Alfred North Whitehead · 阿尔弗雷德·诺思·怀特海
Process and Reality · 过程与实在
25年怀特海笔记
Douban · Bidasari
Source revised / 来源修订: 26 June 2026
In this note / 篇目
怀特海论什么是思辨哲学:
1. 任何思辨哲学都是从最高总体性出发对一切经验的普遍解释。这一普遍解释要求合宜(adequacy),即对事实解释的有力,和顺服(coherence),即诸概念之间互相规定的紧密。到达顶点的总体性要求创造性的想象力,也就是并非仅仅是另一种意义上进行抽象的想象力,而是在抽象的同时对抽象概念进行逻辑组织和系统生成的能力。但显然,任何哲学都是无法完全解释一切事实的,任何如此宣称的无非是教条主义。但哲学之所以没有不是特殊的局限于分支的科学,恰恰是因为它占据了这一总体性的中心,并在这一总体性中心的位置上,作为整全世界,与其它整全的世界进行交互,并在这个意义上获得思辨的自由。而这一思辨交互正是神圣概念的自我充实,并在这个演化过程中,演化了神圣概念的实在内容。
2. 概念首先不能仅仅是被理解成一个主谓结构中的主语,而恰恰因其自我充实的演化过程,是诸实在的集合的自我纠正。因此,真正重要的并非概念,而是概念的意义,而概念意义是时空上被其它意义规定充实的。思辨哲学就是对这些意义进行整体上规划和总结的学科。在这种情况下,思辨哲学恰恰不是常识,也不能依赖于常识,而必须不断生成对常识的革命。在这里,思辨哲学是有诗性的,只是它对概念的创造依赖于理性与辩证的知识,而非审美体验。它同样并非科学,因为任意科学只能是区域本体论;像培根那样站在经验科学的立场上对形而上学的攻击本身恰恰还是形而上学的;科学作为区域本体论因此只是对“纯粹”事实(经验科学将事实解读为直接可感物)的思想解读。它也并非宗教,因为宗教是对“纯粹”经验(宗教将其解读为直接的情动与感受)的思想解读。哲学则是在思想本身的立场上对宗教和科学的统一综合。
3. 思辨哲学因此需要规避两种危险,一种是沉浸于常识,从而无法进入概念创造活动的总体平面。任何科学在奠基处其实就处在这样的平面上,只是其后的沉淀和细分逐渐让这一科学失去了此前驱动它的思辨强度。另一种则是完全教条化,忽视了创造性活动所要求的潜能个体化进程,从而要么认为自己的系统是正确的,要么认为对自己系统的修正是简单直接的。事实上,任何精神系统都必然是辩证变化的,一方面,它从“事实”,也就是对低限度的解释中,获取契机,另一方面,它在与其它世界的批评交互中进展。我们因此可以将思辨哲学视作一种“表达”,而非数学化的定论。表达无失于真理性,如果真理本就是对神圣概念的表达。
4. 这不就是胡塞尔吗?
怀特海与「生机哲学(philosophy of organism)」
1. 生机哲学的宇宙论图景以「一」与「多」为基本范畴要素,而这里必须强调这一范畴确定的图景与以「有」与「无」为基本范畴的图景之间根本的不同。在「一」与「多」之间的生成关系表达为「创造」范畴。而任一生成都必然符合这一关系,其生成结果之为一被表达为「实在(actual entity)」,可说是莱布尼茨的单子或本体,是主体,但不一定是意识,也是无限的「预相(prehensions)」在感受中的综合。预相虽是实在的材料,但在实在统合之下才成为材料,因此是「一下之多」,但其为「一下之多」,本身也可以再次被分析为无限的预相,并且作为新的中心同样统合所有这些无限的预相,只是在这一番操作下,它将在定义上就不再是隶属于实在的诸预相之一,而反而自己是一个实在了。
2. 任何的预相,因其总是「一下之多」,永远是在实体的内部的。但它同样昭显了在这实体生成前的「一外之多」,也就是,并非是其内容,而是诸多实体相聚,使这实体得以生成的整个境况,这就是「契机(nexus)」。但是生成这一实在的契机是唯一的,假如实在已经被确认,但是在生成当中,实在是潜在,那这契机也就是潜在的,因此,这一诸多实体互相映照的潜流变动状态就是「契说(proposition)」。而在最根本,正如我在我关于莱布尼茨的毕论里写的,这一切的杂多最终都需要有基本的理念单位作为构成,那这些理念单位就是「永物(eternal objects)」。由此,我们可以重构出存在的历史,就是无限多的永物相互契说,并在契说中逐渐达到了稳定的契机,并在这契机中,实体因「缘起(concrescence)」而生发。在这一实体中,这诸多因缘于是就成了这实体内部的「自造(self-constitution)」,而那外部的「世界」,也就是无限多的实体造出的对应于其缘起的契机,也就将其内容倾入预相,而留下一个外部的「印(mark)」,这印就是超出了实体自造的不定缘起,也就是根本的对一整个世界的创造力,也就是自由。
3. 缘起时,一切世界都化进主体的感受中。然而它毕竟意识到,在它的拣选中,它只是一个视角,而它拥有的诸预相也只是对外部世界的内化,或者,是外部其它主体的自我物化。因为,既然一个预相属于我,却又超越性地指示外部,那么自然,这个预相于那外部来说,就指示了我这一实体的超越性。因此,一个预相总有其正反两面,尽管其内容并不是对称或者恒定的。比如说,我的预相是她对我的说,可她的预相却是我的听。根本上,诸理性的相互交织并非是完全平面化的,而是互相折叠的。同时,一切实体都必然在某个实体中成为预相,区别无非是这一预相的指涉是否「作业(operative)」罢了。最终,无限的实体以其各自的契机缘起而获「圆满(satisfaction)」,也就是满足了它自己的自身规定,不多不少地完成了开示。
4. 当怀特海说「哲学只能从具体走向抽象,而无法从抽象走向具体」,他的意思很明确,就是一切解释都应以实体为基准,从实体出发,因为只有实体是实在的。我们无法探知永物,而只能探知实体,并通过实体的预相的指示来分析更多的内容,尽管这些分析或许依然还是预相,但它们将逐渐开示出更复杂的结构,直到这些结构逐渐丰富,获得稳定性和实在性,而让这些预相的结集成为一个世界的契机,这个时候,我们就可以说自己或多或少地中和了某一个实体的优先性,而得以并非仅仅在内容上充实某个实体,更是在历史层面解释一个实体缘起的契机,也得以解释这一实体如何反过来回溯性地切入契机,并进行新的缘起生成;同样,解释一个实体的缘起,反过来说,就是解释一个实体的本质内容。就是说,(过去)生成解释(当下)存在,(当下)存在解释(未来)生成;反过来,(过去)存在解释(当下)生成,(当下)生成解释(未来)存在。
怀特海的神学
1. 怀特海的神学与我在我那篇莱布尼茨论文里书写的是大体一致的。神有两个层次,一层是统摄着所有永物的视野,一层是对所有主体的超越综合。也就是说,在第一层,神是一个没有褶子也没有中心的创造性平面,祂中性地将一切永物及其组合放置在视野中。在第二层,祂是无限的褶子的嵌套,是无数个中心的勾连。在这两层之间,就是创造的神圣秩序,也就是,诸永物要依照什么规律进入实体的缘起,并以什么规律成为实体的预相。
2. 这两个层次彼此预设。中性的神有对完满内容的「愿(appetition)」,因此希求自我设限所带来的无限充实;而完满的神,若处于任一实体的视角限制中,也有对超越性对象,那一切实体预相所指涉的契机的渴求,希求那契机能带来新的缘起,让祂向圆满进展。这样的受限的愿,假如指涉了尚未在主体中实现的契机,那这契机之为契机自然也不会是被包括在任何其它主体内部的,而只能是独立于所有主体运命及其诸世界的绝对中立的神圣秩序,这在莱布尼茨处被称作「前定和谐(pre-established harmony)」;而这样的神圣秩序只能是建立在神的中性上的。这个意义上,神的自然本性,也就是其中性视野,也是对所有实在来说所共享的「缘(relevance)」。但这里同样需要明确,神的中性并不是说神是愿灭尽的,而是说神愿圆满,所以遍行诸法;哪怕是中性的神,也是有愿的。然后,这中性神依旧也是造物,是从诸永物中,以「多中取一(e plurubis unum)」而非「无中生有(creatio ex nihilo)」的方式平等地造就的;祂的被造同时也是一切造的条件,否则彻底无一的多是无法为一奠基的;神由此是自造过程,是自因自果。这样,神的创造就是两个进程,维持自我的自一与充实自我的自满,而这两个进程之间也不是完全分离,而是相互交织的。
3. 诸神圣秩序,也即诸法,有常法无常法、有为法无为法、善法恶法,各有论定。当中,如果一法是无常的,就说明虽然它规定了一批稳定的「法众(society)」,以此法众构造「法身(person)」,并通过这一法众稳定地传法;但法身却在传法的进程中反复生灭。这里要注意,法身必然是一个实体,只是将中性的施与法众的法炼化进了一个具有实在视角的主体,而这法众与其法就成了这一法身的内容;用之前确立的语言说,法众是法身的契机,法身缘起于法众。而如果,某一实体接触了某法众,可以通过其预相去感受,又通过感受去「效法(imitate)」这一法众所推行的共相,从而成为了这法众中的一份子,与法众中的其它实体变得相似,那这法就是可推行的;但是,假如其法并不按次第传播,这一法众就没有最终可清晰辨认的法身,即此法既没有传播的源头也没有终点,那自然就不会有确认的历史,以及背负这一历史的实在个体。这一法身,也就是最终炼化了法众的最终实体,其内容反而依赖于法众的增减而生灭,它的生成并不是最清晰简单的线性,而会在增加的同时反过来回溯性地变更自己;那么,哪怕这法持恒驻留,它也是无常的,因为它的特征在法身中依法众的增减而生灭。而如果这法的推行是次第进行的,或者是由次第进行传播的诸链条组合成的法网,那这法网中的诸实体就不再只能集结为法众,而可以炼化法身;这时候,就不仅有了群落,这一群落还成了稳定可辨认的个体,这时候的法不再是刹那灭,而是「有常的(endurable)」。比如说,任意自然物都是有常法身,因它的发生总是在时间上从A到B顺次排布的,也就是,其法总是从过去向未来传播,因为A是石头,所以B也会是石头,但B对A没有影响,A对B,B对C,却有影响;但是,有些法却没有这样干净的法身,它的缘起是错综的,并非是从过去到未来,或是未来法,或是如来法,或是刹那灭,比如说,俄狄浦斯那自我实现的预言,其法在法众中的传播就不是顺次传播;或者更复杂的混沌,就是在根本上无法总结而只能描述的。更简单也更熟悉的譬喻自然就是德勒兹-加塔利的「根茎」之于「树」。
补充3. 澄清一下法身与个体性与线性的关系。首先,为什么越线性的就越个体,这个是因为线性的历史可以被完全容纳在位于起点或终点的实体内容中,由此,法身可以很清晰地获得个体性,也就是那起始的或者终结的实体。而一个法身失去个体性,就是当这些线互相排斥互相交织甚至在线的内部出现了倒因为果,也就是果回溯性地通过因而自我生成,的时候;这个时候,就不再有哪个实体可以简单地容纳一整个历史,而任一实体都被内生的矛盾和复杂性驱散,法身就分裂成法众。
怀特海论外延:
1. 其实根本上,怀特海遵从的就是莱布尼茨单子论对外延的处理方式。任何实体的内容无非就是被炼化为一体的契机,在这炼化中,契机中完全展开作为实体的诸单子的个体性被消解,而被统合成一个从诸实体的法网中抽象出来的连续统一的图景。实在平面上的无限多的单子在炼化了契机的某个单子的视角中,成了这一个单子图景里无限多的褶子,每个褶子都是一种个体化潜能。所以,怀特海可以说,在实在平面上,只有个体单子;但对任意单子来说,它都已经拥有了属于它的一个连续的时空外延图景;这个图景,根据这一单子的缘起,个体化为属于这一单子的「诸世(epochs)」和「诸界(regions)」。如此的诸世界,作为对契机的抽象,对位于世界中心的实体来说,都是可学的「道理(mathemata)」,所以有了几何和算数,也就有了数学。
2. 单子可以不断地展开它的褶子,从一个单子的视角过渡到下一个视角,尽管这并不是一个移动的动作,而是差异的自我丰富。在内容上,实体感受着其它实体的感受,修正着自己对永物的掌握,因此是因果关系。这也是身体对实体的作用;实体的「情(feeling)」或感受奠基于先前的身体诸器官的情。在另一个层面,每个实体在这个实体的图景中获得超越性和独立性,作为一个契机,而非完全内在的永物,被炼化进实体的内在图景,成为这个实体的一个「事件(event)」。这样,就不是因果,而是色相。我看到椅子,这只是椅子的图像;但是这个图像却同时指涉了,不是某个这个图像作为谓词直接描绘的主词“对象”,更是我首先拥有着的有情的身体,与这个有情的身体所拥有的契机。椅子因此并不是一个具有颜色、质地、形状等性质的本体,而是一道炼化了有情与契机的法身。色相有「色根(sense datum)」,而这色根自然不再是庸俗的心理现象主义所假定的作为物自体的外部触发物,而是身体的有情,如眼根、耳根、身根等。
3. 我们因此也要把属于永物的无差别的潜能与属于实体的有限定与差别的潜能区分开来。实体的潜能是具体的;同时,潜能并不意味着这一实体尚未完成。相反的,潜能意味着这一实体已经完成了所有规定了,或者用亚里士多德的方式说,没有实体,就没有潜能。潜能就是已经完成的实体,在属于这一实体的图景中,因其已完成了的彻底的同一性,所以对其它实体的抽象,以至于对其契机中的诸单子各自完整个体性的压抑;换句话说,潜能就是在一个实体中被炼化了的契机。那么,对潜能的实现就是非生非灭的,而仅仅是一个实体所拥有的契机的丰富,是对一个实体自身命运的时空化;所有的过去以及所有的将来都已经是现在的种子。由此,并没有什么性质不断改变但本质不变的「本体(substance)」,有的只有按照自我已经实现的定法去不断丰富不断澄清自身命运的单子。这一种澄清就是单子所拥有的连续无断的外延世界。
怀特海论进展与圆满:
1. 任何实体的内容或缘起都有两重意涵,首先,是说它是诸永物依法依缘的组合,这是「形式本质(formal essence)」,然后,是说它同时是诸实体依法依缘的组合,这是「实在本质(real essence)」。在这个意义上,「力(power)」也有两重,一重是由一实体对诸永物的感受构成了另一个实体,这是「因果(causality)」,另一重是实体之为实体本身(作为诸实体的缘起)而非其对永物的感受被纳入了另一个实体的感受,这种就叫「色相(presentation)」。换句话说,因果描述了实体形式本质所依赖的诸实体,它是从哪里取得这些永物,以及对这些永物的组合方式的;而色相则描述了实体实在本质所依赖的诸实体,这些实体是如何纠缠,是如何互相理解或互相排斥的。在现象学里,色相也可以被理解为「动机(motivation)」。有力就有「业(habit)」,意思是诸力叠加或彼此修正后留下的总趋势,是一种惯性。
2. 任何实体在根本上都已经是圆满的了。但是这带来了一个困难。假如说,实体A生成了实体B,那实体B也就得被包含在A的缘起中,因为一切实体与一切实体有缘,无非是这是「正缘(positive relevance)」还是「反缘(negative relevance)」的问题,正缘即是实体A不矛盾于实体B,而反缘则是矛盾,因此A要远离于B罢了;可B本就是A生成的,怎么又能反过来成为A的缘起呢?这样,A不就不再是A,而成了A+了吗?那B不也成了是A+生成的,也就不再是B,而是B+了?这个悖论仅仅来自于对圆满的误解。圆满不生不灭,但这不意味着圆满是不无限丰富的;反而,圆满就是无穷无漏,这就是说,实体A确实生成了实体B,但B中的A是对A的预相,而这一预相本身也被A在其对B的预相中把握。说A在B中是预相,这不是说B中的A是对A的表征,仿佛A是主语,而对A的预相是谓语;而是说,A进入B的缘起,恰恰是因为B亦是A的缘起,B因此就是A的自我生成,自我丰富,或者说,自我差异化。但是,这是否说明,圆满只是一个理念,没有任何意义呢?毕竟虽然你认定A的自我差异依然维持了A的自我同一性,可这难道不是一种诡辩?假如一个东西需要自我生成,那不就是有漏有缺吗?
3. 我们需要更清晰地认识究竟什么是“漏”。在根本上,任何实体都是自由的,因为它们各自都是总体,却又向它们各自的缘起敞开。在这种情况下,我们可以说,任何实体的内在本质都会呈现为被给予的事实,而在这个程度上,是一种「无明(givenness)」,而这种无明是永远无法消解的,因为它是一切事实最基本的超越性。可是,当一个实体进展圆满,或者说,当一个人证悟之后,她就突破了最终的反思,而抵达了无限的理念,从而将自己认识为一个实体,而不是其它实体的某个预相:这意味着,她知道自己是一个总体,也因这智慧,并在对这智慧的修持中,真正成为了一个最高强度的实体;对已证悟的她来说,哪怕是那属事实的无明,也是内在于她本质的,是她的自我超越,而这超越也无非是她的自我认识罢了。用尼采的话说,这些事实成了“只属于她自己的事实”。整个世界因此在她的智慧中被炼化,不再污染她、攻击她,而是像成了她的手足一样。这就是圆融无漏的状态,这些事实不再是由其它实体决定的必然,而是由自己这一实体决定的自由。漏因此并非是有内有外,而是内外交攻,由其它实体限定了自我;圆满也并非无内无外,而是外部决定了事实的就只有自由。对这一点,黑格尔也已经有很深刻的分析:智慧的圆满并非是一个不断去吞噬更多东西的总体,而是在彻底成全了总体性之后,依着这总体性,在无根生地之上获得自由的主体。
怀特海的三重圆满
1.任何实体在根本上就已经是圆满的了。这是一种形式圆满,也就是之前所说的,任何实体都有自己无限丰富的命运,并且其对新的实体的生成,也总已经是自己圆满命运的部分,是自己的自由。形式上,圆满是过去的契机,是当下的创造,也是未来的愿的三重综合。任何圆满都并非在对已有内容的反思中自觉圆满,而是通过超越的创造,在新的造物中重新回归自在,在如此自在,圆满同时是过去的现实实在,也是未来的理想愿景,也是当下的——并非反思性的意识——而是持有。这就是内时间意识(一个笑话,内时间意识,既不“内在”,也没有“时间”,甚至不是“意识”)的永恒滞留。圆满因此并非反思,因为任何反思带来的主体的分裂就已经取消了圆满了;而是前-反思甚至后-反思的对诸实体的统一炼化。这并不是通过展开成契机的意识,而是那属于契机的缘起同一,一个无论是过去的事实,还是当下的创造,还是未来的超越,都一般永恒的实在永驻。
2. 但我们这样就已经从原则上每个实体都同样拥有的形式上的圆满过渡到另一种圆满了,即圆满自持。这意味着诸矛盾混沌的实体被重新归置,在新的缘起中获得了统一,不再以矛盾的契机,而是以「映照(contrasts)」的缘起被炼化成预相。这样的圆满就不再只是形式,而真正地获得了实体。意思是,这一圆满成了一个有情主体的顶点和目的,成了最高统一的理念。遵循这个顶点,一切内容才获得了法的规定性。我们因此可以说,这一最高的理念就是统一了一切法众和混沌的法身,而这法身总是有着最小程度的混乱。这些混乱的来源自然就是诸永物中性的潜能对极性实在的法则规制的阻抗。诸永物在神圣平面的中性里具有任意性的潜能,而这一任意性却在法身的极场中重新被梳理排布,从而产生了远近。这一远近自然带来了离极点近处的圆满,与远处的混沌。
3. 由此,我们得以引入第三重圆满,也就是圆满无穷。圆满不仅仅需要实体,还需要实体的内容。其内容丰富与否依赖于距离极点远近的永物多少。圆满自持在实体层面上要求诸实体的统一性,而圆满无穷则要求在永物层面上的丰富性。这其实也是意味着实体可理解的精神内容的丰富性。这个与我莱布尼茨论文里写的几个论题相当。一个实体可以很同一,但是却很不丰富;也可以相反。哪怕原则上,实体作为实体总已经是圆满的,诸实体的圆满之间也有差异和秩序,有些是被嵌套在大圆满中的小圆满,有些圆满则能将相对杂乱的圆满提纯。这就是遍行诸法的意涵;并不是说诸法被强加在质料上,这是牛顿科学宇宙观所依赖的闪米特神学的偏见;而是诸法来于诸法,又来于诸法,无穷无尽。
怀特海论生物:
怀特海这里和我在莱布尼茨论文里的设定不太一样,但挺有意思的。在我那篇论文里,清晰性绑定的是感觉器官,而同一性绑定营养器官。在怀特海这里,对清晰性的含糊是对复杂契机的抽象,这是无机物,如石头,在契机中自我保存的手段,通过压平所有的契机,让契机显示为简单的预相图景。而同一性则奠基于有机物的自我保存策略,并不是通过对契机的忽略和抽象,而是最大限度地去清晰化每个契机中的实体,并重新地去创造新的法,从而创造出同一的法身;这一创造性的活动就是生命的本质。这并不意味着生命本身是同一的。生命是创造的过程,而它的造物,如果顺利的话,才是同一的法身。并且,这一造物也不一定是法身,也可能是混沌或是病症。而有机与无机的原则相互交缠,有机原则驱动着无机原则,而无机原则从环境的诸流中保护着敏感的有机原则。生命作为这一创造性的、不断重构诸法秩序的原则是我论文里面没有详细展开的。新陈代谢所以就是环境中的食物流被捕获之后生命的原则把矛盾的杂多契机重构成相互映照的多元丰富的同一缘起的内容;就是之前说的炼化。而既然生命原则并不是法身,而仅仅有制造法身的潜能,那它就不是任何器官,而是器官的「间隙(interstice)」。不是脑,而是脑不在处,才有思维。
怀特海论生活世界:
1. 无机物只有最低限度的生活世界。从色相的角度,无机物,像石头,是无分别的,意思是说,契机的诸实体在石头的世界里是最抽象的,而它们因果上的业也是同质的、仅仅在量上依据缘来作区分的物理力或是能量。而从因果的角度,石头还有一种无差别,就是它仅仅接受,而不反应。缺失生命的创造性的石头很少在缘起中去改变生成它的契机,而它的缘起也仅仅在最低程度上有变更它的本性。与之相反,生命总是有丰富的内容去区分,并且总是积极地去改变它所处的秩序,通过构造新的意义,去敉平矛盾。这个意义的世界就是生命的生活世界。
2. 接着,任何实体的生活世界都有着两个层次,一个是实在因果契机的世界,一个是感知色相的世界。这两个世界彼此奠基,但却又不是直接对应的关系。比如说,后者可能是一种幻觉。镜中的世界在色相上与镜外同等清晰,但因果上却没有直接对应的契机。这种情况下,我们严格区分什么是现象,什么是实体。现象,在我们这一世,遵循精确几何的规则,以线为基本单位。线的第一性需要一个实体上的解释,这一世,是实体间什么样的缘,致使线成为了可能的。此外,我们还需要更精准地去划分因果与色相的世界。
3. 色相,至少在视觉里,很大程度上是独立于因果的,因为看到的色相总是共时的。因果是前后相继传达永物的契机,而色相则奠基于这一契机在某实体内的共时缘起。这一共时缘起,如果放大到覆盖整个契机,而忽视诸实体相对于这一实体缘的远近的话,就是一「刹那(duration)」。奠基于这个刹那,色相的世界对实体来说就是刹那缘起的无限丰富的诸多预相。同时,依据相对论,我们知道,任何实体都可以立定诸多刹那中;在一个视角,A事件和B事件共时,但在另一个视角,A和C共时,而不和B共时。因此,我们说,在所有可能的刹那中,只有那从A实体本身视角出发的刹那,与A实体的色相重合覆盖最多的刹那,也就是A在生活着的那个刹那,才是权重最高的刹那。但是就像在2.中已经提出的,这一权重计算是会有很多问题的,因为色相与实体之间是复杂的奠基关系,而并非是简单的对应关系;当中至少要经过身体的中介。椅子的图像最直接的贡献者并不是外面实在的椅子,而是眼睛。我们还需要考虑共情等要素。这样,我们就可以说,最高权重的刹那并非是直接覆盖重合了我们当下感知的生活世界的瞬间,而更可能是那奠基了我们感知的生活世界的过去,而我们的生活世界也常常会受其它实体所规定的刹那扰动。
4. 这似乎很反逻辑,因为假如每个实体都已经是完整的世界,也就是有自己完整的时空了,那我们说实体之间共时或者不共时,又是什么意思呢?时间本身可以被时间化吗?这个其实如果破除了对时间和空间的偏见,而将时空视作秩序,或者实体排布的方式,而实体的排布本身也是另一个实体的内容的话,就很好理解了。莱布尼茨的单子论实际上也是这样的一种诸法生诸法的形而上学。我们可以从看见的共时的色相世界退回因果的深层,但这个深层同时也有着自己的色相世界。所以哪怕是视觉也是有其不断重构的层次的;这个意义上,我认为怀特海对休谟的批评是,休谟最终还是简化了,而没有注意所谓的「现象主义(phenomenalism)」有着更激进彻底的一面,就是并非从现象直接退回对应实体,而是从现象退回奠基现象的契机,上层现象无非是对下层契机的重构;而这一契机本身又是深层实体的现象;如此不断溯源深化,直至无限,由此现象和实体相互纠缠,达到统一;而这深化过程中的每一层次都有自己的独立性,比如镜中世界,虽然对因果层次更深的触觉来说只是幻觉,但自有其独立的意义,或者视觉上认为是同时发生的,在更精密的测量下,或者在另一个视角下,发现不是同时发生,也无法完全抹消之前的共时性图景(刹那)的意义。
怀特海论有情:
1. 「主体形式(subjective form)」是在一个主体的命运中占据统治地位的永物所集结出的契机,无论是以肯定还是否定的形式;如果否定,那就会以“我绝对不是……”的形式表现出来。这就是尼采说的,灵魂最底部无法回避的事实,是灵魂根本的视角。主体形式永远是双向的,也就是,一方面,它作为事实是从对契机的「物情(physical feeling)」里抽象出来的,而另一方面,它作为形式又是中性永物加诸质料上的「念情(conceptual feeling)」。如果物情和念情的综合是直接的、直观的,那就是「感情(perceptive feeling)」。
2. 感情又可以分成几种。感情如果呈现出「拟象(reproduction)」,就近于无机物,其世界因抽象而和谐,不和谐全被推出当下,成为与果断裂的因,因果在永物层面接续,但在对实体感受的层面,因果不定而有差异,这一差异的感受与对永物接续的感受结合,呈现为因果重复。也就是,虽然因果在同一实体的内容上都是和谐的,但形式上,作为因的实体外在于作为果的实体。感情也可能呈现出「返象(reversion)」,也就是,通过对神这一实体的感受,而得到了一定程度上独立于当前契机的潜能,这一种潜能可能会褫夺主体对原初实在的缘,作为一种抽象去扭曲现实。但反象也可能得到充实,充实后就是「化象(transmutation)」。这一化象如果又与原初的现实契合结缘,那因果间的实在断裂或会消弭,而内容同时也会丰富,诸实体在契机的不断重构和缘起里,逐渐结实成圆满的色相。
3. 契说是物情与念情的综合。契说是诸永物依照实体的缘进行排布组合后的产物。所以契说比起物情是抽象的,比如实体,在契说中其实最后只是像几个逻辑占位符,而契说包含的永物则遵循更具体更极化的样式,比之念情更具象。假如契说加诸物情,成了返象,扭曲了实在,那这一契说就是「不真的(inauthentic)」。假如这契说不扭曲实在,而是自己化象出来,与实在可能契合,可能不契合,那这一契说就是「有曲的(indirect)」,比如我们说文化相对于自然就是有曲的,虽然并不能说文化是虚假的。只有达成了拟象的契说,也就是这一契说直接的是物情契机的果,才是「正直(authentic and direct)」的。
4. 从3.能看到几个重要补充。首先,意识和判断是形式与质料的综合,而契说的抽象如果没有被实在填充,那意识就是缺失的。所以,并不是一切契说都要求意识判断,主体可以活在返象的虚幻里,也可以选择不敉平化象和原初实在间的抵牾;感知的世界因此与判断的世界分开的,我们可以在生活中指鹿为马,但不能在理性中指鹿为马。然后,可以看到,对契说的正直感知是最基本的生命功能,连无机物都具备;但对契说的有曲与不真的感知,甚至达到克服正直感知的地步,这是只有更高强度的生命才有的。正是因为这样的生命具有犯错的潜能,即想象力,它才会需要判断去与实在进行综合。判断因此并非是最基本也并非是最高等的功能,而是为生命最高强度的创造去服务的工具,通过不断的自我批评去综合错误与真实,并在这种综合带来的不断重构世界的震荡和韵律里,达到更强更圆满的感受。实体最基本的功能是排序与筛选,也就是价值。实体有「喜(adversion)」有「恶(aversion)」,这是创造了价值的决断。判断只是对这一决断的充实。理性是意志强大者的公义。
怀特海论外延II:
1. 既然有且至少有一个实体B在实体A的预相里有无限可分的外延,那就意味着,一定有无限的实体被炼化在实体A的预相中,并且实体B中介了所有其它实体,而外延就是对互相抵牾的实体的重构,重构成色相。「华严(patterned actuality)」是色相,但是也是因果圆满的。达到华严,色相要呈现出完整展开的时空结构,要与因果综合起来,这就是实体内在超越的辩证过程。但是从因果里得到几乎完全同质的外延,也就是得到矛盾被减小到近乎中性的实体契机,这一定要求了抽象;而反过来,如果这一外延要保持因果的异质性,就要甚至将自己实体所包括的所有内容都外化出去,为了避免实体内部的矛盾,而将自己给时空化到自己的预相内容里去;也就是自己成了自己的一个对象,让无限构造着的实体成了造物中的一个;像这也是抽象。区别无非是前者从多抽取一,从外向内;而后者从一抽取多,从内向外。抽象因此在内与外的辩证中占据了一个要被决定的位置;也就是,对属于我的世界,我的决断要选择到什么程度,我要定夺什么是在我之内,什么是在我之外的。这一决断就是自由。
2. 每一个独立的单子都是华严圆满的世界。这些世界相互独立又相互交织,独立就会恒久,交织就会变易。如果强调第一点,那就是从因果里抽出的色相,里面诸实体是独立但是同质的,或者,恰恰因为它们彼此独立,所以是中性的,彼此没有矛盾抵牾,所以可以同质;如果强调第二点,那就是从色相里抽出的因果,因为它们彼此交织,所以有矛盾抵牾,所以必须是异质的。所以,前者的多是无矛盾的形式上最小程度的多,而后者的一是充满矛盾的内容上最小程度的一。抽象出对应的科学来的话,前者是对同质色相进行分析的几何学,后者是对异质因果进行综合的动力学。几何学不仅包含空间,也包含对时间的空间化;动力学也包含了对空间的时间化。两者都是可行的,因为时空本就是统一的,甚至对时间时间化或对空间空间化也是有意义的,如果我们能理解什么是秩序的秩序。而具体的科学也可以有侧重,侧重于空间化的具体科学讨论「风土(strain)」,以及风土与身体的作用关系;侧重于时间化的具体科学讨论刹那,以及刹那间永恒相继的关系。风土与刹那也是互相交织、互相继承决定的。这就是生活世界。而只有在空间化的风土里,测量才有意义,因为测量实际上就是建立起两个固定独立的个体在同一系统里差异但相似的功能结构之间的关系,因此要求了恒定不变的背景。
3. 神的创造因此有四个阶段。首先是一切都是中性永物的潜能。然后是众多实体尚未聚合缘起的阶段。然后是一个实体在契机中缘起的阶段。最后是实体本身获得圆满,并重新进入契机的阶段。这样,神进入了世界并爱着这个世界,将所有的恶和不足都转化成善,但同时也在善中爱着那要被拯救的恶。所以,神不仅仅是亚里士多德式的永恒中性的圣努斯,也不仅仅是自然宗教不断生成实体的第一因,也不仅仅是启示宗教里对多进行目的统合的立法者、统治者,也是肉身的基督,是爱与恩典的神。但是,像我一直以来怀疑的,这种爱到底如何面对伊凡·卡拉马佐夫那样的「叛逆(renegade)」的质问呢?处在当下的恶中的人,真的应该或者能够坦然接受未来的大和解吗?这里我会觉得怀特海,和莱布尼茨一样,有些过于刻奇地强调自己神学里善的力量了。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
In this note / 篇目
Whitehead on What Speculative Philosophy Is:
1. Every speculative philosophy is a universal interpretation of all experience starting from the highest totality. This universal interpretation requires adequacy—the force of its explanation of facts—and coherence—the closeness of concepts’ mutual determination. Reaching the summit of totality requires creative imagination: not merely imagination abstracting in another sense, but the capacity, while abstracting, to organize abstract concepts logically and generate them systematically. Obviously, however, no philosophy can explain all facts completely; any such claim is merely dogmatism. Yet philosophy is not a special science confined to a branch precisely because it occupies this center of totality. From this position, as an integral world, it interacts with other integral worlds and in this sense acquires speculative freedom. This speculative interaction is precisely the divine concept’s self-enrichment, evolving the divine concept’s real content through this process.
2. A concept must first not be understood merely as the subject in a subject–predicate structure. Precisely through its self-enriching evolution, it is the self-correction of a collection of realities. What truly matters, therefore, is not the concept but its meaning, and conceptual meaning is spatiotemporally determined and enriched by other meanings. Speculative philosophy is the discipline that plans and gathers these meanings as a whole. In this situation, speculative philosophy is precisely not common sense and cannot depend on it, but must continually generate revolutions against it. Here speculative philosophy is poetic, except that its creation of concepts depends on rational and dialectical knowledge rather than aesthetic experience. Nor is it science, since any science can only be regional ontology. An attack on metaphysics from the standpoint of empirical science, like Bacon’s, is itself precisely metaphysical. Science as regional ontology is therefore merely an intellectual interpretation of “pure” facts, which empirical science interprets as immediately sensible things. Nor is philosophy religion, since religion is an intellectual interpretation of “pure” experience, interpreted by religion as immediate affect and feeling. Philosophy, by contrast, is the unified synthesis of religion and science from thought’s own standpoint.
3. Speculative philosophy must therefore avoid two dangers. One is immersion in common sense, preventing entry into the total plane of conceptual creation. Every science actually occupies such a plane at its foundation, but subsequent sedimentation and subdivision gradually deprive it of the speculative intensity that once drove it. The other danger is complete dogmatization: neglecting the process of potentiality’s individuation required by creative activity, and consequently regarding either one’s system as correct or its correction as simple and direct. In fact, every spiritual system necessarily changes dialectically. On the one hand, it obtains occasions from “facts”—interpretations at a minimal level; on the other, it advances through critical interaction with other worlds. We can therefore regard speculative philosophy as “expression,” rather than a mathematized final determination. Expression sacrifices no truth if truth itself is the expression of the divine concept.
4. Is this not simply Husserl?
Whitehead and the “Philosophy of Organism”
1. The cosmological picture of the philosophy of organism takes “one” and “many” as its basic categorical elements. We must emphasize the fundamental difference between the picture determined by these categories and one taking “being” and “nothing” as basic categories. The generative relation between “one” and “many” is expressed by the category of “creativity.” Every generation necessarily conforms to this relation. Its generated result, as one, is expressed as an “actual entity” (实在), comparable to Leibniz’s monad or substance: a subject, though not necessarily consciousness, and also a synthesis in feeling of infinite “prehensions” (预相). Although prehensions are the actual entity’s material, they become material only under its unification, and are therefore “many beneath one.” Yet as “many beneath one,” a prehension can itself again be analyzed into infinite prehensions, and as a new center likewise unify them all. Under this operation, however, by definition it ceases to be one prehension subordinate to an actual entity, becoming an actual entity itself.
2. Every prehension, always being “many beneath one,” is always internal to an entity. Yet it also discloses the “many outside one” preceding this entity’s generation: not its content, but the entire situation in which many entities gather to enable its generation. This is the “nexus” (契机). If an actual entity is already confirmed, the nexus generating it is unique. During generation, however, the actual entity is potential, and so is the nexus. This changing undercurrent in which many entities contrast with one another is the “proposition” (契说). At the most fundamental level, as I wrote in my graduation thesis on Leibniz, all this manifold ultimately requires basic ideal units of constitution: these are “eternal objects” (永物). We can thus reconstruct the history of being: infinitely many eternal objects enter into propositions with one another, gradually attaining stable nexuses within these propositions, and within a nexus an entity arises through “concrescence” (缘起). Within this entity, these many conditions and relevances become its internal “self-constitution” (自造). The external “world”—the nexus produced by infinitely many entities corresponding to its concrescence—pours its content into prehensions, leaving an external “mark” (印). This mark is the indeterminate concrescence exceeding the entity’s self-constitution: fundamentally, the creativity of an entire world, or freedom.
3. In concrescence, all worlds are transformed into the subject’s feeling. Yet the subject nevertheless recognizes that, in its selection, it is merely a perspective, and its prehensions merely internalize the external world, or are other external subjects’ self-objectification. For if a prehension belongs to me yet transcendentally indicates the outside, naturally, for that outside, the same prehension indicates my transcendence as an entity. A prehension therefore always has obverse and reverse sides, although their contents are neither symmetrical nor constant. For example, my prehension is her speaking to me, while hers is my listening. Fundamentally, the interweaving of rationalities is not completely planar: they fold into one another. At the same time, every entity must become a prehension within some entity; the only difference is whether this prehension’s reference is “operative.” Ultimately, infinite entities concresce through their respective nexuses and attain “satisfaction” (圆满): they fulfill their own self-determination, completing disclosure neither more nor less than required.
4. When Whitehead says “philosophy can only move from the concrete to the abstract, not from the abstract to the concrete,” his meaning is clear: every explanation should take entities as its reference and start from them, since only entities are actual. We cannot investigate eternal objects directly, only entities, analyzing further content through the indications of their prehensions. Although these analyses may themselves remain prehensions, they gradually disclose more complex structures until these become richer, acquire stability and actuality, and allow this gathering of prehensions to become a world’s nexus. At that point, we can say we have more or less neutralized a particular entity’s priority, enabling us not merely to enrich its content but to explain historically the nexus of its concrescence. We can also explain how this entity in turn retroactively intervenes in the nexus and undertakes new concrescent generation. Likewise, explaining an entity’s concrescence is, conversely, explaining its essential content. That is: past generation explains present being, and present being explains future generation; conversely, past being explains present generation, and present generation explains future being.
Whitehead’s Theology
1. Whitehead’s theology broadly agrees with what I wrote in my Leibniz thesis. God has two levels: a field of vision encompassing all eternal objects, and a transcendent synthesis of all subjects. At the first level, God is a creative plane without folds or center, neutrally placing all eternal objects and their combinations within his vision. At the second, he is a nesting of infinite folds, a linking of innumerable centers. Between these levels lies creation’s divine order: the laws according to which eternal objects enter an entity’s concrescence and become its prehensions.
2. These two levels presuppose each other. The neutral God has “appetition” (愿) for complete content, and thus desires the infinite enrichment brought by self-limitation. The complete God, when restricted to any entity’s perspective, also craves the transcendent object: the nexus to which all entities’ prehensions refer, hoping it will bring new concrescence and advance him toward satisfaction. If such restricted appetition refers to a nexus not yet realized within the subject, that nexus, as nexus, naturally cannot be included within any other subject either. It can only be the absolutely neutral divine order independent of all subjects’ destinies and worlds: what Leibniz calls “pre-established harmony.” Such a divine order can rest only on God’s neutrality. In this sense, God’s natural character—his neutral vision—is also the “relevance” (缘) shared by all actual entities. Yet God’s neutrality does not mean his appetition is extinguished. It means he desires satisfaction and thus pervades all laws (法); even the neutral God has appetition. Moreover, this neutral God is still a creature, created equally from eternal objects by “e plurubis unum,” one from many, rather than “creatio ex nihilo,” creation from nothing. His creation is simultaneously the condition of all creation; otherwise, a many wholly without one could not ground one. God is thus a process of self-constitution, his own cause and effect. Divine creation therefore consists of two processes: self-unification preserving the self, and self-fulfillment enriching it. These processes are not wholly separate but interwoven.
3. Divine orders, or laws, admit different determinations: enduring and impermanent, conditioned and unconditioned, good and evil. If a law is impermanent, this means that, although it determines a stable “society” (法众), constructs a “person” (法身) through this society, and transmits the law stably through it, the person repeatedly arises and perishes in the process of transmission. We must note that a person necessarily is an entity: it refines the neutral law bestowed upon the society into a subject with an actual perspective, while the society and its law become this person’s content. In the language established earlier, the society is the person’s nexus, and the person concresces from the society. If an entity encountering a society can feel it through its prehensions, then through feeling “imitate” the universality propagated by that society, thereby becoming a member resembling its other entities, the law is transmissible. But if the law does not spread sequentially, this society has no ultimately clearly identifiable person: the law has neither an origin nor an endpoint of transmission, and naturally no confirmed history or actual individual bearing that history. The content of this person—the final entity ultimately refining the society—arises and perishes instead according to the society’s increase and decrease. Its generation is not the clearest, simplest linearity; while increasing, it also retroactively changes itself. Thus, even if this law persists constantly, it is impermanent, because its characteristics arise and perish within the person with the society’s changes. If the law spreads sequentially, however, or through a network of laws composed of sequentially transmitting chains, the entities in this network need no longer merely gather as a society: they can refine a person. There is then not merely a community, but a community that has become a stable, identifiable individual. The law no longer perishes instantaneously; it is “endurable.” For example, any natural object is an endurable person, since its occurrence is always temporally arranged in sequence from A to B: its law always spreads from past to future. Because A is a stone, B will also be a stone; B does not affect A, whereas A affects B, and B affects C. Some laws, however, have no such cleanly delineated person. Their concrescence is intricate rather than running from past to future: laws of the future, laws of thus-coming, or instantaneous perishing. For example, the law of Oedipus’ self-fulfilling prophecy does not propagate sequentially within its society. Or there is more complex chaos, fundamentally incapable of summary and capable only of description. A simpler and more familiar analogy is naturally Deleuze and Guattari’s “rhizome” versus “tree.”
Supplement to 3: Let us clarify the relation between person, individuality, and linearity. Why does greater linearity mean greater individuality? Because a linear history can be completely contained within the content of the entity at its beginning or endpoint. The person can thus acquire individuality very clearly: that initial or final entity. A person loses individuality when these lines exclude and intertwine with one another, or even invert cause and effect within themselves—when the effect retroactively generates itself through the cause. No entity can then simply contain an entire history. Every entity is dispersed by internally generated contradiction and complexity, and the person splits into a society.
Whitehead on Extension:
1. Fundamentally, Whitehead follows Leibnizian monadology’s treatment of extension. Any entity’s content is nothing other than a nexus refined into unity. In this refinement, the individuality of the monads fully unfolded as entities within the nexus dissolves, and they are integrated into a continuous, unified picture abstracted from the entities’ network of laws. Within the perspective of a monad that has refined the nexus, the infinitely many monads on the plane of actuality become infinitely many folds in this monad’s picture, each fold a potential individuation. Whitehead can therefore say that only individual monads exist on the actual plane, while every monad already possesses its own continuous picture of spatiotemporal extension. According to this monad’s concrescence, this picture individuates into its “epochs” (诸世) and “regions” (诸界). These worlds, as abstractions from the nexus, are all learnable “mathemata” (道理) for the entity at the world’s center. Hence geometry and arithmetic, and thus mathematics.
2. A monad can continually unfold its folds, passing from one monad’s perspective to the next, although this is not an act of movement but difference’s self-enrichment. In content, an entity feels other entities’ feelings and corrects its grasp of eternal objects: this is causality. This is also the body’s effect on the entity: the entity’s “feeling” (情) is grounded in the prior feelings of bodily organs. At another level, each entity acquires transcendence and independence within this entity’s picture. As a nexus, rather than a wholly immanent eternal object, it is refined into the entity’s internal picture, becoming an “event” for it. This is presentation, not causality. I see a chair: this is merely the chair’s image. Yet the image simultaneously refers not simply to a subject-“object” directly described by the image as predicate, but more fundamentally to the feeling body I already possess and that body’s nexus. The chair is therefore not a substance with properties such as color, texture, and shape, but a person refining feeling and nexus together. Presentation has a “sense datum” (色根), which naturally is no longer the external stimulus as thing in itself assumed by vulgar psychological phenomenalism, but the body’s feeling: the roots of sight, hearing, bodily sense, and so on.
3. We must therefore distinguish the undifferentiated potentiality belonging to eternal objects from the limited, differentiated potentiality belonging to entities. An entity’s potentiality is concrete. At the same time, potentiality does not mean the entity is incomplete; on the contrary, it means the entity has already completed all its determinations. Or, in Aristotle’s manner: without entity, there is no potentiality. Potentiality is the completed entity’s abstraction from other entities within its own picture, owing to its completed, thoroughgoing identity, even to the point of suppressing the complete individuality of each monad in its nexus. In other words, potentiality is the nexus refined within an entity. Actualizing potentiality thus neither generates nor destroys; it merely enriches an entity’s nexus, spatiotemporalizing its own destiny. All past and all future are already seeds of the present. There is consequently no “substance” whose properties continually change while its essence remains unchanged, only monads continually enriching and clarifying their own destinies according to the determinate laws they have already realized. This clarification is the continuous, uninterrupted extensive world the monad possesses.
Whitehead on Advance and Satisfaction:
1. Any entity’s content or concrescence has two meanings. First, it is a combination of eternal objects according to law and relevance: this is “formal essence.” Second, it is simultaneously a combination of entities according to law and relevance: this is “real essence.” In this sense, “power” also has two dimensions. In one, an entity’s feeling of eternal objects constitutes another entity: this is “causality.” In the other, the entity itself as entity—as the concrescence of entities—rather than its feeling of eternal objects, is included in another entity’s feeling: this is “presentation” (色相). In other words, causality describes the entities on which an entity’s formal essence depends: where it obtains these eternal objects and their manner of combination. Presentation describes the entities on which its real essence depends: how they become entangled, understand one another, or exclude one another. In phenomenology, presentation can also be understood as “motivation.” Where there is power, there is “habit” (业): the overall tendency remaining after powers accumulate or modify one another, a kind of inertia.
2. Every entity is fundamentally already satisfied. Yet this raises a difficulty. Suppose entity A generates entity B. Entity B must then also be included in A’s concrescence, because every entity has relevance to every other. The question is only whether this is “positive relevance” or “negative relevance”: positive relevance means A does not contradict B; negative relevance means contradiction, so A must distance itself from B. Yet if B is generated by A, how can it in turn become A’s concrescence? Would A not cease being A and become A+? Would B then not be generated by A+, likewise ceasing to be B and becoming B+? This paradox comes merely from misunderstanding satisfaction. Satisfaction neither arises nor perishes, but this does not mean it lacks infinite enrichment. On the contrary, satisfaction is infinite and without outflows (无漏). Entity A does indeed generate entity B, but A within B is a prehension of A, and A itself grasps this prehension within its prehension of B. Saying A is a prehension within B does not mean A within B is a representation of A, as though A were a subject and its prehension a predicate. It means A enters B’s concrescence precisely because B is likewise A’s concrescence. B is thus A’s self-generation, self-enrichment, or self-differentiation. But does this not mean satisfaction is merely an idea without any meaning? After all, even if you claim A’s self-difference maintains its self-identity, is this not sophistry? If something needs self-generation, does that not mean it has outflows and lacks?
3. We need to understand more clearly what an “outflow” is. Fundamentally, every entity is free, since each is a totality while remaining open to its own concrescence. We can therefore say that any entity’s immanent essence appears as given facts, and to this extent as “givenness” (无明). This givenness can never be dissolved, since it is every fact’s most basic transcendence. Yet when an entity advances into satisfaction—or when a person awakens—she breaks through the final reflection and attains the infinite idea, recognizing herself as an entity rather than some prehension within other entities. This means she knows herself as a totality and, through this wisdom and its cultivation, genuinely becomes an entity of the highest intensity. For the awakened person, even factual givenness is immanent to her essence: her self-transcendence, which is itself nothing but her self-knowledge. In Nietzsche’s words, these facts become “facts belonging to her alone.” The whole world is thus refined within her wisdom, no longer polluting or attacking her but becoming like her own limbs. This is the state of harmonious satisfaction without outflows: these facts are no longer necessities determined by other entities, but freedoms determined by herself as an entity. Outflow therefore does not mean merely having inside and outside; it means their mutual attack, other entities limiting the self. Satisfaction likewise does not mean having neither inside nor outside, but that what determines facts externally is only freedom. Hegel also analyzes this profoundly: wisdom’s satisfaction is not a totality continually devouring more things, but a subject that, having thoroughly fulfilled totality, gains freedom upon a groundless ground through this totality.
Whitehead’s Threefold Satisfaction
1. Every entity is fundamentally already satisfied. This is formal satisfaction: as stated earlier, every entity has its own infinitely rich destiny, and its generation of new entities is always already part of that satisfied destiny, its freedom. Formally, satisfaction is a threefold synthesis: the past’s nexus, the present’s creativity, and the future’s appetition. Satisfaction does not become aware of itself as satisfied through reflection on existing content. Through transcendent creation, it returns anew to being in itself within new creatures. In this being in itself, satisfaction is simultaneously past actual reality, future ideal aspiration, and present holding—not reflective consciousness. This is internal time-consciousness’s eternal abiding. A joke: internal time-consciousness is neither “internal,” nor does it have “time,” nor is it even “consciousness.” Satisfaction is therefore not reflection, since the subject’s division brought by any reflection has already canceled satisfaction. Rather, it is the prereflective, even postreflective, unified refinement of entities. This is not consciousness unfolded into a nexus, but the concrescent identity belonging to the nexus: an eternal persistence of actuality equally eternal as past fact, present creation, and future transcendence.
2. Yet we have thereby already passed from the formal satisfaction every entity equally possesses in principle to another satisfaction: self-sustaining satisfaction. Contradictory, chaotic entities are rearranged and attain unity within new concrescence. They are refined into prehensions not as contradictory nexuses, but as a concrescence of “contrasts” (映照). Such satisfaction is no longer merely formal: it genuinely acquires entity. This means it becomes the summit and end of a feeling subject, the idea of highest unity. Only by following this summit does all content acquire determination by law. We can therefore say that this highest idea is the person unifying all societies and chaos, and this person always has a minimal degree of disorder. The source of this disorder is naturally the neutral potentiality of eternal objects resisting the lawful regulation of polarized actuality. Within the divine plane’s neutrality, eternal objects possess arbitrary potentiality. Yet this arbitrariness is rearranged within the person’s polar field, producing distances of near and far. This distance naturally brings satisfaction near the pole and chaos farther away.
3. We can thus introduce the third satisfaction: infinite satisfaction. Satisfaction requires not merely an entity, but its content. Whether this content is rich depends on the number of eternal objects at different distances from the pole. Self-sustaining satisfaction requires unity among entities at the level of entities; infinite satisfaction requires richness at the level of eternal objects. This also means richness in the entity’s intelligible spiritual content. It corresponds to several theses in my Leibniz essay. An entity can be highly unified yet very poor in richness, or the reverse. Even though, in principle, entities as entities are always already satisfied, their satisfactions admit differences and order. Some are small satisfactions nested within greater ones; others can purify comparatively disordered satisfactions. This is what pervading all laws means. It does not mean laws are imposed upon matter—that is the prejudice of the Semitic theology underlying Newtonian scientific cosmology. Rather, laws come from laws, which come again from laws, without end.
Whitehead on Living Beings:
Whitehead’s account here differs somewhat from the arrangement in my Leibniz thesis, but is quite interesting. In my thesis, clarity is tied to sensory organs, identity to nutritive organs. In Whitehead, obscurity with respect to clarity is abstraction from a complex nexus: inorganic things, such as stones, preserve themselves within a nexus by flattening all nexuses into a simple prehensive picture. Identity, by contrast, is founded on organic beings’ strategy of self-preservation. This works not by neglecting or abstracting from nexuses, but by clarifying the entities within each nexus as much as possible and creating new laws anew, thereby creating an identical person. This creative activity is life’s essence. It does not mean life itself is identical. Life is the creative process; its creature, if all goes well, is the identical person. Nor must this creature necessarily be a person: it may be chaos or illness. Organic and inorganic principles intertwine: the organic principle drives the inorganic, while the inorganic protects the sensitive organic principle from environmental flows. Life as this creative principle continually reconstructing the order of laws is something my thesis did not develop in detail. Metabolism is therefore the capture of environmental food-flows, after which the principle of life reconstructs contradictory, manifold nexuses into the content of a unified concrescence, plural and rich in mutual contrasts: the refinement mentioned earlier. Since the life-principle is not a person but merely has the potential to make persons, it is not any organ, but the organs’ “interstice.” Thought exists not in the brain, but where the brain is absent.
Whitehead on the Lifeworld:
1. Inorganic things have only a minimal lifeworld. From the perspective of presentation, inorganic things such as stones are undiscriminating: entities within the nexus are most abstract in the stone’s world, and their causal habits are homogeneous physical forces or energies, distinguished only quantitatively according to relevance. From the perspective of causality, a stone has another indifference: it merely receives and does not respond. Lacking life’s creativity, the stone seldom changes in its concrescence the nexus generating it, and its concrescence modifies its nature only minimally. Life, conversely, always has rich content to discriminate and actively changes its surrounding order, reconciling contradictions by constructing new meanings. This world of meaning is life’s lifeworld.
2. Every entity’s lifeworld then has two levels: the world of actual causal nexuses, and the world of perceptual presentation. These worlds ground each other but do not correspond directly. The latter, for instance, may be an illusion. The world in a mirror is as clear in presentation as the world outside it, yet has no directly corresponding causal nexus. In this situation, we strictly distinguish phenomena from entities. Phenomena, in our epoch, follow the rules of exact geometry, taking the line as their basic unit. The line’s primacy requires an explanation at the level of entities: what relevance between entities in this epoch makes the line possible? Moreover, we need a more precise differentiation between the causal and presentational worlds.
3. Presentation, at least visually, is largely independent of causality, since what is visually presented is always simultaneous. Causality is the nexus conveying eternal objects in succession; presentation is grounded in this nexus’ simultaneous concrescence within an entity. If this simultaneous concrescence is expanded to cover the whole nexus, disregarding the varying distances of entities’ relevance to this entity, it is a “duration” (刹那). Founded on this duration, the presentational world for the entity consists of the infinitely rich prehensions of the duration’s concrescence. At the same time, relativity tells us that any entity can stand within many durations: from one perspective, events A and B are simultaneous; from another, A and C are simultaneous, but A and B are not. We therefore say that, among all possible durations, only the one starting from entity A’s own perspective—the duration overlapping most extensively with A’s presentation, the duration A lives in—has the greatest weight. But as point 2 has already suggested, calculating this weight raises many problems. Presentation and entity stand in a complex grounding relation, not a simple correspondence, mediated at least by the body. The most immediate contributor to a chair’s image is not the actual external chair, but the eyes. We must also consider factors such as empathy. We can thus say that the highest-weight duration is not the instant directly overlapping the lifeworld presently perceived, but more likely the past grounding our perceptual lifeworld. Our lifeworld is also often disturbed by durations determined by other entities.
4. This seems illogical: if every entity is already a complete world, possessing its own complete space and time, what does it mean to call entities simultaneous or nonsimultaneous? Can time itself be temporalized? This becomes easy to understand if we abandon prejudices about time and space, regarding spacetime as order, or the way entities are arranged, while recognizing that this arrangement is itself another entity’s content. Leibniz’s monadology is actually just such a metaphysics of laws generating laws. We can retreat from the visible, simultaneous world of presentation into causality’s depths, but those depths also have their own presentational world. Even vision therefore has continually reconstructed levels. In this sense, I think Whitehead’s criticism of Hume is that Hume ultimately simplifies, overlooking a more radical, thoroughgoing side of “phenomenalism.” One does not retreat directly from phenomenon to corresponding entity, but from phenomenon to the nexus grounding it. The higher-level phenomenon is merely a reconstruction of the lower-level nexus, while this nexus is itself the phenomenon of deeper entities. This tracing back and deepening continues infinitely, entangling phenomenon and entity into unity. Each level in this deepening nevertheless possesses independence. The mirrored world, for instance, although merely an illusion for touch at a deeper causal level, has its own independent meaning. Likewise, discovering through more precise measurement or another perspective that apparently simultaneous events are not simultaneous cannot completely erase the meaning of the earlier picture of simultaneity—the duration.
Whitehead on Feeling:
1. “Subjective form” is the nexus gathered by the eternal objects occupying a dominant place within a subject’s destiny, whether affirmatively or negatively. If negatively, it appears in the form “I am absolutely not…” This is what Nietzsche calls the inescapable fact at the soul’s deepest level, its fundamental perspective. Subjective form is always two-directional: on the one hand, as fact, it is abstracted from the “physical feeling” (物情) of the nexus; on the other, as form, it is the “conceptual feeling” (念情) of neutral eternal objects imposed upon matter. If physical and conceptual feeling are synthesized immediately and intuitively, this is “perceptive feeling” (感情).
2. Perceptive feeling can itself be divided into several kinds. If it exhibits “reproduction” (拟象), it approaches the inorganic: its world is harmonious through abstraction, all disharmony pushed outside the present to become a cause separated from its effect. Cause and effect are continuous at the level of eternal objects, but indeterminate and different at the level of feeling entities. The feeling of this difference combines with the feeling of eternal objects’ continuity, appearing as causal repetition. That is, although cause and effect are harmonious within the content of the same entity, formally the causal entity is external to the resulting entity. Perceptive feeling may also exhibit “reversion” (返象): through feeling God as an entity, it obtains potentiality to some degree independent of the present nexus. Such potentiality may deprive the subject of its relevance to primordial actuality, distorting reality as an abstraction. But reversion can also become enriched, and when enriched it is “transmutation” (化象). If this transmutation again accords and establishes relevance with primordial actuality, the real discontinuity between cause and effect may disappear while content becomes richer. Through nexuses’ continual reconstruction and concrescence, entities gradually consolidate into satisfied presentation.
3. A proposition synthesizes physical and conceptual feeling. It is the product of eternal objects arranged and combined according to entities’ relevance. A proposition is thus abstract compared with physical feeling: entities within it, for example, ultimately resemble mere logical placeholders. Yet its eternal objects follow a more concrete, polarized pattern, making it more concrete than conceptual feeling. If a proposition is imposed upon physical feeling, becoming reversion and distorting actuality, it is “inauthentic” (不真的). If it does not distort actuality but transmutes itself, perhaps corresponding to actuality and perhaps not, it is “indirect” (有曲的). For example, culture is indirect relative to nature, although this does not mean culture is false. Only a proposition attaining reproduction—one directly resulting from a nexus of physical feeling—is “authentic and direct” (正直).
4. Several important supplements follow from point 3. First, consciousness and judgment synthesize form and matter; if a proposition’s abstraction is not filled by actuality, consciousness is absent. Not every proposition therefore requires conscious judgment. A subject may live within reversion’s illusion or choose not to reconcile transmutation’s conflict with primordial actuality. The perceptual world is thus separate from the world of judgment: in life we can point at a deer and call it a horse, but in reason we cannot. Next, authentic and direct perception of propositions is the most basic function of life, possessed even by inorganic things. Yet perceiving propositions indirectly or inauthentically, even overcoming authentic and direct perception, belongs only to life of higher intensity. Precisely because such life has the potential to err—imagination—it needs judgment to synthesize with actuality. Judgment is thus neither the most basic nor the highest function, but an instrument serving life’s most intense creation. Through continual self-criticism, it synthesizes error and truth, attaining stronger, more satisfied feeling within the shocks and rhythms of continual worldly reconstruction brought by this synthesis. The entity’s most basic function is ordering and selection: value. It has “adversion” (喜) and “aversion” (恶), the decision creating value. Judgment merely enriches this decision. Reason is the equity of those strong in will.
Whitehead on Extension II:
1. If at least one entity B has infinitely divisible extension within entity A’s prehensions, infinitely many entities must be refined within A’s prehensions, and entity B mediates all the others. Extension is the reconstruction of mutually conflicting entities into presentation. “Patterned actuality” (华严) is presentation, but also causally satisfied. To attain patterned actuality, presentation must display a fully unfolded spatiotemporal structure and synthesize with causality: this is the entity’s dialectical process of immanent transcendence. Yet obtaining almost completely homogeneous extension from causality—an entity-nexus whose contradictions are reduced nearly to neutrality—necessarily requires abstraction. Conversely, if this extension is to preserve causality’s heterogeneity, it must even externalize every content its entity includes. To avoid contradictions internal to the entity, it spatiotemporalizes itself into its own prehensive content: it becomes its own object, making the infinitely constituting entity one among its creatures. This too is abstraction. The difference is merely that the former abstracts one from many, moving inward from outside, while the latter abstracts many from one, moving outward from inside. Abstraction thus occupies a position requiring decision within the dialectic of inside and outside. Regarding the world belonging to me, my decision must choose its extent: I must determine what is inside me and what is outside. This decision is freedom.
2. Every independent monad is a satisfied world of patterned actuality. These worlds are mutually independent and interwoven: independence brings endurance, interweaving change. Emphasizing the first yields presentation abstracted from causality, within which entities are independent but homogeneous—or precisely because independent, they are neutral, without mutual contradiction or conflict, and can therefore be homogeneous. Emphasizing the second yields causality abstracted from presentation: because entities intertwine, they conflict and contradict, and must therefore be heterogeneous. The former many is a formally minimal many without contradiction; the latter one is a minimally unified one in content, filled with contradictions. Abstracting the corresponding sciences yields, respectively, geometry analyzing homogeneous presentation and dynamics synthesizing heterogeneous causality. Geometry includes not only space, but also time’s spatialization; dynamics also includes space’s temporalization. Both are possible because spacetime is originally unified. Even temporalizing time or spatializing space is meaningful if we understand what an order of order is. Concrete sciences can likewise have different emphases. Those emphasizing spatialization discuss “strain” (风土) and the effective relation between strain and body. Those emphasizing temporalization discuss durations and their eternally successive relations. Strains and durations also intertwine, inherit from, and determine one another. This is the lifeworld. Measurement is meaningful only within spatialized strain, since measurement actually establishes relations between the different yet similar functional structures of two fixed, independent individuals within the same system, and therefore requires an unchanging background.
3. God’s creation thus has four stages. First, everything is the potentiality of neutral eternal objects. Then comes the stage in which many entities have not yet gathered into concrescence. Next comes an entity’s concrescence within a nexus. Finally, the entity itself attains satisfaction and reenters the nexus. In this way, God enters and loves the world, transforming every evil and deficiency into good, yet simultaneously loving within the good the evil requiring salvation. God is therefore not merely Aristotle’s eternally neutral divine Nous; not merely natural religion’s first cause continually generating entities; not merely revealed religion’s legislator and ruler, unifying the many teleologically. He is also Christ incarnate, the God of love and grace. Yet, as I have always wondered, how can such love answer the challenge of a “renegade” like Ivan Karamazov? Should, or can, those within present evil really accept a future great reconciliation serenely? Here I feel Whitehead, like Leibniz, emphasizes the power of the good in his theology with a touch too much kitsch.