Gui Ruiyan

Miscellaneous · 杂记
Music and mathematics · 音乐与数学

The String, Ratio, and Magnitude

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Cutting the string presents at once both a practical and an intellectual difficulty, and its practicality is evinced through both the difficulty itself and the way to its solution. For what is difficult about cutting the string is the preservation of our natural hearing, or the inborn “tuning” of our ears, within a mathematically simple and convincing construct. In other words, the mathematical hypothesis here is to “save the appearances”, rather than destroy them, hence the difficulty has to be related to the practical.

The solution to this problem is also practical, in the sense that it can only be done when the string is viewed as a magnitude. The practical aspect lies in the fact that the mathematical operation dealing with this difficulty cannot have the arithmetical monads (I mean by arithmetical monads those indivisible units for constructing numbers, their indivisibility contributing to their ideal simplicity and purity) as its objects. For a tone presents multiple ratios in relation to other tones, while all these ratios have to remain simple, the string that manifests this tone, hence, has to brook being divided into different measures. For instance, in the Pythagorean scale, from the second to the third, a ratio of 8 to 9 is required, yet from the third to the fourth, the ratio is 243 to 256. These two ratios are united through the mediating tone, namely the third, and this unity is possible only in two ways. One, the third is a collection of arithmetical monads that is large enough to allow being divided in two ways, by number 9 and 243, or, the third is a magnitude that is without limits. The first possibility is vitiated by the initiative of simplicity in our mathematical construct: if the third is treated as a large sum of arithmetical monads, and large enough to be in whole number ratio with any other tone in this scale aside from those immediately nearby, the collection will be clunky and unwieldy. The ugliness of this construct clearly suggests we taking the third as a simple magnitude, which is in a way, as we shall see, oxymoronic.

A magnitude allows within itself infinite ways of division, and this makes it convenient to establish different ratios. For if we consider the third, it easily establishes the ratio 9 to 8 with the second with one measure, whilst establishing the ratio 243 to 256 with another measure. It is just like when we say this spear is 3 cubits long, so three times of one cubit; yet it is also equal to 4.5 feet, hence nine times of a half foot. This easiness on our mind is not possible unless the tone is conceived as a magnitude, and not a number composed of pure arithmetical monads.

The tone being conceived of as a magnitude, however, does not automatically make the whole operation with tones practical, without clarifying first where practicality here is bounded off. For in one way we can say geometry, which deals with magnitudes, is practical, yet theoretical in another. The sense of practicality here is sensuality. A magnitude obtains only in the sensible, for the thoughts of things are complete and indivisible, according to Aristotle. In this vein, sciences like geometry and music have to retain the sensible, and sensibility will be germane to any exploration in these fields.

Thus far I have maintained that the practicality of the construction of scales lies in the sensibility of this phenomenon. The phenomenon is sensible in a twofold way. First, it is sensible because it is sensed, and is exclusively related to the stimulation of the ear. That means it has a sonic quality. Second, it is sensible so that it is a magnitude, and being a magnitude makes it mathematical viable for the construction. Yet, we have to notice the intricacy imbued in this twofold sensibility in relation to the intellect. It is precisely the ear that first delimits the whole number ratios, so that one has to be careful in saying that the mind imposes a mathematical construct upon the phenomenon. It is never enough to stress that the mathematical hypotheses here are not to destroy appearances, but to save them, in making them accountable and harmonized with each other. Also, one can see how being a magnitude only prepares and validates the mathematical treatment, instead of compromising it. The potentially unlimited is there to lay the groundwork for the limiting factors, and to receive those multifarious limitations. But this only raises the most crucial problem that I have so far evaded: what is the thinghood of tones?

It seems at first that a tone is a composite thing. It has a mathematical relationship to other things of the same kind, and is thus limited by a certain mathematical form. Yet its limitations, instead of being one, are multiple, and the unity or integrity of a tone lies not so much in that multiplicity of mathematical relationships it has to others, but in itself being a magnitude that receives these relationships.

It can be said that the ratios, or mathematical relationships, are in a way heterogeneous to the thing itself. For a relative quality is only there with the presence of another, and will change in accordance to the change of the other without necessarily involving the transmutation of oneself. For instance, a stripling is lower than a grown tree, yet with the stripling staying the same while the other felled, the stripling now becomes higher than the remaining stump of the other tree without any of its own effort. And if relative qualities are not even qualities of one’s own, how can they be said to be the thinghood of it? So are the mathematical ratios between tones characterized, not as forms of tones, but only relatives.

Therefore we have to seek the thinghood of tones somewhere else. The conviction is sustained that the limiting factor has to exhibit a mathematical aspect, by the very fact of tones being mathematically determined with respect to each other. Yet the limit should not stem from the ratios themselves, but only from the tones as mathematical beings.

Being a magnitude in itself also does not fully resolve the issue, for a magnitude, as we see, is only partially limited. Every magnitude is limited by the thinghood so that it expresses itself as a finite magnitude. Notwithstanding its finitude, it still retains the infinite potency. And insofar as the tone, qua magnitude, is composite in this way, the pure limiting factor remains lost.

Some say it is the measure that contributes to the being of the magnitude. That three centimeters is gathered into a whole by the common measure of one centimeter. Despite its superficial persuasiveness, one has to reckon that the common measure here is only a “one among many”, instead of the “one over many” which collects the three things into one singular collection. Also, this measure hardly works with our objects at hand. The tone is a unity of ratios instead of merely homogeneous measures, which means that the tone somehow exceeds the former example, into a unity of different, heterogeneous measures. By this current impasse, one is, of course, tempted to resort to the thing that is spurned with earlier, i.e. to conceive of the tone as a collection of arithmetical monads, a number that is large enough to be divided by multifarious other numbers without remainder. This would solve the problem because a number in this sense is naturally intellectual and pure, hence its unity is both ideal and homogeneous in itself, and its division without remainder. Within a number of this kind, there will be no multiplicity of measures, for every unit is the same as every other; also the number in thought naturally holds the collection of units under one name. A magnitude seems essentially incapable of doing this: first, it is a composite product derivative from a pure form, its unity thus provided from elsewhere other than itself; second, unlike a collection of arithmetical monads, a magnitude holds within itself the potential infinity that requires limiting. In other words, it needs be determined if the tone is in itself finite, or only finite by an external principle. And if it is finite by an external principle, other questions will ensue: what is the external principle? in what way is this external principle mathematical, so that it allows for multiple mathematical ratios?

Here, we see the ultimate incapability of mathematical understanding to really render intelligible the phenomenon of music. This necessitates a radical modification of our thinking, and in one sense an ascension. The being of a tone is far from its being a magnitude. To inquire into its magnitude, however, will guide us to that ultimate inquiry into the unity that limits the magnitude. The proposal is, this unity can be thought in no other terms except that of whole-and-part relationship. For the different measures unified within the tone are nothing but distinct (hence akin to the understanding) partial articulations of the whole. It is only through grasping the wholeness of this being that we discern a mathematical structure that allows the sensible tone to be related to all other tones. Therefore, it is most vividly expressed through music, with its peculiar mathematical character, what Aristotle considers to be the case, that everything sensed is a sensed form.