László Tengelyi · 拉斯洛·滕格义
Selfhood, experience, and phenomenology · 自身性、经验与现象学
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自身性、经验与现象学——散记
Reflections · Pages
滕老师论自我差异
承袭后-结构主义与梅洛庞蒂,滕认为自我首先是视角;也就是,自我并非任何一种构造之形象,而是一切构造最终呈现的透视方位。这首先意味着,自我究其根本是不可还原的差异性;哪怕他人与我共享了一切经验,其根本上仍然是外在于“我属”的。一切经验根本上都只能自第一人称视角出发。
然而,当自我在这个意义上成为了不可被还原为质料内容的纯粹差异时,质料内容也相对应地获得了自身的差异性,而这种差异性则是相对于自我差异性的他者的差异性。
而自我经验同时要求着结构性的我属视角与质料性的经验内容,因此在经验中同时存在着原初的自性与他者性。
然而,在经验领域,自性与他者性时常被颠倒与混淆。其原因在于,自我在作为视角的同时,本身也在世界化进程中被构造为实体,因此自我分裂成质料自我和形式自我;形式自我,即自我的视角,超出质料自我的视界而展现为“未曾被辨认的自我”,以他者的面貌勾勒出“意义经验的野性领域”。
换句话说,滕在这里就是把拉康翻译到现象学去了……
滕老师的问题域
滕理解的胡:1.范畴直观并非是对更高对象的直观,而是对经验对象直观的充实。
2.因此,范畴直观与经验直观相互依存。
3.经验直观即感性直观。
这将解决如下几个问题。第一,范畴因此并不独立于对象,无论是作为外在于对象的主体规定,还是作为内在于对象的谓述。第二,经验的意义结构如此可以被确立,而无需借助于判断或表达,如此前语言的意义经验将是可讨论的。第三,和康德一样,这将同时规避教条经验主义与教条理性主义的陷阱。
然而,这个视角将同时导致新的问题,接下来就是滕格义自己的问题域刻画。
首先,(滕所理解的)胡的范畴直观与经验直观之间并不仅仅只是相互依存的关系,而是奠基关系。这是因为胡并不满足于康德式的双重原则,而希望建立一个整全的结构;双重原则即使相互依存,其原则本身仍然是独立的,而非一个整体。这与胡的理念不符,可从上面的1,2,3条看出。
然而,这意味着进行奠基的经验直观本身就具有意义结构,而范畴直观的意义结构仅仅是经验直观中意义结构的充实或升华。同时,范畴直观又确实不同于经验直观。如此,对范畴直观与经验直观的区分就极为重要,如果要进一步勾勒两者之间关系的话。两者作为一个整体却相互独立,拥有差异的意义结构。也正是因为两者被视作同一个整体,其相应结构的区分才显得重要。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
Professor Tengelyi on Self-Difference
Following poststructuralism and Merleau-Ponty, Tengelyi takes the self to be, first of all, a perspective. The self is not any constituted image, but the perspectival orientation in which every constitution ultimately appears. This first means that the self is fundamentally irreducible difference. Even if another person shared all my experiences, they would still be fundamentally external to what is “mine.” All experience can fundamentally begin only from a first-person perspective.
Yet when the self becomes, in this sense, pure difference irreducible to material content, material content correspondingly gains its own difference: the difference of the other relative to the self’s difference.
Self-experience simultaneously requires both the structural perspective of mineness and the material content of experience. Originary selfhood and otherness therefore coexist within experience.
Within the field of experience, however, selfhood and otherness are often inverted and confused. The reason is that, while the self is a perspective, it is also constituted as an entity in the process of worlding. The self thus splits into a material self and a formal self. The formal self, the self’s perspective, exceeds the material self’s horizon and appears as an “unrecognized self.” In the guise of the other, it outlines the “wild region of the experience of meaning.”
In other words, Tengelyi is translating Lacan into phenomenology here…
Professor Tengelyi’s Field of Problems
Husserl as Tengelyi understands him: 1. Categorial intuition is not intuition of a higher object, but the fulfillment of intuition of an empirical object.
2. Categorial intuition and empirical intuition are therefore interdependent.
3. Empirical intuition is sensible intuition.
This resolves several problems. First, categories are not independent of objects, whether as subjective determinations external to objects or as predications intrinsic to objects. Second, experience’s structure of meaning can thus be established without recourse to judgment or expression, making prelinguistic experience of meaning discussable. Third, as with Kant, this avoids the traps of both dogmatic empiricism and dogmatic rationalism.
Yet this perspective also produces new problems. What follows is Tengelyi’s characterization of his own field of problems.
First, Husserl’s categorial and empirical intuition, as Tengelyi understands them, are not merely interdependent: they stand in a relation of foundation. This is because Husserl is not satisfied with Kantian dual principles, but hopes to establish a comprehensive structure. Even if two principles are interdependent, the principles themselves remain independent rather than constituting one whole. This conflicts with Husserl’s conception, as points 1, 2, and 3 above show.
This means, however, that the founding empirical intuition itself possesses a structure of meaning, while categorial intuition’s structure of meaning is merely the fulfillment or sublimation of that in empirical intuition. At the same time, categorial intuition genuinely differs from empirical intuition. Distinguishing them therefore becomes crucial if their relation is to be delineated further. They constitute one whole, yet are mutually independent, possessing different structures of meaning. Precisely because they are considered one whole, distinguishing their corresponding structures matters.