Gui Ruiyan

Baruch Spinoza · 巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎
Ethics · 伦理学

2024年笔记

Douban · Bidasari

Source revised / 来源修订: 28 June 2026

Reading / 研读:Gilles Deleuze · Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 斯宾诺莎与表现问题

In this note / 篇目

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, I:

1. The two Cartesian misconceptions: attribute is a property of the thing’s changing, or attribute is a ground for modification and diversification of the substance itself; any idea conceived clearly and distinctly corresponds to an individual thing.

2. The consequences of these two misconceptions are: first, since attribute is only a ground for diversification, any modification should distinguish one substance from all others with the same attribute, and any modification delineates a numerically different substance; second, since any idea conceived corresponds to an individual, any real distinction results in a numerical distinction in things themselves.

3. The problem is, the necessity of existence of any substance, due to these two misconceptions, is no longer secured. The first part of this problem is that, because the same attribute can hold multiple substances within it, moreover any modification is due to external causes, substance itself becomes contingent upon other substances and is caused by other substances.

4. The second part of this same problem is that, because each attribute limits one singular substance, substance in itself becomes a genus that is divided by all attributes. But a genus is only external to the differentia, so the substance itself is external to the attribute and the specific substance, the existence of any specific substance, therefore, is only possible, but not necessary. Since any specific substance is dependent upon either an external genus of substance or a specific difference being applied to the genus.

5. Spinoza reverses the Cartesian conception, and differentiates numerical difference from real or substantial difference. This consists in two steps. The first step here he takes is that, what is numerically different is only different in modes, but not in substance, and in this way any mode in a substance is caused by the substance itself necessarily, though the cause is external to the mode thus caused. Any mode is caused or limited only by a mode that inheres in the same substance. This he achieves through the first eight propositions, which culminate in the conclusion, “no two substances can share the same attribute”. The result is that, any attribute expresses an infinite and indivisible essence.

6. The second step he takes is that, what is substantially different, that is, conceived as distinctly and clearly different, cannot be numerically different. In this way, one substance is necessarily expressed through attributes as many essences united within one singular substance. He achieves this first by establishing the possibility for one substance to have many attributes. Because each attribute is self-caused and the existence of its essence self-posited, each is absolutely independent from the other. As there is no dependence of one upon the other, there is no negation of one against the other. In other words, there is no possible contradiction between attributes. Hence one substance can have multiple attributes.

7. Then, he argues, there must be only one absolute substance for all attributes. For if there were many substances, the same problem in 4. would result, these many substances would be nothing but species of a general substance, which speciation would only be contingent. Rather, there is only one substance that expresses itself through the expressions of the attributes and expressed as essences, which essences are only qualitatively different. Only if there is one is there absolute necessity. Here we derive a different kind of infinite, the infinity of attributes. Infinite intensity within the attribute, infinite number of attributes, infinity unity of the substance.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, II:

1. The problematical status of attributes for Spinoza can be observed in his seemingly contradictory characterizations: on the one hand, attributes posit existences of essences, yet on the other hand, they should not have separate existences, apart from the substance. Spinoza solves this paradox by emphasizing the fact that, an attribute only posits the existence of its essence in its own point of view: that is, as expression, an attribute only posits the existence of the expressed. But then the existence of its essence is dependent upon the expression, while the expression in turn upon the expressed. They are therefore mutually dependent for their existence, and neither is by itself absolute. Only that which expresses itself as the expressed in an expression is absolutely independent, that which is self-caused, viz substance. In conceiving a substance by itself, its existence necessarily follows from the conception of its essence, hence the attribute posits the existence of its own essence through and only through the environing of its substance.

2. Then, Spinoza transforms the problem of the triad itself into a problem of the unity of all such triads. It’s only because there is one singular substance that all attributes are “attributive” and not “attributed”. If the one substance is dispersed into many, attributes become simply things attributed to this or that substance; the converse also holds. Now let’s consider the inverse. If there is only one substance, then all attributes are the expressions of this one self-expressive thing, and are thereby implicated within the same substance. Hence all become dependent to “that which is other” and shall refer to this “other thing”. That’s why they are dynamical and “attributive”. In other words, attributes all point beyond mere expressions to the thing that expresses itself; so long as this thing is singular, attributes would not stop pointing, but as soon as the substance is dispersed to many, the center to which each attribute points is lost, and all expressions remain dead.

3. Attributes belong to the asymmetrical yet common border shared by substance and modes. It’s asymmetrical because God is different from men in both essence and existence and their relation. Attributes are convertible with God, but only involved by modes. Yet God is not separate from men. For if ever such separation obtains, God can only be conceived through analogy. Either God has a perfection extrinsic to man, or God has a perfection that man only possesses in bare character. Either way, one has to project one’s own attributes onto God, and confuse both. That is, one might say “God thinks better (eminence) than we can conceive” or “God thinks differently (equivocation)”, but one essentially is saying no different than “God, like us, thinks”. Spinoza on the other hand does not deny the shared form or univocity between substance and modes. This gives him the advantage to entertain a third term, not as mediation, but “immediation”. With the analogical method, there are only two terms in a relation, and some sort of projection is inevitable. With Spinozism, however, one neither abstracts and mediates from modes to higher modes and gets stuck in the infinite process, nor projects directly onto the substance. Rather, one reconceives the attributes involved, which “ground” the finite modes, in the context of the infinite. In other words, Deleuze sees Spinoza to be one of the first to propose the “ground” of things, as different from the “ladder” or the “order/proportion” of things.

4. Spinoza differentiates property from attribute. An attribute is that which is directly convertible with substance and is thus its Word or Name. A property only characterizes the word as an Adjective, such as “eternal” or “infinite”, as in “eternal power”. Or it depicts how God should cause modes in an attribute. Or how mortals imagine God to be.

A clarification on 2.: simply, if different attributes express different essences that belong to different substances, each substance that goes beyond and transcends each singular expression becomes inexhaustible, and hence the substance remains an abyss, a darkness that breaches the expression. This is the problem Aristotle is faced with. Any expression always points to something more than expressed, beyond expression, a “more than” and “in itself”. But if one singular substance comprehends all the infinite attributes, there is no beyond. Rather, God becomes the immanent God who is the horizon of all expressions himself. In a word, God is the world. This is where the Spinozist pantheism comes in.

A further remark on 2.: this very same problem has been stated already in Chapt I, as the problem of the highest genus. If one attribute limits one substance, these will be the species of “THE substance”, but then the Aristotelian paradox of the highest substance. Aristotle tries to resolve the paradox through analogy, but as we state here Spinoza detects a problem with analogy. Analogy does not account for the ground that supports the proportion. To be done with the whole Aristotelian problematic once and for all, Spinoza claims that there is a highest unity, but this unity is not a genus divisible into species, but a transitive substance. The other cast of the same problem focuses not on the grand picture of totality of being, but simply on the being of an individual. A substance that exceeds the expressed of the expression condemns the expression as inadequate and denies any necessity of the “attributed” expression, if the substance is not that which necessarily expresses itself in all possible ways, in whose totality the current expression is necessarily included. Therefore only an “attributive” expression can be adequate since it points to the nexus where all possible excesses are drained into other expressions, to its own necessary horizon. Moreover, only under such a schema is substance expressible and conceivable. Otherwise the substance cannot be conceived at all, much less be conceived by itself; that would be self-contradiction, since substance by definition is that which is conceived by itself.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, III:

1. Expression is different from signification. Through expression the expressed is posited and affirmed, in which there is no privation, no negation, and no excess as its counterpart. Expression is the expressing of the expressed. But in signification the signified always escapes the signifier. The signifier is a face that points away into the black hole of subjectivity, the signified.

2. Both analogical theology and negative theology suppose the negativity of a transcendent God. Analogical theology affirms the properties negatively, while negative theology negates the properties affirmatively. Either case, a privation is supposed.

3. Why do these privations all relate to properties, but not to attributes? Properties are only perceived through imagination, via the operation of abstraction. That which divides and separates eventually yields the black hole of subjectivity, and this is due to imagination and the process of transcending imagination. In negative theology, imagination denies all the images and abstracts from them; in analogical theology, imagination projects images onto the screen of imagination itself. Such operation is reasoning, which is the process of transcending imagination.

4. But for Spinoza, there is a direct access to the forms through understanding, since all thoughts, in their grounds of grounds, are indivisible. A direct conception of the infinite, therefore, is possible, without the labor of infinite abstraction, and without the ungrounded projection, which posits the ground as an abyss. Rather, the grounding is always already underway, and understanding always starts from the middle: from the attributes, and not from only finite modes. This is because the world of understanding is univocal, so that from one end one always directly arrives the other in one continuous passage.

5. Therefore, theologians always start from morality in their imagination, and project these figments of the mind onto God, because they misunderstand the method by which scriptures are supposed to be read. Revelation is not expression, for revelation only clears in imagination an assemblage of properties, which always conceal their ground; but expression does not conceal. Expression, therefore, has nothing to do with subjectivity; only morality requires its moral subject who is to enter into the world of death, responsibility and labor, which revolves around the question “how should I act?”. Expression, however, is the joy of vision, the play of innocence.

6. Descartes advanced near enough, only to relinquish everything in a more unfortunate fiasco. It is through Descartes that a reduction in conception, and not just an abstraction in imagination, becomes possible. Through the Cartesian method, a substance in its infinite attributive essence is first conceived. But he obscures this natural light all over again by introducing multiple possible substances that deprive the substance of its univocity, and eventually reduces the substance into a mode of itself. This is also why he remains for a large part a theologian, not because he moralizes philosophy, but because he posits God to be infinite perfection, which is only a property and not an attribute of God. A property like this is always only deduced in comparison to our finitude, and hence through abstraction or analogy. He imagines God to be different from us, and hence deprive God of its content and us of our grounding.

7. Any such property is a product of the imagination. The modality of essences, such as infinitude, omnipresence, omniscience, etc., is only viewed in contrast to our finitude. The conducts of causality of God’s are in contrast to us being merely the caused. The imaginary properties need no elaboration. In all, all properties are products of negation through imagination, and they therefore constitute the ontological difference, i.e. the abyss. All attributes, however, compose the grounding in understanding.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, IV:

1. The Cartesian ontological argument: “there is something infinitely perfect that which can be conceived by my finite intelligence as clear and distinct.”; “God is infinite perfection, and existence is a perfection, hence God exists.” Spinoza criticizes this argument the same way Leibniz criticizes it: before one moves to ascertain the existence of an idea clear and distinct, one must first explain if it is “adequate”, that is, if it, when fully unfolded, contains any contradiction. Just as it’s nonsensical to state there exists an infinite velocity, it might be the same to speak of an infinite perfection.

2. But this criticism does not hinge on a mere technicality. Rather, it has everything to do with the Spinozist anti-Cartesianism and the fundamental disagreement between Spinoza and Descartes.

3. As was explained before, Descartes grounds his ontological proof on the ontological difference between finite and infinite, imperfect and perfect. The Cartesian ontological proof therefore only employs imagination and reason. Because infinite perfection is only an imaginary posit, it always involves in its own idea an obscurity. “That which is infinitely perfect” is therefore not an adequate idea at all, but only a figment that feigns to be clear and distinct. It is not a real definition that fully expresses itself, but a mere concept-image that is posited unitary and enfolded. In other words, what Descartes perceives in his mind is nothing but a property that is projected across the abyss onto a dark subjectivity, and he mistakes it for the nature of God; but what Spinoza wants is the articulation of attributes themselves in their full expression of their own essence, which grounds this property. Because Descartes only projects the concept of God, he evades the reality of this concept, and if God really conforms to our conception is not left for us to know; thus he can know the nature of this concept no more than stop at the screen of projection, beyond which is but darkness and obscurity. Only by starting from the understanding of attributes and leaving aside the imagination of properties, therefore, is Spinoza able to overcome this difficulty and first elucidate the reality of this concept: God is not infinite perfection, but the Absolute.

4. Thus both Spinoza and Leibniz start from the middle, from attributes and the understanding of these attributes. It is because these attributes are all infinite and self-determined that they don’t contradict each other, and it becomes possible for them to be unified in one substance, i.e. God. This is how God as a concept is possible, and how by his nature he can be real. Only after this is established does Spinoza resort to imagination: because God is possible, so is our projection landing on a real concept that exudes such projected property, and so can God be conceived to be existing. A clear and distinct idea is only real when it is also proved to be adequate. Adequation is the operation of understanding, which unifies multiplicity into one unity. Projection is the operation of imagination, which casts a property over a subject.

5. Leibniz disagrees with Spinoza insofar as Leibniz believes the divine understanding is inaccessible. We always already live amongst the worldly. In other words, for Leibniz, all the primary attributes are always already mixed up into the world and its series. Substance is not that which can be conceived by itself, to which all attributes belong, but that which includes “everything”, each “thing” an infinite series of combined attributes. For Spinoza, what is directly convertible with substance is attributes; but for Leibniz, it is the world that is directly convertible with the monad. Substance for Leibniz is always for the world and situated in the world, swayed among possibilities (time and space), and God an orderer who “traverses” and “transcends” the world: the danger of analogy reintroduced.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, V:

1. The two Cartesian a posteriori proofs: “a cause is greater than its effect; I have an idea of God that has infinite objective reality, hence God himself must possess even more infinite formal reality”; “whatever is more difficult to produce, once produced, contains more reality and is less of an abstraction, and whatever produces such a difficult thing is more powerful; I cannot produce or conserve myself, yet I exist, therefore something more powerful than I must exist, and its own existence must be proportionately more difficult to be produced, and hence only produced by its own infinite power, and thus produced, infinitely real”.

2. Spinoza critiques the Cartesian arguments, which are both based on a notion of “quantity of reality”. The same problem regarding the ground recurs here. All quantities of reality are divisions by imagination, and require an absolute ground. Such ground is power.

3. By the usage of power, Spinoza transforms the two arguments. First, with the infinite power of Thought, there needs correspond to it an infinite power of existence. This conforms to my earlier interpretation of the Spinozist epistemic shift. Thought is a special attribute which unites in itself all other attributes which are parallel to it; Thought is an infinite mirror. Here, however, what matters is not that God’s existence is somehow “more” real than the idea of God: for that is still only a projection between two relative terms. Rather, the two infinite powers are equal; only with the infinite power of Thought can knowledge of the infinite reality of God be obtained. Thought must itself be infinite, so that because nothing else can be thought to cause the idea of God, God himself must be the cause of himself. The first proof thus becomes: “I have an idea of God that is infinite, which does not contradict itself; this infinite idea does not depend on anything other than itself; God must exist in order for this idea to be true”.

4. The second argument is involved in the demarcation between modes and substance, and is reworked for this very purpose. We shall witness what is changed and what is preserved. The argument runs as follows: “finite things necessarily exist; therefore they have power as their essence; but God as the absolute substance has more power, so God has to exist”. The modifications Spinoza adds to this argument are easily discernible. First, reality is not measured by the difficulty to produce, but by power, and power, being ensconced into essence, is separate from any notion of difficulty. Power is not the relative capacity to produce what is “difficult” for the finite imagination, but is the essence that simply exists. Hence, “more power” does not mean a capacity to produce more difficult things, but an essence whose existence grounds the finite powers of modes. Again, Spinoza is not interested in an analogy projected from our imagination, but from the ontological ground itself: finite modes are powers grounded upon the infinite powers of attributes.

5. From these modifications it is evident how Spinoza moves to his a priori argument. Reality is no longer exclusively measured by “property”, but by “attribute”. Attribute is that which contains absolute reality, since its essence simply posits existence, while property still remains relative to the imperfection of imagination. Therefore a thing is more real the more attributes it has; and for modes, they are more real when they have “more” of one attribute. Perfection is no longer measured by a mere quantity from finite to infinite, but by the power that posits existence in an essence, participating in the power of the substance. The quantity of reality is grounded finally in power (what powers are possessed by the substance; what external cause gives power to a given mode, affecting its essence into existence), and not in imagination.

6. Power, for Spinoza, does not mean potentiality, taken in a static, structural sense. It is productivity. In other words, it is always already an act that produces affectations. The scholastic division between potentiality and actuality is here substituted by a differentiation between active and passive. Every essence is a power that makes existence, a power that expresses, some expressive, some expressed. Power is no dormant possibility, as if it lies obscure in actuality and waits to be actualized, but a dynamism, passivity in activity, being expressed. God is a substance that produces himself, hence self-caused. There is therefore a naturing nature and a natured nature. For finite things, since their essence is actualized by external causes, they have active and passive powers, both constituting and expressing fully their essence, dependent on others. There is no possibility in essence, only a necessity to be expressed.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VI:

1. A necessity of the production of modes is proved in two ways, first by understanding, then by power. God is expression as such and necessarily expresses himself, this is his formal being. But such expression also relates to its expressed in the self-expressing substance. Substance expresses itself as the expressed in its own expression to itself. Thus, any expression is posited in a divine understanding. This understanding is not an analogy to human wisdom, but simply hinges on the very nature of expression; it has everything to do with God’s complete being, and nothing to do with the projected image of a human activity, which invokes only a conception or deliberation of possibilities. In such infinite understanding, a necessary production of infinite perceptions must be posited, provided that attributes also express themselves through modes. The same holds true for power, as God produces infinite attributes through his infinite power, so he necessarily produces infinite modes.

2. A similar triad of expression is thereby constituted through modification as through attribution. Attributes express themselves through finite modes, expressed as an infinite and necessary modification that belongs, not to the attribute simply, since all attributes further refer to the same substance, but also to the substance, as a modification of the substance. This illustrates the asymmetry between two levels of expression. Because finite modes always express the modification of an attribute within an attribute, they also express the modification of the substance itself. Modes therefore express doubly, the attributes immediately, and substance remotely. The attribute grounds the modes by providing all the modes a principle, whence all necessary and infinite modes are produced, through which the determinations of infinitely many finite modes by other finite modes are grounded.

3. Once the necessity of further production and expression is established, and provided that the equality of all attributes is already established, we can finally have a correct grasp of Spinoza’s parallelism. For Spinoza, since all things are produced by God all at once, all things have an identity of order, a one-to-one correspondence, so that attributes relate to attributes, modes relate to modes, all these infinities mapped onto each other; and since all attributes are equally an expression of the same substance, they also have an equality of connection, an equality as series, unlike the Leibnizian “series of projection”, where all monads as expressions are, in other monads, always distorted by that other monad’s perspective, and included under that monad; finally, they have an equality of being, since all the modes, though they express different attributes immediately, express remotely the same substance.

4. Those modes produced by attributes directly, touched upon in 2., must be infinite, for if they were finite, they were determined, that is, limited as parts of a whole; and either they were determined by the attribute insofar as the attribute that determines them is itself, per impossible, that which constitutes their determination, and thereby is itself determined, or if the attribute, being absolute, should determine it, which is also not possible, since by determination, the attribute will not remain absolute, but will itself also be determined by what it determines. For the absolute does not constitute limitations, but only provides the ultimate ground for limitation to happen. Ground is the necessary, not the sufficient cause for any limitation. The infinite cannot limit parts, but only parts in the infinite can limit parts; to say, like Aquinas, that there’s an infinite power of limiting is to speak in contradiction, if such power does not stay a mere ground that makes limitation only “possible”. Either case, therefore, is absurd, and whatever follows from the attribute should be undetermined and infinite.

5. Because of 4., whatever is understood to be sufficient reason, or sufficiency, needs to be revised. For the infinite is not a sufficient cause for the finite as a cause of determination. As cause of determination or limitation, attribute is only a ground. But as cause of production or generation, attribute is the sufficient cause, for attribute necessarily expresses itself through infinitely many modes. In other words, attribute is the sufficient cause of the totality of all finite things (hence not a mere genus), but is only a necessary cause for anything being specifically limited. This is what Spinoza means by God being a remote cause, that he renders all finite things possible and necessary, but does not cause them directly. That is, attribute is a ground not only for possibilities, but for necessity itself, for it renders all ontic necessities, not only ontologically possible, but also ontologically necessary in the ultimate sense.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VII:

1. Different from the equality of attributes, Spinoza posits one other equality, the equality of powers. There are two powers: the formal power of existence and action, and the objective power of understanding.

2. The equality of attributes is posited in a domain of formal existence, while the privilege of Thought as an attribute over other attributes is posited in the domain of objective understanding. Thought is like a mirror, when considered only in its formal existence, is but one attribute among many. Yet when it is considered as that which represents all other things, hence as the condition for the power of understanding, Thought is privileged. There is no contradiction here, since Thought is equal to other attributes in respect to the power of existence, but unequal in respect to the power of understanding.

3. The privilege of Thought needs further specifications. First, idea of God objectively “represents” the infinite power of thinking, but formally “is” infinite understanding, the former being the substance in its essence as a thinking substance, as the naturing nature, the latter being the mode that belongs to Thought, as the natured nature; the power of understanding is a ground of its necessity, while the modification of Thought into understanding is a ground of the possibility of actualizing that power. Second, just as different attributes and modes are different really and formally, so are ideas different objectively; more than that, they can also be different formally, so that some ideas have one way to exist while some have another. Third, ideas can be themselves thought again, and one can have ideas of ideas, ad infinitum. This is because ideas exist both formally and objectively, and any idea can be understood, not as an instance of the power of understanding, but as an instance of the power of existence, even when all ideas belong to the same attribute of Thought as modes.

4. This explains how in the first few definitions of the book the word “conceive” is used. For modification is not just unified by one substance, but also by one understanding; in other words, there cannot be multiple possible worlds united in one substance, but only one world in understanding, which understanding is also approachable by the human understanding, since understanding has nothing to do with “the faculty of knowledge”, as Kant understands it, but only has to do with the necessity of the grounding. Of course I don’t have intuition for any knowledge of the divine understanding and might get tired or obstructed from fulfilling the understanding, yet I must posit it as the ground of necessity. The question of ground is therefore always to be differentiated from the question of “knowledge”, and to understand is different from to know. To “know” in finitude, ultimately, is only projected onto the infinite, since to know is always for thought to exceed itself and reach for the object, which is denied us, and not only us, but Thought in itself as an independent attribute, since the finitude of knowledge always signifies the transcendence of the object; but to “understand” in finitude is to understand in univocity to the positing of its own ground, the attribute of Thought. In other words, what Kant critiques of Spinoza is that Spinoza does not ground an idea in its possibility of objectivity; yet for Spinoza, the proper ground for an idea is simply another idea. Knowledge is always projection between parallel series, a horizontal crossing. Understanding is the only true act of ground-laying, a vertical making possible and necessary.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, VIII:

1. The question is: what is truth for Spinoza? It cannot be the correspondence between idea and object, since ideas conform only to their own rules of thought. It is also not clarity and distinctness, since “natural light” seems only coincidental and external to thought itself, and makes as if thought is dependent on some psychological consciousness, and hence only makes truth for consciousness, but not truth in general. There must be some logical criterion, therefore, that defines truth as it is. This criterion is called adequacy by Spinoza.

2. Adequacy means that an idea expresses an essence through existence. Another way to put it, an essence insofar as it grounds and generates its own existences, has an adequate idea. Therefore, God’s knowledge is inadequate insofar as he only constitutes the essence of human mind (the idea of body), for it does not involve the determined existence and affections of the body. God’s knowledge is also inadequate insofar as it comprehends only an affection, since it does not express the essence in its full determination, an essence fully unfolded in all of its affections.

3. Truth has three stages. The first is its formal stage. Falsity is not a form, for if so, there would never be any mistake, since a false idea would be formally distinct from a true idea, and should never be mistaken for truth. An idea is thereby true and adequate insofar as it is an idea in God. Truth in this sense is formal, because it is a reflexive truth. It means that as long as an idea formally exists, it has formal truth, i.e. can be posited as true, regardless of what object this idea is supposed to represent; it therefore means that truth is also in the idea of an idea. The idea of an idea is the form of an idea. Formal truth pertains to this idea of an idea. Yet the problem is, formal truth is itself without any content. We can only “posit” the adequacy of ideas as ideas, but we don’t know what adequacy itself is. That is, we know all ideas conform to truth insofar as they are ideas, yet we don’t know how is the form reflected in its content. This stage provides us with only a “necessity of form”.

4. The second stage therefore deals with material truth. Adequation is such a process through which adequacy or truth is materialized. What happens is that from all the existences in question an essence is deduced “capable” of generating all these existences. Via this expression of the generative principle through existences, a “necessity of order” is established. This is the content of truth.

5. By the third stage Spinoza aspires to unify the form and content of truth. In the second stage, a “necessity of order” is accomplished, but there is no “necessity of production”. The modal essence capable of producing these many existences is not determined to do so, since its determination is dependent on other things. All essences are undetermined in their existences, except for such essences that posit their own existences, and thereby must exist in infinitely many ways. The determining power is thereby found in God. We move from an idea of finite existence, to its essence, to that which determines it, to that which self-determines, and reaches God “quickly”. We surely don’t start from God via our human understanding, but we do rise to that idea pretty quickly. This idea of God, however, is the idea of all ideas, and is therefore the form of ideas. But this idea of God also in itself produces all ideas in due order. Hence formal truth and material truth are unified in the idea of God. All ideas that exist in God are true, and are true in their adequacy; falsity only occurs in privation.

6. Spinoza can therefore claim a more proper way of understanding truth and human finitude. Truth is not correspondence between object and idea, but an order among ideas themselves. It is also not dependent on a psychological “feeling” of clarity and distinctness, but the real relations ideas themselves draw among themselves, namely, how essences are involved in and expressed by existences, which expressions are called “common notions”. Finitude is not a state men psychologically experience, but a partition of the realm of God’s ideas. Infinitude is not a state men project onto God, but a map of the contours of the idea of God.

7. Two questions are solved by this new formulation. Both are dealt with in the last section of Book II of Ethics. First is “what can we truly know”? We can only truly know common notions (absolute or relative) because these are properties of the essence that we are that must be produced in all affections. We cannot have adequate knowledge of external bodies, since they are different from our own essence; nor of our own bodies, since we can neither know adequately our own bodies by themselves or by their affections, neither by their individual parts nor as wholes; what we can know adequately are only things in our essence that must be expressed in any affection, that is, that which is commonly shared by my body and all other bodies. The essence of human body does not involve its own existence and can exist only by being determined by other bodies external to it. The affection therefore does not involve one essence in itself, but a mixture of essences, hence one essence can have infinitely many such mixtures and affections. Yet, the common notion is shared between my body and all external bodies. Therefore, any affection of my body in its existence must necessarily involve this common notion, since it involves all related essences. An affection doesn’t express the essence in itself, but it does express the common notion by necessity. An affection cannot express fully the essence, but an affection of essence is not an affection of the common notion. An affection is a complete “expression” of the common notion, since an affection expresses a mixture of all the essences of external bodies and my body, but only one common notion.

8. The second question is “how do I know that I know”? This question is solved by noticing the unity between formal truth and material truth. Since material truth comes in when ideas are produced in order of expression (adequation), and formal truth is when the idea of ideas is itself posited to be true, one can say that in the unity of Thought, all ideas that are materially true are essences expressed by existences, but the idea of this very order itself is reflexively expressed in this order, and is thus joined to this order of expression. The reasoning therefore goes like follows: “I know A, because I know A in its existence; but I have an idea of this expression of A, which is expressed in existence through the actual expression; therefore, my idea of this state of affairs, ‘A being expressed’, is itself expressed in the being expressed in existence of the idea of A; then of course I have an idea being expressed of the idea of A being expressed. This is equivalent to saying that I know that I know A.”

A clarification on 5.: formal truth is introduced because all ideas formally exist and conform to an idea of ideas, and existence is truth, so all ideas are formally true. But this is not sufficient, for we know absolutely nothing about why existence is truth, why such conformation happens, or why conformation makes things exist and an idea of ideas must exist. Therefore we move to the second stage. There is a necessity of order in the determination of things. Through such determination, ideas conform to other ideas, as existences conform to essences. Then we know, conformation is truth because ideas are ordered by a necessity. Existence is truth because existence is grounded by such truth-making, by such necessary production of the essence. We therefore can understand the whole process of truth-making now: essences necessarily produce existences, and existences necessarily conform to essences; ideas formally exist because they conform to one idea as their essence, the idea of God. God is the form of ideas, the idea of ideas, that produces all ideas to conform to itself and produces existences to express the ultimate essence. Such necessary expression makes truth.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, IX:

1. This part is a basic recapitulation of last part. The aim is to answer why we have inadequate ideas.

2. Inadequate ideas stem from human finitude, and imagination is our finite and imperfect way of “knowing”. The finitude is framed by the inadequacy of our knowledge. This inadequacy has three parts.

3. First, we don’t know affections of our mind, since we cannot derive affections from the essence of our mind, for any affection comes from an external body or external idea that limits my body or mind, but that which is outside me and affects me is not “knowable”. Therefore, I don’t know how I’m affected and don’t know the affections of my mind. Second, I don’t know my mind. Since my mind is capable of all its affections, I must know all the external bodies that limit my body in order to know my mind adequately, and not just a particular modification of it. Third, I don’t know the external body. Anyway, all affections of the body are not expressions, but only indications. They are signs in my imagination. Only in the understanding of God are they adequate expressions.

4. Through adequacy, Spinoza overcomes the Cartesian definition of truth as clear and distinct ideas, for these ideas are only representations and signs, but are not expressions. Expressions are things that explicate the sufficient reasons for things and exhaust ideas of their meanings. They bring other ideas into its own unity.

5. Only an understanding that sees in the sign a positivity that grounds the idea in its reality can through this positivity understand the actual ground that produces all those affections in the essence.

6. Affections are the source of all human knowledge. Affections indicate natures of my body and other bodies. These natures are heterogenous, and not adequately knowable. Yet all affections presuppose something shared between my body and other bodies, since all affections are limitations, and no limitations can be without a shared boundary. Therefore, all affections presuppose some common notions. This common notion as that which is positive in an affection is thereby always known adequately, since all such common notions are expressions of a shared nature that is perceived as it is, and is not a sign indicative of what are different. The cause of an affection understood thus is always known as the common notion inherent in this limitation, and an affection is always produced from such limitation as an expression of the shared common ground. In other words, in all affections, there is always something that I do perceive and know adequately, which belongs to both ends of the equation and can hence be understood as produced by the properties shared by two ends, which properties can thereby be inferred from this positivity.

7. A further clarification would be, affections do not express the body affected, because affections always are mixtures from two bodies, thus no one affection fully and singly expresses the body, and no body lets itself be expressed by one affection only; but the common property can be expressed, because it is in the affection and shared between the affecting and the affected, hence it’s totally exhausted and the same in both affection and the affecting and the affected, the one effect in affection involves and only involves that singular cause, being the common property, in the body. This is what expression means in the realm of bodily affections. Exhaustibility doesn’t mean that the property cannot be always reexpressed by other affections, but just that in any affection that expresses that same property, there’s the same expression of the property.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, X:

1. Spinoza is an anti-Cartesian in two orders, first in the order of knowledge, then in the order of being.

2. In the order of knowledge, Spinoza opposes the Cartesian analytic method with the synthetic one. The analytic method proceeds from the perceived effect to the grounding cause for the effect, and this is what the Platonic “recollection”, the Aristotelian “abstraction”, the Kantian “transcendental philosophy”, and the Heideggerian “hermeneutic circle” all amount to, from the finite to rise to the infinite. The synthetic method is to start from the absolutely known and deduce by necessity all that which is produced by and in this absolute ground. The cause can only be analytically known in confusion and obscurity. But synthetically, one starts from the absolute ground and move down clearly and adequately.

3. One might object how the synthetic method is impossible. Indeed, that is Descartes’ objection. Descartes does believe the synthetic method is necessary to ground knowledge, yet it is only derived from the analytic method and may never be adequate by itself. Spinoza, however, would argue, it’s because Descartes is only using imagination to abstract universals from particulars, which is an infinite process. This will never give us adequate knowledge, since any abstract thing cannot by itself explain the sufficient necessity of the production, but must always assume some other thing, ad infinitum. Namely, a particular is the conclusion of infinitely many abstract universals gathered together. Analysis is always infinite.

4. To break away from such infinite chain, Spinoza proposes, we have to use our understanding in spite of imagination. This is done because we can grasp the impossibility of this very infinite chain, if there’s nothing that grounds it absolutely. Thus we rise “quickly” from that which is dependent on others to that which is absolute and self-caused. But Spinoza cannot simply stop at the necessity and possibility of synthetic method. He also has to explain how is analytic method grounded through the synthetic. This he effects by showing how any finite analysis is an analysis of an affection and the common notion it contains. That is, what is analyzed is always itself already an expressed synthesis, though this mechanism of synthetically grounded analysis is not yet fully worked out in this part of the book.

5. In the other order of being, Spinoza opposes univocity to equivocity. Everything is grounded in God and through God. Being is not analogical, not eminent, not merely possible, and not merely infinite. For if it were perceived to be analogical, it should depend on some ground that makes such analogy possible. Moreover, this conception itself involves all kinds of difficulty, the most prominent of which is that, how can anything be in proportion to something infinite? How can substance be without properties, when nothing should have no property? These are sheer contradictions. Hegelian dialectic moves through all these contradictions to finally ground the totality in this contradiction. But Deleuze does not believe in contradictions in the first place. He believes we can simply remove such contradiction by saying, there’s no contradiction with the absolute being who expresses itself fully in all its infinite attributes, each attribute fully independent and thereby not contradicting any other.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XI:

1. Like I mentioned in my Plotinus essay, there are three patterns of emanation Plotinus has in mind: first, a symbolic one, where the emanated (or the participating) turns back and seeks for its own origin through the traces it finds among its products, a tragic groping in the dark; second, an imagistic one, where the emanating (or the participated), as the original, produces images of itself, a comic play; third, a continuous radiation of light in a sphere. In the third pattern, emanation becomes immanation, or immanative expression. Plotinus, however, never fully works out the third pattern.

2. Spinoza undertakes to fulfill Plotinus’ task. He does it by instituting the univocity of Being. All things are equal in that they all share the common form. There’s still hierarchy, but not a transcendent one. Rather, since everything is completely involved in its lower level and totally exhausted by its expression in the lower level, there is no longer a hierarchy proper. Rather, everything becomes complete expression and thereby inheres together. They merge into one continuous radiation. Attributes are one with the substance as qualitative expressions of the substance, and modes are one with their respective attributes as quantitative expressions of the attributes. God is not a remote cause but causes everything immediately. Everything inheres like one in God. The power of thinking is equal to power of being. All attributes are equal amongst themselves. Because the substance is fully expressed by attributes, and the attribute is also fully expressed by the modes, there is no transcendence or obscurity. No analogy. Even our finite mind, for Spinoza, sees affection more as an expression of common property, not primarily a sign of some transcendent body.

3. By working out the third pattern, Spinoza successfully solves some problems bugging Neoplatonists since history starts. First, the One no longer needs to go out of itself to produce Being; rather, Being already inheres in the One as its expression. Second, the One does not need to be divided, nor to be accountable for the production of a number. For, on the first level, attributes are not numerically distinct and therefore easily inhere in substance without being a plurality; on the second level, modes are not independent units of number that is generated by the One, but only quantitative expressions of a “maximum”, i.e. an attribute that is an infinity indivisible in itself, and this means that modes are not numerically distinct beings separated from the substance, but are “intensities” (even when they constitute an extensive number, they still inhere in the attribute as an expression of its intensity) expressed of the attribute as its parts. An attribute is indivisible in itself, but its infinity can only be expressed by infinitely many finite modes, taken altogether; it is only because such expressions are immanent and all finite modes inhere in the infinite can the indivisible attribute be “divided”, since these are not actual divisions, but only expressions embraced in one indissoluble continuity of self-expression, or parts that only exist inherently in the whole, and are nothing in themselves.

A clarification on 3.: one can therefore conceive of an attribute as an indivisible unit; yet this unit has inherent content, or a quantitative intensity; and the unit is indivisible not because it cannot be analyzed through partitions of this quantitative content, but rather because any such partition by itself would be inadequate in expressing the unit, and cannot therefore be independent from the unit and all its other infinite partitions; only when all the infinite partitions of this content are unfolded inside the unit can the unit be adequately expressed. Now we can see how an attribute as an infinity is indivisible yet divisible. It is divisible insofar as it has to its modes a relation of whole to parts; it is indivisible insofar as not any number of parts can adequately express the infinite attribute, but the attribute can only be adequately expressed in its own self as that in which its own infinitely many partitions or expressions inhere continuously. In other words, no infinity can ever be divisible for no division can adequately express it, and only infinity itself can express itself; but all infinity must contain infinite divisions or infinitely many inadequate expressions in order to be infinity at all.

What we normally understand to be division is separation or limitation, the unlimited of course cannot be limited; yet it doesn’t preclude any kind of division immanent to infinity, so long as the parts divided cannot be separated from the whole, nor do they limit the unlimited, nor do they adequately express the infinity. The limitation therefore must only be immanent to the infinite, and not limiting the infinite. Infinity contains in itself infinitely many things, but is still indivisible, for it can only be expressed by itself as infinity.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XII:

1. Modal essences are not possibilities, but are necessarily actual expressions of the attribute they belong to. Modal essences exist insofar as they are caused by God in God. Moreover, it is nonsensical to Spinoza to say that essences are just possibilities that don’t actually exist, since all essences necessarily exist “as essences”. The only difference is that the existences of modal essences are interdependent, each caused by the other, though all ultimately caused by the existence of God.

2. Modal essences are not extrinsic to the attribute as differentia are to genera in Aristotle’s system. Rather, they are internal determinations, or rather, intensive quantities. Modal existences, on the other hand, are extensive quantities, which require further investigation in later chapter.

3. Attributes are not divisible since they qualitatively belong to the absolute substance. Yet they are modally divisible, since they constitute the infinitely many modes as expressions of themselves. They are indivisible insofar as they are infinite and can only be infinite, but they are divided insofar as they comprise of infinitely many finite modes. These modes are divided in the attribute in two ways, first, as intensities that belong to the attribute and continuous among themselves, i.e. as modal essences that necessarily implicate other essences which all belong to the attribute immediately; second, as numerically distinct extensities that belong to the essences, i.e. as modal existences that separately only express their essences inadequately.

4. Though Deleuze will only talk about modal existence in next chapter, it is worth notice how at the start of Book III Spinoza is using conatus to delineate the relation between modal existence and modal essence. Modal essence equals the existence of a thing in itself, and strives to actualize its being in modal existence. This does not mean, if we take Deleuze’s suggestion, that modal essence is a possibility striving to exist, as in Leibniz, but that the actual existence of the modal essence is striving to “express itself”. This is clear since there is nothing contrary to the thing’s nature in the thing’s essence, hence nothing inherent in the thing that destroys it, and anything that destroys it must be external to it, we thereby conclude that everything exists in themselves, but is negated by something else. Modal existence is this existence that is the result of a conatus holding itself out in what negates it, its enduring or lingering. The existence of a modal essence, however, is the cause of this activity of “holding out”, this lingering, the essence itself being caused into existence, then trying to cause other effects to express itself, and encountering thereby what negates it. When something causes other things by itself, it’s said to be active; when not, that is, when partially negated, passive.

5. A further development of this theory would emphasize again the Spinozist notion of “common property”. When an essence is active in its existence, i.e. in its expression, it produces an adequate expression of itself. That means, at least for human body, our body produces an affection that expresses a common property shared between human body and the external body that affects it. In other words, I am active when I perceive that what I produce adequately expresses my production of it (put aside for now the mind-body division), without any obscurity indicated by the affection of my body or the external body. I am passive when what I perceive in the affection is either something indicative of my own body which I don’t know how it‘s been represented as external to me (what’s of my body negated by other), or something indicative of an external body which I don’t know how I have represented it (what’s of other body negated by mine); that is, expressed inadequately and confusedly. Activity is knowledge, passivity ignorance.

Comment on 5.: this is why for Spinoza to become more perfect or active is synonymous to obtaining more knowledge. To know more is to have more adequate ideas from which other ideas proceed adequately; that is, to perceive more common properties expressing themselves in affections, that is, to be more substantiated in existence through such expressions in effects related to causes inherent in my nature. In other words, to know more is to see more adequately how everything affirms, rather than negates, everything else; the more I perceive in affections that express common properties, the more I know about myself that is affirmed by other bodies, and not negated by other bodies. The more reality therefore my nature will possess. The more pleasure I therefore possess, and the happier I am.

The essence of my body is infinitely determined by other bodies in actual existence. But such actual existence of my infinitely determined body can only be expressed by infinitely many such determinations. Each determination is an affection. Any affection can only express the infinitely determined existent essence inadequately, since all affections of my body only express partially the nature of my body, partially the nature of other bodies, without the knowledge of either I cannot know myself adequately. No affection, therefore, actualizes the existence of my body adequately, but is always partially negated. But the common property is adequately expressed and completely affirmed in the affection. This expresses the actual existence of a modal essence in being affirmed and grounded by other modal essences to an enrichment of expressed properties. Therefore the actual existence of modal essence of my body is rendered actual in expression too through affections which express adequately the common property in the modal essence. Modal essence is always already actual; but it is actual in expression, hence must be expressed through affections to be actual. In other words, the striving of any modal existence is just to express adequately what it already essentially is. My essence is already fully determined, and my affections are but expressions of that fact. These affections, however, can express better or worse this predetermined essence depending on how adequately is the common property expressed through the affection, how active is my body in producing effects, or rather, how much of the effect is an expression of the common property.

To strive for perfection is to strive to stay expressive, to stay in the state of utmost expression, or to possess an affection that expresses the most, preserving the actual modal existence, which is an expression of the actual existence of the modal essence, against the negations of others. Since one’s essence is already determined in existence, one can only be affected by certain things, but the affections themselves can be of different degrees of adequacy and be expressive in different manners and to different degrees. That is, it’s determined in my essence to be affected or limited by some other body, but this affection can be largely only indicative and obscure, or it can be expressive of a common property; that is, for instance, I might bounce into that other body and bounce off, or both bodies may hardly budge, thus expressive in different degrees of the one common property of force or movability.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIII:

1. Deleuze’s account of the relationship between modal essence and modal existence is inconclusive. I shall lay down a more convincing reading based on his interpretation.

2. Deleuze is right in his observation that modal essence and modal existence obey different rules in their actual beings. Yet he is not clear in his determination of the grounding thus occurs between them. He rightly maintains that modal existence is an expression through extensities of the intensity of essence, yet he does not clarify the way one leads to the other. The key then is to answer how intensities of modal essences shall pass into extensities of modal existences.

3. Modal essences are intensities because they have a being to belong to “intrinsically”. Because they are intrinsically unified by the attribute only are they intensities, or degrees of the attribute’s power of being. They have the attribute directly in view, consequently they are intrinsic to the attribute, and are intensive.

4. Modal existences do not have the attribute directly in view, but are affections of the essences they belong to. Essences left on themselves, as only expressed by affections without also being unified by the attribute, are distinct from each other. For essences as they express one attribute are distinct only intrinsically. Yet their affections are expressions “of this essence” and of this essence primarily, hence only as distinct from other essences that they express less of, these expressions thereby must distinguish the essence they express from other essences that determine this essence nonetheless.

5. This is due to the two ways infinity is construed. First, as intensities, each essence is determined infinitely by all other essences under the same attribute. This is what it means to express an infinity with the infinity as a whole in view, each part as a degree of the infinity. But this expression itself needs to be re-expressed as “infinitely many parts”, each part separate from other parts, i.e. extensities. Yet this passage to infinitely many extrinsic parts is carried out through the very nature of expression and the expressed: insofar as modes express the attribute alone, they are intensities, hence essences infinitely determined; but insofar as a mode only expresses some other mode, it is necessarily an expression extrinsic to the expressed since it must involve the expressed as abstracted from the attribute and its infinite determination, and only indicates the essence as determined by some other essence external to the expressed.

6. Thus we have two levels that are differently structured. On the level of essences, we have actual existences of these essences as infinitely determined. On the level of existences, we have actual existences of the affections of these essences as produced by these infinitely determined essences to be expressions of these infinite determinations. Since they are not just expressions of abstract essences but rather expressions of concretely determined existences of these essences, i.e. expressions of these very determinations themselves, they necessarily involve more than one essences. Since they express the essence in terms of what is distinct from and opposed to the essence that determines the essence, certainly any such expression must be extrinsic, and necessarily inadequate.

7. So on the level of existences, where we are located, essence is “the thing itself”. But on the level of essences, each essence is adequately determined to express the attribute, “complicated” in the attribute, and attribute itself is not determined by any thing distinct. Modal existences, on the other hand, are not “complicated” in the essence, but merely “explicate” the essence, which essence is determined by some other distinct essence, hence must express the essence together with an extrinsic essence as determining. Therefore an expression of an essence must involve another.

8. It also makes sense what Spinoza means by rule or law inscribed in the attribute. Each attribute has all its expressions determined by each other as essences. But such essences themselves express themselves through other modes which express their determinations as affections. But such expressions as affections are nothing in themselves but further essences fully determined that require expression on their own parts. This is not Leibnizian in the sense that essences are not simply existences or units to be added onto substances. For Spinoza, essences are not simply additive. Rather, Spinoza takes a Kantian turn, that essences and existences are but different perceptions of the same thing, that is, in view of the attribute, all modes are modal essences, and in view of other modes, all modes are modal existences that express other modes as essences; just like intuition and concept are each the same thing. Hence the law or mechanics of infinitely many composite bodies are nothing but the intrinsically determined destiny of everything expressed as external bodies affecting each other. What Deleuze finds difficult to resolve is how modal essences and modal existences can correspond yet not term by term; apparently there must be more existences than essences they correspond. But this is the same structure in Kant, where apparently intuition must be “more” than a concept, yet but intuition and concept must be infinite. It is similar here, essence must be expressible by many existences, yet to each existence there must correspond one singular essence; this is simply because existences are not merely expressions of “an essence”, but rather “determinations of this essence” or “this essence as thus determined”. Just as an essence, in view of the attribute, must be infinitely determined, so each essence must be expressed infinitely. Yet no existence is outside the attribute, hence itself must in turn be expressible. This same structure inheres in reflexive ideas.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIV:

1. In this part I shall lay out an outline for Spinoza’s theory of affection and affects.

2. Affections are inadequate expressions of the essence as determined by something else. Every affection is in this sense equal, since each affection indicates the essence through some other essence, and in this indicating is necessarily passive, since it expresses one essence through an essence extrinsic to the one expressed, extrinsic due to the finite nature of the affection, which only fully includes a part of the whole infinity of determinations. An intrinsic or adequate expression of essences must involve all other essences and their determinations on this essence, that is, must involve the whole destiny of this essence. Yet such knowledge is only accessible to God. What is expressed adequately for human beings is therefore only part of the essence, namely, its property shared with the other essence that determines it in that affection. That is, though one cannot perceive adequately an affection expressing the essence, it does perceive adequately its expressing the very determination of the essence, that common boundary shared by two ends of causation. The converse also holds true, whatever is perceived adequately in an affection can be analyzed into a property shared by both essences.

3. All affections, therefore, are equally passive, being dependent on other causes unknown, and equally active, containing adequate expressions of common properties. But this cannot be the end of story, for no affect other than desire is possible if there is no transition from activity to passivity and vice versa. Affections are all equally expressions, but they are not equally expressive. That is, all affections express the destiny of the essence with formal equality, but some express this destiny as less of the essence in their content. Though being killed by Peter is equally in my destiny as killing Paul, but one expression of my destiny reduces my expressiveness more than the other. Destruction is an expression of destiny, a negative one nonetheless. In other words, though both the power to suffer (passive affection) and the power to act (active affection) comprise the total power to be affected, the power to suffer is still only an impotence that has reduced what could’ve been done if it were more active. Even though such passivity happens by necessity, and is a legitimate expression of the essence, it nonetheless is a meager expression that is “cut off” from the expressive power. A passive state in itself as a separate affection is merely passive and cut off and impotence, but if it’s adequated it becomes more active and more perfect.

4. Pain always decreases the power, and power continually dwindles as there’s more difficulty now in resisting pain, everything else equal. Pleasure increases power and continually increases as there’s more power gathering pleasure. Wonder is both knowledge and ignorance, hence by itself neither pain nor pleasure; it transfixes the mind on one single thought, but does not by this fact show other thoughts as some transcendent ground for this thought, hence is not particularly passive. Its nature depends solely on the content of this very thought on which the mind is transfixed.

5. Affects are the root for society. Since any active expression of myself contributing to my perfection is to express others as intrinsic to my essence, to express the common destiny of other things in my destiny, to affirm others’ affirmation of me, I thereby seek what intrinsically shares more properties with my nature, since what is common is what is adequately expressed, and what is more common is more expressive and makes myself thus more perfect. Therefore, in order to be more perfect, I seek other human beings, and seek to express the common fate of humanity through expressing my own fate. The more singular my fate is, the more perfect I am, the more so humanity is.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XV:

1. There are three orders of nature, the order of essences, the order of relations (or determinations), and the order of individuals. As I laid out last time, the order of essences is all essences united with the attribute, all essences being eternal. The order of determinations is all essences being intrinsic to all other essences, constituting each other’s whole destiny. The order of individual existences are partial derivations, or products, or affections, of the destiny of any essence. They are expressions of the destiny.

2. Though all affections are equally expressions of the destiny, each a necessary event belonging to the destiny, yet this agreement is only in form. It is only in the second order, the order of determinations, that all affections are equally expressive and equal parts of something’s destiny. Yet in the third order, which is also the order of content, where one affection is opposed to another affection, both as finite and limited things, we find inequality of expressions. For now we see one affection being ambivalent, expressing one individual determination, hence not constituting the whole essence, but only a part of it, all other parts thereby excluded from this singular affection as obscure and negative. This negation turns expression into indication, and makes it inadequate. Passivity and activity thereby come onto the scene as distinguished. And now we have the ratio between passivity and activity; whatever expresses more adequately, in its content of expression, the destiny inscribed already in the essence, is more expressive.

3. This is not to deny that even the event of passivity itself is written in the destiny as a necessary product. There is no altering of passivity into activity in the second order, since everything is already determined. Spinoza is very clear on this point: there is no such thing as a free action. The way to be free is to understand the necessity of our destiny. Formally, this means that even our passivity expresses our destiny. Practically, it means to love our fate, even including our occasional resentment of it. There is no contradiction, since whenever passivity starts to express our destiny, it is activized; whenever we perceive our passions to be necessary to the preservation of our destiny, it is activated.

4. This means there’s no such thing as evil. Evil has no ontological status for Spinoza, since it is not even privation. Evil is not the Good of Being being deprived, since all essences are eternal, and all products necessary, there is not any kind of privation possible there. Evil does not even inhere in the third order, since no affection is contingent or inexpressive in itself, each as a part constituting the common fate of the world. It is only within one singular affection as such that Evil takes on some negative meaning for that affection: it is only that which is posited in the affection to oppose the expressiveness of that one affection itself. In other words, evil is always that which opposes an affection to express through itself alone the fate of its essence. My body expresses the essence of man. If something deforms my body, my body by itself no longer expresses humanity as well, though it together with the cause of deformation nonetheless expresses the “deformability” of humanity. Evil is thus not privation, but only negation that opposes the expressiveness of an affection.

5. Thus the problem of evil is always a concrete problem. One needs always to consider what is the affection in question, and how is this affection itself an essence expressed by other affections, what are its parts, what are its “insofar”s, etc. My body is an affection of humanity, and my heart is an affection of my body, and my ventricle an affection of my heart… The whole series of events going on in my ventricle affects the series of my heart and everything else. Evil for one, however, might not be evil for another.

6. Like a problem in ventricle reduces its expressiveness for the whole destiny of my heart and loses its power, yet its loss in power might put everything else in more harmonious and healthier relations. This is why Spinoza says pain insofar as it checks excessive pleasure is good for the whole. An affection of nail insofar as it expresses the essence of nail might be reduced in power, yet insofar as it expresses my body as a whole it contributes to better my body.

7. To know passivities and to contemplate passions and and to understand ignorances is therefore no contradiction, but rather to activate them. Philosophy is such a task of activation and demystification. Spinoza starts this project already explicitly with his [Theological-political Treatise], by understanding superstitions.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVI:

1. Moralists all make claims on duties and laws prescribed by a transcendent being. An ethics, however, or an ethology, starts with the nature of things and their properties, and how to organize them alongside each other and bind them into one common destiny. Since all moralities presuppose such a transcendence, all morals are nothing but mystifications and violences. One supposes one must or ought to do something because one does not understand what is simply.

2. The state is a moral institute. For no one lives purely by reason, the state is necessary to tyrannize and terrify citizens. But that cannot be all. The city also is responsible for the common good and a general education. In other words, the state has to terrify those who are passive, but bind those who are active. The state is both moral and ethical.

3. Spinoza liberates ethics from morals by liberating the body from the conscious mind. By insisting “we have no idea what the body is capable of”, he liberates the body from the tyranny of our consciousness. Our consciousness always assumes a moral authority over our body, so that within our consciousness, we posit a superego that transcends and rules the abject body. This is the traditional image of morality: the tyranny of consciousness. Before falling to the spell of morals, Spinoza asks: “what is the nature of our body? what does our consciousness really rule?” Now he discerns the mystification: our mind does not rule our body, mind and body are in separate domains; moreover, our mind does not even rule our thoughts. Maybe there is no such thing as a rule, if we understand the rule to be a moral code: what we have are only manuals and guidebooks for productions of things.

4. There is no telos suspended before us, spurring us on. The common good of the city is not something we aspire to, at least not if we are active enough, but a fate always already actualized. The common good is always concrete, it permeates each and every action in the city. The common good is to make the city act and produce and express itself. It is an effective production, not an actualization of some hidden potential we aspire to. The city is not a tyranny of the good. It is an expression of humanity’s common destiny. Beatitude or blessedness is not some transcendent good that each action only leads to or indicates, but is within each action insofar as it is an action. In this sense, Spinoza is closer to Plato than Aristotle, needless to say Cicero, as Plato in [Statesman] describes that essentially, politics is nothing but weaving natures together into one shared destiny.

Comment on 4.: one only needs to remember that for all the end of an Aristotelian city is only analogous to its citizen; as the citizen aspires to some virtue, the city aspires to something more eminent. But not so for Spinoza, or even Hobbes, or Locke. The modern political philosopher no longer stresses the transcendence and aspiration the city prescribes. The city is to express as an individual expresses. That is why the city and the state of nature can now be distinguished. Before, the state of nature is confused with society, the end of man is to be in a city. But now not the nature of man and the nature of city is to express. City is thus merely a product, an effect, like man is, instead of an end. It is only when the individual is liberated from the city to be on a par with the city that they are comparable and distinguishable. Before, the individual is subjugated to the tyranny of city, and city to the tyranny of good, in a hierarchical order.

To have an ideal is to not understand and remain passive, to remain in abstractions. This includes the ideal of “absolute perfection” or “absolute reality” or “absolute expressiveness”. Insofar as it is an ideal, it is not a good. A good is only good when it stops being an ideal, when it “comes to life”. In other words, every city can be conceived in two ways, the Aristotelian way or the Spinozist way. Insofar as it’s put under the Aristotelian way, it remains passive, and its telos remains unreachable; but insofar as the potency is fully actualized, the potency is surely canceled, and shall be nothing. Therefore Spinoza not only corrects the illusion of teleology, but also explains how such distortion comes about. The city’s good is to be as active and expressive as it can be in each of its affections, to persevere and preserve itself in nothingness. This is a telos only when it already sees itself as passive. Otherwise, this is a drive, a conatus, a force.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVII:

1. What is a common notion? It needs to be distinguished from a genus or an essence. A genus is a latency that requires an external determination. An essence is a productivity that produces its own modifications through intrinsic determinations by the inclusion of other essences. That is, an essence produces its own fate. A common notion cannot be either. For we never know a genus adequately, since it is devoid of content (or effects) and is always obscure; an essence, on the other hand, is an infinite cause and has infinitely many effects, and no infinity is known adequately by human intellect.

2. What Spinoza means by common notion is therefore neither a genus nor an essence. It is something shared by things can be adequately expressed. An essence is determined by another essence into an affection, thus expressing part of its fate. Something’s destiny, therefore, can never be fully expressed; yet part of it or a property of it is always adequately expressed as an affection. This is easily understood, since a determination is nothing else than an affection, only a determination is always intrinsic to the thing, while an affection is in-between two things. It is shared because such determinations are always mutual, and the destiny is always shared. This is what a common notion is, it is some property shared by two essences in determining each other gets expressed in an affection. Conversely, from whatever is positive in an affection, we infer backwards to show what is shared between two essences in that one event of encounter.

3. Yet how to understand this description in concreto? The genus of cat we understand to be some material that is later grouped into different individual cats by differentiae. The genus of cat is therefore an image crude and abstract, crude for its arbitrary selection of marks (what sensible traits remains after abstractions that characterize a cat is quite random), abstract for its impotence at generating its own destiny. The essence of cat is a hidden source of infinite intrinsic determinations. The common notion of cat is a “structure”, a “composition” that relates the animal essence to all other essences in its encounter with them, and preserves itself as an expression of the fate of animal, an event in biological nature. In other words, Spinoza is Aristotelian insofar as he upholds the necessity of real definitions, but against Aristotle insofar as Aristotle treats common notions merely the same as impotent genera, or hidden productive principles, instead of a real event between essences.

4. This also demonstrates how the threefold distinction should be interpreted with more subtlety: a genus is a universal seen passively as a potency; an essence is a universal seen passively as a transcendent source of power; a common notion is a universal seen actively and adequately as a relation or a structure comprising different essences, yet itself doesn’t include or exclude any other essence, but is open to both. That is, a common notion is not exclusive to other things, as a genus is; nor is it inclusive as an essence; rather, it is an open passage, and being so, it is not transcendent or superior to what it involves, but is intrinsic to both, and is adequately expressed in affections. Yet when this open passage is closed, either exclusion or inclusion happens, the common notion is thereby no longer an intermediary but itself stands out. No longer the shared destiny between things, but itself a thing in itself, the affection, remaining an affection of the previous essence, can no longer adequately express this newly established essence. That is, cat, insofar as it expresses the shared destiny between animal and a milieu, it is a common notion that is adequately expressed in this affection of animality as such. But insofar as it is itself an essence, it must be expressed by some other affections that exclusively belong to it.

5. Now we have a full account of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. First we have affections and start from affections. Affections are indications of essences, hence only symbolic and confused. This is the first kind of knowledge. Then we proceed to find something positive in these affections, and find in them a structure or relation between two essences, and there we determine this relation to be a common notion. This is the second kind of knowledge, knowledge by scientific inference. Finally, we know this common notion itself is an essence, and we can thereby deduce each and every affection from this essence. This is the third kind of knowledge, the intuitive knowledge by deduction. An example is that, first I learn from others that 1+6=7, then I do it myself, and remember that this is the case; but later I say there must be some relation between 1 and 6 so that it yields 7; then I reach the shared property, which is the addition, and I say, I now know 1 with 6 causes 7, so does 6 with 1, and more than that, I know what addition is; from this knowledge of addition, I can now deduce infinitely many effects from the simple notion of addition, in relation to any other number. It’s noteworthy here that the third kind of knowledge, though intuitive and infinite, is not adequate when the common notion remains a newly conceived essence, but only generates adequate ideas by expressing other common properties. That is, addition is adequate insofar as it is expressed by 7, but what is adequately contained in the idea of addition is again the common properties addition has to other essences. Just as cat is adequate when it relates animal to some milieu, but it only produces other adequate ideas when individual cats express the relation cat as an essence has to other essences, each deducible from the common notion of cat. So finite intelligence can never fulfill infinite adequation, and an infinite progress of deduction and relating essences together in this way is prepared.

6. The three kinds of knowledge correspond to the three stages of truth. The confused idea is nothing but the posited existence of an idea, its formal truth. Then it is questioned if the posited idea should be true when the content seems to get involved, that different ideas seem to contradict each other. But then these are all unified by the idea of God, so that something like a “squared circle” is nothing but an idea of the mutual destruction of two ideas. Insofar as it is an idea it is expressive as all other ideas in the common fate of all ideas; yet its content is by itself least expressive, that is, it expresses nothing. That is, a contradiction is not so much of an idea as a negation of an idea. In the infinite idea of God, all ideas are adequate, and though a contradiction, a negative idea is related to all other ideas and is thereby rectified back into its truth. It is a contradiction insofar as it belongs only in men and not in God, or as it is only a passive limit to circle or square, and not a limit in God. Like a passion becomes action when affirmed in God, though passive in its content taken by itself, active in the whole; a contradiction reveals truth though itself in itself denies truth. For a contradiction occurs because an affection is caused by an extrinsic thing, or an idea is caused by an extrinsic idea, so that one destroys the other. Such destruction no longer subsists in the order of essences. That is, contradictions don’t exist in the order of essences; “a squared circle” is nothing in God but a mistake that men make because they are men; or a limit to circles as they are circles.

A comment on 6.: therefore Spinoza’s way of countering that sophistry, “if God can create something logically contradictory”, is simple, that is, all contradictions are impotences of limited things, God as the truly infinite being, is active and “cannot” be impotent, which means God must be active, and his activity is not anyhow impotence; and we should note that the unity between reflexive knowledge and objective knowledge does not mean one is equivalent to the other, but merely the formal truth itself has a content, like the material truth has a form, that is, all ideas are true because they are in due order (because of their objective content relates one idea to other ideas in due order), and all ideas are in due order because they are ideas (they are equally produced by God under the attribute of Thought and hence are always already communicated and articulated).

7. [Ethics] supersedes [Treatise] on two points. First, as [Treatise] is still not clear that reflexive knowledge is founded upon and unified with immediate knowledge, since Spinoza still claims in [Treatise] that immediate knowledge is separate from reflexive knowledge, and has not noticed that reflexive knowledge somehow “precedes” immediate knowledge (for we initially regard as true whatever we believe is an idea), and therefore the whole system becomes extremely confusing, in [Ethics] Spinoza reworks this theory and unifies Method with Content. He also recognizes that the order of true knowledge is different from our attainment to knowledge; that is, though we first know, and then know that we know, we only first are certain that all ideas are true, and eventually are certain that these ideas are indeed true in objective relations. The second point is that in [Treatise] Spinoza still believes that we can have direct knowledge of real definitions of essences, and properties of any essence are finite; but in [Ethics] all essences are unknowable as essences, and only as common notions can they be known adequately, and that all essences have infinitely many properties.

8. Every idea is an idea of a body. All essences therefore are essential bodies. Common notions are that in which and through which bodies meet. Two cats meet each other; because they share the most common properties in their respective natures, since they are most alike, their affections and mutual determinations are the most expressive of their common fate. This class of common properties shared by two cats, however, cannot be simply rendered as their “cat-hood”. Cat-hood is an essential body to which they are individual affections, but this essence is not fully explicated by either, hence cannot be fully explicated by both. The common notion, therefore, is much more peculiar. Even it is called “cat-hood”, it is a concrete and particular determination of the structure through which they encounter each other. We accumulate our knowledge through these particular things. Any abstract universal is a cessation to our knowledge. We only adequately know about situations and circumstances. But this “cat-hood” between two cats is again joined by some other milieu of the same level, like a dog coming down from the end of a street, which determines this “cat-hood” in a different way, producing different affections on the two cats, and shares with this “cat-hood” a different relationship. This produces a new destiny involving three bodies, two cats and a dog. This is a new community, a new pack. This produces a new common notion that is more universal, since it includes one more member, yet just as concrete. The most universal common notion is therefore the highest essence, but with a twist: the commonest notion is as universal as the highest essence, but the common notion is always a weaving of common destiny shared by everything, while essence is a metaphysical point that “includes” everything. Insofar as “cat-hood” produces all cats, it is an essence; insofar as “cat-hood” describes how every cat encounters another, it is a common notion.

9. What I mean is, by looking at millions of pictures of singular cats, I know less about cat-hood than by looking at a small group of cats interact with each other. The same name always applies in two ways. “Cat-hood” as an essence and “cat-hood” as a common notion. One as the inaccessible wellspring of all cats from all times, the other as the fate which organizes and binds together those cats I am familiar with. Of course for human beings the latter is much restricted, since I only am familiar with a few cats. But for God, the common notion is as universal as the essence. And common notion provides us with adequate knowledge; “cat-hood” in this sense, though it does not transcend beyond our affections till absolute abstraction, it provides us with a network of truths, that this cat today meets that other cat, this cat fought yesterday that cat… till everything gets involved in this common destiny; the essence of a pack of cats is redetermined by the appearance of a dog, and a new pack emerges, a new essence of a new pack that involves multiple cats and a dog… In other words, we never fully know any affection in itself, we never fully know any essence in itself, but we do fully know when a determination of an essence by another essence corresponds to an affection of that essence. What we do adequately know is but the interface where two things meet; where the two things fade, that is, if we take the interface by itself, we again don’t know anything adequately, since we now take a common notion to be its own essence. The problem of knowledge is throughly characterized play between immanence of common notion and transcendence of essence.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XVIII:

1. There are three kinds of knowledge, those that proceed by passive signs, those that proceed by active common notions, and those that proceed by the idea of God. The first and second kind are already dealt with in our last exposition. It is worth noting that common notions do have a hierarchical order, some are more universal than others; yet they only express more shared or less shared fate of things. At any rate, common notions are not abstract things, but real combinations or orders of affections. In other words, Spinoza is thoroughly entertaining the Baconian idea of a common notion, which is operative and scientific. Every common notion is a nexus of determinations of essences, which again are turned into active common notions when their causes are found in relations between other essences. Common notions are therefore guidelines from a roadmap of the intellect, that relate all essences together intrinsically, not as transcendent sources, but as nexus of relations.

2. But so far we only have a system. Systemic knowledge is the second kind of knowledge that nevertheless is dependent on the first kind of knowledge, for before any common notion is arrived at, we have to presuppose essences. There is always this interplay between transcendent essences and immanent common notions. But how do we arrive at an idea of God? The natural thing to say is that God is the commonest notion or the most general fate of everything. But this cannot be the whole story.

3. Rather, we see every common notion can be turned into an essence. The the most universal notion has to be self-affected. That is a self-caused foundation. So we do have a transcendent idea of God. Insofar as God is a self-caused essence, God is transcendent. Our knowledge of God is therefore never adequate. But an essence again can be turned back into a common notion, and since this essence is self-affected, it is its own common notion. So as we regress from an affection to a common notion, then from a common notion to an essence, we pass from what we know confusedly to what we know adequately, and then to the ground of the adequacy of our knowledge. We rise to God speedily. But once we attain to the idea of God and we progress from that self-affected essence, we deduce everything from it adequately.

4. This is difficult but important. God is not just any essence, but a self-caused essence. Insofar as it is an essence, it never gets expressed adequately by any affection of itself, by any modal essence. That is to say, we can never know God insofar as God is an essence, the source of everything. But insofar as God is self-caused, it is self-affected, and hence it is its own common notion. It relates to itself and expresses this relation in any affection insofar as that affection is in it. So God is never a remote cause of anything. God is unique in this, that it is inadequately known as merely another essence, but adequately known as an essence self-affected. No affection of God indicates something other than God.

5. To put this more clearly, one can say that, if different essences conjoin, they express themselves adequately through affections, which again are adequately expressed by their own affections. Adequacy in Spinoza is always immediate between two levels, cause and effect, therefore different from Leibniz, who defines adequacy to be an absolute unfolding of everything. For Spinoza, expression is always between two terms, and so long as one term exhausts the other term, the expression is adequate. So for two essences, thought each only indicated by their affection, their common notion or relation gets fully expressed nonetheless. Yet this relation still posits two ends transcendent to the middle, each end unexpressed by the affection, itself expressive of some other relation. Transcendence subsists in these determinations of relations.

Continuation of 5.: only in God is transcendence fully interiorized as a self-causation, infinitely expressed by each and every affection in it. An essence is determined by another essence, thus only the determination gets expressed in the affection, and itself expressible only by infinitely many such determinations. A self-caused essence however is its own common notion, itself determines itself and this determination must fully exhaust itself in expression, thus everything as an affection of it must be adequately expressive. Any inadequacy of this knowledge therefore results not from God being God, but only due to our finitude, for we in our affection oppose other essences as transcendent, thus dispersing the idea of God, and turn equal and active expressions of God into passivities, or transcendent sources of power, thus alienating God from us. This turns into the prophetic tradition of religion.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XIX:

1. The road to beatitude is like this: first, we live among our affections, and live in wrecks of passivity; then, we feel passive joys, and find expressions of positivity or activity; from these positivities, we form common notions, and see how different essences intertwine into one common fate, each common notion contained in some other common notion more universal; we then rise to the idea of God as we relate essence to the common notion, and see how only the idea of God provides the ultimate grounding that unifies common notions with essences, since God is that thing whose essence is its very own common notion; eventually, we deduce infinite things from this essence qua common notion, and break upon the new ground of pure activity, and think like God; that is, eventually we can think about all essences as infinitely many products from God, within the essence of our own body as the formal cause, and God the material cause, so that I understand my own destiny as conformant to everything else and God itself.

2. To be a Spinozist and to live a life in beautified means to live affectively. It does not mean to live philosophically or unphilosophically. In Book V, philosophy and life essentially become one. To live is to think and understand. To philosophize is to live with affections on a plane of immanence. Deleuze is too perceptive when he comments that [Ethics] as a book is written with different speeds. It starts quick to arrive at God, and then move more slowly, and to speed up at opportune moments. This is what is admirable about Deleuze. He is not just attentive to Spinoza’s philosophy, but also to Spinoza’s language of philosophy. He notices how Book V is not only the shortest of the whole book, but also the most rapid, the absolute speed. He also recognizes how Scholia and Propositions have different rhythms, that Scholia are always disruptive and rather impassioned. There are different currents of capture in one book.

Deleuze, Spinoza and Expressionism, XX:

1. This is a conclusion to the whole journey. We start from Descartes’ failure, that he substitutes real knowledge with imaginative knowledge. First, he makes substance that which is deprived of an image, hence confusing numerical distinction with real distinction. Secondly, he judges a substance to be infinitely perfect or real, compared to the relative imperfections of image. Thirdly, he treats the clarity and distinctness itself as the measure of truth, or the natural light, which again is compared to confusions in images. Finally, he supposes mind to be united to the body as substance is united to its modes, so that mind is a real cause infinitely superior to its effects.

2. Both Leibniz and Spinoza employ the concept of expression to counter such Cartesianism. For Leibniz, it’s because expression is much more general. For Spinoza, it’s rather because expression is more confined and refined for his taste for univocity. But their anti-Cartesian agenda is clearly shared. First, expression does not specify the number of the expressed or of what expresses itself. So instead of an abstract being in our imagination, both Leibniz and Spinoza find what is expressive to be an absolute. Second, the concept of expression not only requires the relation or the form of the expressed with respect to the expressions, but also the very content or nature of both; an expression can never be empty. So both Leibniz and Spinoza arrive at the absolute not simply as the infinitely real, but also as the ground expressed in the content of any expression. Third, since expressions are all related to the absolute expressive thing, truth can never inhere in any singular expression, but must be expressed in relation to all other expressions, for the ground necessarily complicates all other expressions in itself; that is, how one expression is unified with other expressions to form one shared expression that expresses exhaustively the whole content of truth. The standard of truth is therefore not clarity, but adequacy. Lastly, expression is an identity between the expressed and the expression, and an identity as such is always transitive, and cannot be understood simply as real cause. Expressiveness has much more scope that causality. Therefore, Leibniz and Spinoza can talk of expression without involving any kind of real causation between mind and body.

3. The disagreement Leibniz has with Spinoza, therefore, is more on the question of specific delineation of expression. Leibniz upholds a symbolic philosophy of expression. That is to say, for Leibniz, he wants both immanence and transcendence at the same time. He does not want to reduce the difference between different levels to a quantitative difference, namely, attributes comprise of infinitely many modes, substance comprise of infinitely many attributes; he wants to retain the qualitative superiority of God, or a morality, without falling back to the qualms of Cartesianism. He therefore constructs a system of equivocation that nonetheless does not posit any abstract being; rather, everything expresses everything else in a network of preestablished harmony. He needs an absolute that expresses itself infinitely in infinitely many expressions, all of which are potentially concrete and prepare for adequation, or are adequate in their foundation, but nonetheless can never be completely adequate. This results in his monstrous system of monadology: each monad is an infinite expression of the world, which is concrete in some parts but abstract in some others; all expressions potentially adequately ordered in one expression, though yet enfolded; which abstraction and inadequacy come in because of the necessary exclusion of one monad from another, each monad included in the other as transcendence, which however does not affect Cartesianism, as knowledge confined within one soul, everything guaranteed by harmony.

Continuation on 3.: in other words, Descartes’ mistake stems from his confusing immanence with transcendence, so that he tries to know what is supposedly not able to be known, to make the unknown a ground for the known, or to reach the unknown from the known, and that is to say Descartes does not follow the principle of sufficient reason, and stops where he should not stop, so that he does not overcome nor exclude transcendence, but let it stand amidst our imagination as a black hole, itself an unintelligible remainder that is not related to anything else as the sufficient ground of things; both Spinoza and Leibniz recognize his mistake, but unlike Spinoza who eliminates transcendence ontologically and upholds immanence as the most primary, to deduce everything continuously, Leibniz on the other hand restricts continuity of expression to the realm of passivity inside the monad, so that what we know is grounded in the monad and nowhere else. Eventually, both provide sufficient reasons, so that what is expressive is in principle exhausted in its expressions; though for Spinoza, such expressions are common expressions, while for Leibniz, any expression is a unique expression included in a unique center of expression. The most succinct way to put it, I think, is to say that for Spinoza, knowledge expands as it increases, as for Leibniz, it contracts and becomes more concentrated. Truth is an expanse, a plane of immanence for Spinoza, where transcendence is overcome; but a point, a closure, an inclusion for Leibniz, where transcendence is excluded, but in this exclusion most genuinely retains its nature qua transcendence, and reduces the expression of one monad as its counter-expression.

Both Spinoza and Leibniz try to get rid of the Cartesian black hole of subjectivity, where one arrives at the ultimate darkness as the ground, by relating this ground to everything else through adequation as expression; though as Spinoza does it, one expands, and as Leibniz does it, one contracts, for one unfolds it from matter and enfolds it into the monad; but either way, every partial expression is continuous with any other partial expression, the expressed is exhausted in the expressions (even the transcendent world for Leibniz is only transcendence immanent to the monad and can be infinitely unfolded in infinitely many expressions, that is, the world as the expressed exists only in those expressions of it included in one center of expression; the movement of adequation is always to and fro and back and forth, from inside to outside, then back to the inside, an unfolding and enfolding at the same time; what is important, however, is what is considered to be more primary, and for Leibniz as well as Spinoza, it is the activity, the immanent expression, the elimination of transcendence that is more primary and prominent, though Leibniz has to rescue transcendence in the last instance to save morality as such), the expression and expressed are always concrete and have a content through all relations of the expressions, and also the expressed does not cause the expression, but rather is comprehended by the expression.