Miscellaneous · 杂记
Music and mathematics · 音乐与数学
The String, Ratio, and Magnitude
Paper / 论文 · Date from document metadata / 日期据原稿文件信息 · Editorial title / 本版编拟标题
Cutting the string presents at once both a practical and an intellectual difficulty, and its practicality is evinced through both the difficulty itself and the way to its solution. For what is difficult about cutting the string is the preservation of our natural hearing, or the inborn “tuning” of our ears, within a mathematically simple and convincing construct. In other words, the mathematical hypothesis here is to “save the appearances”, rather than destroy them, hence the difficulty has to be related to the practical.
The solution to this problem is also practical, in the sense that it can only be done when the string is viewed as a magnitude. The practical aspect lies in the fact that the mathematical operation dealing with this difficulty cannot have the arithmetical monads (I mean by arithmetical monads those indivisible units for constructing numbers, their indivisibility contributing to their ideal simplicity and purity) as its objects. For a tone presents multiple ratios in relation to other tones, while all these ratios have to remain simple, the string that manifests this tone, hence, has to brook being divided into different measures. For instance, in the Pythagorean scale, from the second to the third, a ratio of 8 to 9 is required, yet from the third to the fourth, the ratio is 243 to 256. These two ratios are united through the mediating tone, namely the third, and this unity is possible only in two ways. One, the third is a collection of arithmetical monads that is large enough to allow being divided in two ways, by number 9 and 243, or, the third is a magnitude that is without limits. The first possibility is vitiated by the initiative of simplicity in our mathematical construct: if the third is treated as a large sum of arithmetical monads, and large enough to be in whole number ratio with any other tone in this scale aside from those immediately nearby, the collection will be clunky and unwieldy. The ugliness of this construct clearly suggests we taking the third as a simple magnitude, which is in a way, as we shall see, oxymoronic.
A magnitude allows within itself infinite ways of division, and this makes it convenient to establish different ratios. For if we consider the third, it easily establishes the ratio 9 to 8 with the second with one measure, whilst establishing the ratio 243 to 256 with another measure. It is just like when we say this spear is 3 cubits long, so three times of one cubit; yet it is also equal to 4.5 feet, hence nine times of a half foot. This easiness on our mind is not possible unless the tone is conceived as a magnitude, and not a number composed of pure arithmetical monads.
The tone being conceived of as a magnitude, however, does not automatically make the whole operation with tones practical, without clarifying first where practicality here is bounded off. For in one way we can say geometry, which deals with magnitudes, is practical, yet theoretical in another. The sense of practicality here is sensuality. A magnitude obtains only in the sensible, for the thoughts of things are complete and indivisible, according to Aristotle. In this vein, sciences like geometry and music have to retain the sensible, and sensibility will be germane to any exploration in these fields.
Thus far I have maintained that the practicality of the construction of scales lies in the sensibility of this phenomenon. The phenomenon is sensible in a twofold way. First, it is sensible because it is sensed, and is exclusively related to the stimulation of the ear. That means it has a sonic quality. Second, it is sensible so that it is a magnitude, and being a magnitude makes it mathematical viable for the construction. Yet, we have to notice the intricacy imbued in this twofold sensibility in relation to the intellect. It is precisely the ear that first delimits the whole number ratios, so that one has to be careful in saying that the mind imposes a mathematical construct upon the phenomenon. It is never enough to stress that the mathematical hypotheses here are not to destroy appearances, but to save them, in making them accountable and harmonized with each other. Also, one can see how being a magnitude only prepares and validates the mathematical treatment, instead of compromising it. The potentially unlimited is there to lay the groundwork for the limiting factors, and to receive those multifarious limitations. But this only raises the most crucial problem that I have so far evaded: what is the thinghood of tones?
It seems at first that a tone is a composite thing. It has a mathematical relationship to other things of the same kind, and is thus limited by a certain mathematical form. Yet its limitations, instead of being one, are multiple, and the unity or integrity of a tone lies not so much in that multiplicity of mathematical relationships it has to others, but in itself being a magnitude that receives these relationships.
It can be said that the ratios, or mathematical relationships, are in a way heterogeneous to the thing itself. For a relative quality is only there with the presence of another, and will change in accordance to the change of the other without necessarily involving the transmutation of oneself. For instance, a stripling is lower than a grown tree, yet with the stripling staying the same while the other felled, the stripling now becomes higher than the remaining stump of the other tree without any of its own effort. And if relative qualities are not even qualities of one’s own, how can they be said to be the thinghood of it? So are the mathematical ratios between tones characterized, not as forms of tones, but only relatives.
Therefore we have to seek the thinghood of tones somewhere else. The conviction is sustained that the limiting factor has to exhibit a mathematical aspect, by the very fact of tones being mathematically determined with respect to each other. Yet the limit should not stem from the ratios themselves, but only from the tones as mathematical beings.
Being a magnitude in itself also does not fully resolve the issue, for a magnitude, as we see, is only partially limited. Every magnitude is limited by the thinghood so that it expresses itself as a finite magnitude. Notwithstanding its finitude, it still retains the infinite potency. And insofar as the tone, qua magnitude, is composite in this way, the pure limiting factor remains lost.
Some say it is the measure that contributes to the being of the magnitude. That three centimeters is gathered into a whole by the common measure of one centimeter. Despite its superficial persuasiveness, one has to reckon that the common measure here is only a “one among many”, instead of the “one over many” which collects the three things into one singular collection. Also, this measure hardly works with our objects at hand. The tone is a unity of ratios instead of merely homogeneous measures, which means that the tone somehow exceeds the former example, into a unity of different, heterogeneous measures. By this current impasse, one is, of course, tempted to resort to the thing that is spurned with earlier, i.e. to conceive of the tone as a collection of arithmetical monads, a number that is large enough to be divided by multifarious other numbers without remainder. This would solve the problem because a number in this sense is naturally intellectual and pure, hence its unity is both ideal and homogeneous in itself, and its division without remainder. Within a number of this kind, there will be no multiplicity of measures, for every unit is the same as every other; also the number in thought naturally holds the collection of units under one name. A magnitude seems essentially incapable of doing this: first, it is a composite product derivative from a pure form, its unity thus provided from elsewhere other than itself; second, unlike a collection of arithmetical monads, a magnitude holds within itself the potential infinity that requires limiting. In other words, it needs be determined if the tone is in itself finite, or only finite by an external principle. And if it is finite by an external principle, other questions will ensue: what is the external principle? in what way is this external principle mathematical, so that it allows for multiple mathematical ratios?
Here, we see the ultimate incapability of mathematical understanding to really render intelligible the phenomenon of music. This necessitates a radical modification of our thinking, and in one sense an ascension. The being of a tone is far from its being a magnitude. To inquire into its magnitude, however, will guide us to that ultimate inquiry into the unity that limits the magnitude. The proposal is, this unity can be thought in no other terms except that of whole-and-part relationship. For the different measures unified within the tone are nothing but distinct (hence akin to the understanding) partial articulations of the whole. It is only through grasping the wholeness of this being that we discern a mathematical structure that allows the sensible tone to be related to all other tones. Therefore, it is most vividly expressed through music, with its peculiar mathematical character, what Aristotle considers to be the case, that everything sensed is a sensed form.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
分弦同时提出了一个实践的困难和一个智性的困难;它的实践性既体现于困难本身,也体现于解决困难的途径。因为,分弦之难,在于如何在一个数学上简单而有说服力的构造中,保存我们的自然听觉,或者说耳朵与生俱来的“调音”。换句话说,这里的数学假设旨在“拯救现象”,而不是摧毁现象,因此,这个困难必然与实践相关。
这个问题的解决同样是实践性的,因为只有把弦视为一个量,问题才能得到解决。其实践方面在于:处理这一困难的数学操作,不能以算术单元为对象。我所谓算术单元,是指构成数的那些不可分的单位;它们的不可分性,使它们在理念上具有简单性与纯粹性。因为,一个音相对于其它音呈现出多种比例,而所有这些比例又必须保持简单,所以,表现这个音的弦必须容许按不同尺度来划分。例如,在毕达哥拉斯音阶中,从第二级到第三级,需要8比9的比例,而从第三级到第四级,比例却是243比256。这两个比例通过中介的音,也就是第三级,统一起来,而这样的统一只有两种可能。一种是:第三级是一个算术单元的集合,它足够庞大,能够按两种方式划分,即被9和243整除;另一种则是:第三级是一个不受限制的量。我们的数学构造追求简单性这一出发点,使第一种可能失效:如果把第三级当作大量算术单元的总和,而且这个总和还要大到足以同音阶里除紧邻音以外的任何其它音构成整数比,那么这个集合就会笨重而难以操作。这个构造的丑陋,清楚地提示我们,应把第三级看作一个简单的量;而我们将会看到,这在某种意义上又是一个矛盾修辞。
一个量在自身内部容许无限多种划分方式,这使建立不同的比例变得方便。如果考察第三级,它可以轻易地用一个尺度与第二级建立9比8的比例,同时又用另一个尺度建立243比256的比例。这就像我们说,这根矛长3肘,也就是一肘的三倍;但它又等于4.5英尺,也就是半英尺的九倍。除非把音理解为量,而不是由纯粹算术单元构成的数,这种思考上的便利便是不可能的。
然而,把音理解为量,并不会自动使全部关于音的操作成为实践性的;我们必须先澄清,这里的实践性是从哪里划界的。因为,从一个角度,我们可以说,研究量的几何学是实践的,但从另一个角度,它又是理论的。这里所谓实践性,是指感性。量只存在于可感者中,因为按照亚里士多德的说法,关于事物的思想是完整而不可分的。循此而言,几何学和音乐这样的科学,必须保留可感者,而感性将与这些领域内的任何探索密切相关。
到目前为止,我一直主张,音阶构造的实践性在于这一现象的感性。这个现象在两重意义上是可感的。首先,它是可感的,因为它被感觉到,并且专门与耳朵的刺激相关。这意味着,它具有声音的性质。其次,它是可感的,因此它是一个量;而作为量,又使它在数学上能够进入这一构造。然而,我们必须注意,这种双重感性与智性之间的关系,蕴含着怎样的复杂性。首先划定整数比的恰恰是耳朵,所以,当我们说心灵把一个数学构造强加于现象时,必须谨慎。无论怎样强调都不为过:这里的数学假设不是要摧毁现象,而是通过使现象能够被说明、彼此协调,来拯救现象。同样,我们可以看到,作为量,只是为数学处理作准备,并使之成立,而不是损害它。潜在的无限者,是为限制性因素奠定基础,并接受那些多种多样的限定。但这仅仅提出了那个我迄今一直回避的最关键的问题:音的物性是什么?
乍看起来,一个音是一个复合事物。它与其它同类事物具有数学关系,因此受到某种数学形式的限制。然而,它的限定不是单一的,而是多重的;一个音的统一性或完整性,与其说在于它同其它音之间的多重数学关系,不如说在于它自身是一个接受这些关系的量。
我们可以说,比例,或者数学关系,在某种意义上与事物自身是异质的。因为,一种相对性质只有在另一事物在场时才存在,而且会随另一事物的变化而改变,却不必涉及自身的转变。例如,一株幼树比一棵成年的树矮;然而,在幼树保持原样而另一棵树被砍倒之后,幼树现在便比另一棵树剩下的树桩高,而它自身没有付出任何努力。如果相对性质甚至不是事物自身的性质,又怎么能说它们是它的物性呢?音与音之间的数学比例,也应这样刻画:它们并不是音的形式,而只是相对关系。
因此,我们必须到别处寻找音的物性。音彼此之间受数学规定这一事实,支持着这样一个信念:限制性因素必须表现出数学的一面。但这个限制不应来自比例本身,而应仅仅来自作为数学存在者的音。
作为量本身,也不能完全解决这个问题。因为正如我们所见,一个量只是部分地受到限制。每个量都受其物性的限制,从而把自身表达为有限的量。尽管它是有限的,它仍然保留着无限的潜能。而音作为量,只要在这个意义上是复合的,那个纯粹的限制性因素便仍然没有找到。
有人说,尺度促成了量的存在:三厘米通过一厘米这个共同尺度,被聚集为一个整体。尽管这一说法表面上颇具说服力,我们仍必须承认,这里的共同尺度只是“多中之一”,而不是把三个事物聚集成一个单一集合的“多上之一”。而且,这个尺度很难适用于我们手头的对象。音是比例的统一,而不只是同质尺度的统一;这意味着,音在某种意义上超出了先前的例子,成为不同的、异质尺度的统一。面对眼下的困境,我们当然容易求助于先前所摒弃的东西,也就是把音理解为算术单元的集合,理解为一个足够大的数,可以被多种多样的其它数整除而不留下余数。这将解决问题,因为在这个意义上的数,天然就是智性的、纯粹的;因此,它的统一性在自身中既是理念的,也是同质的,它的划分也没有余数。在这样一个数内部,不会有尺度的多样性,因为每个单位都与其它所有单位相同;而且,思想中的数天然把单位的集合统摄于一个名称之下。量似乎在本质上无法做到这一点:首先,它是从纯粹形式派生出来的复合产物,因此,其统一性来自自身以外的某处;其次,与算术单元的集合不同,量在自身内部包含着需要加以限制的潜在无限。换句话说,必须确定,音究竟在自身中就是有限的,还是仅仅通过一个外在原则才成为有限的。如果它通过外在原则才成为有限的,就会引出其它问题:这个外在原则是什么?这个外在原则如何具有数学性质,从而容许多种数学比例?
在这里,我们看到,数学理解最终无法真正使音乐现象成为可理解的。这要求我们彻底改变自己的思考,并在某种意义上有所上升。一个音的存在,远远不是它作为量的存在。然而,探究它的量,将引导我们走向那个最终的探究,即探究限制着量的统一性。这里提出的是:除了整体与部分的关系之外,这种统一性无法通过其它范畴来思考。因为,在音内部统一起来的不同尺度,无非是整体的各个分明的——因而与知性相近的——局部环节。只有把握这个存在者的整体性,我们才能辨认出一个数学结构,让可感的音得以与其它所有音发生关系。因此,亚里士多德所认为的情形,即一切被感觉到的都是一个被感觉到的形式,通过音乐及其特殊的数学性质,得到了最生动的表达。