Baruch Spinoza · 巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎
Ethics · 伦理学
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斯宾诺莎的认识论转向
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斯宾诺莎的认识论转向:
本体是独立存在「且」无需它物便可被思的东西。从「伦理学」开篇的定义思与在就已经获得统一了。但一个需要注意的地方,这并不代表之后斯宾诺莎没有更深入地发展这个「预设」;相反的,我们甚至可以说,斯宾诺莎通过这一预设颠倒了他所问的问题。
斯宾诺莎的思路如下。
1. 从对本体的定义出发,我们可以得出确定「某物是本体」的方法,即,如果一个东西可以不依赖于任何其它东西被思考,那这个东西就是一个本体;
2. 如果有人说,「虽然我认识到了本体,可我如何确定在认识之外的「本体本身」是否与认识内的本体呼应呢?」,这时候斯宾诺莎的回应就是,「当你如此问的时候,你实际上在假设,如果在我认识中的本体其实不是它自身,也就是说,如果我对「本体」的认识实际上来自其它事物,那该如何。可是这是自相矛盾的,因为你对「本体」的认识不能来自其它事物。如果你的这个假设是真的,那只能说明,你要么认识到的不是本体,要么你的认识是错误的。」;
3. 这样,我们需要解决的问题就不是认识内外的呼应问题,而是我们是否能找到一个认识内的本体,使得其无需任何其它认识内的事物奠基便可被认识。如果有这样一个东西,那我们就可以说,确实存在这样的事物。这也是为什么斯宾诺莎的本体论第一证明如此简洁:试着思考「上帝不存在」,其荒谬自然显示出来。因为上帝正是这一个无需任何其它事物就可以被认识的东西,因此其认识只能来源于祂自身。如果有人说,来源于某物的认识不代表对某物的认识,那斯宾诺莎会有同样的回应,「如果来源于某物的认识不是某物,那它必然有其它的来源使它不同于那某物,因此它依然不会是「本体」。」;
第二证明则遵循同样的原则,即,「因为没有东西可以使上帝不存在,所以上帝存在」,可以被转化为,「因为没有东西可以影响对上帝的认识,所以上帝必然被认识为「本体」,所以上帝必然存在。」。
综上,斯宾诺莎虽然使用的了一种认识论进路,但由于他思考的对象的特殊性,这个认识论进路与本体论进路相重合,是一种特殊的认识论。
斯宾诺莎是很有意志力且蛮不讲理的哲学家,最显著的可以从四个地方看出来:1. 他轻巧地默许了无限回退进入他的系统;2. 他一方面在讨论人与上帝的差异时强调了因与果的差异,一方面却「捏造」了「自因说」;3. 他否定了前人对「无限身体」的批评,认为这不过说明了「无限的身体是不可分的」,但这是奠基在他已经更改了对「身体」的定义上了,对前人来说,「可分」是身体的最重要的属性,对他来说这只是来自于「想象力」;4. 一方面在论证无限的属性产生无限的情动时,他说「决断」永远隐含了「非决断」的可能性,即条件性,但在之后他又彻底否定了条件性,认为任何决断都是必然的,但仅仅说决断来自于上帝的必然性并不完全意味着决断本身是必然的,至少这是一个有争论的问题,尤其是联系决断的「无限回退」。我认为前三点要强于第四点,因为第四点似乎有更大的希望去解决。
其实还有一条进路,也就是从公理6反推回去:因为你的知识是真的,那它不能是假的,因此对象必须与认识相符。所以你对本体的真认识必然意味着本体的存在。接下来就是决定哪个可以被真正认识为本体。也就是找到那个不需要奠基于其它认识的认识。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Spinoza’s Epistemic Turn:
Substance is what exists independently and can be conceived without anything else. Thought and being are already unified in the opening definitions of the Ethics. But one point deserves attention: this does not mean that Spinoza fails to develop this “presupposition” more deeply afterward. On the contrary, we can even say that through this presupposition he reverses the question he asks.
Spinoza’s line of thought runs as follows.
1. From the definition of substance, we can derive a method of determining that “something is a substance”: if something can be thought without depending on anything else, it is a substance.
2. If someone says, “Although I have cognized substance, how can I be certain that ‘substance itself’ outside cognition corresponds to substance within cognition?”, Spinoza’s response is: “When you ask this, you are actually supposing: what if the substance in my cognition is not itself—that is, what if my cognition of ‘substance’ actually comes from something else? But this is self-contradictory, because your cognition of ‘substance’ cannot come from something else. If your supposition is true, it only shows that either what you cognize is not substance, or your cognition is mistaken.”
3. The problem we must resolve is therefore not correspondence between the inside and outside of cognition, but whether we can find a substance within cognition that can be cognized without being grounded by anything else within cognition. If there is such a thing, we can say that it genuinely exists. This is also why Spinoza’s first ontological proof is so concise: try to think “God does not exist,” and the absurdity reveals itself. God is precisely what can be cognized without anything else, so cognition of him can arise only from himself. If someone says that cognition arising from something does not imply cognition of that thing, Spinoza offers the same response: “If cognition arising from something is not that thing, it must have another source that makes it differ from that thing; it would therefore still not be ‘substance.’”
The second proof follows the same principle. “Because nothing can make God not exist, God exists” can be transformed into: “Because nothing can affect cognition of God, God must be cognized as ‘substance,’ and therefore God must exist.”
To sum up, although Spinoza uses an epistemic approach, the peculiar nature of his object makes this approach coincide with the ontological one. It is a special kind of epistemology.
Spinoza is a very strong-willed and rather unreasonable philosopher. This is clearest in four places. 1. He lightly allows infinite regress into his system. 2. While emphasizing the difference between cause and effect when discussing humanity’s difference from God, he nevertheless “invents” the doctrine of “self-causation.” 3. He rejects earlier criticisms of the “infinite body,” holding that these merely show that “an infinite body is indivisible.” But this rests on his having already changed the definition of “body.” For earlier thinkers, “divisibility” is the body’s most important property; for him it comes merely from “imagination.” 4. When arguing that infinite attributes produce infinite affections, he says that “determination” always implies the possibility of “nondetermination,” hence conditionality. Later, however, he rejects conditionality entirely, holding every determination necessary. Yet merely saying that determination comes from God’s necessity does not wholly imply that determination itself is necessary. At least this is debatable, especially in connection with the “infinite regress” of determinations. I consider the first three points stronger than the fourth, because the fourth seems more amenable to resolution.
There is actually another approach, reasoning backward from Axiom 6: because your knowledge is true, it cannot be false, so the object must agree with cognition. Your true cognition of substance therefore necessarily implies substance’s existence. What remains is to determine what can truly be cognized as substance: to find the cognition that does not need grounding in another cognition.