Zhuangzi · 庄子
Free and Easy Wandering · 逍遥游
Undated 未注日期
逍遥游——散记
Reflections · Pages
我感觉我终于抓住理解《逍遥游》的某种可能性了,或许「小大之辩」的重点从来不在「小」与「大」的关系上,而在于「小」与「大」和「变化」的关系。因此「小大之辩」同时也意味着「小大之变」。「变化」是生成的开端,生成的开端则是「大」的开端。「小」或许实是「静止」「孤立」「抽象」之意。「大」即「生成」,当生成开始,新的关系被构建起来,一种崭新的、积极的力的网络被重新组织,而这带来了物在这一崭新的网络中游动的自由。但是「大」必须不能在保持其「大」的情况下化为「小」,这两个层次是不对称的;但这种不对称是沟通上的不对称,是在大小分处两端的这个光谱上的不对称,或者说从一端到达另一端的不对称,而并非如柏拉图式的不可沟通的理念的差异。此外,「大」「小」如果被这样理解,就将会是一种本体论的原则。这个可以与古希腊的「一-多」做比照,两边的差异应该会有意思。
鲲鹏之变是小大之变,是「小」这种静止的特殊(哪怕这特殊在微观意义上是无限的,它依然如质料受着形式般受制约)在生成中偶然突破了自己的界限,进入了「大」的生存境况;这种崭新的生存境况给予了鹏积极的力量,一种实在的「能」,并褫夺了它原本那种静止的「能」;因此小大绝非是完全齐一的;说小大完全齐一无非是一种危险的价值颠倒。正如在亚那里,灵魂作为形式之形式有着形式转换的潜能,庄子这里也是有着形式转换的过程,而这一整个过程就是由小变大的生成过程。但是大鹏所在的生存境况之「大」决定了它与小者的关系必须与凡鸟们不同了,正如灵魂进入了更高的形式与次等形式的关系同样会发生改变。
AI translation from the Chinese original. The original is the authoritative text.
I feel that I have finally grasped one possible way of understanding Free and Easy Wandering. Perhaps the point of the “distinction between small and great” never lies in the relation between the “small” and the “great,” but in their relation to “transformation.” The “distinction between small and great” thus also means the “transformation between small and great,” playing on bian as both distinction and transformation. “Transformation” is the beginning of becoming, and the beginning of becoming is the beginning of the “great.” The “small” may really mean “static,” “isolated,” or “abstract.” The “great” is “becoming.” When becoming begins, new relations are established: a new, active network of forces is reorganized, bringing a thing the freedom to move within this new network. But the “great” must not become “small” while retaining its greatness. These two levels are asymmetrical. Yet this asymmetry concerns communication: an asymmetry along the spectrum whose two ends are small and great, or an asymmetry in passage from one end to the other, rather than a Platonic difference between incommunicable Ideas. Furthermore, understood this way, the “great” and the “small” become an ontological principle. This could be compared with the ancient Greek “one–many”; the differences between them should be interesting.
The transformation of Kun into Peng is a transformation from small to great. The “small,” a static particular—even if this particular is infinite at a microscopic level, it remains constrained as matter is by form—contingently breaks through its own limits in becoming and enters the existential circumstances of the “great.” These new circumstances give Peng active power, an actual “capacity,” and deprive it of its previous static “capacity.” Small and great are therefore by no means wholly equalized; to say they are wholly equalized is merely a dangerous inversion of values. Just as, in Aristotle, the soul as the form of forms has the potential to transform forms, Zhuangzi likewise has a process of formal transformation. This entire process is the becoming of the small into the great. But the “greatness” of the circumstances in which the great Peng lives determines that its relation to the small must differ from that of ordinary birds, just as the soul’s relation to inferior forms changes when it enters a higher form.