possible, so is our projection landing on a real concept that exudes such projected property, and so can God be conceived to be existing. A clear and distinct idea is only real when it is also proved to be adequate. Adequation is the operation of understanding, which unifies multiplicity into one unity. Projection is the operation of imagination, which casts a property over a subject.
5. Leibniz disagrees with Spinoza insofar as Leibniz believes the divine understanding is inaccessible. We always already live amongst the worldly. In other words, for Leibniz, all the primary attributes are always already mixed up into the world and its series. Substance is not that which can be conceived by itself, to which all attributes belong, but that which includes “everything”, each “thing” an infinite series of combined attributes. For Spinoza, what is directly convertible with substance is attributes; but for Leibniz, it is the world that is directly convertible with the monad. Substance for Leibniz is always for the world and situated in the world, swayed among possibilities (time and space), and God an orderer who “traverses” and “transcends” the world: the danger of analogy reintroduced.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, V:
1. The two Cartesian a posteriori proofs: “a cause is greater than its effect; I have an idea of God that has infinite objective reality, hence God himself must possess even more infinite formal reality”; “whatever is more difficult to produce, once produced, contains more reality and is less of an abstraction, and whatever produces such a difficult thing is more powerful; I cannot produce or conserve myself, yet I exist, therefore something more powerful than I must exist, and its own existence must be proportionately more difficult to be produced, and hence only produced by its own infinite power, and thus produced, infinitely real”.
2. Spinoza critiques the Cartesian arguments, which are both based on a notion of “quantity of reality”. The same problem regarding the ground recurs here. All quantities of reality are divisions by imagination, and require an absolute ground. Such ground is power.
3. By the usage of power, Spinoza transforms the two arguments. First, with the infinite power of Thought, there needs correspond to it an infinite power of existence. This conforms to my earlier interpretation of the Spinozist epistemic shift. Thought is a special attribute which unites in itself all other attributes which are parallel to it; Thought is an infinite mirror. Here, however, what matters is not that God’s existence is somehow “more” real than the idea of God: for that is still only a projection between two relative terms. Rather, the two infinite powers are equal; only with the infinite power of Thought can knowledge of the infinite reality of God be obtained. Thought must itself be infinite, so that because nothing else can be thought to cause the idea of God, God himself must be the cause of himself. The first proof thus becomes: “I have an idea of God that is infinite, which does not contradict itself; this infinite idea does not depend on anything other than itself; God must exist in order for this idea to be true”.
4. The second argument is involved in the demarcation between modes and substance, and is reworked for this very purpose. We shall witness what is changed and what is preserved. The argument runs as follows: “finite things necessarily exist; therefore they have power as their essence; but God as the absolute substance has more power, so God has to exist”. The modifications Spinoza adds to this argument are easily discernible. First, reality is not measured by the difficulty to produce, but by power, and power, being ensconced into essence, is separate from any notion of difficulty. Power is not the relative capacity to produce what is “difficult” for the finite imagination, but is the essence that simply exists. Hence, “more power” does not mean a capacity to produce more difficult things, but an essence whose existence grounds the finite powers of modes. Again, Spinoza is not interested in an analogy projected from our imagination, but from the ontological ground itself: finite modes are powers grounded upon the infinite powers of attributes.
5. From these modifications it is evident how Spinoza moves to his a priori argument. Reality is no longer exclusively measured by “property”, but by “attribute”. Attribute is that which contains absolute reality, since its essence simply posits existence, while property still remains relative to the imperfection of imagination. Therefore a thing is more real the more attributes it has; and for modes, they are more real when they have “more” of one attribute. Perfection is no longer measured by a mere quantity from finite to infinite, but by the power that posits existence in an essence, participating in the power of the substance. The quantity of reality is grounded finally in power (what powers are possessed by the substance; what external cause gives power to a given mode, affecting its essence into existence), and not in imagination.
6. Power, for Spinoza, does not mean potentiality, taken in a static, structural sense. It is productivity. In other words, it is always already an act that produces affectations. The scholastic division between potentiality and actuality is here substituted by a differentiation between active and passive. Every essence is a power that makes existence, a power that expresses, some expressive, some expressed. Power is no dormant possibility, as if it lies obscure in actuality and waits to be actualized, but a dynamism, passivity in activity, being expressed. God is a substance that produces himself, hence self-caused. There is therefore a naturing nature and a natured nature. For finite things, since their essence is actualized by external causes, they have active and passive powers, both constituting and expressing fully their essence, dependent on others. There is no possibility in essence, only a necessity to be expressed.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VI:
1. A necessity of the production of modes is proved in two ways, first by understanding, then by power. God is expression as such and necessarily expresses himself, this is his formal being. But such expression also relates to its expressed in the self-expressing substance. Substance expresses itself as the expressed in its own expression to itself. Thus, any expression is posited in a divine understanding. This understanding is not an analogy to human wisdom, but simply hinges on the very nature of expression; it has everything to do with God’s complete being, and nothing to do with the projected image of a human activity, which invokes only a conception or deliberation of possibilities. In such infinite understanding, a necessary production of infinite perceptions must be posited, provided that attributes also express themselves through modes. The same holds true for power, as God produces infinite attributes through his infinite power, so he necessarily produces infinite modes.
2. A similar triad of expression is thereby constituted through modification as through attribution. Attributes express themselves through finite modes, expressed as an infinite and necessary modification that belongs, not to the attribute simply, since all attributes further refer to the same substance, but also to the substance, as a modification of the substance. This illustrates the asymmetry between two levels of expression. Because finite modes always express the modification of an attribute within an attribute, they also express the modification of the substance itself. Modes therefore express doubly, the attributes immediately, and substance remotely. The attribute grounds the modes by providing all the modes a principle, whence all necessary and infinite modes are produced, through which the determinations of infinitely many finite modes by other finite modes are grounded.
3. Once the necessity of further production and expression is established, and provided that the equality of all attributes is already established, we can finally have a correct grasp of Spinoza’s parallelism. For Spinoza, since all things are produced by God all at once, all things have an identity of order, a one-to-one correspondence, so that attributes relate to attributes, modes relate to modes, all these infinities mapped onto each other; and since all attributes are equally an expression of the same substance, they also have an equality of connection, an equality as series, unlike the Leibnizian “series of projection”, where all monads as expressions are, in other monads, always distorted by that other monad’s perspective, and included under that monad; finally, they have an equality of being, since all the modes, though they express different attributes immediately, express remotely the same substance.
4. Those modes produced by attributes directly, touched upon in 2., must be infinite, for if they were finite, they were determined, that is, limited as parts of a whole; and either they were determined by the attribute insofar as the attribute that determines them is itself, per impossible, that which constitutes their determination, and thereby is itself determined, or if the attribute, being absolute, should determine it, which is also not possible, since by determination, the attribute will not remain absolute, but will itself also be determined by what it determines. For the absolute does not constitute limitations, but only provides the ultimate ground for limitation to happen. Ground is the necessary, not the sufficient cause for any limitation. The infinite cannot limit parts, but only parts in the infinite can limit parts; to say, like Aquinas, that there’s an infinite power of limiting is to speak in contradiction, if such power does not stay a mere ground that makes limitation only “possible”. Either case, therefore, is absurd, and whatever follows from the attribute should be undetermined and infinite.
5. Because of 4., whatever is understood to be sufficient reason, or sufficiency, needs to be revised. For the infinite is not a sufficient cause for the finite as a cause of determination. As cause of determination or limitation, attribute is only a ground. But as cause of production or generation, attribute is the sufficient cause, for attribute necessarily expresses itself through infinitely many modes. In other words, attribute is the sufficient cause of the totality of all finite things (hence not a mere genus), but is only a necessary cause for anything being specifically limited. This is what Spinoza means by God being a remote cause, that he renders all finite things possible and necessary, but does not cause them directly. That is, attribute is a ground not only for possibilities, but for necessity itself, for it renders all ontic necessities, not only ontologically possible, but also ontologically necessary in the ultimate sense.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VII:
1. Different from the equality of attributes, Spinoza posits one other equality, the equality of powers. There are two powers: the formal power of existence and action, and the objective power of understanding.
2. The equality of attributes is posited in a domain of formal existence, while the privilege of Thought as an attribute over other attributes is posited in the domain of objective understanding. Thought is like a mirror, when considered only in its formal existence, is but one attribute among many. Yet when it is considered as that which represents all other things, hence as the condition for the power of understanding, Thought is privileged. There is no contradiction here, since Thought is equal to other attributes in respect to the power of existence, but unequal in respect to the power of understanding.
3. The privilege of Thought needs further specifications. First, idea of God objectively “represents” the infinite power of thinking, but formally “is” infinite understanding, the former being the substance in its essence as a thinking substance, as the naturing nature, the latter being the mode that belongs to Thought, as the natured nature; the power of understanding is a ground of its necessity, while the modification of Thought into understanding is a ground of the possibility of actualizing that power. Second, just as different attributes and modes are different really and formally, so are ideas different objectively; more than that, they can also be different formally, so that some ideas have one way to exist while some have another. Third, ideas can be themselves thought again, and one can have ideas of ideas, ad infinitum. This is because ideas exist both formally and objectively, and any idea can be understood, not as an instance of the power of understanding, but as an instance of the power of existence, even when all ideas belong to the same attribute of Thought as modes.
4. This explains how in the first few definitions of the book the word “conceive” is used. For modification is not just unified by one substance, but also by one understanding; in other words, there cannot be multiple possible worlds united in one substance, but only one world in understanding, which understanding is also approachable by the human understanding, since understanding has nothing to do with “the faculty of knowledge”, as Kant understands it, but only has to do with the necessity of the grounding. Of course I don’t have intuition for any knowledge of the divine understanding and might get tired or obstructed from fulfilling the understanding, yet I must posit it as the ground of necessity. The question of ground is therefore always to be differentiated from the question of “knowledge”, and to understand is different from to know. To “know” in finitude, ultimately, is only projected onto the infinite, since to know is always for thought to exceed itself and reach for the object, which is denied us, and not only us, but Thought in itself as an independent attribute, since the finitude of knowledge always signifies the transcendence of the object; but to “understand” in finitude is to understand in univocity to the positing of its own ground, the attribute of Thought. In other words, what Kant critiques of Spinoza is that Spinoza does not ground an idea in its possibility of objectivity; yet for Spinoza, the proper ground for an idea is simply another idea. Knowledge is always projection between parallel series, a horizontal crossing. Understanding is the only true act of ground-laying, a vertical making possible and necessary.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VIII:
1. The question is: what is truth for Spinoza? It cannot be the correspondence between idea and object, since ideas conform only to their own rules of thought. It is also not clarity and distinctness, since “natural light” seems only coincidental and external to thought itself, and makes as if thought is dependent on some psychological consciousness, and hence only makes truth for consciousness, but not truth in general. There must be some logical criterion, therefore, that defines truth as it is. This criterion is called adequacy by Spinoza.
2. Adequacy means that an idea expresses an essence through existence. Another way to put it, an essence insofar as it grounds and generates its own existences, has an adequate idea. Therefore, God’s knowledge is inadequate insofar as he only constitutes the essence of human mind (the idea of body), for it does not involve the determined existence and affections of the body. God’s knowledge is also inadequate insofar as it comprehends only an affection, since it does not express the essence in its full determination, an essence fully unfolded in all of its affections.
3. Truth has three stages. The first is its formal stage. Falsity is not a form, for if so, there would never be any mistake, since a false idea would be formally distinct from a true idea, and should never be mistaken for truth. An idea is thereby true and adequate insofar as it is an idea in God. Truth in this sense is formal, because it is a reflexive truth. It means that as long as an idea formally exists, it has formal truth, i.e. can be posited as true, regardless of what object this idea is supposed to represent; it therefore means that truth is also in the idea of an idea. The idea of an idea is the form of an idea. Formal truth pertains to this idea of an idea. Yet the problem is, formal truth is itself without any content. We can only “posit” the adequacy of ideas as ideas, but we don’t know what adequacy itself is. That is, we know all ideas conform to truth insofar as they are ideas, yet we don’t know how is the form reflected in its content. This stage provides us with only a “necessity of form”.
4. The second stage therefore deals with material truth. Adequation is such a process through which adequacy or truth is materialized. What happens is that from all the existences in question an essence is deduced “capable” of generating all these existences. Via this expression of the generative principle through existences, a “necessity of order” is established. This is the content of truth.
5. By the third stage Spinoza aspires to unify the form and content of truth. In the second stage, a “necessity of order” is accomplished, but there is no “necessity of production”. The modal essence capable of producing these many existences is not determined to do so, since its determination is dependent on other things. All essences are undetermined in their existences, except for such essences that posit their own existences, and thereby must exist in infinitely many ways. The determining power is thereby found in God. We move from an idea of finite existence, to its essence, to that which determines it, to that which self-determines, and reaches God “quickly”. We surely don’t start from God via our human understanding, but we do rise to that idea pretty quickly. This idea of God, however, is the idea of all ideas, and is therefore the form of ideas. But this idea of God also in itself produces all ideas in due order. Hence formal truth and material truth are unified in the idea of God. All ideas that exist in God are true, and are true in their adequacy; falsity only occurs in privation.
6. Spinoza can therefore claim a more proper way of understanding truth and human finitude. Truth is not correspondence between object and idea, but an order among ideas themselves. It is also not dependent on a psychological “feeling” of clarity and distinctness, but the real relations ideas themselves draw among themselves, namely, how essences are involved in and expressed by existences, which expressions are called “common notions”. Finitude is not a state men psychologically experience, but a partition of the realm of God’s ideas. Infinitude is not a state men project onto God, but a map of the contours of the idea of God.
7. Two questions are solved by this new formulation. Both are dealt with in the last section of Book II of Ethics. First is “what can we truly know”? We can only truly know common notions (absolute or relative) because these are properties of the essence that we are that must be produced in all affections. We cannot have adequate knowledge of external bodies, since they are different from our own essence; nor of our own bodies, since we can neither know adequately our own bodies by themselves or by their affections, neither by their individual parts nor as wholes; what we can know adequately are only things in our essence that must be expressed in any affection, that is, that which is commonly shared by my body and all other bodies. The essence of human body does not involve its own existence and can exist only by being determined by other bodies external to it. The affection therefore does not involve one essence in itself, but a mixture of essences, hence one essence can have infinitely many such mixtures and affections. Yet, the common notion is shared between my body and all external bodies. Therefore, any affection of my body in its existence must necessarily involve this common notion, since it involves all related essences. An affection doesn’t express the essence in itself, but it does express the common notion by necessity. An affection cannot express fully the essence, but an affection of essence is not an affection of the common notion. An affection is a complete “expression” of the common notion, since an affection expresses a mixture of all the essences of external bodies and my body, but only one common notion.
8. The second question is “how do I know that I know”? This question is solved by noticing the unity between formal truth and material truth. Since material truth comes in when ideas are produced in order of expression (adequation), and formal truth is when the idea of ideas is itself posited to be true, one can say that in the unity of Thought, all ideas that are materially true are essences expressed by existences, but the idea of this very order itself is reflexively expressed in this order, and is thus joined to this order of expression. The reasoning therefore goes like follows: “I know A, because I know A in its existence; but I have an idea of this expression of A, which is expressed in existence through the actual expression; therefore, my idea of this state of affairs, ‘A being expressed’, is itself expressed in the being expressed in existence of the idea of A; then of course I have an idea being expressed of the idea of A being expressed. This is equivalent to saying that I know that I know A.”
A clarification on 5.: formal truth is introduced because all ideas formally exist and conform to an idea of ideas, and existence is truth, so all ideas are formally true. But this is not sufficient, for we know absolutely nothing about why existence is truth, why such conformation happens, or why conformation makes things exist and an idea of ideas must exist. Therefore we move to the second stage. There is a necessity of order in the determination of things. Through such determination, ideas conform to other ideas, as existences conform to essences. Then we know, conformation is truth because ideas are ordered by a necessity. Existence is truth because existence is grounded by such truth-making, by such necessary production of the essence. We therefore can understand the whole process of truth-making now: essences necessarily produce existences, and existences necessarily conform to essences; ideas formally exist because they conform to one idea as their essence, the idea of God. God is the form of ideas, the idea of ideas, that produces all ideas to conform to itself and produces existences to express the ultimate essence. Such necessary expression makes truth.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, IX:
1. This part is a basic recapitulation of last part. The aim is to answer why we have inadequate ideas.
2. Inadequate ideas stem from human finitude, and imagination is our finite and imperfect way of “knowing”. The finitude is framed by the inadequacy of our knowledge. This inadequacy has three parts.
3. First, we don’t know affections of our mind, since we cannot derive affections from the essence of our mind, for any affection comes from an external body or external idea that limits my body or mind, but that which is outside me and affects me is not “knowable”. Therefore, I don’t know how I’m affected and don’t know the affections of my mind. Second, I don’t know my mind. Since my mind is capable of all its affections, I must know all the external bodies that limit my body in order to know my mind adequately, and not just a particular modification of it. Third, I don’t know the external body. Anyway, all affections of the body are not expressions, but only indications. They are signs in my imagination. Only in the understanding of God are they adequate expressions.
4. Through adequacy, Spinoza overcomes the Cartesian definition of truth as clear and distinct ideas, for these ideas are only representations and signs, but are not expressions. Expressions are things that explicate the sufficient reasons for things and exhaust ideas of their meanings. They bring other ideas into its own unity.
5. Only an understanding that sees in the sign a positivity that grounds the idea in its reality can through this positivity understand the actual ground that produces all those affections in the essence.
6. Affections are the source of all human knowledge. Affections indicate natures of my body and other bodies. These natures are heterogenous, and not adequately knowable. Yet all affections presuppose something shared between my body and other bodies, since all affections are limitations, and no limitations can be without a shared boundary. Therefore, all affections presuppose some common notions. This common notion as that which is positive in an affection is thereby always known adequately, since all such common notions are expressions of a shared nature that is perceived as it is, and is not a sign indicative of what are different. The cause of an affection understood thus is always known as the common notion inherent in this limitation, and an affection is always produced from such limitation as an expression of the shared common ground. In other words, in all affections, there is always something that I do perceive and know adequately, which belongs to both ends of the equation and can hence be understood as produced by the properties shared by two ends, which properties can thereby be inferred from this positivity.
7. A further clarification would be, affections do not express the body affected, because affections always are mixtures from two bodies, thus no one affection fully and singly expresses the body, and no body lets itself be expressed by one affection only; but the common property can be expressed, because it is in the affection and shared between the affecting and the affected, hence it’s totally exhausted and the same in both affection and the affecting and the affected, the one effect in affection involves and only involves that singular cause, being the common property, in the body. This is what expression means in the realm of bodily affections. Exhaustibility doesn’t mean that the property cannot be always reexpressed by other affections, but just that in any affection that expresses that same property, there’s the same expression of the property.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, X:
1. Spinoza is an anti-Cartesian in two orders, first in the order of knowledge, then in the order of being.
2. In the order of knowledge, Spinoza opposes the Cartesian analytic method with the synthetic one. The analytic method proceeds from the perceived effect to the grounding cause for the effect, and this is what the Platonic “recollection”, the Aristotelian “abstraction”, the Kantian “transcendental philosophy”, and the Heideggerian “hermeneutic circle” all amount to, from the finite to rise to the infinite. The synthetic method is to start from the absolutely known and deduce by necessity all that which is produced by and in this absolute ground. The cause can only be analytically known in confusion and obscurity. But synthetically, one starts from the absolute ground and move down clearly and adequately.
3. One might object how the synthetic method is impossible. Indeed, that is Descartes’ objection. Descartes does believe the synthetic method is necessary to ground knowledge, yet it is only derived from the analytic method and may never be adequate by itself. Spinoza, however, would argue, it’s because Descartes is only using imagination to abstract universals from particulars, which is an infinite process. This will never give us adequate knowledge, since any abstract thing cannot by itself explain the sufficient necessity of the production, but must always assume some other thing, ad infinitum. Namely, a particular is the conclusion of infinitely many abstract universals gathered together. Analysis is always infinite.
4. To break away from such infinite chain, Spinoza proposes, we have to use our understanding in spite of imagination. This is done because we can grasp the impossibility of this very infinite chain, if there’s nothing that grounds it absolutely. Thus we rise “quickly” from that which is dependent on others to that which is absolute and self-caused. But Spinoza cannot simply stop at the necessity and possibility of synthetic method. He also has to explain how is analytic method grounded through the synthetic. This he effects by showing how any finite analysis is an analysis of an affection and the common notion it contains. That is, what is analyzed is always itself already an expressed synthesis, though this mechanism of synthetically grounded analysis is not yet fully worked out in this part of the book.
5. In the other order of being, Spinoza opposes univocity to equivocity. Everything is grounded in God and through God. Being is not analogical, not eminent, not merely possible, and not merely infinite. For if it were perceived to be analogical, it should depend on some ground that makes such analogy possible. Moreover, this conception itself involves all kinds of difficulty, the most prominent of which is that, how can anything be in proportion to something infinite? How can substance be without properties, when nothing should have no property? These are sheer contradictions. Hegelian dialectic moves through all these contradictions to finally ground the totality in this contradiction. But Deleuze does not believe in contradictions in the first place. He believes we can simply remove such contradiction by saying, there’s no contradiction with the absolute being who expresses itself fully in all its infinite attributes, each attribute fully independent and thereby not contradicting any other.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XI:
1. Like I mentioned in my Plotinus essay, there are three patterns of emanation Plotinus has in mind: first, a symbolic one, where the emanated (or the participating) turns back and seeks for its own origin through the traces it finds among its products, a tragic groping in the dark; second, an imagistic one, where the emanating (or the participated), as the original, produces images of itself, a comic play; third, a continuous radiation of light in a sphere. In the third pattern, emanation becomes immanation, or immanative expression. Plotinus, however, never fully works out the third pattern.
2. Spinoza undertakes to fulfill Plotinus’ task. He does it by instituting the univocity of Being. All things are equal in that they all share the common form. There’s still hierarchy, but not a transcendent one. Rather, since everything is completely involved in its lower level and totally exhausted by its expression in the lower level, there is no longer a hierarchy proper. Rather, everything becomes complete expression and thereby inheres together. They merge into one continuous radiation. Attributes are one with the substance as qualitative expressions of the substance, and modes are one with their respective attributes as quantitative expressions of the attributes. God is not a remote cause but causes everything immediately. Everything inheres like one in God. The power of thinking is equal to power of being. All attributes are equal amongst themselves. Because the substance is fully expressed by attributes, and the attribute is also fully expressed by the modes, there is no transcendence or obscurity. No analogy. Even our finite mind, for Spinoza, sees affection more as an expression of common property, not primarily a sign of some transcendent body.
3. By working out the third pattern, Spinoza successfully solves some problems bugging Neoplatonists since history starts. First, the One no longer needs to go out of itself to produce Being; rather, Being already inheres in the One as its expression. Second, the One does not need to be divided, nor to be accountable for the production of a number. For, on the first level, attributes are not numerically distinct and therefore easily inhere in substance without being a plurality; on the second level, modes are not independent units of number that is generated by the One, but only quantitative expressions of a “maximum”, i.e. an attribute that is an infinity indivisible in itself, and this means that modes are not numerically distinct beings separated from the substance, but are “intensities” (even when they constitute an extensive number, they still inhere in the attribute as an expression of its intensity) expressed of the attribute as its parts. An attribute is indivisible in itself, but its infinity can only be expressed by infinitely many finite modes, taken altogether; it is only because such expressions are immanent and all finite modes inhere in the infinite can the indivisible attribute be “divided”, since these are not actual divisions, but only expressions embraced in one indissoluble continuity of self-expression, or parts that only exist inherently in the whole, and are nothing in themselves.
A clarification on 3.: one can therefore conceive of an attribute as an indivisible unit; yet this unit has inherent content, or a quantitative intensity; and the unit is indivisible not because it cannot be analyzed through partitions of this quantitative content, but rather because any such partition by itself would be inadequate in expressing the unit, and cannot therefore be independent from the unit and all its other infinite partitions; only when all the infinite partitions of this content are unfolded inside the unit can the unit be adequately expressed. Now we can see how an attribute as an infinity is indivisible yet divisible. It is divisible insofar as it has to its modes a relation of whole to parts; it is indivisible insofar as not any number of parts can adequately express the infinite attribute, but the attribute can only be adequately expressed in its own self as that in which its own infinitely many partitions or expressions inhere continuously. In other words, no infinity can ever be divisible for no division can adequately express it, and only infinity itself can express itself; but all infinity must contain infinite divisions or infinitely many inadequate expressions in order to be infinity at all.
What we normally understand to be division is separation or limitation, the unlimited of course cannot be limited; yet it doesn’t preclude any kind of division immanent to infinity, so long as the parts divided cannot be separated from the whole, nor do they limit the unlimited, nor do they adequately express the infinity. The limitation therefore must only be immanent to the infinite, and not limiting the infinite. Infinity contains in itself infinitely many things, but is still indivisible, for it can only be expressed by itself as infinity.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XII:
1. Modal essences are not possibilities, but are necessarily actual expressions of the attribute they belong to. Modal essences exist insofar as they are caused by God in God. Moreover, it is nonsensical to Spinoza to say that essences are just possibilities that don’t actually exist, since all essences necessarily exist “as essences”. The only difference is that the existences of modal essences are interdependent, each caused by the other, though all ultimately caused by the existence of God.
2. Modal essences are not extrinsic to the attribute as differentia are to genera in Aristotle’s system. Rather, they are internal determinations, or rather, intensive quantities. Modal existences, on the other hand, are extensive quantities, which require further investigation in later chapter.
3. Attributes are not divisible since they qualitatively belong to the absolute substance. Yet they are modally divisible, since they constitute the infinitely many modes as expressions of themselves. They are indivisible insofar as they are infinite and can only be infinite, but they are divided insofar as they comprise of infinitely many finite modes. These modes are divided in the attribute in two ways, first, as intensities that belong to the attribute and continuous among themselves, i.e. as modal essences that necessarily implicate other essences which all belong to the attribute immediately; second, as numerically distinct extensities that belong to the essences, i.e. as modal existences that separately only express their essences inadequately.
4. Though Deleuze will only talk about modal existence in next chapter, it is worth notice how at the start of Book III Spinoza is using conatus to delineate the relation between modal existence and modal essence. Modal essence equals the existence of a thing in itself, and strives to actualize its being in modal existence. This does not mean, if we take Deleuze’s suggestion, that modal essence is a possibility striving to exist, as in Leibniz, but that the actual existence of the modal essence is striving to “express itself”. This is clear since there is nothing contrary to the thing’s nature in the thing’s essence, hence nothing inherent in the thing that destroys it, and anything that destroys it must be external to it, we thereby conclude that everything exists in themselves, but is negated by something else. Modal existence is this existence that is the result of a conatus holding itself out in what negates it, its enduring or lingering. The existence of a modal essence, however, is the cause of this activity of “holding out”, this lingering, the essence itself being caused into existence, then trying to cause other effects to express itself, and encountering thereby what negates it. When something causes other things by itself, it’s said to be active; when not, that is, when partially negated, passive.
5. A further development of this theory would emphasize again the Spinozist notion of “common property”. When an essence is active in its existence, i.e. in its expression, it produces an adequate expression of itself. That means, at least for human body, our body produces an affection that expresses a common property shared between human body and the external body that affects it. In other words, I am active when I perceive that what I produce adequately expresses my production of it (put aside for now the mind-body division), without any obscurity indicated by the affection of my body or the external body. I am passive when what I perceive in the affection is either something indicative of my own body which I don’t know how it‘s been represented as external to me (what’s of my body negated by other), or something indicative of an external body which I don’t know how I have represented it (what’s of other body negated by mine); that is, expressed inadequately and confusedly. Activity is knowledge, passivity ignorance.
Comment on 5.: this is why for Spinoza to become more perfect or active is synonymous to obtaining more knowledge. To know more is to have more adequate ideas from which other ideas proceed adequately; that is, to perceive more common properties expressing themselves in affections, that is, to be more substantiated in existence through such expressions in effects related to causes inherent in my nature. In other words, to know more is to see more adequately how everything affirms, rather than negates, everything else; the more I perceive in affections that express common properties, the more I know about myself that is affirmed by other bodies, and not negated by other bodies. The more reality therefore my nature will possess. The more pleasure I therefore possess, and the happier I am.
The essence of my body is infinitely determined by other bodies in actual existence. But such actual existence of my infinitely determined body can only be expressed by infinitely many such determinations. Each determination is an affection. Any affection can only express the infinitely determined existent essence inadequately, since all affections of my body only express partially the nature of my body, partially the nature of other bodies, without the knowledge of either I cannot know myself adequately. No affection, therefore, actualizes the existence of my body adequately, but is always partially negated. But the common property is adequately expressed and completely affirmed in the affection. This expresses the actual existence of a modal essence in being affirmed and grounded by other modal essences to an enrichment of expressed properties. Therefore the actual existence of modal essence of my body is rendered actual in expression too through affections which express adequately the common property in the modal essence. Modal essence is always already actual; but it is actual in expression, hence must be expressed through affections to be actual. In other words, the striving of any modal existence is just to express adequately what it already essentially is. My essence is already fully determined, and my affections are but expressions of that fact. These affections, however, can express better or worse this predetermined essence depending on how adequately is the common property expressed through the affection, how active is my body in producing effects, or rather, how much of the effect is an expression of the common property.
To strive for perfection is to strive to stay expressive, to stay in the state of utmost expression, or to possess an affection that expresses the most, preserving the actual modal existence, which is an expression of the actual existence of the modal essence, against the negations of others. Since one’s essence is already determined in existence, one can only be affected by certain things, but the affections themselves can be of different degrees of adequacy and be expressive in different manners and to different degrees. That is, it’s determined in my essence to be affected or limited by some other body, but this affection can be largely only indicative and obscure, or it can be expressive of a common property; that is, for instance, I might bounce into that other body and bounce off, or both bodies may hardly budge, thus expressive in different degrees of the one common property of force or movability.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIII:
1. Deleuze’s account of the relationship between modal essence and modal existence is inconclusive. I shall lay down a more convincing reading based on his interpretation.
2. Deleuze is right in his observation that modal essence and modal existence obey different rules in their actual beings. Yet he is not clear in his determination of the grounding thus occurs between them. He rightly maintains that modal existence is an expression through extensities of the intensity of essence, yet he does not clarify the way one leads to the other. The key then is to answer how intensities of modal essences shall pass into extensities of modal existences.
3. Modal essences are intensities because they have a being to belong to “intrinsically”. Because they are intrinsically unified by the attribute only are they intensities, or degrees of the attribute’s power of being. They have the attribute directly in view, consequently they are intrinsic to the attribute, and are intensive.
4. Modal existences do not have the attribute directly in view, but are affections of the essences they belong to. Essences left on themselves, as only expressed by affections without also being unified by the attribute, are distinct from each other. For essences as they express one attribute are distinct only intrinsically. Yet their affections are expressions “of this essence” and of this essence primarily, hence only as distinct from other essences that they express less of, these expressions thereby must distinguish the essence they express from other essences that determine this essence nonetheless.
5. This is due to the two ways infinity is construed. First, as intensities, each essence is determined infinitely by all other essences under the same attribute. This is what it means to express an infinity with the infinity as a whole in view, each part as a degree of the infinity. But this expression itself needs to be re-expressed as “infinitely many parts”, each part separate from other parts, i.e. extensities. Yet this passage to infinitely many extrinsic parts is carried out through the very nature of expression and the expressed: insofar as modes express the attribute alone, they are intensities, hence essences infinitely determined; but insofar as a mode only expresses some other mode, it is necessarily an expression extrinsic to the expressed since it must involve the expressed as abstracted from the attribute and its infinite determination, and only indicates the essence as determined by some other essence external to the expressed.
6. Thus we have two levels that are differently structured. On the level of essences, we have actual existences of these essences as infinitely determined. On the level of existences, we have actual existences of the affections of these essences as produced by these infinitely determined essences to be expressions of these infinite determinations. Since they are not just expressions of abstract essences but rather expressions of concretely determined existences of these essences, i.e. expressions of these very determinations themselves, they necessarily involve more than one essences. Since they express the essence in terms of what is distinct from and opposed to the essence that determines the essence, certainly any such expression must be extrinsic, and necessarily inadequate.
7. So on the level of existences, where we are located, essence is “the thing itself”. But on the level of essences, each essence is adequately determined to express the attribute, “complicated” in the attribute, and attribute itself is not determined by any thing distinct. Modal existences, on the other hand, are not “complicated” in the essence, but merely “explicate” the essence, which essence is determined by some other distinct essence, hence must express the essence together with an extrinsic essence as determining. Therefore an expression of an essence must involve another.
8. It also makes sense what Spinoza means by rule or law inscribed in the attribute. Each attribute has all its expressions determined by each other as essences. But such essences themselves express themselves through other modes which express their determinations as affections. But such expressions as affections are nothing in themselves but further essences fully determined that require expression on their own parts. This is not Leibnizian in the sense that essences are not simply existences or units to be added onto substances. For Spinoza, essences are not simply additive. Rather, Spinoza takes a Kantian turn, that essences and existences are but different perceptions of the same thing, that is, in view of the attribute, all modes are modal essences, and in view of other modes, all modes are modal existences that express other modes as essences; just like intuition and concept are each the same thing. Hence the law or mechanics of infinitely many composite bodies are nothing but the intrinsically determined destiny of everything expressed as external bodies affecting each other. What Deleuze finds difficult to resolve is how modal essences and modal existences can correspond yet not term by term; apparently there must be more existences than essences they correspond. But this is the same structure in Kant, where apparently intuition must be “more” than a concept, yet but intuition and concept must be infinite. It is similar here, essence must be expressible by many existences, yet to each existence there must correspond one singular essence; this is simply because existences are not merely expressions of “an essence”, but rather “determinations of this essence” or “this essence as thus determined”. Just as an essence, in view of the attribute, must be infinitely determined, so each essence must be expressed infinitely. Yet no existence is outside the attribute, hence itself must in turn be expressible. This same structure inheres in reflexive ideas.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIV:
1. In this part I shall lay out an outline for Spinoza’s theory of affection and affects.
2. Affections are inadequate expressions of the essence as determined by something else. Every affection is in this sense equal, since each affection indicates the essence through some other essence, and in this indicating is necessarily passive, since it expresses one essence through an essence extrinsic to the one expressed, extrinsic due to the finite nature of the affection, which only fully includes a part of the whole infinity of determinations. An intrinsic or adequate expression of essences must involve all other essences and their determinations on this essence, that is, must involve the whole destiny of this essence. Yet such knowledge is only accessible to God. What is expressed adequately for human beings is therefore only part of the essence, namely, its property shared with the other essence that determines it in that affection. That is, though one cannot perceive adequately an affection expressing the essence, it does perceive adequately its expressing the very determination of the essence, that common boundary shared by two ends of causation. The converse also holds true, whatever is perceived adequately in an affection can be analyzed into a property shared by both essences.
3. All affections, therefore, are equally passive, being dependent on other causes unknown, and equally active, containing adequate expressions of common properties. But this cannot be the end of story, for no affect other than desire is possible if there is no transition from activity to passivity and vice versa. Affections are all equally expressions, but they are not equally expressive. That is, all affections express the destiny of the essence with formal equality, but some express this destiny as less of the essence in their content. Though being killed by Peter is equally in my destiny as killing Paul, but one expression of my destiny reduces my expressiveness more than the other. Destruction is an expression of destiny, a negative one nonetheless. In other words, though both the power to suffer (passive affection) and the power to act (active affection) comprise the total power to be affected, the power to suffer is still only an impotence that has reduced what could’ve been done if it were more active. Even though such passivity happens by necessity, and is a legitimate expression of the essence, it nonetheless is a meager expression that is “cut off” from the expressive power. A passive state in itself as a separate affection is merely passive and cut off and impotence, but if it’s adequated it becomes more active and more perfect.
4. Pain always decreases the power, and power continually dwindles as there’s more difficulty now in resisting pain, everything else equal. Pleasure increases power and continually increases as there’s more power gathering pleasure. Wonder is both knowledge and ignorance, hence by itself neither pain nor pleasure; it transfixes the mind on one single thought, but does not by this fact show other thoughts as some transcendent ground for this thought, hence is not particularly passive. Its nature depends solely on the content of this very thought on which the mind is transfixed.
5. Affects are the root for society. Since any active expression of myself contributing to my perfection is to express others as intrinsic to my essence, to express the common destiny of other things in my destiny, to affirm others’ affirmation of me, I thereby seek what intrinsically shares more properties with my nature, since what is common is what is adequately expressed, and what is more common is more expressive and makes myself thus more perfect. Therefore, in order to be more perfect, I seek other human beings, and seek to express the common fate of humanity through expressing my own fate. The more singular my fate is, the more perfect I am, the more so humanity is.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XV:
1. There are three orders of nature, the order of essences, the order of relations (or determinations), and the order of individuals. As I laid out last time, the order of essences is all essences united with the attribute, all essences being eternal. The order of determinations is all essences being intrinsic to all other essences, constituting each other’s whole destiny. The order of individual existences are partial derivations, or products, or affections, of the destiny of any essence. They are expressions of the destiny.
2. Though all affections are equally expressions of the destiny, each a necessary event belonging to the destiny, yet this agreement is only in form. It is only in the second order, the order of determinations, that all affections are equally expressive and equal parts of something’s destiny. Yet in the third order, which is also the order of content, where one affection is opposed to another affection, both as finite and limited things, we find inequality of expressions. For now we see one affection being ambivalent, expressing one individual determination, hence not constituting the whole essence, but only a part of it, all other parts thereby excluded from this singular affection as obscure and negative. This negation turns expression into indication, and makes it inadequate. Passivity and activity thereby come onto the scene as distinguished. And now we have the ratio between passivity and activity; whatever expresses more adequately, in its content of expression, the destiny inscribed already in the essence, is more expressive.
3. This is not to deny that even the event of passivity itself is written in the destiny as a necessary product. There is no altering of passivity into activity in the second order, since everything is already determined. Spinoza is very clear on this point: there is no such thing as a free action. The way to be free is to understand the necessity of our destiny. Formally, this means that even our passivity expresses our destiny. Practically, it means to love our fate, even including our occasional resentment of it. There is no contradiction, since whenever passivity starts to express our destiny, it is activized; whenever we perceive our passions to be necessary to the preservation of our destiny, it is activated.
4. This means there’s no such thing as evil. Evil has no ontological status for Spinoza, since it is not even privation. Evil is not the Good of Being being deprived, since all essences are eternal, and all products necessary, there is not any kind of privation possible there. Evil does not even inhere in the third order, since no affection is contingent or inexpressive in itself, each as a part constituting the common fate of the world. It is only within one singular affection as such that Evil takes on some negative meaning for that affection: it is only that which is posited in the affection to oppose the expressiveness of that one affection itself. In other words, evil is always that which opposes an affection to express through itself alone the fate of its essence. My body expresses the essence of man. If something deforms my body, my body by itself no longer expresses humanity as well, though it together with the cause of deformation nonetheless expresses the “deformability” of humanity. Evil is thus not privation, but only negation that opposes the expressiveness of an affection.
5. Thus the problem of evil is always a concrete problem. One needs always to consider what is the affection in question, and how is this affection itself an essence expressed by other affections, what are its parts, what are its “insofar”s, etc. My body is an affection of humanity, and my heart is an affection of my body, and my ventricle an affection of my heart… The whole series of events going on in my ventricle affects the series of my heart and everything else. Evil for one, however, might not be evil for another.
6. Like a problem in ventricle reduces its expressiveness for the whole destiny of my heart and loses its power, yet its loss in power might put everything else in more harmonious and healthier relations. This is why Spinoza says pain insofar as it checks excessive pleasure is good for the whole. An affection of nail insofar as it expresses the essence of nail might be reduced in power, yet insofar as it expresses my body as a whole it contributes to better my body.
7. To know passivities and to contemplate passions and and to understand ignorances is therefore no contradiction, but rather to activate them. Philosophy is such a task of activation and demystification. Spinoza starts this project already explicitly with his [Theological-political Treatise], by understanding superstitions.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVI:
1. Moralists all make claims on duties and laws prescribed by a transcendent being. An ethics, however, or an ethology, starts with the nature of things and their properties, and how to organize them alongside each other and bind them into one common destiny. Since all moralities presuppose such a transcendence, all morals are nothing but mystifications and violences. One supposes one must or ought to do something because one does not understand what is simply.
2. The state is a moral institute. For no one lives purely by reason, the state is necessary to tyrannize and terrify citizens. But that cannot be all. The city also is responsible for the common good and a general education. In other words, the state has to terrify those who are passive, but bind those who are active. The state is both moral and ethical.
3. Spinoza liberates ethics from morals by liberating the body from the conscious mind. By insisting “we have no idea what the body is capable of”, he liberates the body from the tyranny of our consciousness. Our consciousness always assumes a moral authority over our body, so that within our consciousness, we posit a superego that transcends and rules the abject body. This is the traditional image of morality: the tyranny of consciousness. Before falling to the spell of morals, Spinoza asks: “what is the nature of our body? what does our consciousness really rule?” Now he discerns the mystification: our mind does not rule our body, mind and body are in separate domains; moreover, our mind does not even rule our thoughts. Maybe there is no such thing as a rule, if we understand the rule to be a moral code: what we have are only manuals and guidebooks for productions of things.
4. There is no telos suspended before us, spurring us on. The common good of the city is not something we aspire to, at least not if we are active enough, but a fate always already actualized. The common good is always concrete, it permeates each and every action in the city. The common good is to make the city act and produce and express itself. It is an effective production, not an actualization of some hidden potential we aspire to. The city is not a tyranny of the good. It is an expression of humanity’s common destiny. Beatitude or blessedness is not some transcendent good that each action only leads to or indicates, but is within each action insofar as it is an action. In this sense, Spinoza is closer to Plato than Aristotle, needless to say Cicero, as Plato in [Statesman] describes that essentially, politics is nothing but weaving natures together into one shared destiny.
Comment on 4.: one only needs to remember that for all the end of an Aristotelian city is only analogous to its citizen; as the citizen aspires to some virtue, the city aspires to something more eminent. But not so for Spinoza, or even Hobbes, or Locke. The modern political philosopher no longer stresses the transcendence and aspiration the city prescribes. The city is to express as an individual expresses. That is why the city and the state of nature can now be distinguished. Before, the state of nature is confused with society, the end of man is to be in a city. But now not the nature of man and the nature of city is to express. City is thus merely a product, an effect, like man is, instead of an end. It is only when the individual is liberated from the city to be on a par with the city that they are comparable and distinguishable. Before, the individual is subjugated to the tyranny of city, and city to the tyranny of good, in a hierarchical order.
To have an ideal is to not understand and remain passive, to remain in abstractions. This includes the ideal of “absolute perfection” or “absolute reality” or “absolute expressiveness”. Insofar as it is an ideal, it is not a good. A good is only good when it stops being an ideal, when it “comes to life”. In other words, every city can be conceived in two ways, the Aristotelian way or the Spinozist way. Insofar as it’s put under the Aristotelian way, it remains passive, and its telos remains unreachable; but insofar as the potency is fully actualized, the potency is surely canceled, and shall be nothing. Therefore Spinoza not only corrects the illusion of teleology, but also explains how such distortion comes about. The city’s good is to be as active and expressive as it can be in each of its affections, to persevere and preserve itself in nothingness. This is a telos only when it already sees itself as passive. Otherwise, this is a drive, a conatus, a force.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVII:
1. What is a common notion? It needs to be distinguished from a genus or an essence. A genus is a latency that requires an external determination. An essence is a productivity that produces its own modifications through intrinsic determinations by the inclusion of other essences. That is, an essence produces its own fate. A common notion cannot be either. For we never know a genus adequately, since it is devoid of content (or effects) and is always obscure; an essence, on the other hand, is an infinite cause and has infinitely many effects, and no infinity is known adequately by human intellect.
2. What Spinoza means by common notion is therefore neither a genus nor an essence. It is something shared by things can be adequately expressed. An essence is determined by another essence into an affection, thus expressing part of its fate. Something’s destiny, therefore, can never be fully expressed; yet part of it or a property of it is always adequately expressed as an affection. This is easily understood, since a determination is nothing else than an affection, only a determination is always intrinsic to the thing, while an affection is in-between two things. It is shared because such determinations are always mutual, and the destiny is always shared. This is what a common notion is, it is some property shared by two essences in determining each other gets expressed in an affection. Conversely, from whatever is positive in an affection, we infer backwards to show what is shared between two essences in that one event of encounter.
3. Yet how to understand this description in concreto? The genus of cat we understand to be some material that is later grouped into different individual cats by differentiae. The genus of cat is therefore an image crude and abstract, crude for its arbitrary selection of marks (what sensible traits remains after abstractions that characterize a cat is quite random), abstract for its impotence at generating its own destiny. The essence of cat is a hidden source of infinite intrinsic determinations. The common notion of cat is a “structure”, a “composition” that relates the animal essence to all other essences in its encounter with them, and preserves itself as an expression of the fate of animal, an event in biological nature. In other words, Spinoza is Aristotelian insofar as he upholds the necessity of real definitions, but against Aristotle insofar as Aristotle treats common notions merely the same as impotent genera, or hidden productive principles, instead of a real event between essences.
4. This also demonstrates how the threefold distinction should be interpreted with more subtlety: a genus is a universal seen passively as a potency; an essence is a universal seen passively as a transcendent source of power; a common notion is a universal seen actively and adequately as a relation or a structure comprising different essences, yet itself doesn’t include or exclude any other essence, but is open to both. That is, a common notion is not exclusive to other things, as a genus is; nor is it inclusive as an essence; rather, it is an open passage, and being so, it is not transcendent or superior to what it involves, but is intrinsic to both, and is adequately expressed in affections. Yet when this open passage is closed, either exclusion or inclusion happens, the common notion is thereby no longer an intermediary but itself stands out. No longer the shared destiny between things, but itself a thing in itself, the affection, remaining an affection of the previous essence, can no longer adequately express this newly established essence. That is, cat, insofar as it expresses the shared destiny between animal and a milieu, it is a common notion that is adequately expressed in this affection of animality as such. But insofar as it is itself an essence, it must be expressed by some other affections that exclusively belong to it.
5. Now we have a full account of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. First we have affections and start from affections. Affections are indications of essences, hence only symbolic and confused. This is the first kind of knowledge. Then we proceed to find something positive in these affections, and find in them a structure or relation between two essences, and there we determine this relation to be a common notion. This is the second kind of knowledge, knowledge by scientific inference. Finally, we know this common notion itself is an essence, and we can thereby deduce each and every affection from this essence. This is the third kind of knowledge, the intuitive knowledge by deduction. An example is that, first I learn from others that 1+6=7, then I do it myself, and remember that this is the case; but later I say there must be some relation between 1 and 6 so that it yields 7; then I reach the shared property, which is the addition, and I say, I now know 1 with 6 causes 7, so does 6 with 1, and more than that, I know what addition is; from this knowledge of addition, I can now deduce infinitely many effects from the simple notion of addition, in relation to any other number. It’s noteworthy here that the third kind of knowledge, though intuitive and infinite, is not adequate when the common notion remains a newly conceived essence, but only generates adequate ideas by expressing other common properties. That is, addition is adequate insofar as it is expressed by 7, but what is adequately contained in the idea of addition is again the common properties addition has to other essences. Just as cat is adequate when it relates animal to some milieu, but it only produces other adequate ideas when individual cats express the relation cat as an essence has to other essences, each deducible from the common notion of cat. So finite intelligence can never fulfill infinite adequation, and an infinite progress of deduction and relating essences together in this way is prepared.
6. The three kinds of knowledge correspond to the three stages of truth. The confused idea is nothing but the posited existence of an idea, its formal truth. Then it is questioned if the posited idea should be true when the content seems to get involved, that different ideas seem to contradict each other. But then these are all unified by the idea of God, so that something like a “squared circle” is nothing but an idea of the mutual destruction of two ideas. Insofar as it is an idea it is expressive as all other ideas in the common fate of all ideas; yet its content is by itself least expressive, that is, it expresses nothing. That is, a contradiction is not so much of an idea as a negation of an idea. In the infinite idea of God, all ideas are adequate, and though a contradiction, a negative idea is related to all other ideas and is thereby rectified back into its truth. It is a contradiction insofar as it belongs only in men and not in God, or as it is only a passive limit to circle or square, and not a limit in God. Like a passion becomes action when affirmed in God, though passive in its content taken by itself, active in the whole; a contradiction reveals truth though itself in itself denies truth. For a contradiction occurs because an affection is caused by an extrinsic thing, or an idea is caused by an extrinsic idea, so that one destroys the other. Such destruction no longer subsists in the order of essences. That is, contradictions don’t exist in the order of essences; “a squared circle” is nothing in God but a mistake that men make because they are men; or a limit to circles as they are circles.
A comment on 6.: therefore Spinoza’s way of countering that sophistry, “if God can create something logically contradictory”, is simple, that is, all contradictions are impotences of limited things, God as the truly infinite being, is active and “cannot” be impotent, which means God must be active, and his activity is not anyhow impotence; and we should note that the unity between reflexive knowledge and objective knowledge does not mean one is equivalent to the other, but merely the formal truth itself has a content, like the material truth has a form, that is, all ideas are true because they are in due order (because of their objective content relates one idea to other ideas in due order), and all ideas are in due order because they are ideas (they are equally produced by God under the attribute of Thought and hence are always already communicated and articulated).
7. [Ethics] supersedes [Treatise] on two points. First, as [Treatise] is still not clear that reflexive knowledge is founded upon and unified with immediate knowledge, since Spinoza still claims in [Treatise] that immediate knowledge is separate from reflexive knowledge, and has not noticed that reflexive knowledge somehow “precedes” immediate knowledge (for we initially regard as true whatever we believe is an idea), and therefore the whole system becomes extremely confusing, in [Ethics] Spinoza reworks this theory and unifies Method with Content. He also recognizes that the order of true knowledge is different from our attainment to knowledge; that is, though we first know, and then know that we know, we only first are certain that all ideas are true, and eventually are certain that these ideas are indeed true in objective relations. The second point is that in [Treatise] Spinoza still believes that we can have direct knowledge of real definitions of essences, and properties of any essence are finite; but in [Ethics] all essences are unknowable as essences, and only as common notions can they be known adequately, and that all essences have infinitely many properties.
8. Every idea is an idea of a body. All essences therefore are essential bodies. Common notions are that in which and through which bodies meet. Two cats meet each other; because they share the most common properties in their respective natures, since they are most alike, their affections and mutual determinations are the most expressive of their common fate. This class of common properties shared by two cats, however, cannot be simply rendered as their “cat-hood”. Cat-hood is an essential body to which they are individual affections, but this essence is not fully explicated by either, hence cannot be fully explicated by both. The common notion, therefore, is much more peculiar. Even it is called “cat-hood”, it is a concrete and particular determination of the structure through which they encounter each other. We accumulate our knowledge through these particular things. Any abstract universal is a cessation to our knowledge. We only adequately know about situations and circumstances. But this “cat-hood” between two cats is again joined by some other milieu of the same level, like a dog coming down from the end of a street, which determines this “cat-hood” in a different way, producing different affections on the two cats, and shares with this “cat-hood” a different relationship. This produces a new destiny involving three bodies, two cats and a dog. This is a new community, a new pack. This produces a new common notion that is more universal, since it includes one more member, yet just as concrete. The most universal common notion is therefore the highest essence, but with a twist: the commonest notion is as universal as the highest essence, but the common notion is always a weaving of common destiny shared by everything, while essence is a metaphysical point that “includes” everything. Insofar as “cat-hood” produces all cats, it is an essence; insofar as “cat-hood” describes how every cat encounters another, it is a common notion.
9. What I mean is, by looking at millions of pictures of singular cats, I know less about cat-hood than by looking at a small group of cats interact with each other. The same name always applies in two ways. “Cat-hood” as an essence and “cat-hood” as a common notion. One as the inaccessible wellspring of all cats from all times, the other as the fate which organizes and binds together those cats I am familiar with. Of course for human beings the latter is much restricted, since I only am familiar with a few cats. But for God, the common notion is as universal as the essence. And common notion provides us with adequate knowledge; “cat-hood” in this sense, though it does not transcend beyond our affections till absolute abstraction, it provides us with a network of truths, that this cat today meets that other cat, this cat fought yesterday that cat… till everything gets involved in this common destiny; the essence of a pack of cats is redetermined by the appearance of a dog, and a new pack emerges, a new essence of a new pack that involves multiple cats and a dog… In other words, we never fully know any affection in itself, we never fully know any essence in itself, but we do fully know when a determination of an essence by another essence corresponds to an affection of that essence. What we do adequately know is but the interface where two things meet; where the two things fade, that is, if we take the interface by itself, we again don’t know anything adequately, since we now take a common notion to be its own essence. The problem of knowledge is throughly characterized play between immanence of common notion and transcendence of essence.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVIII:
1. There are three kinds of knowledge, those that proceed by passive signs, those that proceed by active common notions, and those that proceed by the idea of God. The first and second kind are already dealt with in our last exposition. It is worth noting that common notions do have a hierarchical order, some are more universal than others; yet they only express more shared or less shared fate of things. At any rate, common notions are not abstract things, but real combinations or orders of affections. In other words, Spinoza is thoroughly entertaining the Baconian idea of a common notion, which is operative and scientific. Every common notion is a nexus of determinations of essences, which again are turned into active common notions when their causes are found in relations between other essences. Common notions are therefore guidelines from a roadmap of the intellect, that relate all essences together intrinsically, not as transcendent sources, but as nexus of relations.
2. But so far we only have a system. Systemic knowledge is the second kind of knowledge that nevertheless is dependent on the first kind of knowledge, for before any common notion is arrived at, we have to presuppose essences. There is always this interplay between transcendent essences and immanent common notions. But how do we arrive at an idea of God? The natural thing to say is that God is the commonest notion or the most general fate of everything. But this cannot be the whole story.
3. Rather, we see every common notion can be turned into an essence. The the most universal notion has to be self-affected. That is a self-caused foundation. So we do have a transcendent idea of God. Insofar as God is a self-caused essence, God is transcendent. Our knowledge of God is therefore never adequate. But an essence again can be turned back into a common notion, and since this essence is self-affected, it is its own common notion. So as we regress from an affection to a common notion, then from a common notion to an essence, we pass from what we know confusedly to what we know adequately, and then to the ground of the adequacy of our knowledge. We rise to God speedily. But once we attain to the idea of God and we progress from that self-affected essence, we deduce everything from it adequately.
4. This is difficult but important. God is not just any essence, but a self-caused essence. Insofar as it is an essence, it never gets expressed adequately by any affection of itself, by any modal essence. That is to say, we can never know God insofar as God is an essence, the source of everything. But insofar as God is self-caused, it is self-affected, and hence it is its own common notion. It relates to itself and expresses this relation in any affection insofar as that affection is in it. So God is never a remote cause of anything. God is unique in this, that it is inadequately known as merely another essence, but adequately known as an essence self-affected. No affection of God indicates something other than God.
5. To put this more clearly, one can say that, if different essences conjoin, they express themselves adequately through affections, which again are adequately expressed by their own affections. Adequacy in Spinoza is always immediate between two levels, cause and effect, therefore different from Leibniz, who defines adequacy to be an absolute unfolding of everything. For Spinoza, expression is always between two terms, and so long as one term exhausts the other term, the expression is adequate. So for two essences, thought each only indicated by their affection, their common notion or relation gets fully expressed nonetheless. Yet this relation still posits two ends transcendent to the middle, each end unexpressed by the affection, itself expressive of some other relation. Transcendence subsists in these determinations of relations.
Continuation of 5.: only in God is transcendence fully interiorized as a self-causation, infinitely expressed by each and every affection in it. An essence is determined by another essence, thus only the determination gets expressed in the affection, and itself expressible only by infinitely many such determinations. A self-caused essence however is its own common notion, itself determines itself and this determination must fully exhaust itself in expression, thus everything as an affection of it must be adequately expressive. Any inadequacy of this knowledge therefore results not from God being God, but only due to our finitude, for we in our affection oppose other essences as transcendent, thus dispersing the idea of God, and turn equal and active expressions of God into passivities, or transcendent sources of power, thus alienating God from us. This turns into the prophetic tradition of religion.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIX:
1. The road to beatitude is like this: first, we live among our affections, and live in wrecks of passivity; then, we feel passive joys, and find expressions of positivity or activity; from these positivities, we form common notions, and see how different essences intertwine into one common fate, each common notion contained in some other common notion more universal; we then rise to the idea of God as we relate essence to the common notion, and see how only the idea of God provides the ultimate grounding that unifies common notions with essences, since God is that thing whose essence is its very own common notion; eventually, we deduce infinite things from this essence qua common notion, and break upon the new ground of pure activity, and think like God; that is, eventually we can think about all essences as infinitely many products from God, within the essence of our own body as the formal cause, and God the material cause, so that I understand my own destiny as conformant to everything else and God itself.
2. To be a Spinozist and to live a life in beautified means to live affectively. It does not mean to live philosophically or unphilosophically. In Book V, philosophy and life essentially become one. To live is to think and understand. To philosophize is to live with affections on a plane of immanence. Deleuze is too perceptive when he comments that [Ethics] as a book is written with different speeds. It starts quick to arrive at God, and then move more slowly, and to speed up at opportune moments. This is what is admirable about Deleuze. He is not just attentive to Spinoza’s philosophy, but also to Spinoza’s language of philosophy. He notices how Book V is not only the shortest of the whole book, but also the most rapid, the absolute speed. He also recognizes how Scholia and Propositions have different rhythms, that Scholia are always disruptive and rather impassioned. There are different currents of capture in one book.
Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XX:
1. This is a conclusion to the whole journey. We start from Descartes’ failure, that he substitutes real knowledge with imaginative knowledge. First, he makes substance that which is deprived of an image, hence confusing numerical distinction with real distinction. Secondly, he judges a substance to be infinitely perfect or real, compared to the relative imperfections of image. Thirdly, he treats the clarity and distinctness itself as the measure of truth, or the natural light, which again is compared to confusions in images. Finally, he supposes mind to be united to the body as substance is united to its modes, so that mind is a real cause infinitely superior to its effects.
2. Both Leibniz and Spinoza employ the concept of expression to counter such Cartesianism. For Leibniz, it’s because expression is much more general. For Spinoza, it’s rather because expression is more confined and refined for his taste for univocity. But their anti-Cartesian agenda is clearly shared. First, expression does not specify the number of the expressed or of what expresses itself. So instead of an abstract being in our imagination, both Leibniz and Spinoza find what is expressive to be an absolute. Second, the concept of expression not only requires the relation or the form of the expressed with respect to the expressions, but also the very content or nature of both; an expression can never be empty. So both Leibniz and Spinoza arrive at the absolute not simply as the infinitely real, but also as the ground expressed in the content of any expression. Third, since expressions are all related to the absolute expressive thing, truth can never inhere in any singular expression, but must be expressed in relation to all other expressions, for the ground necessarily complicates all other expressions in itself; that is, how one expression is unified with other expressions to form one shared expression that expresses exhaustively the whole content of truth. The standard of truth is therefore not clarity, but adequacy. Lastly, expression is an identity between the expressed and the expression, and an identity as such is always transitive, and cannot be understood simply as real cause. Expressiveness has much more scope that causality. Therefore, Leibniz and Spinoza can talk of expression without involving any kind of real causation between mind and body.
3. The disagreement Leibniz has with Spinoza, therefore, is more on the question of specific delineation of expression. Leibniz upholds a symbolic philosophy of expression. That is to say, for Leibniz, he wants both immanence and transcendence at the same time. He does not want to reduce the difference between different levels to a quantitative difference, namely, attributes comprise of infinitely many modes, substance comprise of infinitely many attributes; he wants to retain the qualitative superiority of God, or a morality, without falling back to the qualms of Cartesianism. He therefore constructs a system of equivocation that nonetheless does not posit any abstract being; rather, everything expresses everything else in a network of preestablished harmony. He needs an absolute that expresses itself infinitely in infinitely many expressions, all of which are potentially concrete and prepare for adequation, or are adequate in their foundation, but nonetheless can never be completely adequate. This results in his monstrous system of monadology: each monad is an infinite expression of the world, which is concrete in some parts but abstract in some others; all expressions potentially adequately ordered in one expression, though yet enfolded; which abstraction and inadequacy come in because of the necessary exclusion of one monad from another, each monad included in the other as transcendence, which however does not affect Cartesianism, as knowledge confined within one soul, everything guaranteed by harmony.
Continuation on 3.: in other words, Descartes’ mistake stems from his confusing immanence with transcendence, so that he tries to know what is supposedly not able to be known, to make the unknown a ground for the known, or to reach the unknown from the known, and that is to say Descartes does not follow the principle of sufficient reason, and stops where he should not stop, so that he does not overcome nor exclude transcendence, but let it stand amidst our imagination as a black hole, itself an unintelligible remainder that is not related to anything else as the sufficient ground of things; both Spinoza and Leibniz recognize his mistake, but unlike Spinoza who eliminates transcendence ontologically and upholds immanence as the most primary, to deduce everything continuously, Leibniz on the other hand restricts continuity of expression to the realm of passivity inside the monad, so that what we know is grounded in the monad and nowhere else. Eventually, both provide sufficient reasons, so that what is expressive is in principle exhausted in its expressions; though for Spinoza, such expressions are common expressions, while for Leibniz, any expression is a unique expression included in a unique center of expression. The most succinct way to put it, I think, is to say that for Spinoza, knowledge expands as it increases, as for Leibniz, it contracts and becomes more concentrated. Truth is an expanse, a plane of immanence for Spinoza, where transcendence is overcome; but a point, a closure, an inclusion for Leibniz, where transcendence is excluded, but in this exclusion most genuinely retains its nature qua transcendence, and reduces the expression of one monad as its counter-expression.
Both Spinoza and Leibniz try to get rid of the Cartesian black hole of subjectivity, where one arrives at the ultimate darkness as the ground, by relating this ground to everything else through adequation as expression; though as Spinoza does it, one expands, and as Leibniz does it, one contracts, for one unfolds it from matter and enfolds it into the monad; but either way, every partial expression is continuous with any other partial expression, the expressed is exhausted in the expressions (even the transcendent world for Leibniz is only transcendence immanent to the monad and can be infinitely unfolded in infinitely many expressions, that is, the world as the expressed exists only in those expressions of it included in one center of expression; the movement of adequation is always to and fro and back and forth, from inside to outside, then back to the inside, an unfolding and enfolding at the same time; what is important, however, is what is considered to be more primary, and for Leibniz as well as Spinoza, it is the activity, the immanent expression, the elimination of transcendence that is more primary and prominent, though Leibniz has to rescue transcendence in the last instance to save morality as such), the expression and expressed are always concrete and have a content through all relations of the expressions, and also the expressed does not cause the expression, but rather is comprehended by the expression.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
In this note / 篇目
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,I:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,II:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,III:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,IV:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,V:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,VI:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,VII:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,VIII:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,IX:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,X:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XI:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XII:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XIII:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XIV:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XV:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XVI:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XVII:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XVIII:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XIX:
- 德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XX:
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,I:
1. 笛卡尔的两个误解:属性是事物变化的一种性质,或属性是本体自身变状和多样化的根据;任何被清晰分明地构想的观念都对应一个个别事物。
2. 这两个误解的后果是:首先,既然属性只是多样化的根据,任何变状都应使一个本体区别于具有同一属性的其它本体,任何变状都划出一个数量上不同的本体;其次,既然任何被构想的观念都对应一个个体,任何实在区分都会导致事物自身的数量区分。
3. 问题在于,由于这两个误解,任一本体存在的必然性不再得到保障。这一问题的第一部分是,同一属性可以在自身中容纳多个本体,而且任何变状都出于外因,本体自身因此依存于其它本体而偶然,并由其它本体造成。
4. 同一问题的第二部分是,由于每个属性限定一个单一本体,本体自身成了被所有属性划分的属。但属只是外在于种差,所以本体自身外在于属性和特定本体,因而任一特定本体的存在只是可能,而非必然。因为任一特定本体都依赖于一个外在的本体之属,或依赖于某特定差异被施加在这个属上。
5. 斯宾诺莎颠倒笛卡尔的构想,将数量差异与实在或本体差异区分开。这包含两步。第一步,数量上不同的只在样态上不同,而非在本体上不同;如此,本体中的任何样态都必然由本体自身造成,尽管原因外在于如此被造成的样态。任何样态仅由内在于同一本体的样态造成或限定。他通过前八个命题做到这一点,最终得出:“没有两个本体能够共享同一属性。”结果是,任何属性都表达一个无限且不可分的本质。
6. 第二步,本体上不同的,也就是被清晰分明地构想为不同的,不可能在数量上不同。如此,一个本体必然通过属性被表达为统一在一个单一本体中的多个本质。他首先确立一个本体具有多个属性的可能性。因为每个属性都是自因,其本质的存在由自己设定,所以每个属性都绝对独立于其它属性。既然彼此不依赖,也就彼此不否定。换言之,属性间不可能有矛盾。因此,一个本体可以有多个属性。
7. 接着他论证,所有属性必然只有一个绝对本体。因为若有多个本体,就会产生第4点同一问题:这些本体无非是某一般本体的种,而这种分种只是偶然的。相反,只有一个本体,通过属性的表达来表达自身,并被表达为本质,这些本质只在质上不同。只有一,才有绝对必然性。我们由此得到另一种无限,即属性的无限。属性内部的无限强度,属性的无限数目,本体的无限统一。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,II:
1. 斯宾诺莎那里属性的问题性地位,可从其看似矛盾的刻画看出:一方面,属性设定本质的存在;另一方面,属性却不应有脱离本体的独立存在。斯宾诺莎强调,属性只在自身视点中设定其本质的存在,以此解决悖论:即作为表达,属性只设定被表达者的存在。但这样,本质的存在依赖表达,表达又依赖被表达者。所以它们在存在上相互依赖,没有哪个自身绝对。唯有在表达中把自身表达为被表达者的东西才绝对独立,是自因,即本体。凭自身构想本体,其存在必然从本质概念推出,所以属性通过且仅通过本体的环绕,设定自身本质的存在。
2. 随后,斯宾诺莎将三元组自身的问题变成所有这类三元组统一的问题。只有因为存在一个单一本体,所有属性才是“赋属性的(attributive)”,而非“被赋予的(attributed)”。若一个本体分散为多个,属性就只是被赋给这个或那个本体的东西;反过来也成立。现在考虑逆向:若只有一个本体,所有属性就是这个自我表达者的表达,因而都蕴含于同一本体。因此,它们都依赖于“异于自身者”,并指向这“另一个东西”。所以它们是动态的、“赋属性的”。换言之,属性全都越过单纯表达而指向表达自身的东西;只要这个东西单一,属性就持续指向;但本体一旦分散为多个,各属性所指的中心便丧失,一切表达都死寂。
3. 属性属于本体与样态共享的不对称边界。不对称,是因为神与人在本质、存在及其关系上都不同。属性与神可互换,却只是被样态包含。但神并不与人分离。因为一旦分离,神就只能通过类比被构想。或神有一种外在于人的完美,或神有一种人仅在名义上具有的完美。不论哪种,都必须把自己的属性投射给神,混淆两者。也就是说,人可以说“神比我们所能构想的思得更好(卓越)”,或“神以不同方式思(歧义)”,但本质上与说“神像我们一样思”没有区别。斯宾诺莎则不否认本体与样态共享的形式或单义性。这让他得以引入第三项,作为“直接化(immediation)”,而非中介。类比方法的关系中只有两项,某种投射不可避免。但在斯宾诺莎主义中,既不是从样态抽象并中介到更高样态而困于无限过程,也不是直接投射到本体;而是在无限的语境中,重新构想其中涉及的、为有限样态“奠基”的属性。换言之,德勒兹将斯宾诺莎视作最早提出事物“根据”、区别于事物“阶梯”或“秩序/比例”的思想家之一。
4. 斯宾诺莎区分性质与属性。属性是直接与本体可互换者,因而是其道或名。性质只是作为形容词修饰这个道,如“永恒”“无限”,例如“永恒的力量”;或描绘神在一个属性中如何造成样态;或描绘凡人如何想象神。
对2的澄清:简言之,若不同属性表达属于不同本体的不同本质,每个超出并超越单一表达的本体就变得不可穷尽,本体因而仍是深渊,是破开表达的黑暗。这就是亚里士多德面对的问题。任何表达总指向比被表达者更多、超出表达的东西,一个“更多”与“自在”。但若一个单一本体涵括全部无限属性,就没有彼外。相反,神成为内在的神,自身就是一切表达的视域。一句话,神就是世界。这就是斯宾诺莎泛神论出现之处。
对2的进一步说明:第一章已经把这个同一问题陈述为最高属问题。如果一个属性限定一个本体,它们便是“那一本体”的种,于是出现亚里士多德的最高本体悖论。亚里士多德试图通过类比解决,但如这里所说,斯宾诺莎发现类比的问题。类比没有交代支撑比例的根据。为一劳永逸摆脱整个亚里士多德问题域,斯宾诺莎宣称有一个最高统一,但这统一不是可分为种的属,而是可传递的本体。同一问题的另一形式不着眼于存在全体的宏大图景,而只着眼于个体的存在。如果本体不是必然以一切可能方式表达自身、且其全体必然包含当前表达的东西,那么,超出表达之被表达者的本体,就会判表达为不恰切,并否定“被赋予的”表达的任何必然性。因此,只有“赋属性的”表达才可能恰切,因为它指向一个结点,在那里一切可能的超出都流入其它表达,指向它自己必然的视域。而且,只有这种图式下,本体才可表达、可构想。否则本体根本不可构想,更不用说凭自身构想;这将自相矛盾,因为按定义,本体就是凭自身被构想者。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,III:
1. 表达不同于意指。通过表达,被表达者被设定并肯定,其中没有匮乏,没有否定,也没有作为对应面的超出。表达是对被表达者的表达。但意指中,所指总逃逸能指。能指是一张把人指向主体性黑洞、即所指的脸。
2. 类比神学与否定神学都预设超越之神的否定性。类比神学否定地肯定性质,否定神学肯定地否定性质。两种情况都预设匮乏。
3. 为什么这些匮乏都关乎性质,而非属性?性质只通过想象、经抽象操作被感知。分割与分离者最终产出主体性的黑洞,这来自想象及超越想象的过程。否定神学中,想象否定所有图像并从中抽象;类比神学中,想象把图像投射到想象自身的屏幕上。这种操作就是推理,即超越想象的过程。
4. 但在斯宾诺莎看来,通过知性可直接通达形式,因为一切思想在其根据之根据中不可分。因此,无须无限抽象的劳作,无须将根据设为深渊的无根据投射,便可直接构想无限。相反,奠基总已在进行,知性总从中间开始:从属性,而非仅从有限样态。因为知性世界是单义的,从一端总能沿一条连续通道直接到达另一端。
5. 因此,神学家总从想象中的道德出发,将这些心灵虚构投射到神身上,因为他们误解了应当如何阅读经书的方法。启示不是表达,因为启示仅在想象中澄清一组性质,这些性质总遮蔽根据;表达却不遮蔽。所以表达与主体性无关;只有道德需要其道德主体进入死亡、责任与劳动的世界,围绕“我应如何行动?”这一问题。表达却是观看之喜悦,纯真之游戏。
6. 笛卡尔已经前进得足够近,却在更不幸的惨败中放弃一切。通过笛卡尔,概念中的还原,而不只是想象中的抽象,才成为可能。通过笛卡尔方法,一个具有无限属性本质的本体首次被构想。但他引入多个可能本体,剥夺本体的单义性,又把这自然之光遮蔽,最终将本体还原为自身的一个样态。这也是他很大程度上仍是神学家的原因,不是因为他使哲学道德化,而是因为他把神设为无限完美,而这只是神的性质,不是属性。这种性质始终只是相较于我们的有限性、因而通过抽象或类比推导出来。他想象神异于我们,遂剥夺神的内容,以及我们的根据。
7. 任何这种性质都是想象的产物。本质的模态,如无限、无所不在、无所不知等,只是与我们的有限相对照而被看见。神的因果作用方式与我们仅是被造成者相对照。想象性质无须赘述。总之,所有性质都是通过想象所作否定的产物,因而构成本体论差异,即深渊。而一切属性却共同构成知性中的奠基。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,IV:
1. 笛卡尔的本体论论证:“有某种无限完美者,可以被我的有限理智清晰分明地构想”;“神是无限完美,存在是一种完美,所以神存在”。斯宾诺莎与莱布尼茨一样批评这个论证:在着手确定清晰分明观念的存在之前,必须先说明它是否“恰切”,即完全展开后是否含矛盾。正如说存在无限速度没有意义,说无限完美也可能一样。
2. 但这一批评并不系于纯粹技术细节。相反,它完全关乎斯宾诺莎的反笛卡尔主义,以及斯宾诺莎与笛卡尔的根本分歧。
3. 如前所述,笛卡尔以有限与无限、不完美与完美之间的本体论差异为其本体论证明奠基。因此,笛卡尔的本体论证明只使用想象与理性。无限完美只是想象设定,所以其观念始终包含晦暗。“无限完美者”根本不是恰切观念,只是佯装清晰分明的虚构。它不是完全表达自身的实在定义,而只是被设为统一且折叠起来的概念图像。换言之,笛卡尔在心中感知的,只是一个跨过深渊投射到黑暗主体性上的性质,他却误认作神的自然;斯宾诺莎要的则是属性自身的贯通表达,让属性完整表达其自身本质,而这本质才为该性质奠基。因为笛卡尔只投射神概念,他避开这个概念的实在,神是否真符合我们的构想也不让我们知道;因而他对这个概念自然的认识至多停在投射屏幕,屏幕之外只有黑暗晦昧。所以,只有从对属性的理解出发,撇开对性质的想象,斯宾诺莎才克服困难,首先阐明此概念的实在:神不是无限完美,而是绝对者。
4. 所以斯宾诺莎与莱布尼茨都从中间开始,从属性及对属性的理解开始。正因为属性都无限且自我规定,它们才不互相矛盾,才可能统一在一个本体、即神中。这就是神作为概念如何可能,以及如何依其自然实在。只有确立这一点后,斯宾诺莎才诉诸想象:因为神可能,我们的投射就落在一个散发被投射性质的实在概念上,因此神可被构想为存在。清晰分明的观念只有也被证明恰切才实在。恰切化是知性的操作,将杂多统一为一。投射是想象的操作,把性质投到主体上。
5. 莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎的分歧,在于莱布尼茨认为神圣知性不可通达。我们总已经活在世间。换言之,对莱布尼茨,所有原初属性总已混入世界及其诸系列。本体不是凭自身可构想、所有属性所归属者,而是包含“一切”者,每个“东西”都是组合属性的无限系列。对斯宾诺莎,与本体直接可互换的是属性;对莱布尼茨,与单子直接可互换的是世界。莱布尼茨的本体总是为了世界、处于世界,在诸可能性(时间与空间)间摇摆,而神是“穿越”并“超越”世界的秩序赋予者:类比的危险被重新引入。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,V:
1. 笛卡尔的两个后天证明:“因大于果;我有一个具有无限客观实在性的神观念,所以神自身必有更无限的形式实在性”;“越难产出之物,一旦产出,就包含越多实在性而越少抽象;产出如此困难之物的东西越有力;我不能产出或保存自身,但我存在,所以必有比我更有力者,其自身存在必按比例更难产出,因而只能由自身无限力量产出,并如此被产出而无限实在”。
2. 斯宾诺莎批评这两个都基于“实在性之量”的笛卡尔论证。同一个根据问题在此重现。一切实在性之量都是想象作出的划分,都要求绝对根据。这根据就是力。
3. 通过使用力,斯宾诺莎改造了两个论证。首先,思想的无限力量必须对应一个无限的存在力量。这符合我此前对斯宾诺莎认识论转向的解读。思想是特殊属性,在自身中统一所有与之平行的其它属性;思想是一面无限镜子。但这里关键不在于神的存在比神观念在某种意义上“更”实在:那仍只是两个相对项间的投射。相反,两个无限力量相等;唯有思想的无限力量,才能获得对神之无限实在的认识。思想自身必须无限,既然无法思到其它东西造成神观念,神自身就必是自身之因。第一个证明遂变为:“我有一个无限而不自相矛盾的神观念;这无限观念不依赖自身之外的任何东西;为了这观念为真,神必须存在。”
4. 第二个论证涉及样态与本体的划界,并为此目的重写。我们将看到什么改变、什么保留。论证如下:“有限事物必然存在,所以以力为本质;但神作为绝对本体有更多力,所以神必存在。”斯宾诺莎加上的修正很容易分辨。首先,实在性不以产出的困难衡量,而以力衡量;力安置于本质之中,与任何困难概念分开。力不是产出对有限想象而言“困难”之物的相对能力,而是直接存在的本质。因此,“更多力”不指产出更困难事物的能力,而指其存在为样态的有限力量奠基的本质。再次,斯宾诺莎兴趣不在于从我们想象投射的类比,而在于本体论根据自身:有限样态是奠基于属性无限力量上的力量。
5. 从这些修正可清楚看到斯宾诺莎如何走向先天论证。实在性不再仅由“性质”衡量,而由“属性”衡量。属性包含绝对实在,因为其本质直接设定存在;性质却仍相对于想象的不完美。因此,一物有越多属性就越实在;对样态,它具有某属性的“更多”就更实在。完美不再由从有限到无限的单纯数量衡量,而由在本质中设定存在、参与本体之力的力量衡量。实在性之量最终奠基于力(本体拥有哪些力;何种外因给予某样态力量、使其本质受到作用而进入存在),而非想象。
6. 对斯宾诺莎,力不意味着静态、结构意义上的潜能。它是生产性。换言之,它总已是产出情状的活动。经院哲学的潜能与现实性之分,在此被主动与被动之分取代。每个本质都是造成存在的力、表达的力,有些表达,有些被表达。力不是沉睡的可能,仿佛晦暗地卧于现实性中等待现实化,而是一种动力,是主动中的被动,是被表达。神是产出自身的本体,所以是自因。因此有能生的自然与所生的自然。对于有限事物,由于其本质被外因现实化,它们有主动与被动力量,两者都完整构成并表达其依赖他者的本质。本质中没有可能性,只有被表达的必然性。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,VI:
1. 样态生产的必然性以两种方式证明,先通过知性,再通过力。神就是表达本身,必然表达自身,这是其形式存在。但这种表达也在自我表达的本体中关联其被表达者。本体在向自身作出的自身表达中,把自身表达为被表达者。因此,任何表达都被设定在神圣知性中。这知性不是人类智慧的类比,而仅系于表达的自然本身;它完全关乎神完整的存在,与投射出的人类活动图像无关,后者只涉及对可能性的构想或斟酌。在如此无限知性中,只要属性也通过样态表达自身,就必须设定无限知觉的必然产出。力同样如此:神通过无限力量产出无限属性,也因此必然产出无限样态。
2. 因而,通过样态化构成了与通过属性化相似的表达三元组。属性通过有限样态表达自身,被表达为一种无限且必然的变状;这变状不单属于属性,因为所有属性还指向同一本体,所以也属于本体,是本体的变状。这说明两个表达层次的不对称。有限样态既然总在属性内部表达属性的变状,也就表达本体自身的变状。因此,样态双重表达:直接表达属性,遥远地表达本体。属性通过给所有样态一个原则来为样态奠基,所有必然且无限的样态从中产出,而无限多个有限样态受其它有限样态的规定也由此奠基。
3. 一旦确立进一步生产与表达的必然性,并且所有属性的平等已确立,我们终于能正确把握斯宾诺莎的平行论。对斯宾诺莎,既然一切都由神同时产出,一切便有秩序的同一,即一一对应,属性对应属性,样态对应样态,这些无限相互映射;又因为所有属性同样表达同一本体,它们也有连接的平等,即作为系列的平等,不同于莱布尼茨的“投射系列”:在那里,所有作为表达的单子在其它单子中总被后者的视角扭曲,并被纳于后者之下;最后,它们有存在的平等,因为所有样态虽直接表达不同属性,却遥远地表达同一本体。
4. 第2点触及的由属性直接产出的样态必须无限;若有限,就被规定,即作为整体的部分受限定;或它们被属性规定,而规定它们的属性自身不可能地成了构成其规定的东西,因而自身被规定;或作为绝对者的属性来规定它,这同样不可能,因为一经规定,属性就不再绝对,而自身也被其所规定者规定。绝对者不构成限定,只提供限定发生的终极根据。根据是任一限定的必要因,而非充分因。无限不能限定部分,唯有无限中的部分能限定部分;像阿奎那那样说有一种无限的限定力量,若这种力不只是使限定“可能”的根据,就是自相矛盾。因此两种情况都荒谬,从属性推出的任何东西都应无规定且无限。
5. 由于4,凡被理解为充足理由或充分性的东西,都需修订。因为作为规定之因,无限不是有限的充分因。作为规定或限定之因,属性只是根据。但作为生产或生成之因,属性是充分因,因为属性必然通过无限多个样态表达自身。换言之,属性是所有有限事物全体的充分因(所以不只是属),却仅是任一事物受到特定限定的必要因。这就是斯宾诺莎说神是遥远原因的意思:祂使所有有限事物可能且必然,却不直接造成它们。就是说,属性不仅是可能性的根据,也是必然性自身的根据,因为它使一切存在者层面的必然性,不仅在本体论上可能,而且在终极意义上本体论地必然。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,VII:
1. 区别于属性的平等,斯宾诺莎另设一种平等,即力量的平等。力量有两种:存在与行动的形式力量,以及理解的客观力量。
2. 属性平等被设在形式存在领域;思想作为属性相对于其它属性的特权,则被设在客观理解领域。思想像镜子,仅按其形式存在考虑,只是众属性之一。但若把它看作表征所有其它事物者,因而是理解之力的条件,思想就有特权。这里没有矛盾,因为思想在存在之力上与其它属性平等,在理解之力上却不平等。
3. 思想特权需要进一步规定。首先,神观念客观地“表征”思的无限力量,形式上却“是”无限知性:前者是本质上作为思的本体、作为能生自然的本体,后者是属于思想的样态、作为所生自然;理解之力是其必然性的根据,思想变状为知性则是现实化该力量之可能性的根据。其次,正如不同属性与样态实在地、形式地不同,观念也客观地不同;不仅如此,它们也可形式地不同,有些观念以一种方式存在,有些以另一种。第三,观念自身可再次被思,可以有观念的观念,以至无限。因为观念既形式地又客观地存在,任何观念都可被理解为存在之力的实例,而非理解之力的实例,即便所有观念都作为样态归属同一思想属性。
4. 这解释本书最初几个定义中“构想”一词的用法。因为变状不只由一个本体统一,也由一个知性统一;换言之,不可能有多个可能世界统一于一个本体,而只有一个知性中的世界。这知性也可由人的知性通达,因为知性与康德所理解的“认识能力”无关,只关乎奠基的必然性。当然,我对神圣知性的任何知识都无直观,也可能疲倦,或受阻而无法完成理解,但我必须将它设为必然性的根据。因此,根据问题始终须与“认识”问题区分,理解不同于认识。在有限中“认识”,归根结底只是被投射到无限上,因为认识总是思想超出自身、伸向对象,这对我们不被允许;不只对我们,对作为独立属性的思想自身也一样,因为认识的有限总标示对象的超越。但在有限中“理解”,则是在单义性中理解直至设定自身根据、即思想属性。换言之,康德批评斯宾诺莎的是:斯宾诺莎不把观念奠基于其客观性的可能;但对斯宾诺莎,观念恰当的根据只是另一个观念。认识总是平行系列间的投射,是横向穿越。理解才是唯一真正的奠基活动,是纵向地使之可能且必然。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,VIII:
1. 问题是:对斯宾诺莎,什么是真理?它不能是观念与对象的对应,因为观念只遵循自己的思想规则。也不是清晰分明,因为“自然之光”似乎只是偶然且外在于思想自身,使思想仿佛依赖某种心理意识,因此只造成对意识的真,而非一般的真。所以必须有某种逻辑标准,定义真理本身。斯宾诺莎称这个标准为恰切性。
2. 恰切性意为观念通过存在表达本质。换句话说,一个本质就其为自己的存在奠基并生成这些存在而言,具有恰切观念。所以,神的知识就祂仅构成人心的本质(身体观念)而言不恰切,因为它不涉及身体被规定的存在及情状。神的知识就仅涵括一种情状而言也不恰切,因为它没有在全部规定中表达本质,即在一切情状中完全展开的本质。
3. 真理有三个阶段。第一是形式阶段。虚假不是形式,否则永远不会有错误,因为假观念会在形式上区别于真观念,永远不应被误认作真。因此,观念就其为神中观念而言,真且恰切。这意义上的真是形式的,因为它是反思性的真。这意为只要观念形式地存在,它就有形式真理,即可被设定为真,不论它被认为表征何种对象;所以这也意为真理在观念的观念中。观念的观念是观念的形式。形式真理属于这个观念的观念。但问题是,形式真理自身没有内容。我们只能“设定”观念作为观念的恰切性,却不知道恰切性自身是什么。即我们知道一切观念作为观念符合真理,却不知道形式如何反映于内容。此阶段只给出“形式的必然性”。
4. 因此第二阶段处理质料真理。恰切化就是让恰切性或真理实在化的过程。从所涉一切存在中,推导出一个“能够”生成全部这些存在的本质。通过存在来表达生成原则,“秩序的必然性”被确立。这是真理的内容。
5. 到第三阶段,斯宾诺莎意欲统一真理的形式与内容。第二阶段完成了“秩序的必然性”,却没有“生产的必然性”。能产出这些存在的样态本质并未被规定去如此产出,因为其规定依赖其它事物。一切本质在其存在中都无规定,只有设定自身存在、因而必须以无限多方式存在的本质除外。规定的力遂在神中被找到。我们从有限存在的观念到其本质,再到规定它者,再到自我规定者,“迅速”抵达神。我们当然不以人的知性从神出发,但确实很快升到这一观念。然而,神观念是所有观念的观念,所以是观念的形式。但这神观念也自身按应有秩序产出所有观念。因此形式真理与质料真理在神观念中统一。一切在神中存在的观念都真,并在恰切性中真;虚假只在匮乏中发生。
6. 斯宾诺莎因此可提出更恰当的真理与人类有限性理解。真理不是对象与观念的对应,而是观念自身之间的秩序。它也不依赖清晰分明的心理“感觉”,而依赖观念自身在彼此间建立的实在关系,即本质如何被存在包含并表达,这些表达称为“共同概念”。有限不是人心理上经历的状态,而是神观念领域的一种分区。无限不是人投射给神的状态,而是神观念轮廓的地图。
7. 这一新表述解决两个问题,都在《伦理学》第二卷最后一节处理。首先是“我们能真正认识什么?”我们只能真正认识共同概念(绝对或相对),因为它们是我们所是的本质的性质,必定在一切情状中产出。我们不能恰切认识外部身体,因为它们异于自身本质;也不能恰切认识自己的身体,因为无论凭身体自身还是情状、凭其个别部分还是整体,都不能恰切认识它;可恰切认识的,只有自身本质中必在任何情状中表达的东西,即我的身体与所有其它身体共享者。人身本质不包含自身存在,只能被外在的其它身体规定而存在。所以情状不包含一个本质自身,而是本质的混合,故一个本质可有无限多这类混合与情状。但共同概念为我的身体与一切外部身体共享。因此,我的身体在其存在中的任一情状都必包含这一共同概念,因为它包含全部相关本质。情状不表达本质自身,却必然表达共同概念。情状不能完整表达本质,但本质的情状不是共同概念的情状。情状是共同概念的完整“表达”,因为情状表达一切外部身体本质与我的身体本质的混合,却只表达一个共同概念。
8. 第二个问题是“我如何知道自己知道?”注意形式真理与质料真理的统一,就解决这一问题。质料真理在观念按表达秩序(恰切化)产出时出现;形式真理则是观念的观念自身被设为真。因此可说,在思想统一中,所有质料上真的观念都是通过存在被表达的本质;而这一秩序自身的观念反思地在秩序中表达,因而加入这一表达秩序。推理如下:“我知道A,因为我在A的存在中知道A;但我有一个A之表达的观念,它通过实际表达而在存在中被表达;因此,我对‘A被表达’这一事态的观念,自身在A观念于存在中被表达时得到表达;那么我当然有一个被表达的、关于A观念被表达的观念。这等于说,我知道自己知道A。”
对5的澄清:引入形式真理,是因为一切观念形式地存在,并符合某个观念的观念,而存在即真,所以一切观念形式地真。但这不够,因为我们完全不知道存在为什么是真、这种符合为何发生、符合何以让事物存在且观念的观念必存在。因此转入第二阶段。事物的规定中有秩序的必然性。通过这种规定,观念符合其它观念,正如存在符合本质。于是知道,符合是真,因为观念由一种必然性排序。存在是真,因为存在由这种成真、这种本质的必然生产奠基。因此我们现在能理解成真的全过程:本质必然产出存在,存在必然符合本质;观念形式地存在,因为它们符合一个作为其本质的观念,即神观念。神是观念的形式、观念的观念,产出所有观念使之符合自身,产出存在使之表达终极本质。这种必然表达造成真理。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,IX:
1. 本部分基本重述上一部分,旨在回答我们为什么有不恰切观念。
2. 不恰切观念源于人的有限性,想象是我们有限而不完美的“认识”方式。这有限性由认识的不恰切性框定。这种不恰切有三部分。
3. 首先,我们不知道心灵的情状,因为不能从心灵本质推出情状;任何情状都来自限定身体或心灵的外部身体或观念,但外在于我而影响我的东西是不可“认识”的。所以我不知道自己如何被作用,也不知道心灵情状。其次,我不知道心灵。既然心灵能有其一切情状,要恰切认识心灵而非仅其特定变状,就必须知道所有限定我身体的外部身体。第三,我不知道外部身体。总之,身体的一切情状都不是表达,只是指示,是我想象中的符号。唯有在神的知性中,它们才是恰切表达。
4. 通过恰切性,斯宾诺莎克服笛卡尔把真理定义为清晰分明观念的做法,因为这些观念只是表征与符号,不是表达。表达阐明事物的充足理由,穷尽观念的意义。它们把其它观念带入自身统一。
5. 唯有一种知性在符号中看见将观念奠基于其实在的肯定性,才能通过这肯定性,理解在本质中产出那些情状的实际根据。
6. 情状是一切人类知识的来源。情状指示我与其它身体的自然。这些自然异质,无法恰切认识。但一切情状都预设我与其它身体共享的东西,因为一切情状都是限定,任何限定都不能没有共同边界。因此,一切情状都预设某些共同概念。共同概念作为情状中肯定者,总被恰切认识,因为这些共同概念都是对共享自然的表达;此自然如其所是被感知,不是指示不同者的符号。如此理解的情状之因,总被认识为内在于该限定的共同概念,情状总从该限定产出,作为共同根据的表达。换言之,一切情状中,总有某种我确实恰切感知并认识的东西,它属于等式两端,因而可理解为两端共享性质的产物;这些性质由此可从这种肯定性推知。
7. 进一步澄清:情状不表达受作用的身体,因为情状总是两身体的混合,没有一个情状完整且单独表达身体,也没有身体仅由一个情状表达;但共同性质可被表达,因为它在情状中,且为作用者与受作用者共享,所以它在情状、作用者与受作用者中都被完全穷尽且同一;情状中的一个果包含且仅包含身体中那一个因,即共同性质。这就是身体情状领域中表达的意义。可穷尽性不意味该性质不能不断被其它情状重新表达,只是说,任何表达同一性质的情状,都有该性质的同一表达。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,X:
1. 斯宾诺莎在两个秩序上反笛卡尔,先在知识秩序,再在存在秩序。
2. 知识秩序中,斯宾诺莎以综合方法反对笛卡尔的分析方法。分析方法从感知到的果前往为果奠基的因,柏拉图的“回忆”、亚里士多德的“抽象”、康德的“先验哲学”、海德格尔的“诠释学循环”都是如此,从有限升到无限。综合方法从绝对已知者出发,必然地推导由这绝对根据、在其中产出的一切。因在分析中只能被混淆晦暗地认识。但在综合中,从绝对根据出发,清晰恰切地向下推进。
3. 有人或反对,综合方法不可能。事实上,这就是笛卡尔的异议。笛卡尔确实认为综合方法是为知识奠基所必需,但它仅从分析方法派生,可能永远不能自身恰切。斯宾诺莎却会说,这是因为笛卡尔只用想象从殊相抽象共相,而这是无限过程。它永远不给我们恰切知识,因为任一抽象之物自身都不能解释生产的充分必然性,必须始终预设其它东西,以至无限。即,殊相是无限多个抽象共相汇聚的结论。分析总是无限的。
4. 为脱离这种无限链,斯宾诺莎提出,必须不顾想象而运用知性。我们能如此,是因为能把握:若无绝对根据,这无限链本身就不可能。于是我们从依赖其它者“迅速”升到绝对且自因者。但斯宾诺莎不能止于综合方法的必然与可能。他还须解释分析方法如何通过综合奠基。他展示任一有限分析都是对情状及其所含共同概念的分析,以此做到。即被分析者自身总已是被表达的综合,尽管书中此处尚未完全展开这种由综合奠基的分析机制。
5. 在另一存在秩序中,斯宾诺莎以单义性反对歧义性。一切在神中并通过神奠基。存在不是类比的,不是卓越的,不仅仅可能,也不仅仅无限。因为若理解为类比,就应依赖某个使类比可能的根据。而且,这一构想自身涉及各种困难,最突出的是:任何东西如何与无限者成比例?既然没有东西应全无性质,本体又如何能没有性质?这些纯是矛盾。黑格尔辩证法穿过所有这些矛盾,最终把全体奠基于矛盾。但德勒兹一开始就不相信矛盾。他认为,只需说:在一切无限属性中完整表达自身的绝对存在者没有矛盾,因为每个属性完全独立,因而不与任何其它属性矛盾,便能消除这种矛盾。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XI:
1. 如我在普罗提诺论文中所说,普罗提诺心中有三种流溢模式:第一是象征的,被流溢者(或分有者)回转,经由产物中的踪迹寻找自己的起源,一种黑暗中的悲剧摸索;第二是图像的,流溢者(或被分有者)作为原型产出自身图像,一种喜剧游戏;第三是球体内部光的连续辐射。第三模式中,流溢成为内溢,或内溢式表达。但普罗提诺从未充分展开第三模式。
2. 斯宾诺莎承担完成普罗提诺任务的工作,通过确立存在的单义性做到。一切平等,因为共享共同形式。仍有层级,却不是超越的层级。相反,一切都完全包含于下一层,并被下一层的表达完全穷尽,因而不再有严格意义的层级。一切反而成为完整表达,彼此共内在,合流为一连续辐射。属性作为本体质的表达,与本体为一;样态作为属性量的表达,与各自属性为一。神不是遥远原因,而直接造成一切。一切如一地内在于神。思的力量与存在的力量平等。所有属性彼此平等。因为本体被属性充分表达,属性又被样态充分表达,没有超越,也无晦暗。没有类比。对斯宾诺莎,即便有限心灵也更多把情状看作共同性质的表达,而首先不是某超越身体的符号。
3. 通过展开第三模式,斯宾诺莎成功解决自有历史以来困扰新柏拉图主义者的若干问题。首先,太一不再须走出自身产出存在;存在已作为其表达内在于太一。其次,太一不必被划分,也不必为数的产出负责。因为第一层上,属性并非数量上有别,所以容易内在于本体而不成为复数;第二层上,样态不是太一生成的独立数单位,只是某“最大者”的量的表达,即自身不可分的无限属性的表达。这意为样态并非与本体分离、数量上不同的存在者,而是属性作为其部分所表达的“强度”(即便构成广延数目,它们也仍作为属性强度的表达而内在于属性)。属性自身不可分,但其无限唯有通过合在一起的无限多个有限样态才被表达;只有因为这些表达内在、一切有限样态内在于无限,不可分属性才能被“划分”,因为这不是实际分割,只是被包容在一个不可解开的自我表达连续体中的表达,或仅内在于整体而存在、自身为无的部分。
对3的澄清:因此可把属性构想为不可分单位;但这单位有内在内容,或量的强度;单位不可分,并非因无法通过其量的内容的分区来分析,而是因为任一分区自身都不足以恰切表达单位,因而不能独立于单位及其余无限分区;只有内容的一切无限分区在单位内部展开,单位才被恰切表达。现在可见,属性作为无限如何既不可分又可分。就它与样态具有整体/部分关系而言,可分;就没有任何数量的部分能恰切表达无限属性、属性只在自身作为无限多个分区或表达连续内在的所在时才被恰切表达而言,不可分。换言之,任何无限都永不可分,因为没有分割能恰切表达它,唯有无限自身表达自身;但任何无限都必须包含无限分割或无限多个不恰切表达,才成其为无限。
通常所理解的分割是分离或限定,无限定者当然不能被限定;但这不排除内在于无限的分割,只要被分出的部分不能脱离整体,也不限定无定限者,更不恰切表达无限。因此限定只能内在于无限,而不限定无限。无限自身含无限多事物,却仍不可分,因为它只能作为无限由自身表达。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XII:
1. 样态本质不是可能性,而必然是其所归属属性的现实表达。样态本质就其在神中由神造成而言存在。而且,对斯宾诺莎,说本质只是并不现实存在的可能性,毫无意义,因为一切本质必然“作为本质”存在。唯一区别是样态本质的存在相互依赖,彼此造成,尽管最终都由神的存在造成。
2. 样态本质并不像亚里士多德系统中的种差外在于属那样,外在于属性。相反,它们是内部规定,或更确切说,强度量。样态存在则是广延量,需在后章进一步考察。
3. 属性不可分,因为在质上属于绝对本体。但它们在样态上可分,因为构成无限多个作为自身表达的样态。就它们无限且只能无限而言,不可分;就由无限多个有限样态组成而言,被划分。这些样态以两种方式在属性中被划分:第一,作为属于属性、彼此连续的强度,即作为必然蕴含其它本质的样态本质,而所有这些本质都直接属于属性;第二,作为属于本质、数量上不同的广延,即作为各自仅不恰切表达其本质的样态存在。
4. 虽然德勒兹下一章才谈样态存在,但需留意斯宾诺莎在第三卷开端如何用conatus(努力)描画样态存在与样态本质的关系。样态本质等于事物自在的存在,并努力在样态存在中现实化其存在。若接受德勒兹的建议,这不意味像莱布尼茨那里,样态本质是努力存在的可能性,而是样态本质的现实存在努力“表达自身”。这很清楚,因为事物本质中无物违反其自然,所以没有内在于事物而毁灭它的东西;凡毁灭它者必外在于它。于是得出:一切自身存在,却被它物否定。样态存在就是conatus在否定它者中坚持自身的结果,是其持续或逗留。但样态本质的存在是这种“坚持”活动、这种逗留之因:本质自身被造成而存在,随后试图造成其它结果表达自身,因而遇到否定它者。某物凭自身造成它物时,称为主动;否则,即被部分否定时,称为被动。
5. 进一步发展此理论,会再次强调斯宾诺莎的“共同性质”概念。一个本质在存在、即表达中主动时,产出自身的恰切表达。至少对人的身体,这意为身体产出一个情状,表达它与作用于它的外部身体共享的共同性质。换言之,当我感知自己产出者恰切表达了我对它的产出(暂且撇开心身区分),且我的或外部身体的情状不指示任何晦暗时,我主动。当我在情状中感知者,或指示自身身体,却不知它如何被表征为外在于我(我的身体中被他者否定者),或指示外部身体,却不知我如何表征它(其它身体中被我的身体否定者),即表达不恰切而混乱时,我被动。主动是知识,被动是无知。
对5的评论:所以对斯宾诺莎,变得更完美或主动,与获得更多知识同义。知道更多,就是有更多恰切观念,其它观念从中恰切推出;即感知更多在情状中表达自身的共同性质;即通过结果中的表达——这些结果关联于自身自然内在的原因——在存在中更充实。换言之,知道更多,就是更恰切看见一切如何肯定而非否定其它一切;我在表达共同性质的情状中感知越多,对自身被其它身体肯定而非否定者就知道越多。我的自然因此有越多实在性。我因此有越多快乐,也越幸福。
我身体的本质在现实存在中被其它身体无限规定。但这被无限规定的身体之现实存在,只能由无限多个这样的规定表达。每个规定都是情状。任一情状只能不恰切表达这被无限规定而存在的本质,因为身体的一切情状都只部分表达我的身体自然、部分表达其它身体自然;不知两者,就不能恰切认识自身。因此,没有情状恰切地现实化我身体的存在,而总被部分否定。但共同性质在情状中被恰切表达、完全肯定。这表达了样态本质的现实存在:它被其它样态本质肯定、奠基,使被表达的性质丰富。因此,我身体的样态本质的现实存在,也通过恰切表达该本质中共同性质的情状,在表达中成为现实。样态本质总已现实;但它在表达中现实,所以必须通过情状被表达才现实。换言之,任一样态存在的努力,只是恰切表达其本质上已是者。我的本质已被完全规定,情状只是这一事实的表达。但这些情状可以更好或更坏地表达这预先规定的本质,取决于共同性质经情状被表达得多恰切,我的身体产出结果时多主动,或更确切说,结果中有多少是共同性质的表达。
努力完美,就是努力保持有表达力,保持最充分表达的状态,或拥有表达最多的情状,抵抗他者否定,保存现实的样态存在——它是样态本质现实存在的表达。既然本质已在存在中被规定,人只能受某些东西作用,但情状自身可有不同恰切程度,并以不同方式、不同程度表达。即,受某其它身体作用或限定,已在我的本质中规定;但这情状可以主要仅为晦暗的指示,也可表达共同性质。例如,我可能撞上另一身体后弹开,或两个身体都几乎不动,从而以不同程度表达力或可动性这一共同性质。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XIII:
1. 德勒兹对样态本质与样态存在关系的说明未有定论。我将在其诠释基础上提出更有说服力的读法。
2. 德勒兹正确观察到,样态本质与样态存在在其现实存在中遵循不同规则。但他未清楚规定它们之间如何奠基。他正确坚持样态存在是通过广延对本质强度的表达,却未阐明一者如何通向另一者。因此关键是回答样态本质的强度如何过渡到样态存在的广延。
3. 样态本质是强度,因为有一个它们“内在地”归属的存在。唯有内在地由属性统一,它们才是强度,或属性存在之力的程度。它们直接以属性为视野,因而内在于属性,是强度的。
4. 样态存在不直接以属性为视野,而是所归属本质的情状。本质若被独自留下,只由情状表达而未同时由属性统一,就彼此有别。因为本质在表达一个属性时,只内在地有别。但其情状是“这个本质的”、且首先是这个本质的表达,因而只是相对于表达得较少的其它本质而言有别;这些表达因此必把它们表达的本质,与那些仍规定此本质的其它本质区别开。
5. 这是由于理解无限有两种方式。首先,作为强度,每个本质被同一属性下的其它一切本质无限规定。这就是以无限整体为视野来表达无限、每个部分作为无限的一个程度的意思。但这表达自身需要重新表达为“无限多个部分”,每部分与其它部分分离,即广延。然而,过渡到无限多个外在部分,是通过表达与被表达者的自然本身完成:就样态只表达属性而言,它们是强度,因而是被无限规定的本质;但就一个样态只表达某其它样态而言,它必是外在于被表达者的表达,因为它必须包含从属性及其无限规定中抽象出的被表达者,只指示作为被某个外在于被表达者的其它本质规定的本质。
6. 因此有两个结构不同的层次。本质层面上,是这些本质作为被无限规定者的现实存在。存在层面上,是这些本质的情状之现实存在,由被无限规定的本质产出,表达这些无限规定。它们不只表达抽象本质,而表达这些本质被具体规定的存在,即这些规定本身,所以必涉及不止一个本质。既然它们通过与本质不同、相对立而规定本质者来表达本质,任何这种表达就必外在,必不恰切。
7. 所以,在我们所处的存在层面,本质是“物自身”。但本质层面,每个本质都被恰切规定以表达属性,在属性中“共卷(complicated)”,属性自身不被任何有别之物规定。而样态存在并未在本质中“共卷”,只是“展开(explicate)”本质;此本质被某其它不同本质规定,所以必须将本质与规定它的外在本质一起表达。因此,本质的表达必涉及另一个本质。
8. 斯宾诺莎所说铭刻在属性中的规则或法则也因此可理解。每个属性的一切表达作为本质彼此规定。但这些本质又通过其它样态表达自身,后者把它们的规定表达为情状。但这些作为情状的表达自身无非是进一步被完全规定的本质,也要求自己的表达。这不是莱布尼茨式的,因为本质并非可添加到本体上的单纯存在或单位。对斯宾诺莎,本质不可简单相加。相反,斯宾诺莎采取康德式转向:本质与存在只是同一事物的不同感知;即以属性为视野,所有样态都是样态本质;以其它样态为视野,所有样态都是将其它样态表达为本质的样态存在;如直观与概念各自是同一事物。因此,无限多个复合身体的法则或力学,无非是一切内在规定的命运被表达为外部身体相互作用。德勒兹难以解决的是,样态本质与样态存在如何对应却非逐项对应;显然存在必多于其对应的本质。但这与康德结构相同:直观显然必比概念“更多”,但直观与概念都必无限。这里类似,本质必须可由多个存在表达,而每个存在又必对应一个单一本质;这只是因为存在不单表达“一个本质”,更表达“这个本质的规定”或“如此被规定的这个本质”。正如以属性为视野,本质必被无限规定,每个本质也必被无限表达。但没有存在在属性外,所以它自身反过来也必可表达。同一结构内在于反思观念。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XIV:
1. 本部分将勾勒斯宾诺莎的情状(affection)与情动(affect)理论。
2. 情状是本质作为被它物规定者的不恰切表达。每个情状在此意义上平等,因为各通过某其它本质指示本质,并在指示中必然被动:它通过外在于被表达本质的本质来表达一个本质。这外在性出于情状的有限自然,它只完整包含无限规定全体的一部分。本质的内在或恰切表达必须涉及一切其它本质及其对此本质的规定,即涉及此本质的完整命运。但这种知识只有神可通达。对人而言被恰切表达的,因此仅是本质一部分,即它与在该情状中规定它的另一本质共享的性质。即便人不能恰切感知情状对本质的表达,却确实恰切感知情状对此本质的那一规定、即因果两端共享边界的表达。反过来也真:情状中凡被恰切感知者,都可分析为两个本质共享的性质。
3. 因此,一切情状都同样被动,依赖未知其它原因;又同样主动,包含共同性质的恰切表达。但这不能就是全部,因为若无从主动到被动及反向过渡,欲望之外就不可能有情动。所有情状同样是表达,却并非同样有表达力。即所有情状形式上平等地表达本质的命运,但有些在其内容中将此命运表达为较少的本质。尽管被彼得杀与杀保罗同样在我的命运中,其中一种命运表达比另一种更减损我的表达力。毁灭是命运表达,但仍是否定的表达。换言之,虽受苦之力(被动情状)与行动之力(主动情状)共同组成受作用的总力量,受苦之力仍只是一种无能,减少了若更主动本可做到的事情。即便这被动必然发生,是本质的正当表达,它仍是与表达力量“切断”的贫乏表达。被动状态自身作为独立情状只是被动、切断、无能;但一旦被恰切化,就更主动、更完美。
4. 痛苦总减少力量,其它条件相等时,由于如今更难抵抗痛苦,力量持续萎缩。快乐增加力量,因有更多力量获取快乐而持续增加。惊异既是知识也是无知,所以自身既非痛苦也非快乐;它使心灵凝住于一个思想,但不由此把其它思想展示为该思想的超越根据,故不特别被动。其自然仅取决于心灵所凝住的这一思想的内容。
5. 情动是社会的根。既然任何助我完美的主动自我表达,都是把他者表达为内在于自身本质,把它物共同命运表达于自身命运,肯定他者对我的肯定,我便寻求与自身自然内在共享更多性质者,因为共同者就是被恰切表达者,更共同者更有表达力,使我更完美。因此,为更完美,我寻求其它人,并寻求通过表达自身命运来表达人类的共同命运。我的命运越孤异,我越完美,人类也越完美。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XV:
1. 自然有三个秩序:本质秩序、关系(或规定)秩序、个体秩序。如上次所述,本质秩序是所有本质与属性统一,一切本质永恒。规定秩序是所有本质内在于其它一切本质,构成彼此完整命运。个体存在秩序是任一本质命运的局部派生物、产物或情状。它们表达命运。
2. 虽然一切情状同样表达命运,每个都是命运中必然事件,但这种一致只在形式上。唯在第二秩序、规定秩序中,一切情状才同样有表达力,是某物命运的平等部分。但在第三秩序,也即内容秩序中,一个情状与另一个情状作为有限受限之物相对立,我们发现表达的不平等。因为现在看到,一个情状具有两面性,表达一个个别规定,因而不构成整个本质,只构成一部分,其余部分都作为晦暗、否定者被排除于此单一情状。这否定把表达变成指示,使之不恰切。被动与主动遂作为区别登场。如今有被动与主动的比例;凡在表达内容中更恰切表达已铭刻于本质之命运者,就更有表达力。
3. 这不否认连被动事件自身也作为必然产物写在命运中。第二秩序中没有被动变主动,因为一切已规定。斯宾诺莎对此很清楚:不存在自由行动。自由之路是理解自身命运的必然性。形式上,这意味着连被动也表达命运。实践上,意味着爱命运,甚至包括偶尔对它的怨恨。没有矛盾,因为被动一旦开始表达命运,就被激活;一旦我们感知激情对于保存命运必不可少,它就被激活。
4. 这意味着没有恶。恶对斯宾诺莎没有本体论地位,因为它甚至不是匮乏。恶不是存在之善被剥夺,因为所有本质永恒,一切产物必然,那里不可能有任何匮乏。恶甚至不内在于第三秩序,因为没有情状自身偶然或无表达力,每个都作为部分构成世界共同命运。只有在一个单一情状自身内部,恶才对此情状有某种否定意义:它只是在情状中被设为反对该情状自身表达力者。换言之,恶总是反对一个情状单凭自身表达其本质命运者。我的身体表达人之本质。若某物使身体变形,身体自身就不再同样好地表达人性,尽管身体连同变形原因仍表达人性的“可变形性”。所以恶不是匮乏,只是反对情状表达力的否定。
5. 所以恶的问题总是具体问题。始终需要考虑,所讨论的情状是什么,这情状自身如何又是由其它情状表达的本质,其部分是什么,其“就……而言”有哪些,等等。我的身体是人性的情状,心脏是身体的情状,心室是心脏的情状……心室里发生的整个事件系列影响心脏系列及其它一切。但对此者为恶,对彼者可能并非恶。
6. 如心室问题降低它对心脏整体命运的表达力,使它失去力量,但这一失力可能把其它一切置于更和谐、健康的关系。所以斯宾诺莎说,痛苦就其抑制过度快乐而言,对整体是善。指甲情状就表达指甲本质而言可能力量减少,但就表达身体整体而言,有助于改善身体。
7. 因此,认识被动、观照激情、理解无知,并无矛盾,而是激活它们。哲学就是这项激活与祛魅任务。斯宾诺莎早在《神学政治论》中,已通过理解迷信明确开始此事业。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XVI:
1. 道德家都诉诸超越存在者规定的义务与法律。但伦理学,或行为学,从事物自然及其性质出发,考察如何把它们并列组织、结合为一个共同命运。既然一切道德都预设这种超越,道德便无非神秘化与暴力。人认为自己必须或应当做某事,是因为不理解直接所是者。
2. 国家是道德机构。因为无人纯靠理性生活,国家必须暴制并恐吓公民。但这不能是一切。城邦也负责共同善与普遍教育。换言之,国家须恐吓被动者,联结主动者。国家既道德,又伦理。
3. 斯宾诺莎通过将身体从有意识的心灵解放,使伦理脱离道德。他坚持“我们不知道身体能做什么”,由此把身体从意识暴政下解放。意识总对身体自居道德权威,于是在意识内部,我们设定一个超越并统治卑下身体的超我。这是传统道德图像:意识的暴政。在受道德蛊惑前,斯宾诺莎问:“身体的自然是什么?意识实际统治什么?”他辨出神秘化:心灵不统治身体,心与身处于不同领域;而且心灵甚至不统治思想。若把统治理解为道德法则,也许根本没有统治:我们所有的只是事物生产的手册与指南。
4. 没有悬在前方、鞭策我们的目的。城邦共同善不是我们追求的东西,至少足够主动时不是,而是总已现实化的命运。共同善总具体,渗透城邦每一个行动。共同善就是让城邦行动、生产、表达自身。它是有效生产,而非我们追求的隐藏潜能之现实化。城邦不是善的暴政,而是人类共同命运的表达。至福或福佑不是每个行动仅通向或指示的超越之善,而在每个行动之为行动中。在此意义上,斯宾诺莎更近柏拉图而非亚里士多德,更不用说西塞罗,因为柏拉图在《政治家篇》说,政治本质上无非把诸自然编织为一个共同命运。
对4的评论:只需记住,亚里士多德城邦的目的毕竟只类比其公民;公民追求某种美德,城邦追求更卓越者。但斯宾诺莎,乃至霍布斯、洛克,都非如此。现代政治哲学家不再强调城邦规定的超越与追求。城邦应像个体那样表达。这就是为什么现在可区分城邦与自然状态。此前,自然状态与社会混淆,人的目的是处于城邦。但如今,人与城邦的自然都是表达。城邦因此像人一样,只是产物、结果,而非目的。唯有个体从城邦解放、与城邦平等,两者才可比较、区分。此前,个体臣属于城邦暴政,城邦又臣属于善的暴政,形成层级秩序。
怀有理想就是不理解而保持被动,停在抽象中。这包括“绝对完美”“绝对实在”“绝对表达力”的理想。就其是理想而言,它不是善。善唯有不再是理想、“活起来”时才善。换言之,每个城邦可有两种构想方式,亚里士多德式与斯宾诺莎式。只要置于亚里士多德方式下,就保持被动,目的不可达;但潜能一旦完全现实化,就必被取消,成为无。因此斯宾诺莎不只纠正目的论幻觉,也解释这种扭曲如何产生。城邦之善是在其每个情状中尽可能主动、有表达力,在无中坚持并保存自身。唯有已把自身看作被动时,这才是目的。否则,这是驱力,是conatus,是力。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XVII:
1. 什么是共同概念?须与属或本质区分。属是需要外部规定的潜伏。本质是生产性,通过包含其它本质的内在规定,产出自身变状。即本质产出自己的命运。共同概念两者皆非。因为我们从不能恰切认识属,它没有内容(或结果),始终晦暗;而本质是无限原因,有无限多结果,人类理智无法恰切认识无限。
2. 所以斯宾诺莎所说共同概念既非属也非本质,而是事物共享、可以被恰切表达的东西。本质被另一本质规定为情状,表达部分命运。因此某物命运永不能被完整表达,但其中一部分或一种性质总作为情状被恰切表达。这容易理解,因为规定无非情状,只是规定始终内在于事物,而情状处在两物之间。之所以共享,是因这些规定总相互,命运总共享。共同概念就是两个本质在相互规定中共享的某种性质,在情状中被表达。反过来,从情状中凡肯定者,我们向后推论,揭示两个本质在那一次相遇事件中共享什么。
3. 但如何具体理解这描述?我们把猫之属理解为某种材料,后来经种差分为不同个体猫。因此猫之属是粗糙抽象的图像:粗糙,因为标记选取任意(抽象后留下哪些表征猫的可感特征,相当随机);抽象,因为无力生成自己的命运。猫的本质是无限内在规定的隐藏源头。猫的共同概念则是“结构”“组合”,把动物本质在相遇中与所有其它本质联系,并作为动物命运的表达、生物自然中的事件保存自身。换言之,斯宾诺莎就坚持实在定义的必然性而言是亚里士多德式的;但亚里士多德把共同概念仅等同于无力的属或隐藏的生产原则,而非本质之间的实在事件,就此而言他反对亚里士多德。
4. 这也展示应如何更细致解释三重区分:属是被被动地看作潜能的共相;本质是被被动地看作超越力量源头的共相;共同概念则是被主动、恰切地看作包含不同本质的关系或结构的共相,它自身既不包容也不排除其它本质,而向两者开放。即共同概念不像属那样排除它物,也不像本质那样包容;它是开放通道,因而不超越或高于其所涉及者,而内在于两者,在情状中被恰切表达。但开放通道一关闭,就发生排除或包容,共同概念不再是中间者,而自己突显。不再是物间的共同命运,而自身成为物自身;情状仍是此前本质的情状,却不能再恰切表达这个新成立的本质。即,猫就表达动物与环境之间共同命运而言,是在动物性这一情状中被恰切表达的共同概念。但就其自身为本质而言,它必须由其它专属于它的情状表达。
5. 如今有了斯宾诺莎知识理论的完整说明。首先有情状,从情状出发。情状指示本质,所以只是象征且混乱。这是第一种知识。接着,在情状中寻找肯定者,找到两个本质之间的结构或关系,并确定该关系是共同概念。这是第二种知识,经科学推论的知识。最后,知道共同概念自身是本质,因而可从此本质推导每一个情状。这是第三种知识,经演绎的直观知识。例如,先从别人那里学到1+6=7,再自己做,记住如此;后来我说,1与6间必有某种关系使其产出7;于是抵达共享性质,即加法,我说现在知道1与6造成7,6与1也如此,而且知道加法是什么;从这加法知识,现可由单纯加法概念、关联任意其它数字,推导无限多结果。需注意,第三种知识虽直观且无限,但当共同概念仍是新构想的本质时,并不恰切,而只通过表达其它共同性质产出恰切观念。即,加法就被7表达而言恰切,但加法观念中恰切包含的,仍是加法与其它本质的共同性质。正如猫在把动物与某环境相连时恰切,但唯当个体猫表达猫作为本质与其它本质的关系、且每个都可从猫之共同概念推出时,才产出其它恰切观念。所以有限理智永不能完成无限恰切化,由此预备了如此演绎并联结本质的无限进展。
6. 三种知识对应真理三个阶段。混乱观念无非观念被设定的存在,其形式真理。随后,当内容似乎介入、不同观念似乎相互矛盾时,就质疑被设定的观念是否应为真。但这些都由神观念统一,因此如“方的圆”无非两个观念相互毁灭的观念。就其是观念而言,它与所有其它观念一样,在一切观念的共同命运中有表达力;但其内容自身表达力最小,即什么也不表达。就是说,矛盾与其说是观念,不如说是观念的否定。在神的无限观念中,所有观念恰切;否定观念虽是矛盾,却与其它一切观念相联,因而被纠正回其真。它就其只属于人而不属于神、或只是圆或方的被动限制而非神中的限制而言,是矛盾。如激情在神中被肯定便成行动,尽管单取其内容被动,在整体中却主动;矛盾虽自身否认真理,却揭示真理。因为矛盾出于情状被外物造成,或观念被外在观念造成,遂一者毁灭另一者。这毁灭不再存于本质秩序。即本质秩序没有矛盾;“方的圆”在神中无非是人因为是人而犯的错,或是圆作为圆的限制。
对6的评论:因此斯宾诺莎反驳“神能否创造逻辑矛盾之物”这一诡辩的方法很简单:一切矛盾都是受限事物的无能,神作为真正无限存在者是主动的,“不能”无能,这意为神必主动,其主动绝非无能;还应注意,反思知识与客观知识的统一不意味彼此等价,只意味形式真理自身有内容,正如质料真理有形式。即,一切观念真,因为它们处于应有秩序(因为其客观内容把一个观念按应有秩序与其它观念相联);一切观念处于应有秩序,因为它们是观念(它们同样在思想属性下由神产出,因而总已相互传达并贯通)。
7. 《伦理学》在两点上超出《论》。首先,《论》仍不清楚反思知识奠基于直接知识并与其统一,因为斯宾诺莎在《论》中仍称直接知识与反思知识分离,尚未注意反思知识以某种方式“先于”直接知识(我们最初把凡认为是观念者都视为真),使整个系统极其混乱;在《伦理学》中,他重写理论,统一方法与内容。他也认识到,真知识的秩序不同于我们达到知识的次序:虽然先知道,再知道自己知道,但最先只是确信一切观念真,最终才确信这些观念在客观关系中确实真。第二,《论》中斯宾诺莎仍相信可以直接知道本质的实在定义,任一本质的性质有限;但《伦理学》中,一切本质作为本质不可知,唯作为共同概念才可恰切认识,而且一切本质有无限多个性质。
8. 每个观念都是身体的观念。因此一切本质都是本质的身体。共同概念是身体在其中、通过其相遇者。两只猫相遇;因为最相似,各自自然中共享最多共同性质,所以其情状与相互规定最能表达共同命运。但这组两猫共享的共同性质不能简单写成“猫性”。猫性是本质的身体,两猫是其个体情状,但这本质未由任一完全展开,所以也不能由两者完全展开。因此共同概念特殊得多。即便叫“猫性”,它也是两者相遇所经结构的一个具体特定规定。我们通过这些特定东西积累知识。任一抽象共相都是知识的停顿。我们只恰切认识情境与境况。但两猫之间的“猫性”又会与同层次的其它环境结合,如一只狗从街头走来,以另一方式规定“猫性”,在两猫身上产出不同情状,与这“猫性”共享另一关系。这产出涉及三个身体——两猫一狗——的新命运。这是新共同体、新群。这产出更普遍却同样具体的新共同概念,因为多包含一个成员。因此,最普遍共同概念就是最高本质,却有一个转折:最共同概念与最高本质同样普遍,但共同概念总是编织一切共享的共同命运,本质却是“包含”一切的形而上学之点。“猫性”就产出所有猫而言是本质;就描述每只猫如何遇见另一只而言,是共同概念。
9. 我的意思是,看数百万张单只猫的照片,不如看一小群猫彼此互动,更让我了解猫性。同一名称总有两种用法:作为本质的“猫性”,与作为共同概念的“猫性”。一者是一切时代所有猫的不可通达源泉,另一者是组织并结合我熟悉那些猫的命运。对人,后者当然大受限制,因为我只熟悉几只猫。但对神,共同概念与本质同样普遍。共同概念给予恰切知识;此意义上的“猫性”虽不超越情状抵达绝对抽象,却提供真理网络:这只猫今天遇见那只,这只昨天与那只打架……直到一切进入共同命运;一群猫的本质被狗出现重新规定,新群涌现,涉及多只猫与一只狗的新群之新本质……换言之,我们从不完全知道任一情状自身,也从不完全知道任一本质自身,但确实完全知道一个本质被另一本质规定何时对应于该本质的情状。我们恰切知道的,只是两物相遇的界面;两物淡去之处,即单取界面自身时,我们又不再恰切知道什么,因为如今把共同概念当成其自身的本质。知识问题完全由共同概念的内在与本质的超越之间的交互刻画。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XVIII:
1. 知识有三种:经被动符号的,经主动共同概念的,经神观念的。前两种上一部分已处理。需注意,共同概念确有层级秩序,有些比另一些更普遍;但它们只表达事物共享较多或较少的命运。不论如何,共同概念不是抽象事物,而是情状的实在组合或秩序。换言之,斯宾诺莎充分采纳了培根式共同概念,它是操作的、科学的。每个共同概念都是本质规定的结点,而这些本质一旦在其它本质的关系中找到原因,又转为主动共同概念。因此,共同概念是理智路线图的指引,将一切本质内在地联系,不作为超越源头,而作为关系结点。
2. 但目前只有一个系统。系统知识是第二种知识,却仍依赖第一种,因为抵达任何共同概念之前,必须预设本质。超越本质与内在共同概念总这样交互。但如何抵达神观念?自然会说神是最共同概念,或一切最普遍的命运。但这不能就是全部。
3. 相反,我们看到每个共同概念都能变成本质。最普遍概念必须自我作用。这是自因的基础。所以确有超越的神观念。神就其是自因本质而言,超越。因此,我们对神的认识永不恰切。但本质又可转回共同概念,而此本质自我作用,因而是自己的共同概念。所以从情状回溯共同概念、再从共同概念回溯本质时,我们从混乱所知到恰切所知,再到认识恰切性的根据。我们迅速升到神。但一旦达到神观念,并从这自我作用的本质前进,就从中恰切推导一切。
4. 这困难却重要。神不是任一本质,而是自因本质。就其为本质而言,从不被自身任一情状、任一样态本质恰切表达。即,我们永不能认识神之为本质、一切源头。但就神是自因而言,祂自我作用,因而是自己的共同概念。祂与自身相关,在任一情状就其内在于祂而言表达此关系。所以神从不是任何东西的遥远原因。神的独特在于,作为仅另一本质被不恰切认识,却作为自我作用的本质被恰切认识。神的任何情状都不指示神之外的东西。
5. 更清楚地说,若不同本质结合,它们通过情状恰切表达自身,而情状又被其自身情状恰切表达。斯宾诺莎的恰切性总是两个层次、因果之间直接的,所以不同于莱布尼茨将恰切性定义为一切的绝对展开。对斯宾诺莎,表达总在两项之间,只要一项穷尽另一项,表达就恰切。因此对两个本质,虽各自只被其情状指示,它们的共同概念或关系却仍被完整表达。但这关系仍设定两个超越中间的端点,每端都未被该情状表达,自身表达某其它关系。超越性存于这些关系的规定中。
续5:唯在神中,超越性才作为自因完全内化,由其中每个情状无限表达。一个本质被另一本质规定,所以情状只表达该规定,而本质自身只有通过无限多个这类规定才可表达。但自因本质是自己的共同概念,自身规定自身,此规定必须在表达中完全穷尽自身,因此一切作为其情状者都必恰切表达。这知识的任何不恰切因此不来自神之为神,只来自我们的有限性,因为我们在情状中把其它本质作为超越者相对立,分散神观念,把神平等主动的表达变为被动、或超越力量的源头,使神与我们疏离。这转为宗教的先知传统。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XIX:
1. 至福之路如下:先活在情状中,活在被动的残骸里;随后感到被动快乐,发现肯定性或主动性的表达;从这些肯定性形成共同概念,看见不同本质如何交织为共同命运,每个共同概念都被更普遍的共同概念包含;随后,把本质与共同概念相联,升到神观念,看见唯神观念提供统一共同概念与本质的终极根据,因为神就是其本质为自身共同概念之物;最终,从这个作为共同概念的本质推导无限事物,开辟纯粹主动的新领域,像神那样思;即最终能在自身身体本质作为形式因、神作为质料因中,将所有本质思作神的无限多产物,于是理解自身命运与其它一切及神自身相符合。
2. 成为斯宾诺莎主义者、过至福生活,意味着以情动生活,不意味着哲学地或非哲学地生活。在第五卷,哲学与生活本质上合一。活就是思与理解。哲学活动就是在内在平面上以情状生活。德勒兹评论《伦理学》作为一本书以不同速度写成,洞察力何其敏锐。开头迅速抵达神,然后变慢,再在适宜时加速。这是德勒兹令人钦佩之处。他不只留意斯宾诺莎哲学,也留意其哲学语言。他注意第五卷不只全书最短,也最快,是绝对速度。他也看出附释与命题节奏不同,附释总是打断且较激昂的。一本书中有不同的捕获流。
德勒兹、斯宾诺莎与表达论,XX:
1. 这是整个旅程的结论。从笛卡尔的失败开始:他以想象知识取代实在知识。首先,他使本体成为被剥夺图像者,混淆数量区分与实在区分。其次,相较于图像的相对不完美,他判本体为无限完美或实在。第三,他把清晰分明自身当作真理尺度、自然之光,而这又与图像中的混乱相比。最后,他假定心灵与身体统一,如本体与样态统一,于是心灵成为无限高于其结果的实在原因。
2. 莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎都用表达概念对抗这种笛卡尔主义。对莱布尼茨,因为表达普遍得多;对斯宾诺莎,则因为表达更限定、更精炼,符合其单义性趣味。但反笛卡尔议程显然共享。首先,表达不规定被表达者或自我表达者的数量。因此,两者都以有表达力者为绝对者,代替想象中的抽象存在。其次,表达概念不只要求被表达者相对于表达的关系或形式,也要求两者的内容或自然;表达永不可能空。所以两者抵达绝对者,不单作为无限实在者,也作为在任一表达内容中被表达的根据。第三,表达全与绝对表达者相关,真理永不能内在于单一表达,必须在与所有其它表达的关系中表达,因为根据必在自身中共卷其它一切表达;即一个表达如何与其它表达统一,形成穷尽表达全部真理内容的共享表达。因此真理标准不是清晰,而是恰切。最后,表达是被表达者与表达之间的同一,这种同一总可传递,不能简单理解为实在原因。表达力的范围远大于因果。因此,莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎谈表达,无须涉及任何心身间的实在因果。
3. 因此,莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎的分歧,更多在如何具体描画表达。莱布尼茨坚持象征性的表达哲学。即,他同时要内在与超越。他不想把层次间差异还原为量的差异,即属性包含无限多样态、本体包含无限多属性;他要保留神在质上的优越,或道德,而不重陷笛卡尔主义的疑难。因此他构建歧义系统,却不设抽象存在;一切反在前定和谐网络中表达其它一切。他需要一个绝对者,在无限多表达中无限表达自身;这些表达都潜在具体,为恰切化作准备,或在基础上恰切,却永不能完全恰切。这产出其怪异庞大的单子论系统:每个单子是世界的无限表达,某些部分具体、另一些抽象;全部表达潜在地恰切排序于一个表达中,尽管尚折叠着;抽象与不恰切来自单子彼此必然排除,每个单子作为超越被包含在另一个中,但这不构成笛卡尔主义,因为知识限于一个灵魂,一切由和谐保障。
续3:换言之,笛卡尔之错来自混淆内在与超越,因而试图认识本应不可知者,以未知为已知根据,或从已知抵达未知;即他不遵循充足理由律,在不该停处停止,因此既未克服也未排除超越,却让它像黑洞立在想象中,自身是不可理解的余项,未作为事物充分根据与其它任何东西相关。斯宾诺莎与莱布尼茨都看出错误,但斯宾诺莎本体论地消除超越,把内在作为最原初者,以连续推导一切;莱布尼茨却把表达连续性限于单子内部的被动领域,使所知只奠基在单子而非别处。最终,两者都提供充足理由,使有表达力者原则上被其表达穷尽;但对斯宾诺莎,这是共同表达;对莱布尼茨,任何表达是包含于独特表达中心的独特表达。我想最简洁的说法是:斯宾诺莎那里,知识增长时扩张;莱布尼茨那里,则收缩而更集中。对斯宾诺莎,真理是展开面、内在平面,超越在此克服;对莱布尼茨,真理是点、闭合、包含,超越在此被排除,却恰在排除中最真切保留其超越自然,并把一个单子的表达还原为其反表达。
斯宾诺莎与莱布尼茨都试图通过作为表达的恰切化,把根据与其它一切相联,摆脱笛卡尔的主体性黑洞——在那里,最终黑暗成了根据。但斯宾诺莎的方式是扩张,莱布尼茨的方式是收缩,因为从质料展开,又折入单子。无论哪种,每个局部表达都与其它局部表达连续,被表达者被表达穷尽(即便莱布尼茨的超越世界也只是内在于单子的超越,可在无限多表达中无限展开;即作为被表达者的世界,只存在于被含在一个表达中心的那些世界表达中;恰切化总往返,从内到外再回内,同时展开又折叠;关键却是什么更原初,对莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎,活动、内在表达、消除超越都更原初突出,尽管莱布尼茨最终须救回超越以保存道德本身),表达与被表达者始终具体,通过表达的一切关系有其内容;并且,被表达者不造成表达,而是被表达涵括。