Senior essay ·
Apollo, Athene: The Logical Foundations of Metaphysics
Or, on Leibniz’s Doctrine of Universal Characteristic and its Metaphysical Implications
The halls rose in a pyramid, becoming even more beautiful as one mounted towards the apex, and representing more beautiful worlds. Finally they reached the highest one which completed the pyramid, and which was the most beautiful of all: for the pyramid had a beginning, but one could not see its end; it had an apex, but no base; it went on increasing to infinity. That is (as the Goddess explained) because amongst an endless number of possible worlds there is the best of all, else would God not have determined to create any; but there is not any one which has not also less perfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on descending to infinity…
At this moment Theodorus wakes up…
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy1
Prelude
In his 1928 lectures on Leibniz, Heidegger concludes his “dismantling of the Leibnizian logic”2 with the following words: “This argument [that logic is the foundation of metaphysics even as thinking is the foundation of philosophizing] is not arbitrary. It has metaphysical roots and so crops up recurrently, especially wherever a radical foundation is supposedly sought. And so Leibniz time and again comes close to founding metaphysics on logic, probably most clearly and emphatically in the treatise […] Primae veritates [‘Primary truths’]. Contemporary logic shows a new distortion of the problem. Not only is metaphysics reduced to logic, but logic is itself reduced to mathematics. Contemporary logic is symbolic, mathematical logic, and thus a logic which follows the mathematical method.”3
Heidegger sees the founding of metaphysics on logic as a problem. The primacy Leibniz uncritically grants to logic, so he claims, has obscured the question of Being, which alone is philosophically decisive. But must this be so?
I argue in this essay an alternative approach to interpreting Leibniz, which, if I am not mistaken, is more radical and truer to Leibniz’s own intent than Heidegger’s “dismantling.” I argue that, contrary to Heidegger, Leibniz has not merely “come close to founding metaphysics on logic,” but has actually achieved this founding through his doctrine of the Universal Characteristic. Moreover, he conceives this founding between logic and metaphysics, as I shall explicate in this essay, to be reciprocal: logic founds metaphysics as it makes metaphysics possible through providing a universal view of the pre-established harmony of all possible monads wherein the being of an actual monad can be discerned, while metaphysics founds logic as it makes logic actual through grounding this harmony in the apodictic self-evidence of a primary monad.
This alternative approach has two advantages. First, it obtains a more balanced view on Leibniz’s philosophy as a whole. Instead of playing one part against the other, it recognizes his philosophy to be a genuine attempt at unifying logic and metaphysics into one universal science. By explicating their reciprocal founding, therefore, this approach allows for the more fruitful inquiry into a broadened notion of science that is irreducible to metaphysics or logic alone. Second, it recognizes that logic is secured in this universal science as mathesis universalis, which is for Leibniz’s intellectual predecessors, e.g. Descartes and Wallis, the perennial project to mathematize every truth. Leibnizian logic thus marks the beginning of that “symbolic, mathematical logic” which we now possess and the possession of which Heidegger is so critical of. Now, as mathematical symbolism is the very foundation of modern science, it is worth asking: What is symbolism? What does it achieve for science? Since our approach does not neglect the place mathesis universalis has in Leibniz’s system, these questions regarding symbolism can receive their due attention.
My essay will thus focus on the problem of mathesis universalis and the foundational role it plays in Leibniz’s system. Besides the prelude and an epilogue, this essay is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the doctrine of the Universal Characteristic with its defining marks. Part II examines the tension between the characteristic as a calculus and as a language, while suggesting the idea of infinity to be key to resolving the tension. Part III ventures to reconstruct, using mathematical language, the equivalence between the characteristic, now renewed with an understanding of infinity, and monadology. Part IV first investigates the significance of this equivalence, i.e. how the characteristic and monadology reciprocally found each other, then explores why mathesis universalis, i.e. a general symbolic mathematics, is crucial to Leibniz’s system. Finally, in the flight of fancy of an epilogue, I shall recount briefly the story Leibniz told at the end of his Theodicy (whence the epigraph of this essay) to discuss the ethical import of his philosophy.
Part I
In his early years, Leibniz prided himself on his discovery of the very characteristic “that some people call the Adamic language, and Jacob Böhme calls the ‘nature language.’”4 This characteristic, as Leibniz describes, resembling the art of arithmetic and algebra, reduces thinking to symbolic calculations. With rhetorical optimism, he avers that after his initial outline for it, “a few chosen persons could complete the task in five years; in two years they could set forth those doctrines most often used in daily life, that is, morals and metaphysics in an unshakable calculus.”5 But before I explain how his invention might actually work from the version available to us, I should emphasize a tension inherent to it that will orient all my following discussion.
Throughout his description of the characteristic, Leibniz repeatedly characterizes it as both a calculus and a language. Yet, are these two really compatible? To clarify the difficulty we should start with something simpler. Let us start with counting, as Leibniz himself is quick to the analogy between arithmetic and his characteristic. In his Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, Jacob Klein shows that the Greek concept of ἀριθμός has undergone significant change since the invention of algebra.6 For the Greeks, he argues, the act of counting is directed immediately towards a determinate multitude of determinate objects, such as two pebbles, two cats, two “Platonic” pure monads, two “Aristotelean” abstract units, etc. After the advent of algebra, however, this intuitive thinking is dominated by a symbolic one: now when we think of “a number,” it appears to us primarily to be a symbol that signifies an indeterminate magnitude, i.e. the unknown x. Yet this revolution is not exclusive to algebra, for as we now do arithmetic, we count not with pebbles, but with numerical ciphers.7 When we count to thirty-three, for instance, we do not hold in our mind thirty-three objects, but we represent the number with an Arabic numeral 33. We have established rules that meticulously dictate to us how counting is to be done symbolically: if we replace the second digit of 33 with 4, it is addition by one; if we replace it with 2, it is subtraction by one; if we replace the first digit with 4, it is addition by ten, for we are using a decimal system. No intuition is required in this process: the calculation is done purely symbolically, i.e. mindlessly, by following a fixed set of rules. This is how machines as simple as abaci and as complex as computers work.
This does not mean, however, that intuitive thinking is extinct. Rather, we might say we have trust in the symbolic calculus precisely because we believe that, if we need, we can more or less reactivate whatever is glossed over in our mindless manipulation of ciphers. Though we might be physically incapable of intuiting all the sides of a chiliagon, for instance, we are convinced it is not impossible a priori.8 Moreover, when the count is friendly to our sensibility, we usually do not invoke symbolic thinking. When we see two pebbles, we immediately see them as two.
Is language then similarly transformed through the Universal Characteristic? To be exact, what Leibniz has in mind here is not language in general, but that domain of language relating to “discovery” and “judgement.”9 Namely, he is concerned only with the scientific discourse, a discourse having to do primarily with the determination of theoretical truths.
If a similar revolution of symbolism as we witnessed in mathematics is to occur in the realm of science, what would it look like (for Leibniz)? Certainly, the full-fledged form is only present as the Universal Characteristic, of which I have so far delayed a complete articulation. But it is expected that, even as numeral manipulation is to counting, so should Leibniz’s new symbolic scientific discourse be to that antiquated science handed down by tradition, i.e. the scholastic science which determines truths primarily through contemplating the concrete natures and essences of things. Through the characteristic, old categories of science are to be overturned and renewed alongside the changed general practice of science itself the same way the concept of number is transformed through the advent of algebra. Leibniz’s project here, therefore, is nothing less than what he inherits from Bacon and Descartes: the project of a New Organon.10 The tension inherent to this invention being both a calculus and a language lies precisely in the tension between the new science and the old. The battle waged is all decisive: it is to determine whether science primarily is (should be) an art of rule-based and mindless symbolic manipulation, or it remains (should remain) in its essence rather the theoretical comprehension of the natures of things.
But if science is essentially a determination of the knowledge of Being and all beings, this revolution cannot fail to also have metaphysical implications. Therefore, Heidegger is correct insofar as he sees there is a metaphysical dimension to the Leibnizian logic. However, in his haste to reduce this dimension to that of the question of Being, he fails to engage fully with what is truly revolutionary here. Indeed, for him, both the attempt to found metaphysics on logic and the attempt to establish a genuine mathesis universalis, which two attempts are at the heart of the Leibnizian project for a new science, are rather to be dismissed as “a distortion of the problem.”11
Let us now advance to a presentation of the characteristic and decide for ourselves how it might have distorted the problem. The caveat is that Leibniz himself has never provided an authoritative version of the characteristic. The version to be presented and interpreted, therefore, is a mere conjectural one based on his notes available to us.
In his notes from 1679,12 Leibniz lays down these principles governing the construction of any judgement:
1. In every categorical proposition there are two terms, the subject and the predicate. To these are added a copula (“is”), affirmation or negation, that is quality, and finally, the sign, that is “all” or “some,” which is the quantity.
2. In every proposition, the predicate is said to be in the subject, that is, the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject.
3. Similarly, in a negative proposition, by denying that the predicate is in the subject we affirm by the very act that the negation of the predicate or a term contradictory to the predicate is in the subject.
4. We must consider that every composite notion is composed of other notions, sometimes positive, and sometimes negative.
5. We must also consider the fact that all negative terms have the property that when positive terms are related as genus and species, their negations, on the other hand, are inversely related, as species and genus. For example, “body” is genus, and “animal” is species, for “body” is broader than “animal” since “body” contains animals, plants and other things. But, on the other hand, “nonanimal” is broader than “nonbody.”
He then provides a clear sketch of the characteristic satisfying these principles:
Now that we have understood these things, we can lay down the true foundations of our calculus. Indeed, for every positive (negative) notion, we shall construct its positive (negative) characteristic number, that is, the characteristic number furnished with the “+” (or “–”) sign, by multiplying all of the characteristic numbers of those positive (negative) notions from which the positive (negative) notion of that term is composed.
Thus, suppose: animal = |+ 13, – 5|, rational = |+ 8, – 7|
Then for this term: man
The characteristic number is: man = |+ (13 × 8), – (5 × 7)|
that is: man = |+ 104, – 35|
In constructing these numbers, we must be careful of only one thing, that no number is contained both in the positive and negative part, that is, that the positive and negative numbers are not divisible by one and the same number, that is, that they do not have a common divisor. For if we were to have written this:
animal = |+ 13, – 5|, rational = |+ 10, – 7|
man = |+ 130, – 35|
we would have written an absurdity. For the notion which is signified by “+ 5” is the contradictory of the one signified by “– 5.” And so, since 5 is contained in 10, the positive notion of “rational” (for 10 is divisible by 5, that is, 10 is the product of 5 and 2), that is, since 5 is found in “rational,” while on the other hand, 5 is denied in “animal,” that is, “animal” contains the contradictory of 5, it follows that “animal” and “rational” are incompatible, and therefore “man,” composed of them, implies a contradiction…
It is obvious that wretchedness can be brought about in some special case of the wealthy… For, some special case of the wealthy has a notion composed of the notion of the wealthy, the genus as it were, together with the notion of the difference that distinguishes this wealthy person [i.e. one who is wretched] from another who is not wretched. Let that difference be “|+ 15, – 28|.”
Thus
wealthy person = |+ 11, – 9|, wretchedness = |+ 5, – 14|
the difference [that distinguishes some wealthy person from a general wealthy person] = |+ 15, – 28|
some wealthy person [who is wretched] = |+ (11 × 15), – (9 × 28)|
Now 15 × 11 is divisible by 5, and 28 × 9 by 14. And so it is obvious that one can bring it about that the predicate is in a special case of the subject [i.e. not all wealthy persons are wretched, yet some can be].
We can summarize the rules of this characteristic in the following way. First, each notion is to be assigned a pair of numbers, one positive, one negative. Second, each number (if not a prime) in a notion is a product of numbers from other simpler notions, which are genera to this more complex notion. Finally, a notion is self-contradictory if the positive number assigned to it is not prime to its negative number. From these rules, moreover, we can induce that there must be an infinite number of simplest notions to make up all the composite notions, even as prime numbers make up all the composite numbers through multiplication. Indeed, Leibniz calls these notions “the primitive notions.”13
However, if these rules are to regulate appropriately how notions are to be calculated as if they were numbers, they must first be premised on the properly determined ontological status of notions as such, the same way chess cannot be played without our first presuming the general being of pieces at some very basic level, e.g. pieces are movable physical objects always ready to be handled, pieces are all distinctly shaped and colored to be recognizable bearers of specific functions, etc. At a certain point, the line between rules and properties of the things ruled becomes murky. In Part IV, we see monads are such things whose orderings are their very existences.
The immediate question is, what properties must notions have in this characteristic so that these rules are applicable to them? In the following, I posit three such fundamental properties that are of special importance: equality, independence and intensity.
First, all notions are equal. By equality I mean the characteristic is essentially indifferent to the process by which a composite notion is generated out of simpler notions. For if the characteristic is indifferent to the genesis of a notion, then all notions are equal by nature, as nature in the old science denotes precisely the generative source of a thing. One no longer asks with the characteristic how or why a thing is what it is. One simply registers that it is such. For instance, a biologist and a theologian might both be interested in determining the precise nature of the emergence of man out of the genus of animal through the addition of a differentia, e.g. reason, and they might disagree with each other as to whether reason is a gift from God or a product of evolution. The characteristic, however, is oblivious to this disagreement. It is only interested in the fact that man is a rational animal, but the how or why man is that is suppressed from it.
A possible objection here is that this suppression of the how or why question is not essential to the characteristic but only due to a lack of data registered. One might argue that once we have definitively established either that reason is a gift from God or that it is a product of evolution or that these two options do not contradict each other, we can register this discovery into the characteristic through modifying the composition of these notions. For instance, if we can compose the notion of “reason” out of the notion of “God-given” and other notions, then we would have the why or how of the notion contained in the notion itself. Yet, this objection precisely misses what is crucial. The theologian, when confronted with this clever proposal of a solution, might feel even more flustered. He might say, it is preposterous to think that the notion of “God-given” can be included in the notion of “reason” as its predicate, or to think that in turn “reason” is included in “man,” because reason, qua the gift of God, is by its nature both a miracle of faith and the essence of man, not one datum among many such data predicated of man. In other words, he might argue that “reason” is a source and is thereby irreducible to a predicate. It is not a faculty among many of the human psyche. Rather, as the gift of God, reason marks the incessant miracle of humanity through the formative act of God, which sustains humanity from falling back to the genus of mere animal. Reason, according to this view, is what transcends and first holds humanity in a continuous act of genesis, but not something simply extant in the self-enclosed notion of humanity. That is, “reason” is not included in “man,” but rather it owns man and holds sway over him as his essence.14
Therefore, registering the how of a notion inside a notion only delays the problem but does not solve it. One can always proceed to ask further, given the notion of “God-given” is included in “reason,” how does reason emerge out of the undifferentiated genus of all “God-given” things? Is it not again a gift of God’s will that reason first becomes reason? Should we then include the notion of “God-given” in that differentia that forms reason out of the genus of God-given things? Yet how does this differentia as a species in turn emerge out of the same genus?15 As soon as one is involved in this vicious circle, one always stumbles over the same problem: what is the genesis of a notion out of another, i.e. the genesis of species out of genus? Yet, the characteristic is precisely silent on this fundamental problem of genesis: we know that in Leibniz’s characteristic there is an infinite number of first notions which he calls primitive notions, but these primitive notions are presented merely as neutral and homogeneous material ready for the production of any composite notion through a process of combination analogous to the multiplication of numbers. In other words, notions can be combined into more complex notions through some sort of notional multiplication. What has always haunted metaphysics, however, is precisely the nature of this multiplication.
The problem regarding the notional multiplication has a traditional formulation. In the Sophist, Plato calls it the problem of συμπλοκή εἰδῶν, “the blending of Kinds.”16 Elsewhere, in the voice of Parmenides, he emphasizes the problem thus: “You see, Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by themselves.”17 The difficulty here is that if there are primitive notions, each self-subsisting and independent of others, how can they be mixed and form one unity of a composite notion? Conversely, how can one composite, if it is a genuine one, be composed of many? Traditionally, attempts at solving this problem usually follow the pattern of positing some first and highest self-generating principle, such as the generative interplay between the One and the Dyad in many versions of Platonism, the self-activating Divine Nous of Aristotle, the self-differentiating Concept in Hegelian metaphysical logic, etc. What is left of the task is a deduction of the manifold of all beings from the self-generation of this highest principle. For instance, according to Klein, the unwritten doctrine of Plato is a doctrine of eidetic numbers, which implies a deductive progression from one to many in distinct phases.18 First, the One as the Good is the highest principle. Yet, immanent to the One is the Indeterminate Dyad, which negates the self-repose of the One and thereby posits movement. The first phase of oneness then transitions to its next, where the self-repose of the One is counterposed to the self-movement of the Dyad. The two moments are then captured as Rest and Motion under the new collective unity of Being, thus concluding the second phase of twoness. Then the phase of threeness, fourness, etc. Similarly, Hegel deduces the concept of Nothing from that of Being, then that of Becoming from a holding-together of both earlier concepts, and from Becoming next comes Determinate Being, so on and so forth, through the dialectical movement immanent to the Concept which enriches itself in this movement.19
This pattern of deductive progression is utterly foreign to the characteristic. Although all composite notions seem to be “generated” out of simpler notions, the problem of genesis or συμπλοκή εἰδῶν as delineated is never raised as such by the characteristic. What suppresses this problem is, first, the general mindlessness of the characteristic qua symbolic calculus. That is, it is uninterested in investigating any particular genesis, for all geneses of particular notions are reduced to the one homogeneous operation of multiplication. Furthermore, it is uninterested in determining what this multiplication entails in general, e.g. if this notional multiplication is really analogous to the mathematical multiplication. One can say the characteristic is devised for two questions only: 1. for any given notion, how many notions are contained in it?; 2. what are those contained notions? In other words, the only questions of interest to the characteristic are how simple is this? and what are those things that can make this? These, to be sure, are precisely the principal questions the new science asks, i.e. the questions apropos of efficiency and efficient cause.
But this is to say the characteristic is not just passively suppressive of the problem of genesis. Instead, it has actively deprived this problem of any meaning by revolutionizing the paradigm for what counts as a problem. Let us consider this point carefully. The problem of genesis has lost meaning first in the realm of primitive notions. No primitive is ever generated by another, since they are all equally simple and uncomposed as antecedents to composites, even as greatness of value of prime numbers, i.e. their relative positions on the number line, is irrelevant to them being equally prime. Moreover, primitives are not generated by some highest principle either, as a primitive is by definition simple, i.e. absolutely independent and conceived only in itself. It is not dependent on the Absolute but is only expressive of it. Instead of products generated each in its turn by the self-negated highest unity (e.g. the One negated by the Dyad generates Being; Being negated by Nothing generates Becoming), primitive notions are infinitely many expressive attributes posited of the Absolute. Here, the problem of genesis is replaced by the problem of expression.20
Once the problem of genesis is cast out of the realm of primitives, it is but one step away from total obliteration. For as all primitives are equally simple, none of them can make a composite alone. Nor can a composite be generated out of its positive and negative content of many primitives, for such a generation implies either that one primitive among many is principally the generative cause or that some primitives contribute together to generating the new unity, i.e. the composite. The former amounts to saying a composite is in its essence generated by one primitive, whose impossibility is already demonstrated. But the latter is also impossible. Since generation or the “blending of kinds” always implies a unity of product continuous with its sources, the composite, if it were generated, should be more robust than a mere collection of separate elements. In other words, the generated, insofar as it fully incorporates the generative manifold, would be a unity of primitives reduced to many self-negating and interpenetrating moments submerged in an equilibrium generating this unity.21 This is impossible because it returns to the refuted position where primitives are said to be implicated in dialectical movements of generation. Moreover, as the positive and negative contents express the composite equally, e.g. salt is equally “hard” and “not sweet,” neither is the negative generated out of the positive nor vice versa. Thus the unity of a composite, as dictated by the characteristic, is rather that of a thing expressed in many ways, each expression independent of the other. The composite is not generated out of the many primitives, but merely expressed through them. Here, the problem of genesis is again replaced by the problem of expression. The composite is not a product of immanently negated moments, but as the expressed, it is posited with those primitives expressive of it as elements for its positive or negative content.
Therefore, I say notions are equal because the characteristic is indifferent to how they are generated, not in the sense that the characteristic abstracts from all particular geneses, as if notions are equal because ultimately and abstractly they all share the same origin, source or essence; but notions are equal precisely because they have no source at all! Even as all primitives are immediately posited as expressions of the Absolute, so are composites also immediately posited, each the expressed of some primitives. The Absolute, the primitives and the composites are equally ungenerated, hence equally unnatural, and coeternally express each other: they do not share the ontological distinction between the dependent, generated products and the independent, generative sources. Therefore we understand why Heidegger claims that symbolic mathematical logic such as the characteristic obscures the “fundamental problem,” which for him pertains only to the question of Being. For the question of Being is precisely a question apropos of the ontological distinction between Being as the generative source and beings as the manifold products generated by the all-immersive sway of Being. With the eviction of this ontological distinction, the “fundamental problem” seems lost to the characteristic.
The hint of Spinozism here is unmistakable. One is even inclined to agree with Schelling that Leibniz has contributed nothing to philosophy but a popularized Spinozism.22 Are not primitive notions strikingly similar to Spinoza’s infinitely many attributes of substance? Are not composite notions and modes alike? Of course, attributes are not mixable, nor are modes really composites. Yet, Leibniz and Spinoza share the same project: the establishment of a new science. If Spinoza models his new science on geometry (e.g. the geometrical form of presentation of Ethics and the strict parallelism of qualitatively different attributes), Leibniz establishes his based on algebra. I shall reserve my explication of the full import of Leibniz’s algebraism to Part IV, where I explicitly discuss the relation between mathesis universalis and his philosophical system as a whole.
Aside from equality, notions also have to be independent. This is manifest in composites as they are each assigned a negative characteristic number. Whatever primitive deployed to the negative content of a composite could not without contradiction also be included in the positive. According to the law of excluded middle, there can be no mediation: A and not-A are mutually exclusive. Therefore, no two contradictory composites are ever related, since relation is precisely the middle term that mediates two potentially disagreeing things. They are absolutely independent. It is also noticed that primitives are not independent in this way. As neutral elements that make composites, they in themselves are neither positive nor negative. They are only later, in making composites, assigned to positive or negative in the composite made. That is to say they are not exclusive in their pristine state, when they still cohere in communion within the Absolute without contradicting each other, even as all attributes for Spinoza cohere in the one substance peacefully; since there is no contradiction, there is no interference. Primitives are thus each independent of one another. Though one can determine a “primitive” through negation, i.e. through singling it out as a collection of only one element in exclusion of all others, what is determined would not be a primitive at all, but rather a composite to which the addition of any notion necessarily causes a contradiction, and as such, it is the primitive degenerated into a dead tautology.
It follows that notions are also intensive, by which I mean no notion is self-transcending, i.e. holding something as external which is at the same time immanent to itself. Extensions are all self-transcending, such as time and space, each of which is a synthesis of opposites or a genesis between mutually disagreeing elements, like past and future, far and near. Now, composites are clearly intensive. Even as “–7” involves “7” but excludes “+7,” the negative of a composite involves only its own primitives, since they are neutral to it and do not disagree with it. Those contradictory to it, i.e. positives that involve any primitive this negative involves, are excluded by it, and once excluded, they are not involved in it; while those involved in it, i.e. its primitives, do not contradict it. In either case, this negative does not involve in itself its own opposite. The negative, therefore, is never self-transcending. The same applies to the positive. Hence, though the unity of a composite implies a collection of many, it has no extension. Rather, it is singular in being the expressed: its unity as such is independent of its many contents. Given this, not only are composites independent as they exclude, but they remain independent as they include, i.e. they as collective unities are indifferent to the unities they include, precisely because no unity included potentially disagrees with the overall unity of the collective. Each unity, included or including, is only itself. That is, though the content of a composite might depend on primitives or other composites, its unity per se is neither generated from nor dependent on other unities that are only expressive of it. All composites are intensive qua expressions. Similarly, as all primitives cohere pristinely in the Absolute without contradiction, they are all intensive: they imply no dialectical movement of self-transcendence generated by contradiction.
All these properties are posited with the ungeneratedness of notions. Notions are equal because, qua ungenerated, they do not differ in their nature, insofar as they do not have a nature at all. Notions are independent because, qua ungenerated and self-positing, they are not dependent on a generative source. Finally, notions are intensive because they are not self-transcending, i.e. generative, as extensities are. All notions, primitive or composite, cohere as many independent expressions of their respective expressed. These, so far, are the metaphysical implications of the characteristic, governed by one motif, i.e. the substitution of the problem of genesis with the problem of expression.
Part II
Undeniably, the problem of genesis is still meaningful in our life. If the characteristic is to secure “those doctrines most often used in daily life, that is, morals and metaphysics in an unshakable calculus,” it must take account of the phenomenon of genesis. I would even go out on a limb to suggest that precisely this is the difficulty preventing Leibniz from completing the characteristic. The difficulty, one might say, lies in a genesis of geneses: where do we first encounter, in the characteristic, the mediations and geneses we talk about daily in our natural life?
We are back to the tension between the characteristic as an art of calculation and a linguistic construction. To formulate the general differences, let us first examine an example of this contrast:23
Dog is wretched.
This sentence, being an unconditional truth statement, has a subject-copula-predicate structure, the subject here being “dog,” the predicate “wretchedness.” The act of judgement is the simple analysis of the notion of “dog,” which is found, through this analysis, to include the notion of “wretchedness.” This does not contravene the rules of the characteristic.
I am beating a dog.
This second sentence, however, is more complex. In broad strokes, one can characterize it to have a subject-verb-object structure. It does not lack a predicate, but the predicate here signifies an event. As this predicate contains two notions that clarify its content, i.e. “beat” and “dog,” it also intimates various relations determining it as the event: it is “I,” the speaker, that does the beating to the dog, not vice versa; the beating is ongoing right now; etc. All these various relations are neatly captured by the conjugation, “am beating.”
In ancient Greek, for instance, verb conjugation involves a rather exhaustive list of categories, each expressing a particular relation determining the event: person, number, tense, mood, voice, case and aspect.24 Person expresses how the event is related to the speaker, e.g. if “I” am doing the act or another. Number expresses how many partake in the event as the subject, e.g. if the subject is singular, dual or plural. Tense expresses the time of the event, e.g. if it is in the past or present. Mood expresses how the speaker subjectively relates to the event, e.g. if he thinks the event is certain to happen or not. Voice expresses how active the subject is in relation to the event, e.g. if the subject is doing the act or suffering it. Case expresses how the event relates to the object, e.g. if the act proceeds “to” or “from” the object, viz. if the event comes “here” or goes “there.” Finally, aspect expresses the viewpoint one takes toward the event, e.g. either one sees the action internally as continually unfolding or sees it externally as a completed whole, viz. imperfective or perfective.25 This distinction between two aspects can be rephrased as a distinction between what Leibniz would call “reality” and “virtuality:”26 the imperfective expresses the event as if it were unfolded into an ongoing, concrete experience internally differentiated into many moments, hence expresses it as real; the perfective, on the contrary, expresses it as if its internal content were folded into the undeveloped, undifferentiated latency of an “atom” indifferent to what is really experienced, hence as virtual.
Put succinctly, person has to do with the self-other relation, number with one-many, tense with past-present-future, mood with certain-obscure, voice with active-passive, case with here-there, and aspect with real-virtual. All these relations are generative as they are between relative opposites. They are thus incompatible with the characteristic. For, first, as all notions are independent, each notion subsists only in itself while its unity knows no other. Moreover, notions are immediate unities, hence unrelated to the many; notions are coeternal and thus not in time; notions all have a finite number of components and are thus fully analyzable, i.e. absolutely certain; notions, though some include others while some are included by others, remain independent and do not interact among themselves, hence neither act upon nor suffer from each other; notions do not move about, nor do they proceed anywhere; finally, all notions are virtual, inhering in pure possibility qua eternal essences in the Absolute.27 Clearly, then, the characteristic, qua calculus par excellence, cannot be a language, as it knows none of the distinctions we find in natural speech.
We now have a sharper focus on the puzzle. In what ways can the characteristic in its present form either give rise to or at least simulate the categories inborn to our natural speech, which revolves around events? Is this impossible, since Leibniz never completes the task? Yet neither does he ever abandon it! In multiple places, Leibniz is generous enough to give us a clue as to what his solution to the puzzle is, and they unanimously point to a key concept: infinity.28
In The Source of Contingent Truths,29 Leibniz expounds precisely the genesis of all geneses in terms of infinity with these opening words: “The source of contingent truths [i.e. events] in an infinite progression, on analogy with the proportion between incommensurable quantities [is the following]…” He continues: “if the analysis proceeds to infinity and never attains completion, then the truth is contingent, one which involves an infinite number of reasons, but in such a way that there is always something that remains, for which we must, again, give some reason.” Finally, he maintains “because this has not been understood, the union of the soul and the body has also been taken to be inexplicable. For, in metaphysical rigor, they do not flow into one another, nor indeed, does God move the one on the occasion of the other and divert it from its own proper course. But following its own laws from the time they were instituted with an admirable but infallible constancy [directio], each agrees with the other as exactly as they would if there were a true influx.”
“In metaphysical rigor” means in the way God knows and creates things. But here the metaphysical is equated with the mathematical, for we say the characteristic, though symbolic, contains metaphysically decisive implications, as God employs the same calculus to create the world, which Leibniz calls “Divine Mathematics;”30 only what is for us symbolic is for God intuitive. That is, as we use numbers to stand in for notions, God combines notions in themselves. This implies the world as it is created does not follow the paradigm of genesis or natural speech. Hence, when Leibniz says “in metaphysical rigor” there is no “flow into” but soul and body act as if “there were a true influx,” he means there is no genesis, viz. “influx,” at the foundation.31 There is only its simulation at infinity.
Natural speech revolves around events, each of which depends on infinitely many others as reasons for its happening. I am beating a dog, because I am angry, because the dog was barking, because now I have my hands untied, etc. These reasons relate to the one utterance, I am beating a dog, as its many intimations. It intimates the beating is happening right now because…, happening between me and the dog because…, I am certain of it because…, etc. Each intimation falls under a category that involves the current event with some other event in a genesis, as that other event is its ground of reason, e.g. a past that generates the present, the action of another that generates my passion, etc. All events are geneses. If the characteristic were to simulate events as it proceeds to infinity, then these categories prescribing the various geneses of an event must be derivable from it, despite its being, strictly speaking, only a calculus.
The list of categories based on verb conjugation is less than exhaustive, but each item in it is nonetheless essential: person, number, tense, mood, voice, case and aspect. In Leibniz’s corpus, these categories can roughly be divided under four topics, each focusing on one particular problem of genesis: 1. the genesis of the apperceiving egoic monad “I” and other monads obscurely implicated in the ego’s self-apperception, which corresponds to person and mood; 2. the genesis of the actively unifying form of a discrete monad and its passive, dispersive matter, which corresponds to number and voice; 3. the genesis of the extensity of space-time, which corresponds to tense and case; 4. the genesis of a substantial reality out of many virtual phenomena, which corresponds to aspect. This is not the only possible ordering, as all these categories overlap and each implicates the whole. Yet I deem it to be a very convenient one. In the next part of this essay, I will attempt to derive all the said categories from the characteristic in this order.
Part III uses a mathematical method and vocabulary. It shares its form with Leibniz’s The Source of Contingent Truths, such that it draws an analogy between the theory of proportions and the theory of truths. Yet, the purpose is precisely to suggest that the kinship between mathematics and metaphysics is much more than mere “analogy.” Rather, their equivalence implies their genuine mutual foundation.
Part III
ELEMENTS
- Mathematical symbolism
The infinite series of prime numbers, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13…
- Metaphysical implication
The infinite series of primitive notions, each an absolute neutrality attributive to the divine understanding.
METHOD
1.
- Mathematical symbolism
To multiply one prime number with a different prime number to obtain their product, e.g. 2 × 3 = 6.
- Metaphysical implication
To combine one primitive notion with a different primitive notion to obtain a neutral content.
2.
- Mathematical symbolism
To pair up two such product numbers, then assign positive to one, negative to the other, e.g. (6, 35) = |+ 6, – 35|.
- Metaphysical implication
To include or exclude one notion or a series of notions from the notion that is being defined, e.g. “man” is “rational” and “not-winged.” In other words, to obtain a composite notion with its positive and negative content.
3.
- Mathematical symbolism
A pair in which the positive number is prime to the negative number, e.g. |+ 6, – 35| = |+ (2 × 3), – (5 × 7)|.
- Metaphysical implication
A composite notion that is self-consistent, since it does not exclude a notion that it at the same time includes, e.g. a “wingless man.”
- Mathematical symbolism
A pair in which the positive number has a common divisor with the negative number, e.g. |+ 6, – 15| = |+ (2 × 3), – (3 × 5)|.
- Metaphysical implication
A composite notion that is self-contradictory, since it includes a notion that is to be excluded, e.g. a “winged man.”
DEFINITION
- Mathematical symbolism
A transformation F is defined such that F (X) designates the product of unique prime numbers lesser than but closest to X, e.g. F (2 × 2) = 2, F (2 × 2 × 3 × 5 × 5) = 2 × 3 × 5.
- Metaphysical implication
God does nothing in vain. That is, for any content, God uses unique primitives only, lest there is redundancy; or, all repetitive content is reducible, e.g. “man” added with “man” remains “man.”
AXIOM
- Mathematical symbolism
The set Φ of all the products of unique prime numbers is self-enclosed with the double transformation of multiplication and F. That is, suppose x, a product of elements from Φ, when transformed by F, gives x’, then x’ is an element of Φ.
- Metaphysical implication
The divine understanding is absolutely self-subsistent, wherein an infinite totality of all possible unique content is posited.
EXPLICATION OF THE AXIOM
- Mathematical symbolism
An element of Φ, e.g. 30, is a product of 2, 3 and 5, each of which is a unique prime number. 14, a product of 2 and 7, is also an element of Φ. 420, the product of 30 and 14, is a product of 2, 2, 3, 5, 7, hence not in Φ, as one of its factors, 2, appears twice in the series, hence not unique. But F (420) gives 210, which is in Φ.
- Metaphysical implication
In other words, if the content of a composite, positive or negative, as a combination of primitives is further combined with another primitive to make a different content, this new content is nonetheless included and preconceived by the divine understanding. The divine understanding is therefore The Absolute.
SCHOLIUM I
1.
Besides the distinction between composites, i.e. notions that contain both positive and negative content, and primitives, i.e. notions that are neutral elements for content, it can be deduced there must also exist the following distinctions: The One includes all the primitives for its positive content and excludes nothing, so any negation contradicts it; pure nothingness includes no primitive but excludes them all as negative content, so any true content contradicts it; a pure idea includes some primitives but excludes all others, hence is tautological and any notion added to it contradicts it, as the product must include what is already excluded, even as nothing can be added to justice itself without bringing in impurity it denies; so is that which excludes some primitives but includes all others an opposite pure idea, since any notion added to it excludes something already included, even as nothing can be added to injustice itself without taking away some portion of what is purely unjust; an essence has both a finite positive content and a finite negative content, so some notions contradict it, some do not; an existence has both an infinite positive content and an infinite negative content.
2.
The determining of a composite (following the METHOD) is like an eliminative process.32 As it appears to us, God determines for each primitive if it is positive or negative in, or irrelevant to, the ongoing series that would make the composite in question. Once a composite is fully determined, its negative content excludes certain notions, as primitives in its negative are excluded from its positive. Every composite excludes, as every composite has its negative. The divine understanding, however, is a latent virtuality, so that each content possibly involved in a composite as either positive or negative is already implicated in it without contradiction, even as every possible product of unique prime numbers is contained in Φ. Therefore, as to make a composite requires first of all to select what is to be excluded, and to thus select is to negate the totalizing latent virtuality inherent in the divine understanding, each composite is premised on a selection through negation. As there are infinitely many ways to select, there are infinitely many possible composites.
3.
Existence is an infinite composite: the eliminative process which determines it is indefinite. Each existence thus contains an infinitely unfolding series of positive and negative content. An existence is considered impossible if it is found to exclude what it includes. Adam cannot both sin and not sin. Yet for Adam prior to his sinning, he has the freedom to either sin or not sin. With respect to Adam prior to his sinning, therefore, sinning and not-sinning are only incompossible, but neither alone is impossible. For neither sinning nor not-sinning contradicts the notion of Adam, but as soon as sinning is included, we have the new notion of a sinning Adam, and not-sinning can no longer be included. We should therefore distinguish impossibility from incompossibility.
4.
“[Since] something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. Furthermore, it follows from this that all possibles, that is everything that expresses essence or possible reality, strive with equal right for existence in proportion to the amount of essence or reality or the degree of perfection they contain, for perfection is nothing but the amount of essence […] And in this context, time, place, or in a word, the receptivity or capacity of the world can be taken for the cost or the plot of ground on which the most pleasing building possible is to be built, and the variety of shapes [therein] corresponds to the pleasingness of the building and the number and elegance of the rooms.”33 God, in creating the world, would want to involve maximum content with minimum cost. The maximum here is obviously the totality of all possible essences, as they all have an equal right to strive for existence, i.e. to express. Yet if all possible essences are involved, there must arise contradictions, as some essences are contradictory. These contradictions are alleviated by God through his orderings (APORIA III).34
APORIA I
- Mathematical symbolism
A finite number π belonging to the set Φ either includes prime number ∂ in its series of factors or not. If ∂ is excluded, then π is indifferent to ∂, since it remains itself through this exclusion and as number π is self-sufficient. If now ∂ is multiplied to it, it will then persist in the newly made number as one of its factors, but not the newly made number itself. Conversely, if ∂ is included, the removal of ∂ from its series of factors will change its value, and the number π will be lost, since the newly made number will not contain π as a factor.
- Metaphysical implication
The notion of Adam is either prior or posterior to the predication of sin. If the notion is posterior, it would be absurd, since Adam is free to either sin or not sin. For, given the notion is posterior, it would be like a species to a genus. The differentia would be the predicate “sinning,” whose removal should remove the species altogether, and it would no longer be Adam whom we talk about after the removal, but someone else as the genus of Adam. As he is Adam only if he sins, he, as Adam, could not have not sinned, and is thus not free to not sin, which is contrary to our premise. Thus the notion has to be prior. Yet, if it is prior, the notion of Adam would be like a genus, and Adam stays Adam whether he is predicated of sin or not, and sin is therefore indifferent to him as Adam. In this case, there is no sufficient reason for him as Adam to choose sinning over not sinning. He would be the donkey that does not know if he is to drink or to eat. This is contrary to the law of sufficient reason, hence absurd.
SOLUTION TO APORIA I
- Mathematical symbolism
The removal (addition) of ∂ from (to) an infinite series ∆ does not change the product value of ∆, as it stays infinite; the apparent removal (addition) only obscures (clarifies) whether ∂ is included in ∆ or not.
- Metaphysical implication
The positive and negative content of Adam, qua substance, is each an infinitely unfolding series. Each is prior to the predication insofar as it retains the same content as infinite content when a predicate is removed from (added to) it; each is posterior to the predication as the removal (addition) obscures (clarifies) if the predicate is so far included in the unfolded content or excluded. That is, if the predicate “sinning” is removed, Adam stays the same infinite substance “Adam,” only it is now obscured whether he sins; if added, Adam again stays Adam, only it is now clarified that he also sins.
EXPOSITION OF APORIA I
This aporia is solved because finite and necessary essences are carefully distinguished from infinite and contingent existences. The aporia arises as the notion of Adam is initially misconceived to be a composite that includes only a finite number of primitives for its content, i.e. an essence. In that case, the addition or removal of a predicate would either be absolutely essential or utterly immaterial for the notion of Adam, as “Adam” either is a species defined through the predicate that is its differentia and would be something else without it, or it persists as a genus indifferent to the predicate. In other words, even as 2 times 3 gives 6 and 6 is 6 only with 3 while 2 is 2 with or without 3, Adam either is Adam only through his sin, or stays Adam if he sins or not. Yet, since Adam is a contingent existence composite of infinitely many essences, his content is rather an infinity consisting in an infinitely unfolding series of predicates, the apparent inclusion (exclusion) of any particular predicate into (from) which changes not its content qua infinity, but only clarifies as the series is unfolding whether an element is included (excluded). In other words, an existence is never fully comprehended as a completed whole, but rather as an unfolding infinity is only gradually clarified in its parts if it includes a particular predicate or not.
APORIA II
- Mathematical symbolism
A set that contains all the members of an infinite series ∆ of unique prime numbers has cardinality ℵ0, while the set of real numbers ℝ has cardinality ℵ1.
- Metaphysical implication
If we say the positive and negative content of a substance, such as that of Adam, each consists in an infinite series of unique primitives, it is then implied that each is made of discrete elements. However, the content of a substance is infinitely divisible, i.e. continuous. This implies that the content of a substance is not an infinite series comprised of unique primitive notions, hence contrary to our premise.
SOLUTION TO APORIA II
- Mathematical symbolism
Since a set Ω that contains all the members of an infinite series ∆ has cardinality ℵ0, its power set, i.e. the set that contains all subsets of Ω, has cardinality ℵ1.
- Metaphysical implication
A substance indeed consists in primitives, positive and negative, yet it also consists in things made of them, e.g. composites, which are irreducible to these primitives, as they are equally expressive. Hence from bottom up, a substance first consists in infinitely many primitives, then in the things they make, then in higher things made of these things, ad infinitum; from top down, it is divisible into infinitely many substances, which in turn consists in infinitely many other substances, ad infinitum.
EXPOSITION OF APORIA II
This aporia arises due to the premise that a substance is immediately composed only of unique primitives. Yet this is a false premise. On the contrary, primitives are components of a substance that in turn make other components equally expressive of the substance and hence irreducible to primitives. Suppose a set Ω contains all the primitives in a substance. It is infinite but countable. Now, as each composite contains its own set of primitives, the set of all composites and primitives in this substance is the power set of Ω. It is infinite and uncountable. But just this set contains all the content of a substance. A substance, therefore, contains an uncountably infinite set of elements, and is hence continuous.
APORIA III
- Mathematical symbolism
If an element ∂ is excluded from series ∆, it is not included.
- Metaphysical implication
If a substance excludes a predicate, it does not include it. Otherwise, the law of non-contradiction is violated. For instance, a physical object, once it is clarified to have the shape of a circle, shall never come to have the shape of a square, as it by the inclusion of the notion of circle has excluded the notion of square. Similarly, Adam, once he has sinned, cannot have not sinned. Yet a circular thing can certainly become square and Adam can be redeemed. This seems contrary to the premise.
SOLUTION TO APORIA III
- Mathematical symbolism
Though ∂ is excluded from ∆, it can be ordered such that ∆ includes ∂ ad infinitum but excludes it in any determinate part.
- Metaphysical implication
Though two things can be contradictory, they are not contradictory insofar as they are two different parts of a substance. Adam, who sinned before, can be redeemed in the future. In a similar sense, if this piece of paper here is a circle, that piece of paper over there can be a square.
EXPOSITION OF APORIA III
This aporia arises because the finite analysis of an essence is conflated with the infinite analysis of an existence. A finite analysis is concerned with a determinate notion, i.e. an essence, that can be formally written as |X, – Y|, X and Y being definite values that symbolically represent the positive and negative content of an essence. If X and Y are not prime to each other, a contradiction is incurred. On the other hand, an infinite analysis is concerned with an indeterminable notion, i.e. an existence. Similar to essences, all existences can be formally written as |∂1, – ∂2|, while both ∂1 and ∂2 are products of infinitely many unique prime numbers, symbolically representing the positive and negative content of an existence. As both are infinite, they are neither prime nor not prime to each other. Similarly, existence does not conflict with itself qua existence. We then replace the product values ∂1, ∂2 with infinite series ∆1, ∆2. Suppose the existence is now represented as |∆1 = (… × 2 × 5 × 11 × …), –∆2 = – (… × 3 × 7 × 11 × …)|. In this case, ∆1 and ∆2 are not prime, as they both include 11. Yet since they are infinite, the two series can both be ordered in infinitely many ways. Depending on the ordering, one might unfold them indefinitely without running into any of their common divisors. Analogously, though an existence might contradict itself globally, its content can be ordered in such ways that locally no contradiction ever occurs. Existences, qua infinite series, can thus always be arranged such that in order to run into a contradiction, one must go through infinitely many other existences, qua its sub-series. Therefore, if a contradiction is in finite essence, one sees it immediately, whereas a contradiction in infinite existence can always be infinitely mediated through ordering.
PROBLEM I
To construct the apperceiving self and its perceived other.
ARGUMENT FOR PROBLEM I
Self is the center of perception.35 Earlier, we see a substance consists in an infinitely unfolding series. Moreover, substances are continuous, for their content has cardinality ℵ1. As God constructs the series from the bottom up,36 what he sees is the unfolding of infinitely many primitives in the series and all the things they make. That is, as God sees the series a, b, c, d… which includes both positive and negative primitives, he also sees the series of sets, {∅}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {c}, {a, c}… As human beings, however, we are creatures situated at the end of creation and only know a substance from the top down. For us, substances are given as infinities and we start perceiving them only in obscurity. Yet, as a substance is unfolded (by which I mean the content of a substance is analyzed for our knowledge into its immediate constituents) and its constituents in turn are unfolded,37 we gain more and more clarity on the substance and thus expand continuously the realm of our perception into the realm of obscurity. As this expansion is continuous, the division between clarity and obscurity is indefinite. The habitual realm of clarity is called self, while that of obscurity other. As the two realms are continuous, so are selfhood and otherness. I perceive myself in another, as I look into a mirror darkly lit. Those who see the self clearly and universally through a reflection into all things, i.e. whose self-knowledge keeps unfolding, are apperceiving egos such as human beings; those whose realm of clarity remains relatively stagnant or habitually suffers setbacks are animals, plants and lifeless things. When this realm of clarity unfolds, one lives even as one perceives. When it enfolds (that is, when the content unfolded for our knowledge falls back to obscurity), one perishes in numbness. As one lives, selfhood is generated out of otherness. As one dies, the genesis is reversed.
PROBLEM II
To construct the unifying form and its manifold matter.
ARGUMENT FOR PROBLEM II
Form is the center for organizing a manifold.38 Since some substances unfold while some are enfolded into them, substances organize into a hierarchy. Each substance is a unity, as all composites are unities. But this unity here is extensive, as the series is now infinite and contains contradictory elements; for God, in creating the world, has created a totality involving every essence, thus involving infinitely many contradictions, though none occurs locally (SCHOLIUM I, 4). These contradictions are distributed continuously, for substances are continuous, even as salt is dissolved in water. As some substances unfold, they involve more contradictions than others, and become thus disharmonious. Conversely, some substances are harmonious. Harmonious substances, as they disagree less with themselves, are more unified. Since as a substance unfolds, it tends to fold into more disharmony, even as one tends to take in more salt if one simply drinks more salt water, enfolded series tend to be more harmonious than unfolded ones. The more a substance enfolds, therefore, the more it tends to be unified. Moreover, as all substances are in one continuum, one substance folds into another. A harmonious substance is thereby a nexus that recapitulates a larger disharmony, as it is a more unified expression into which divergent expressions are folded. One calls this nexus form. If as it unfolds a substance enjoys less harmony, it becomes less expressive, till it eventually disperses into a passive content, i.e. matter, that is to be recapitulated by many recapitulating forms. A thing lives as it recapitulates matter to enrich its own content without dispersing itself; that is, as it perceives more things, it also strives to perceive them in harmony. Therefore, though we see through our eye, i.e. a perceptive organ whose content unfolds in clarity, we live on our heart, i.e. a vital organ that, though itself folded in obscurity, actively provides agreeable matter it enfolds for our perceiving life, as it is a silent machine that purveys us our lifeblood. Through these vital organs, we generate ourselves on matter as our food when we live. As we die, the genesis is reversed.
COROLLARY
Life mediates between perception, i.e. unfolding, and nutrition, i.e. enfolding. As one enfolds, one loses clarity but tends to gain unity. As one unfolds, one gains clarity but tends to lose unity. Each approaches death, as one either falls into numbness, or is dispersed into many yet numb things.39
PROBLEM III
To construct space and time.
ARGUMENT FOR PROBLEM III
Space and time are orderings of existing things.40 As countless contradictions are distributed among continuous substances, they are distributed in accord with the orderings ordained by God. As orderings differ, contradictions are differentially distributed, and they might be more concentrated in some parts than others. Suppose two substances unfold the same number of contradictions, while for one they are concentrated in various parts, for the other they are equally distributed throughout the whole substance. Both substances are hence equally harmonious. Yet, as both unfold, the former encounters radically shifting states of harmony, while the latter sees none. The former is then said to be temporally ordered, the latter spatially. For as one views a landscape, one does not take in the whole landscape instantly. Rather, each glance is composed of infinitely many kinestheses that organize the view part by part. It is only because these kinestheses fail to create an internally differentiated rhythm in perception that the perceived is taken to be a space. But if as a thing unfolds it disperses and recollects in distinguishable moments, it is time. As one instant lives in near absolute intensity, then almost immediately perishes as it falls in abrupt disharmony, and recollects into a next instant, it generates a rhythm, without which there is no time. Space is therefore a homogenous time, and time a differential space. Now, as all substances are continuous, so are their contradictions. Moreover, as a substance unfolds, the distribution of contradictions in it also varies continuously. Therefore, as a substance unfolds, not only do time and space generate each itself, they also generate each other, as a sculpture can reveal its rhythm, and music its expanse.
PROBLEM IV
To construct substances and their phenomena.
ARGUMENT FOR PROBLEM IV
Substance is an unfolded series.41 As the series unfolds, our perception gains in content. Reality, indifferent to harmony, disharmony or their distribution, measures only how much content is gained: |+ 2, – 3| has less content than |+ (2 × 5), – (3 × 7)|, hence is less real, though they are equally self-consistent. To illustrate this more concretely: “I am loving” expresses something different from “I love” or “I am in love,” yet all three equally designate a duration experienced by the “I” located within this duration, as “love” signifies a continual state; what is differently expressed by “I am loving,” therefore, must be distinct from mere experienced time. Now, by saying “I am loving,” I only intend to unfold from the atomized state of “I love” its internal differentiation, marking a readiness to confess each and everything I suffer from love. Such differentiation is indifferent to time or the contradictions time alleviates. The passion of love can be fraught with contradictions or be ever so evanescent without seeming less real,42 if its content unfolds enough internal differences before is dispersed. What expresses such reality concretely unfolded is a substance. As everything strains for reality, everything strains to unfold; enfolded, it is abstraction, or phenomenon.
SCHOLIUM II
1.
As a world-series contains all existences and essences, one is formally able to extract from it any series, which usually corresponds to one of the following categories (SCHOLIUM I, 1): The One, pure nothingness, pure ideas, essences and existences. It is easy to see that The One does not involve any negation, while pure nothingness does not involve any true content, hence both are distinct from the substance, which has infinite and contradictory content. Pure ideas are tautologies. Depending on how one extracts it from the substance, one either retains only a finite positive content or a finite negative content, such that one might claim the idea, e.g. justice itself, is either expanded too much or negated too much by the addition of any other notion. Essences are extractions finite in both positive and negative content. Now, existences, though they might be extracted from other existences, always entail immediately an infinity and the whole totality of existences, as they continuously merge into each other and no division between them is ever definite. This extraction is thus a mere reordering of the world-series selected to bring one aspect of it clearer to light instead of another. All extractions, however, are such reorderings, each different depending on what aspect is selected and how much of the substance is to be unfolded through this ordering.
2.
Abstractions, or phenomena, are all indicative of the substance to a greater or lesser extent. As a phenomenon loses this indication and approaches finitude, i.e. as it enfolds, it becomes more like an essence. For instance, color is substantial, as it is a phenomenon indicative of light reflected off an object. Yet, it loses substantiality, though never fully, and becomes pure phenomenon when it is held indifferent to other notions, in the way an essence is indifferent to what is added to it. Conversely, such a quasi-essence in becoming more and more determined might either be re-substantiated or idealized. That is, through many negations and affirmations, the phenomenon might gradually unfold into a full substance and be continually enriched in content. This is substantiation. It is also possible that, in determining it, its content unfolds such that it approaches a pure idea. This is idealization. Now, as all extractable series are of the same continuous world-series, they are only abstractions or phenomena in continuous geneses within it, such that essences and existences are mutually generative, for infinitude and finitude here are only relative concepts measuring how unfolded notions are; so too are ideas, The One and pure nothingness also in continuous geneses. Thus we understand whence the problem of genesis originates: it originates from the presupposition of a substance, the various abstractions it implicates, and the mediate relations that obtain between them.
3.
But this is not God’s perspective. Unlike us, who take the world as given, he expresses the world from himself, i.e. from the totality of primitives in their pristine state inhering in his divine understanding. Each substance is thus for him fully unfolded in its constituent elements. We, on the other hand, can never gain intuition into these primitives that are true elements of the world, for our knowledge relies on abstractions, which are all mere top-down selections of particular aspects that always indicate the substance from which they originate, hence always insinuating some remainder yet to unfold from the hidden source. So far, therefore, our knowledge is only inadequate, as substances cloud our vision. Deus Absconditus. He eternally torments us with the problem of genesis and an unfolding more interminable than Penelope’s weaving. But if we ever desire to know things adequately, we need to know the primitives. That means we need to leave the realm of substances once and for all. Herein lies the tension between the new science and the old: as the former takes this flight and soars, the latter remains grounded.
Part IV
Let us recapitulate the equivalence established in Part III, so as to ground it more firmly.
As the composition of notions proceeds to infinity, we encounter substances, i.e. monads. Each monad unfolds into an ordered series implicating a totality of other series. As all these series are themselves orderings, each monad is an ordering of orderings, i.e. each is a perspective on the totality of all monads. All monads are thereby implicated in each one monad as they express themselves in it qua infinitely many orderings ordered by it. These expressions form into indefinite categories, such as essence, existence, etc., each more or less an abstraction of the one implicating monad, as each unfolds it incompletely. Yet, as God knows all primitives immediately, all monads are fully unfolded in his knowledge. The totality of all orderings from all perspectives, i.e. the world, is thus intuitive to him as the pre-established harmony.
Leibniz divides knowledge into the following: clear, distinct, adequate, and intuitive.43 What is clear is what one knows is true yet can give no account of, e.g. an artist knows how to draw well, yet cannot explain his talent. What is distinct is what one knows is true and can give the account of, as one knows the notions that compose it, e.g. I know “man” distinctly if I know he is a “rational animal.” What is adequate is what one knows in every detail. Yet one can know something adequately either in a symbolic or an intuitive way. That is, one either knows the totality of all truths through symbols, or knows them in themselves. Though we aspire to the intuitive, only symbolic knowledge is humanly possible. For, as we are situated at the end of creation, the world is given to us as a substance. Though we unfold it indefinitely, we merely attain more substances or abstractions indicating substances, but never primitives, through which alone can truths be fully clarified. To truly approach Divine Knowledge, therefore, we would have to first destroy this world underneath which all primitives are concealed.
But the characteristic achieves just this destruction for us, as the world becomes denatured through its symbolism. A symbol, unlike abstraction, is an indifferent substitute for any content. It is pure possibility self-enclosed, i.e. “anything whatsoever.” In it, the infinite horizon of possibility unfolding in continuum with actuality is condensed into one homogeneous object. A symbol can represent something actual as well as possible. It indicates no genesis, as it posits the totality of all possibilities immediately, even as the mathematical unknown x posits all possible magnitudes immediately. In other words, all symbols are expressive. Unlike an abstraction indicative of its substance or an image indicative of its original, symbols only express themselves as immediate and total. Through them, the problem of expression is first manifest as such.
With symbols, we attain all primitives quickly, for we can simply posit them, even as we posit infinitesimals in differential calculus. That is, instead of indefinitely unfolding the substance in search for primitives, we assume this unfolding already completed, and use symbols to represent the primitives that are sought. Primitives, along with their infinite geneses out of the substance, are thereby condensed into symbolic objects. Thus posited, they cannot indicate any substance, for their relation to it is pure indeterminacy. But if primitives are not generated from substances, neither are substances from primitives. A monad is thus posited immediately with primitives, essences and existences, all being expressions equally ungenerated, each definable only through a set of formal principles and rules.
Leibniz’s characteristic is precisely an attempt to formulate these rules. Through it, we see primitives, essences and existences all cohere as expressions of one structural totality encompassed by a universal ordering. That is, we glimpse the pre-established harmony of all monads. Admittedly, we still cannot intuit this harmony, yet we nonetheless manage to discern its formal structure with the help of symbols. At least formally, therefore, a universal monadology is established.
The problem of genesis is, in view of this universal monadology, reworked into a problem of simulation. Genesis is merely emergent at the end of creation, where the world is given to us in perspective as an infinitely unfoldable substance. As we are restricted to always start unfolding from what is clearer and hence more actual to us, i.e. ourselves, the world qua the totality of monads becomes for us a horizon continuously receding into obscurity. The world in its actuality, i.e. self-evidence, becomes thus grounded in the self-evidence first given to a particular monad. A monadology that carries out in actuality this grounding of all monads in one is a particular monadology.
Now the reciprocal foundation between metaphysics and logic can be fully explicated. As metaphysics is primarily a pursuit to ground all beings in the generative activity of Being, it is particular monadology. As such, it grounds all monads and their possible orderings into one actual and self-evident ordering that is a particular monad, i.e. my absolute ego. Logic, however, insofar as it studies pure possibilities through symbols, is mathesis universalis, or universal monadology. It founds metaphysics as it clarifies the universal structure wherein actualities must cohere with possibilities. Metaphysics without logic is thus not possible, as it would lose the absolute universality it aspires to as a science of all beings, hence degenerate into a mere world-view. Logic without metaphysics, however, is not actual, as it would be empty of self-evidence. We only approximate Divine Knowledge, which is both intuitive and universal, with both monadologies. As metaphysics grounds particular evidences in a system as they unfold, logic secures systemicity as such; only together can they complete the new science. Even as “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,”44 logic without metaphysics is but a formality, metaphysics without logic, a myth.
We conclude with an articulation of the structure of Leibniz’s new science. As empirical sciences study particular orderings in relation to the one ultimate ordering, metaphysics studies this ultimate ordering itself, while logic studies all orderings in general. Logic is thus the universal symbolic science of possibility, i.e. mathesis universalis, which founds both metaphysics and empirical sciences, introducing into them a persisting mathematical symbolism such as is witnessed in mathematical physics. But logic in turn is metaphysically grounded, insofar as it is itself imbued with a historically generated self-evidence whose genesis needs investigations on its own account.45
Epilogue
Near the end of Theodicy, Leibniz tells a very Borgesian story. Sextus Tarquin, visiting the Oracle of Apollo, desired to know his future. Having learned it, he asked Apollo to change his destiny, so that he would not turn out evil. Apollo claimed that he, as merely a god of oracles, was unable to accomplish this. Sextus then left enraged and fulfilled his destiny. Theodorus, overhearing the conversation, travelled to Athens and fell asleep in the Temple of Athene. In his dream, he was led by the goddess to observe a pyramid composed of infinitely many worlds, the pinnacle of which is the actual world, which is also the most brilliant.
We misunderstand the story if we miss what is beautiful is not only the world on top, but the whole ordering of all worlds, i.e. the pyramid itself. Only in knowing the whole do we see the beauty of a part, even as God cannot choose the best world to actualize without seeing all that is possible first. Without a knowledge of the totality of the possible, therefore, no reason can be given to the actual as to why it is actual.
Only mathesis universalis offers man a glimpse into this reason. It is, for instance, only through a determination of all the paths light can travel from point A to point B (which determination is almost impossible without some mathematical symbolism such as algebra) that we manage to determine the one path that is “best,” and can thus justify the actual path, as it is simply this “best.”46 But those who do not dream of the totality of all that is possible, even if they have learned all that is actual from the Oracle of Apollo, are altogether blind to what is best. Ethics qua contemplation of the best is impossible for them; rather, they shed their tears under necessity.47 With mathesis universalis, we dream of totality, and are hence first liberated from bitterness and resentment against our fate. The Goddess of Wisdom and the Goddess of Freedom, therefore, are one and the same.
Bibliography
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by Joe Sachs. Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 2019.
Deleuze, Gilles. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Translated by Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 1997.
––––. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Translated by Tom Conley. London: The Athlone Press, 1993.
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
––––. Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller. New York: Humanity Books, 1969.
Heidegger, Martin. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Translated by Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
––––. “On the Essence of Truth.” Translated by John Sallis. In Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell, 111–138. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
Husserl, Edmund. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
––––. Logical Investigations. Translated by J. N. Findlay. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
––––. Philosophy of Arithmetic. Translated by Dallas Willard. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Marcus Weigelt. London: Penguin Group, 2007.
Klein, Jacob. Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra. Translated by Eva Brann. New York: Dover Publications, 1968.
Leibniz, G. W. Philosophical Essays. Translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.
––––. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God. Translated by E. M. Huggard. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, n.d.
Plato. Parmenides. Translated by Mary Louise Gill. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.
––––. Sophist. Translated by Seth Benardete. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Rothstein, Susan. "Aspect." In The Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics, edited by Maria Aloni and Paul Dekker, 360–366. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Schelling, F. W. J. On the History of Modern Philosophy. Translated by Andrew Bowie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
von Siebenthal, Heinrich. Ancient Greek Grammar for the Study of the New Testament. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2019.
Notes
G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, trans. E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, n.d.), 372–373.
↩Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 107.
↩Ibid., 106.
↩G. W. Leibniz, “Preface to a Universal Characteristic,” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew & Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 5.
↩Ibid., 8.
↩Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, trans. Eva Brann (New York: Dover Publications, 1968), especially Chapter 9.
↩For further discussion on the status of arithmetic as symbolic calculus, see Edmund Husserl, Philosophy of Arithmetic, trans. Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), especially Chapter 11.
↩“And so when I think about a chiliagon, that is, a polygon with a thousand equal sides, I don’t always consider the nature of a side, or of equality, or of thousandfoldedness (that is, of the cube of tenfoldedness), but in my mind I use these words (whose sense appears only obscurely and imperfectly to the mind) in place of the ideas I have of these things, since I remember that I know the meaning of those words, and I decide that explanation is not necessary at this time. I usually call such thinking, which is found both in algebra and in arithmetic and, indeed, almost everywhere, blind or symbolic.” See Leibniz, “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas,” in Philosophical Essays, 24–25.
↩Ibid., “Preface to a Universal Characteristic,” 6.
↩“I agree with you that it is important once and for all to examine all of our assumptions in order to establish something solid… If [Descartes] had followed precisely what I call the thread of meditating, I believe that he would have achieved the first philosophy… I admit that I have not yet been able to read all his writings with all the care I had intended to bring to them, and my friends know that, as it happened, I read almost all the new philosophers before reading him. Bacon and Gassendi were the first to fall into my hands… That is why I am inclined to applaud all those who examine the least truth to its deepest level; for I know that it is important to understand one perfectly, however small and however easy it may seem. This is the way to progress quite far and finally to establish the art of discovery which depends on a knowledge, but a most distinct and perfect knowledge of the easiest things…” Ibid., “Letter to Foucher,” 1–5.
↩Heidegger’s early approach to interpreting Leibniz is deeply dismissive. The structure of his “dismantling” as laid out in his lectures from 1928 is as follows: 1. Leibniz’s doctrine of logic is reducible to his theory of judgement; 2. his theory of judgement revolves around the problem of “inherence (inesse),” i.e. the inclusion of a predicate in a subject; 3. since “inherence” already entails the genesis between one and many, self and other, etc., the Leibnizian logic is really grounded in his metaphysical doctrine of monadology, and logic in general grounded in metaphysics; 4. as monadology has to inquire into the problem of genesis, or as Heidegger calls it, “transcendence,” Leibniz is really only concerned with the problem of Being, though he himself is not fully aware of it. Through this “dismantling,” Heidegger therefore reduces Leibniz’s philosophy into a footnote to his own project in Being and Time. See Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.
↩Leibniz, “Samples of a Numerical Characteristic,” in Philosophical Essays, 10–14.
↩Ibid., “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas,” 24.
↩Heidegger is one of the most relevant and eloquent representatives of this position. For a glance into his self-interpretation regarding the question of “essence,” see Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” trans. John Sallis, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 111–138.
↩This difficulty is what causes Aristotle to formulate the injunction that there is no highest genus. As he explains it, suppose there were a highest genus, there would be no reason why a first difference should come from this undifferentiated genus to generate the species under this genus. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Joe Sachs (Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 2019), 43.
↩For simplicity, I did not use Benardete’s translation of this term, i.e. “the weaving together of the species.” See Plato, Sophist, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 57.
↩I changed the phrasing slightly to fit the context of this essay, without hurting the general sense expressed in the original. See Ibid., Parmenides, trans. Mary Louise Gill (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 135.
↩Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, 82–99.
↩G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanity Books, 1969), 82–110.
↩For further discussion on the problem of expression in the context of Spinoza’s philosophy, see Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1997).
↩For a thorough and detailed analysis of a state of dialectical submergence similar to the one described here, see G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 67–79.
↩In fact, Schelling’s remarks are even more abrasive, as he calls Leibniz’s philosophy a “stunted Spinozism.” I do not share his opinion, for I believe he, too, overlooks the importance of mathesis universalis and algebra in shaping Leibniz’s philosophy. See F. W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 75-84.
↩Lest this example should offend reader’s sympathy, let it be said that I am only borrowing it from Leibniz: “a dog runs away from the stick with which he was beaten, because his memory represents to him the pain which the stick caused him.” See Leibniz, “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,” in Philosophical Essays, 208.
↩A brief overview of these categories is given by Siebenthal. Contrary to his schema, I separate tense from aspect, for I believe them to be distinct categories, and shall give my reasoning in both the next footnote and Part III of this essay. I also disregard the nominal forms of verbs, for these have to do mostly only with the content of the verb, without directly expressing relations that determine the event. For his schema, see Heinrich von Siebenthal, Ancient Greek Grammar for the Study of the New Testament (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2019), 88.
↩This understanding of grammatical aspect is based on an interpretation of the following passage: “[…] grammatical aspect […] indicates what Smith (1991) calls ‘viewpoint aspect,’ the viewpoint from which the event denoted by the predicate is perceived. The major grammatical aspects are perfective and imperfective, which correspond roughly to the contrast between whether the event is perceived from an external viewpoint which is located outside the running time of the event, or from an internal viewpoint located within the running time of the event.” As shall be clear from Part III, I champion a not-time-exclusive interpretation of grammatical aspect as opposed to the more traditional temporal interpretation presented in this passage. I do not see imperfective aspect as primarily a designation of experienced duration, but rather as a designation of the concreteness of this experience. That is, by saying “I am noticing,” I am not suggesting that my notice has a running time, since to notice is instantaneous. Or, by saying “I am loving,” I am not suggesting something the same as “I love” or “I am in love.” Yet all three, due to their lexical aspect, designate a duration that I, located within the moment, experience. What is differently expressed by “I am loving,” therefore, cannot be simply a suggestion of experienced duration. Rather, through the imperfective, I only imply the content of this act is not atomized, but has inner differentiation and complexity. Though often this differentiation in content marks a temporal differentiation, what is crucial is not time per se. In other words, what I argue is, in the phrase “running time” used by this passage, what is essential is not “time,” but “running,” i.e. differentiation. For further detail, see Susan Rothstein, “Aspect,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics, ed. Maria Aloni & Paul Dekker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 360–366.
↩Husserl tries to convey a similar sense when he writes “reell.” What is indicated here is that what is “real” is not merely what is “objective,” “out there,” “positively existing,” as some platitudes of crude realism would suggest. Rather, reality primarily means what is concrete and fleshed out as content for our experience. Leibniz therefore says: “a possible thing is something with some essence or reality, that is, something that can distinctly be understood.” What is real is then what is distinctly known to include an infinite amount of essence. Its contrary is virtuality. According to Leibniz, “everything that must happen to a person is already contained virtually in his nature or notion, just as the properties of a circle are contained in its definition.” Moreover, regarding the recollection theory of knowledge, he claims “our soul knows all these things virtually and requires only attention to recognize truths.” What is virtual is then neither less objective nor less necessary, but merely expresses what lies latent and indistinct in existence. See Leibniz “On Freedom and Possibility,” in Philosophical Essays, 21; “Discourse on Metaphysics”, 45, 58. Also see Ibid., 41.
↩“I respond that neither those essences nor the so-called eternal truths pertaining to them are fictitious. Rather, they exist in a certain realm of ideas, so to speak, namely, in God himself, the source of every essence and of the existence of the rest […] So it is necessary that eternal truths have their existence in a certain absolute or metaphysically necessary subject, that is, in God […]” That is, though essences exist formally in God, their content is only a virtual possibility not yet developed into full reality. Despite some essences being more “real” or perfect than others, they all equally fall short of reality as such, i.e. existence. See Ibid., “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” 151–152.
↩Essays relevant to this topic are, besides The Source of Contingent Truths (1685–89?), On Contingency (1686?), On Freedom (1689?), A Specimen of Dynamics (1695). See Ibid., 28, 96, 133.
↩Ibid., “The Source of Contingent Truths,” 98–100.
↩Ibid., “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” 151.
↩Elsewhere, Leibniz also states: “Strictly speaking, one can say that no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any other thing.” From this he derives the absence of influx between body and soul. See Ibid., “Primary Truths,” 33.
↩This simile, however, only applies to the process of determination, which is how human beings regard notions. Notions appear to us to be either determinate or indeterminate. But as was said in Part I, all primitives and composites are coeternal qua expressions of God. For God, though notions can be finite or infinite, they are all already equally determinate. There is no process of the determining of a notion in God himself, and creation does not proceed in time. Rather, God sees the world as his eternal self-expression immediately posited, i.e. his word. All finite composites, i.e. essences, that make up existences as their content, therefore, already emanate from him as his expressions. The only thing that he does determine (this is where Leibniz diverges from Spinoza) is how this totality of expressions is to be ordered, i.e. how the world of existences is to be regulated. See Ibid., “On Freedom and Possibility,” 19–21; “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 39–40; “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,” 211; “The Monadology,” 218.
↩Ibid., “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” 150.
↩“For having accepted the notion of necessity everyone accepts, namely that those things whose contrary implies a contradiction are precisely those that are necessary, it readily appears from a consideration of the nature of demonstration and analysis that there surely can be, indeed there must be, truths which cannot be reduced by any analysis to identical truths or to the principle of contradiction, truths endowed with an infinite series of reasons, fully known to God alone. And, it readily appears, this is the nature of everything called free and contingent, especially those which involve place and time. This has sufficiently been shown above from the very infinity of the parts of the universe and from the mutual interpenetration and connection of things.” See Ibid., “On Freedom,” 98.
↩Ibid., “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 65–66; “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,” 208–209; “The Monadology,” 216; “Preface to the New Essays,” 296.
↩Again, we note that we use this idea of “construction” to describe God’s creation only from a human perspective. All the content being constructed, primitives and composites alike, is already expressed by God. Here, the genuinely “creative” act on God’s part, so to speak, is only God’s ordering of these infinitely various coeternal expressions.
↩For further discussion on the subject of unfolding, see Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press, 1993).
↩Ibid., “Primary Truths,” 34; “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 51–52; “From the Letters to Arnauld,” 88–89; “A New System of Nature,” 142; “The Monadology,” 222.
↩Ibid., “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 65; “From the Letters to Arnauld,” 78, 88; “A New System of Nature,” 140–141; “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,” 208–209, 211.
↩In this essay I use extension or extensity to denominate both what Leibniz calls “extension,” i.e. space, and “duration,” i.e. time. See Ibid., “Note on Foucher’s Objection,” 146–147; “From the Letters to de Volder,” 175, 178, 179, 184; “From the Letters to Des Bosses,” 199.
↩Leibniz often does not differentiate carefully his terms such as “substance,” “form,” “substantial form,” “substantial unity,” etc., for these concepts do overlap. Yet, at one place he distinguishes substantiality from unity: “I do not say that there is nothing substantial or nothing but appearance in things that do not have a true unity, for I grant that they always have as much reality or substantiality as there is true unity in that which enters into their composition.” At another he says: “Things are either concrete or abstract. Concrete things are either substances or substantiata […] Substantiata are aggregates […]” For Leibniz, “reality” or “substantiality” is synonymous with “perfection,” while “perfection” is nothing but the amount of essence included. Though a certain unity of form is always requisite, a thing can still be called “substantial” if it only contains these unities, despite itself being relatively dispersed. See Ibid., “From the Letters to Arnauld,” 86–89; “From the Letters to Des Bosses,” 200. Also see Ibid., “Comments on Michel Angelo Fardella,” 103; “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” 150; “From the Letters to de Volder,” 178, 179, 181; “Letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia,” 186; “The Monadology,” 220.
↩“For we must admit that it is impossible that bare extension, containing geometrical notions alone, is capable of action and passion.” Though “passion” here is rather a concept of physics, our psychological passion follows the same principle. See Ibid., “A Specimen of Dynamics,” 130.
↩Ibid., “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas,” 24–25.
↩Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Marcus Weigelt (London: Penguin Group, 2007), 86.
↩For further studies on this topic of the genesis of logic through the grounding of subjectivity, see Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
↩Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” 54–55.
↩“The language of the ethical Spirit is law and simple command, and complaint, which is more the shedding of a tear about necessity.” See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 396.
↩
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
诸殿堂层层升起,构成一座金字塔;越向顶端攀登,殿堂就越美丽,所呈现的世界也越美丽。最后,他们抵达了最高的一座,它使金字塔臻于完整,也是一切殿堂中最美的一座:因为金字塔有一个开端,却看不到尽头;它有顶点,却没有底座;它不断扩展,直至无限。这是因为(女神如此解释),在无穷多个可能世界中,有一个是一切世界中最好的,否则神便不会决定创造任何世界;然而,没有一个世界的下方不存在更不完满的世界:所以这金字塔不断向下延伸,直至无限……
就在此刻,忒奥多罗斯醒来了……
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨,《神义论》1
序曲
海德格尔在1928年关于莱布尼茨的讲座中,以如下文字结束了他对“莱布尼茨逻辑的拆解”2:“这个论证[即逻辑是形而上学的基础,正如思维是从事哲学的基础]并非任意的。它有形而上学的根源,因此反复出现,尤其出现在据称要寻求一种彻底奠基的地方。所以,莱布尼茨一次又一次地接近于把形而上学奠基于逻辑,或许在那篇……Primae veritates[《最初真理》]中表现得最为清晰而有力。当代逻辑显示出对这一问题的新扭曲。不仅形而上学被还原为逻辑,逻辑本身也被还原为数学。当代逻辑是符号的、数理的逻辑,也就是遵循数学方法的逻辑。”3
海德格尔将形而上学在逻辑中的奠基视为一个问题。他声称,莱布尼茨未经批判便赋予逻辑的优先地位,遮蔽了唯一在哲学上具有决定性的在之问题。但事情一定如此吗?
本文主张用另一种方式解读莱布尼茨。如果我没有弄错,相较于海德格尔的“拆解”,这种解读更为彻底,也更忠于莱布尼茨自己的意图。与海德格尔相反,我认为莱布尼茨并非仅仅“接近于把形而上学奠基于逻辑”,而是确实通过其普遍符号术(Universal Characteristic)学说实现了这一奠基。而且,正如我将在文中阐明的,他将逻辑与形而上学之间的这种奠基理解为相互的:逻辑通过提供一幅所有可能单子之前定和谐的普遍图景,使我们能够在其中辨认一个实在单子的在,从而让形而上学成为可能,由此奠基形而上学;形而上学则通过将这一和谐奠基于一个首要单子无可置疑的自明性,使逻辑成为实在,由此奠基逻辑。
这种解读有两个优势。首先,它能对莱布尼茨的哲学整体取得更平衡的理解。它不以某一部分反对另一部分,而承认他的哲学切实尝试着将逻辑与形而上学统一为一门普遍科学。因此,通过阐明二者的相互奠基,这种解读使我们能够更有成效地探究一种扩展了的科学概念,它既不能仅仅还原为形而上学,也不能仅仅还原为逻辑。其次,它承认逻辑在这门普遍科学中被确立为普全数学(mathesis universalis);对于莱布尼茨思想上的前辈,例如笛卡尔和沃利斯,普全数学正是将一切真理数学化的长久事业。莱布尼茨的逻辑因此标志着我们如今所拥有的“符号的、数理的逻辑”的开端,而海德格尔对我们拥有这种逻辑如此不满。既然数学符号体系恰恰是现代科学的基础,就值得追问:什么是符号体系?它为科学实现了什么?由于我们的解读不忽视普全数学在莱布尼茨体系中的地位,这些关于符号体系的问题就能得到应有的重视。
所以,本文将集中讨论普全数学的问题及其在莱布尼茨体系中的奠基地位。除序曲与尾声外,本文分为四部。第一部介绍普遍符号术学说及其规定性特征。第二部考察符号术作为演算与作为语言之间的张力,并提出无限的理念是化解这一张力的关键。第三部尝试用数学语言,重构符号术与单子论之间的等价关系;此时的符号术已因对无限的理解而焕然一新。第四部先考察这一等价关系的意义,即符号术与单子论如何相互奠基,继而探究为什么普全数学,也就是一般的符号数学,对莱布尼茨的体系至关重要。最后,在尾声的遐想中,我将简要重述莱布尼茨在《神义论》结尾讲述的故事(本文题辞即出于此),以讨论其哲学的伦理意涵。
第一部
莱布尼茨早年曾自豪地宣称,他发现的正是那种“有些人称为亚当的语言,而雅各布·波墨称为‘自然语言’”的符号术。4按照他的描述,这种符号术类似于算术与代数之术,将思维还原为符号计算。他以修辞上的乐观断言,在自己为它勾画出初步轮廓后,“少数经过挑选的人便能在五年内完成这一任务;他们在两年内就能以一种不可动摇的演算,陈述日常生活中最常使用的学说,也就是道德学与形而上学。”5不过,在依据我们所能见到的版本解释这一发明如何实际运作之前,我应先强调一种内在于其中的张力,它将引导以下全部讨论。
莱布尼茨在描述符号术时,反复将它既刻画为一种演算,又刻画为一种语言。然而,这两者真的相容吗?要澄清这个困难,应先从更简单的事情入手。让我们从计数开始,因为莱布尼茨自己也很容易想到将算术与其符号术类比。在《希腊数学思想与代数的起源》中,雅各布·克莱因说明,自代数发明以来,希腊人的ἀριθμός概念已经发生了重大变化。6他认为,对希腊人而言,计数活动直接朝向确定对象的确定多,比如两颗石子、两只猫、两个“柏拉图式的”纯粹单子、两个“亚里士多德式的”抽象单位等等。然而,代数出现后,这种直观思维便被符号思维主导了:如今,当我们想到“一个数”,它首先呈现为一个表示不定量的符号,即未知数x。但这一革命并不限于代数,因为我们如今做算术,也不是用石子计数,而是用数字记号。7例如,数到三十三时,我们不会在心中保有三十三个对象,而是用阿拉伯数字33来表示这个数。我们已经建立了规则,详尽规定如何以符号计数:将33的第二位替换为4,就是加一;替换为2,就是减一;将第一位替换为4,就是加十,因为我们用的是十进制。这个过程无须任何直观:计算完全是遵循一组固定规则而符号地,也就是无须思索地进行的。从简单的算盘到复杂的计算机,机器都是如此运作的。
然而,这并不意味着直观思维已经消失。相反,我们可以说,之所以信任符号演算,恰恰是因为我们相信,只要需要,就多少能重新激活那些在不加思索地操作记号时被略过的东西。例如,虽然我们在身体能力上或许无法直观一个千边形的全部边,却确信这并非先天地不可能。8而且,当数目适合我们的感性时,我们通常也不诉诸符号思维。看见两颗石子时,我们立即就将它们看作两颗。
那么,语言是否也通过普遍符号术发生了类似的转变?确切地说,莱布尼茨在这里考虑的并非一般的语言,而是涉及“发现”和“判断”的语言领域。9也就是说,他关心的只是科学话语,一种主要涉及对理论真理之规定的话语。
如果我们在数学中见证的符号革命也在科学领域发生,那么(对于莱布尼茨而言)它会是什么样子?当然,它完整的形态只体现为普遍符号术,而我至今还未对此作出完整阐述。但可以预期,正如数字操作之于计数,莱布尼茨新的符号科学话语之于传统传下来的旧科学也应如此;这种旧科学即经院科学,主要通过观照事物具体的自然与本质来规定真理。通过符号术,科学的旧范畴将被推翻并更新,同时科学的一般实践本身也将改变,正如数的概念因代数的出现而转变一样。因此,莱布尼茨在此的事业,正是他从培根和笛卡尔继承而来的事业:一部《新工具》的事业。10这一发明既是演算又是语言所内含的张力,恰恰就在新旧科学之间的张力中。这场斗争关乎一切:它要决定科学首先是(或应当是)一种依循规则、无须思索的符号操作技艺,还是在本质上仍然是(或应当仍然是)对事物之自然的理论把握。
但若科学本质上是对在与一切在者之知识的规定,这一革命就不可能没有形而上学的意涵。因此,海德格尔看到莱布尼茨的逻辑具有形而上学维度,在这一点上他是对的。然而,他急于把这个维度还原为在之问题,却未能充分面对这里真正具有革命性的东西。的确,在他看来,无论是把形而上学奠基于逻辑的尝试,还是建立真正的普全数学的尝试,这两项处于莱布尼茨新科学事业之核心的尝试,都应被当作“对问题的扭曲”而摒弃。11
现在,让我们转向符号术本身的呈现,自己判断它究竟如何可能扭曲了问题。需要说明的是,莱布尼茨从未给出符号术的一个权威版本。因此,下面将要呈现并解读的,只是依据他留存的笔记作出的一个推测性版本。
在1679年的笔记中,12莱布尼茨为任何判断的构造确立了以下原则:
1. 每一个定言命题都有两个项,主词与谓词。在这两项之外,还要加上一个系词(“是”)、肯定或否定,也就是质,最后还有符号,即“所有”或“某些”,也就是量。
2. 在每一个命题中,谓词都被说成在主词之中,也就是说,谓词的概念被包含在主词的概念中。
3. 类似地,在否定命题中,当我们否认谓词在主词之中,就以这个行为本身肯定:谓词的否定,或一个与谓词矛盾的项,在主词之中。
4. 我们必须考虑,每一个复合概念都由其他概念构成,这些概念有时是肯定的,有时是否定的。
5. 我们也必须考虑,所有否定项都有这样一个性质:当肯定项以属与种的关系相联时,其否定项则以相反的种与属的关系相联。例如,“物体”是属,“动物”是种,因为“物体”比“动物”宽泛,“物体”包含动物、植物及其他事物。但另一方面,“非动物”却比“非物体”宽泛。
随后,他清楚地勾勒了一种满足这些原则的符号术:
既然已经理解这些事情,我们便可以为演算奠立真正的基础。的确,对于每一个肯定(否定)概念,我们都要构造其肯定(否定)特征数,也就是带有“+”(或“−”)符号的特征数,方法是将构成该项之肯定(否定)概念的所有肯定(否定)概念的特征数相乘。
于是,假定:动物 = |+ 13, − 5|,理性 = |+ 8, − 7|
那么,对于这个项:人
其特征数为:人 = |+ (13 × 8), − (5 × 7)|
即:人 = |+ 104, − 35|
构造这些数时,我们只须注意一件事:不能有任何数同时包含在肯定部分与否定部分中;也就是说,正数和负数不能被同一个数整除,即不能有公约数。因为,倘若我们写成这样:
动物 = |+ 13, − 5|,理性 = |+ 10, − 7|
人 = |+ 130, − 35|
我们就写下了一个荒谬之物。因为“+ 5”所表示的概念与“− 5”所表示的概念相矛盾。所以,既然5包含在“理性”的肯定概念10之中(因为10可被5整除,即10是5与2的乘积),也就是说,既然5存在于“理性”中,而另一方面,5却在“动物”中被否定,即“动物”包含5的矛盾项,那么“动物”与“理性”就不相容,因此,由二者构成的“人”就蕴含矛盾……
显然,悲惨可以出现在富人的某个特殊情形中……因为富人的某个特殊情形,其概念由富人的概念——可以说是属——与区别概念共同构成;这一区别使这位富人[即悲惨的富人]区别于另一位不悲惨的富人。设这一区别为“|+ 15, − 28|”。
于是
富人 = |+ 11, − 9|,悲惨 = |+ 5, − 14|
区别[使某个富人区别于一般富人的区别]= |+ 15, − 28|
某个[悲惨的]富人 = |+ (11 × 15), − (9 × 28)|
现在,15 × 11可被5整除,28 × 9可被14整除。所以显然,可以使谓词包含在主词的一个特殊情形中[即并非所有富人都悲惨,但有些可以是悲惨的]。
我们可以如下概括这种符号术的规则。首先,每个概念都应被赋予一对数,一正一负。其次,一个概念中的每个数(若它不是素数)都是其他较简单概念之数的乘积;这些较简单的概念是这一较复杂概念的属。最后,若赋予一个概念的正数与其负数不互素,这个概念便自相矛盾。此外,从这些规则我们可以推出,必定存在无穷多个最简单的概念,以构成一切复合概念,正如素数通过乘法构成一切合数一样。莱布尼茨确实将这些概念称为“原初概念”。13
然而,若这些规则要适当地规定如何像计算数字那样计算概念,就必须首先以概念本身得到恰当规定的本体论地位为前提,正如若不先在最基本的层面上预设棋子的一般存在方式,就无法下棋:例如,棋子是可移动的物理对象,随时可以被操作;棋子都有可区分的形状与颜色,能够被认作特定功能的承担者,等等。在某个点上,规则与受规则支配之物的性质之间的界线就变得模糊了。到第四部,我们将看到,单子就是这样一种东西,其秩序恰恰就是其存在。
眼前的问题是:在这种符号术中,概念必须具有什么性质,这些规则才能适用于它们?下面,我提出三种尤其重要的基本性质:平等性、独立性与强度性。
首先,一切概念都是平等的。所谓平等,我指的是符号术在本质上不关心复合概念由较简单概念生成的过程。因为,若符号术不关心概念的生成,那么所有概念在自然上就是平等的;旧科学中的自然恰恰指一个事物得以生成的源头。使用符号术时,人们不再问一个事物如何或为何是其所是,而只记录它如此而已。例如,生物学家和神学家可能都关心,通过增加某个种差,比如理性,人从动物之属中涌现的确切自然是什么;他们可能对于理性究竟是神的恩赐还是演化的产物意见不一。但符号术对这种分歧浑然不觉。它只关心人是理性的动物这一事实,而人如何或为何如此,则被排除在外。
这里有一种可能的反对意见:对如何或为何之问的排除,并非符号术的本质,而只是因为记录的数据不足。有人可能认为,只要我们已经确切证明理性是神的恩赐,或是演化的产物,或这两个选项互不矛盾,就能通过修改这些概念的构成,把这一发现录入符号术。例如,如果能用“神赐的”概念与其他概念构成“理性”的概念,那么这个概念的为何或如何就包含在概念本身之中了。然而,这个反驳恰恰错过了关键。面对这样一个巧妙的解决方案,神学家可能反而更加恼怒。他可能说,将“神赐的”概念作为谓词包含在“理性”概念中,或者进一步认为“理性”包含在“人”之中,都是荒谬的;因为理性作为神的恩赐,在自然上既是信仰的奇迹,又是人的本质,而不是关于人所陈述的诸多数据之一。换言之,他可能主张,“理性”是一个源头,因此不可还原为谓词。它不是人类心灵诸能力之一。相反,作为神的恩赐,理性标志着神的赋形活动所带来的、人性永不停歇的奇迹;这种活动维系人性,使其不至于退回单纯动物之属。按照这个观点,理性是超越人性、并首先将人性保持在持续生成活动中的东西,而不是某种仅仅现存于自我封闭的人性概念之内的东西。也就是说,“理性”不是包含在“人”之中,而是作为人的本质占有人,并统摄着人。14
因此,将一个概念的如何记录在概念内部,只是延后了问题,而没有解决它。我们总可以继续追问:既然“神赐的”概念包含在“理性”中,那么理性如何从所有“神赐之物”这个未分化的属中涌现?理性最初成为理性,难道不又是神的意志的恩赐吗?那么,我们是否应把“神赐的”概念,包含在那个使理性从神赐之物的属中形成的种差里?可这个种差作为一个种,又如何从同一个属中涌现?15一旦卷入这个恶性循环,就总会被同一个问题绊住:一个概念从另一个概念中生成,也就是种从属中生成,究竟是什么?然而,符号术恰恰对这个根本的生成问题保持沉默:我们知道,莱布尼茨的符号术有无穷多个最初概念,他称之为原初概念;但这些原初概念只被呈现为中性而同质的材料,随时可以通过类似数字乘法的组合过程,生产出任何复合概念。换言之,概念能通过某种概念的乘法组合为更复杂的概念。但始终困扰形而上学的,恰恰就是这种乘法的自然。
关于概念乘法的问题,有一种传统的表述。柏拉图在《智者》中称其为συμπλοκή εἰδῶν,即“诸类的交织”问题。16在另一处,他借巴门尼德之口如此强调这一问题:“苏格拉底,你看,如果把诸事物划定为各自独立的形式,困难有多大。”17这里的困难是:若存在原初概念,每一个都自存且独立于其他概念,它们如何能够混合,构成复合概念的一个统一体?反之,一个复合体若是真正的一,又如何由多构成?传统上,解决这一问题的尝试通常遵循一种模式:设定某个最初且最高的自我生成原则,例如许多柏拉图主义版本中一与二元之间的生成性交互、亚里士多德自我实现的神圣努斯、黑格尔形而上学逻辑中自我差异化的概念,等等。剩下的任务,就是从这一最高原则的自我生成中演绎出一切在者的杂多。例如,按照克莱因的解释,柏拉图的未成文学说是一种理念数学说,它意味着从一到多、分阶段推进的演绎。18首先,作为善的一是最高原则。但不定二元内在于一,它否定一的自足静止,并由此设定运动。第一个一性阶段便过渡到下一阶段:一的自足静止与二元的自我运动相对立。随后,这两个环节作为静止与运动,被收摄于在这一新的集合统一体之下,从而完成二性的第二阶段。接着是三性、四性等等。同样,黑格尔从在的概念演绎出无的概念,再从前两者的共同保持中演绎出生成的概念;从生成又产生定在,依此类推。这一过程通过内在于概念的辩证运动展开,概念在这一运动中丰富自身。19
这种演绎推进的模式完全陌生于符号术。尽管所有复合概念似乎都从较简单的概念中“生成”,但上述生成或συμπλοκή εἰδῶν的问题,从未作为问题本身在符号术中被提出。首先压制这一问题的,是符号术作为符号演算总体上的无须思索。也就是说,它无意探究任何具体的生成,因为所有具体概念的生成,都被还原为乘法这一种同质的操作。进一步说,它也无意规定这种乘法一般而言意味着什么,比如概念的乘法是否确实类似于数学的乘法。可以说,符号术只为两个问题而设计:1.对任一给定概念,它包含多少概念?2.所包含的概念是什么?换言之,符号术唯一感兴趣的问题就是:这有多简单?以及哪些东西可以构成它?而这恰恰就是新科学的首要问题,即有关效力与动力因的问题。
但这意味着,符号术并非仅仅被动地压制生成问题。相反,它通过革新“何者算作问题”的范式,主动剥夺了这一问题的全部意义。让我们仔细考虑这一点。生成问题首先在原初概念领域失去了意义。任何原初概念都不会由另一个生成,因为作为复合概念的先行者,它们同样简单、同样非复合,正如素数数值的大小,即它们在数轴上的相对位置,与它们同样都是素数这一点无关。而且,原初概念也并非由某个最高原则生成,因为原初概念按定义就是简单的,也就是绝对独立、只能通过自身被构想的。它不依赖绝对者,而只是表达绝对者。原初概念不是由自我否定的最高统一体依次生成的产物(例如,一被二元否定而生成在;在被无否定而生成生成),而是绝对者被设定的无穷多个表达属性。在这里,生成问题被表达问题取代了。20
一旦生成问题被逐出原初概念的领域,它距彻底消失就只有一步之遥。因为既然所有原初概念都同样简单,就没有任何一个能独自构成复合概念。复合概念也不能从由诸多原初概念组成的肯定与否定内容中生成,因为这种生成要么意味着,诸多原初概念中的某一个才是首要的生成原因,要么意味着某些原初概念共同促成一个新统一体,即复合概念的生成。前者无异于说,复合概念在本质上由一个原初概念生成,而这一点已被证明不可能。后者也同样不可能。既然生成或“诸类的交织”总意味着产物的统一性与其源头连续,那么,若复合概念是被生成的,它就应当比彼此分离的元素之集合更为坚实。换言之,被生成者若充分纳入了使它生成的杂多,就会是这样一种统一体:原初概念被还原为诸多自我否定、相互渗透的环节,沉浸于一种生成这一统一体的平衡之中。21这不可能,因为它又回到了已经被驳斥的立场,把原初概念说成卷入了生成的辩证运动。而且,肯定与否定内容同样表达复合概念,例如盐同样是“硬的”与“不甜的”,所以否定内容既不是从肯定内容中生成的,反之也不成立。因此,依符号术所规定,复合概念的统一性,倒是一个事物被以多种方式表达的统一性,每一种表达都独立于其他表达。复合概念不是从诸多原初概念中生成的,而只是通过它们被表达。在这里,生成问题再次被表达问题取代。复合概念不是内在地被否定的诸环节的产物;相反,作为被表达者,它与表达它的那些原初概念一同被设定,后者作为其肯定或否定内容的元素。
所以,我说概念是平等的,因为符号术不关心它们如何生成;这并不是说符号术从所有特殊的生成中作了抽象,仿佛概念平等是因为它们最终且抽象地分享同一个起源、源头或本质;恰恰相反,概念平等,因为它们根本没有源头!正如一切原初概念都直接被设定为绝对者的表达,复合概念也直接被设定,每一个都是某些原初概念的被表达者。绝对者、原初概念与复合概念同样不被生成,因而同样非自然,并且共同永恒地表达彼此:它们不具有依赖的、被生成的产物与独立的、生成性的源头之间的本体论区分。由此我们便理解,为什么海德格尔声称,符号术这样的符号数理逻辑遮蔽了“根本问题”,而这个问题在他看来只关乎在之问题。因为在之问题恰恰涉及这样的本体论区分:在是生成性的源头,在者则是在无所不包的统摄下生成的杂多产物。随着这一本体论区分被驱逐,“根本问题”似乎就在符号术中消失了。
这里的斯宾诺莎主义意味显而易见。人们甚至容易同意谢林的看法:莱布尼茨除了一种通俗化的斯宾诺莎主义外,对哲学没有任何贡献。22原初概念难道不与斯宾诺莎的实体所具有的无穷多属性惊人地相似吗?复合概念难道不也与样态相似吗?当然,属性不可混合,样态也并非真正的复合体。然而,莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎分享同一项事业:建立一种新科学。如果说斯宾诺莎以几何学为新科学的模型(例如《伦理学》的几何式呈现,以及在质上不同的属性之间严格的平行关系),那么莱布尼茨则以代数为基础来建立自己的新科学。我将在第四部明确讨论普全数学与其哲学体系整体的关系时,再完整阐明莱布尼茨代数主义的意义。
除了平等性之外,概念还必须是独立的。这一点在复合概念中表现为,每个复合概念都被赋予一个负特征数。任何被置入复合概念否定内容中的原初概念,都不可能同时又被纳入其肯定内容而不产生矛盾。根据排中律,不可能有中介:A与非A互相排斥。所以,两个相互矛盾的复合概念永远不会相关,因为关系恰恰是使两个可能不一致的事物得到中介的中项。它们是绝对独立的。还应注意,原初概念的独立性并非如此。作为构成复合概念的中性元素,它们本身既非肯定也非否定。只有后来在构成复合概念时,它们才被赋予所构成的复合概念中的肯定或否定位置。也就是说,在其最初状态中,它们并不相互排斥,而仍然在绝对者之内共同融贯,互不矛盾,正如斯宾诺莎的一切属性在唯一实体中和平共存;既然没有矛盾,就没有干涉。因此,原初概念各自独立。虽然可以通过否定来规定一个“原初概念”,即排除所有其他元素,将它挑选为仅含一个元素的集合,但这样规定的根本不再是原初概念,而是一个复合概念:向它添加任何概念都必然导致矛盾。就此而言,它是退化成僵死同义反复的原初概念。
由此可见,概念也具有强度性;我的意思是,没有概念会自我超越,也就是将某物保持为外在之物,同时又将它保持为内在于自身的东西。外延全都自我超越,例如时间和空间,它们各自都是对立项的综合,或相互抵牾的元素之间的生成,如过去与未来、远与近。现在,复合概念显然具有强度性。正如“−7”涉及“7”却排斥“+7”,复合概念的否定内容只涉及它自己的原初概念,因为这些概念对于它是中性的,并不与它抵牾。与它矛盾的那些东西,即涉及这个否定内容中的任何原初概念的肯定内容,被它排除在外;一旦被排除,就不再涉及其中;而涉及其中的那些原初概念,又不与它矛盾。在这两种情况下,否定内容都不在自身中涉及它自己的对立项。因此,否定内容从不自我超越。肯定内容也同样如此。所以,虽然复合概念的统一性意味着诸多的集合,它却没有外延。相反,作为被表达者,它是独异的:其统一性本身独立于它的诸多内容。既然如此,复合概念不仅在排斥时独立,在包含时也保持独立;也就是说,作为集合的统一体,它们不关心所包含的统一体,恰恰因为没有一个被包含的统一体会潜在地与集合的总体统一性抵牾。无论是被包含者还是包含者,每个统一体都只是它自己。也就是说,虽然复合概念的内容可能依赖原初概念或其他复合概念,但它的统一性本身既不是从其他统一体中生成的,也不依赖它们;其他统一体只是表达它。所有复合概念都作为表达而具有强度性。同样,既然一切原初概念都在绝对者中最初地融贯而无矛盾,它们也都具有强度性:它们不意味着由矛盾生成的自我超越的辩证运动。
所有这些性质,都随概念的非生成性一同被设定。概念是平等的,因为作为不被生成者,它们在自然上没有差别,就此而言它们根本没有自然。概念是独立的,因为作为不被生成而自我设定者,它们不依赖任何生成性的源头。最后,概念具有强度性,因为它们不像广延那样自我超越,也就是生成。无论原初还是复合,所有概念都作为各自被表达者的诸多独立表达而相互融贯。到目前为止,这就是符号术的形而上学意涵,由同一个母题统摄:以表达问题取代生成问题。
第二部
不可否认,生成问题在我们的生活中仍然有意义。倘若符号术要把“日常生活中最常使用的学说,也就是道德学与形而上学”确立于“一种不可动摇的演算”中,它就必须顾及生成现象。我甚至愿意大胆提出,恰恰是这一困难阻止了莱布尼茨完成符号术。可以说,困难在于一种诸生成之生成:我们日常在自然生活中谈论的中介与生成,究竟首先在符号术中的何处与我们相遇?
我们又回到了符号术作为计算之术与作为语言构造之间的张力。要表述二者的一般差异,先考察一个对比的例子:23
狗是悲惨的。
这句话是一种无条件的真理陈述,具有主词—系词—谓词的结构:这里的主词是“狗”,谓词是“悲惨”。判断活动只是对“狗”这个概念的分析;通过分析,发现它包含“悲惨”的概念。这并不违反符号术的规则。
我正在打一只狗。
然而,第二句话更为复杂。大体而言,可以将它刻画为主语—动词—宾语结构。它并非没有谓词,但这里的谓词表示一个事件。这个谓词既包含澄清其内容的两个概念,即“打”和“狗”,又暗示了将它规定为此事件的各种关系:是“我”,也就是说话者,在打狗,而非相反;打正在此刻发生;等等。所有这些不同关系,都被“am beating(正在打)”这一变位形式妥帖地收摄了。
例如在古希腊语中,动词变位涉及一组相当详尽的范畴,每个范畴都表达规定事件的某种特定关系:人称、数、时态、语气、语态、格与体。24人称表达事件如何关联于说话者,例如是“我”在行动,还是另一个人。数表达有多少人作为主语参与事件,例如主语是单数、双数还是复数。时态表达事件的时间,例如它在过去还是当下。语气表达说话者在主观上如何关联于事件,例如他是否认为事件一定会发生。语态表达主语相对于事件有多主动,例如主语是在实施行动还是承受行动。格表达事件如何关联于对象,例如行动是“朝向”对象还是“来自”对象,即事件是来到“此处”还是去往“彼处”。最后,体表达看待事件的视角,例如是从内部把行动看作持续展开,还是从外部把它看作已经完成的整体,即未完成体或完成体。25这两种体的区分,可以重新表述为莱布尼茨所谓“实在性”与“潜在性”的区分:26未完成体表达事件,仿佛它已展开为一种正在发生的具体经验,内部又分化为诸多环节,因而把它表达为实在的;相反,完成体表达事件,仿佛其内部内容已被折叠为一个“原子”尚未展开、尚未分化的潜隐状态,不关心实际经验了什么,因而把它表达为潜在的。
简而言之,人称涉及自我—他者关系,数涉及一—多,时态涉及过去—当下—未来,语气涉及确定—晦暗,语态涉及主动—被动,格涉及此处—彼处,而体涉及实在—潜在。这些关系都具有生成性,因为它们存在于相对的对立项之间。所以,它们与符号术不相容。首先,既然一切概念都独立,每个概念就只在自身之中存续,而其统一性不知有他者。并且,概念是直接的统一体,因而与多无关;概念共同永恒,因而不在时间之中;概念的组成部分都有穷,因而可以被完全分析,也就是绝对确定;虽然有些概念包含另一些,有些被另一些包含,但它们仍然独立,彼此不交互,因此既不作用于彼此,也不承受彼此的作用;概念不会四处移动,也不会行进到任何地方;最后,一切概念都是潜在的,作为绝对者中的永恒本质而内属于纯粹可能性。27那么显然,符号术作为最典型的演算,不可能是一种语言,因为它不知自然言说中的任何一种区分。
现在,问题变得更加清晰了。符号术以其目前的形式,究竟能如何产生,或至少模拟那些内生于我们围绕事件而展开的自然言说的范畴?莱布尼茨从未完成这个任务,是否意味着它不可能?但他也从未放弃这个任务!在多个地方,莱布尼茨慷慨地为我们留下了如何解决这一问题的线索,而这些线索都指向同一个关键概念:无限。28
在《偶然真理的来源》中,29莱布尼茨恰恰通过无限来阐明一切生成之生成,其开篇写道:“偶然真理[即事件]在无限进程中的来源,可以类比于不可公度量之间的比例[如下]……”他接着说:“如果分析无限推进而永远不能完成,那么这一真理就是偶然的,它涉及无穷多个理由,但总还有某种东西剩余,我们又必须为它给出理由。”最后,他坚持:“由于这一点尚未被理解,灵魂与身体的结合也就被认为不可解释。因为,严格从形而上学来说,它们并不流入彼此;神也确实不会以一方为机缘而推动另一方,使它偏离自身固有的进程。然而,自其法则被确立以来,每一方都以令人赞叹却绝无差错的恒常性[directio]遵循自身法则,两者彼此契合,精确得如同真有相互流入一般。”
“严格从形而上学来说”,意味着按照神认识并创造事物的方式。但这里,形而上学与数学被等同起来了。因为我们说,符号术虽是符号的,却包含形而上学上具有决定性的意涵,神正是运用同一种演算来创造世界,莱布尼茨称之为“神圣数学”;30只是对我们为符号的东西,对神却是直观的。也就是说,我们用数来代替概念,而神组合的是概念本身。这意味着,被创造的世界并不遵循生成或自然言说的范式。因此,当莱布尼茨说“严格从形而上学来说”没有“流入”,但灵魂与身体的活动却仿佛“真有流入”时,他的意思是,根基上并没有生成,即“流入”。31只有在无限处对生成的模拟。
自然言说围绕事件展开,每个事件又依赖无穷多个其他事件,作为它发生的理由。我正在打一只狗,因为我生气,因为狗之前在叫,因为现在我的双手没有被束缚,等等。这些理由作为诸多暗示,与“我正在打一只狗”这一句话关联。它暗示,打正在此刻发生,因为……;发生在我和狗之间,因为……;我对此是确定的,因为……;等等。每个暗示都属于一个范畴,将当前事件与某个其他事件牵连进一种生成,因为那个其他事件是它的理由根据,例如生成当下的过去、生成我的激情的他者行动,等等。一切事件都是生成。若符号术在趋向无限的过程中要模拟事件,那么,那些规定事件各种生成的范畴就必须能从它推导出来,尽管严格说来它只是一种演算。
以动词变位为基础的范畴清单并不穷尽一切,但其中每一项都不可或缺:人称、数、时态、语气、语态、格与体。在莱布尼茨的著作中,这些范畴大致可以归入四个主题,每个主题聚焦于一种特定的生成问题:1.统觉着的自我单子“我”,与那些晦暗地牵连于自我之自我统觉中的其他单子的生成,对应于人称与语气;2.一个离散单子主动统一的形式,与其被动、分散的质料的生成,对应于数与语态;3.时空外延的生成,对应于时态与格;4.实体的实在从诸多潜在现象中的生成,对应于体。这不是唯一可能的排列,因为所有这些范畴彼此交叠,每个都牵连着整体。但我认为它很方便。在下一部,我将尝试依照这个顺序,从符号术中推导出所有这些范畴。
第三部使用数学的方法与词汇。其形式与莱布尼茨的《偶然真理的来源》相同,在比例理论与真理理论之间作类比。然而,其目的恰恰是要提出,数学与形而上学的亲缘关系远不止单纯的“类比”。相反,它们的等价关系意味着它们真正相互奠基。
第三部
元素
- 数学符号体系
素数的无限序列,2、3、5、7、11、13……
- 其形而上学意涵
原初概念的无限序列,每个都是属于神圣知性的绝对中性。
方法
1.
- 数学符号体系
将一个素数与另一个不同的素数相乘,得到乘积,例如2 × 3 = 6。
- 其形而上学意涵
将一个原初概念与另一个不同的原初概念组合,得到一种中性的内容。
2.
- 数学符号体系
将两个这样的乘积数配对,然后给其中一个赋予正号,另一个赋予负号,例如(6, 35) = |+ 6, − 35|。
- 其形而上学意涵
在正在定义的概念中纳入或排除一个概念或一系列概念,例如“人”是“理性的”且“无翼的”。换言之,得到一个具有肯定与否定内容的复合概念。
3.
- 数学符号体系
一对数,其正数与负数互素,例如|+ 6, − 35| = |+ (2 × 3), − (5 × 7)|。
- 其形而上学意涵
一个自洽的复合概念,因为它不会排除一个同时被它包含的概念,例如“无翼的人”。
- 数学符号体系
一对数,其正数与负数有公约数,例如|+ 6, − 15| = |+ (2 × 3), − (3 × 5)|。
- 其形而上学意涵
一个自相矛盾的复合概念,因为它包含了一个应被排除的概念,例如“有翼的人”。
定义
- 数学符号体系
定义变换F,使F (X)表示小于但最接近X的、互不重复的素数的乘积,例如F (2 × 2) = 2,F (2 × 2 × 3 × 5 × 5) = 2 × 3 × 5。
- 其形而上学意涵
神不做徒劳之事。也就是说,对任何内容,神只使用互不重复的原初概念,以免冗余;或者说,一切重复内容都可以化简,例如“人”加上“人”,仍是“人”。
公理
- 数学符号体系
所有互不重复的素数之乘积的集合Φ,在乘法与F这两个变换下是封闭的。即假设x是Φ中元素的乘积,经F变换得到x′,那么x′就是Φ的元素。
- 其形而上学意涵
神圣知性绝对自存,其中设定了一切可能的、不重复的内容的无限总体。
公理的说明
- 数学符号体系
Φ的一个元素,例如30,是2、3、5的乘积,每个都是不重复的素数。14是2与7的乘积,也是Φ的元素。420是30与14的乘积,它是2、2、3、5、7的乘积,因此不在Φ中,因为其因子2在序列中出现两次,并非不重复。但F (420)得到210,它在Φ中。
- 其形而上学意涵
换言之,若复合概念的肯定或否定内容,作为原初概念的组合,进一步与另一个原初概念组合而形成不同的内容,那么这一新内容依然已被神圣知性包含并预先构想。因此,神圣知性就是绝对者。
附释I
1.
除了复合概念,即同时包含肯定与否定内容的概念,与原初概念,即作为内容之中性元素的概念之间的区分之外,还可以推出以下区分必然存在:一将一切原初概念纳入肯定内容,而不排除任何东西,所以任何否定都与它矛盾;纯粹虚无不包含任何原初概念,却将它们全部作为否定内容排除,所以任何真实内容都与它矛盾;一个纯粹理念包含某些原初概念,却排除其他一切,因此它是同义反复的,向它添加任何概念都与它矛盾,因为所得产物必定包含已被排除的东西,正如若不引入正义本身所否定的不纯之物,就不可能给它添加任何东西;同样,排除某些原初概念却包含其他一切的东西,是一个相反的纯粹理念,因为向它添加任何概念,都会排除某种已被包含的东西,正如若不拿走纯粹不正义的某一部分,就不可能给不正义本身添加任何东西;一个本质同时具有有穷的肯定内容与有穷的否定内容,所以有些概念与它矛盾,有些则不;一个存在则同时具有无限的肯定内容与无限的否定内容。
2.
对复合概念的规定(遵循“方法”)类似于一种排除过程。32在我们看来,神为每个原初概念决定:在那个正在展开、将构成所讨论的复合概念的序列中,它是肯定的、否定的,还是无关的。复合概念一旦被完全规定,其否定内容就排除了某些概念,因为其否定内容中的原初概念被排除在其肯定内容之外。每个复合概念都有排除,因为每个复合概念都有否定内容。然而,神圣知性是一种潜隐的潜在性,因此,任何可能以肯定或否定方式涉及某个复合概念的内容,都已经无矛盾地蕴含其中,正如互不重复的素数的一切可能乘积都包含在Φ中一样。所以,由于构成一个复合概念首先要求选出应被排除的东西,而如此选择,就是否定神圣知性内在的总体化的潜隐可能,每个复合概念都以一种通过否定的拣选为前提。既然拣选的方式无穷,就有无穷多个可能的复合概念。
3.
存在是一个无限的复合概念:规定它的排除过程是无定限的。因此,每个存在都包含一个肯定与否定内容无限展开的序列。如果发现某个存在排除了它所包含的东西,它就被视为不可能的。亚当不能既犯罪又不犯罪。但对于尚未犯罪的亚当,他有犯罪或不犯罪的自由。因此,相对于尚未犯罪的亚当,犯罪与不犯罪只是不能共可能,而两者单独而言都不是不可能。因为无论犯罪还是不犯罪,都不与亚当的概念矛盾;但犯罪一旦被包含,我们就有了“犯罪的亚当”这个新概念,不犯罪便不能再被包含。所以,我们应当区分不可能性与非共可能性。
4.
“[既然]存在的是某物而非无物,那么在可能事物中,或在可能性或本质本身中,就有某种趋向存在的冲动,或(可以说)向存在的奋力趋赴;总之,本质本身就力求存在。而且,由此可见,一切可能者,也就是一切表达本质或可能实在性的东西,都按其所含的本质或实在性之量,或完满程度,拥有平等的权利来力求存在,因为完满无非就是本质之量……在这个语境中,时间、地点,或总之世界的容受性或容量,可以被视为造价,或将要建起最令人愉悦的可能建筑的地块,而[其中]形状的多样性,则对应于建筑的悦目程度,以及房间的数量与优雅。”33神在创造世界时,会希望以最低的代价纳入最多的内容。这里的最多,显然就是所有可能本质的总体,因为它们都有平等的权利来力求存在,也就是表达。但若所有可能的本质都被纳入,就必然出现矛盾,因为有些本质相互矛盾。神通过其秩序化来缓解这些矛盾(疑难III)。34
疑难I
- 数学符号体系
属于集合Φ的有穷数π,其因子序列要么包含素数∂,要么不包含。若∂被排除,π便不关心∂,因为它通过这一排除仍保持自身,且作为数,π自足。现在若将∂与它相乘,它将作为一个因子留存在新产生的数中,却不是这个新数本身。反之,若∂被包含,从因子序列中去掉∂就会改变它的值,数π也就消失了,因为新数将不再包含π作为因子。
- 其形而上学意涵
亚当的概念要么先于、要么后于对罪的谓述。若概念在后,就会导致荒谬,因为亚当有犯罪或不犯罪的自由。假定概念在后,那么它相对于先前的概念,就如种之于属。种差将是谓词“犯罪”,去掉它就应将整个种一并去掉;去掉之后,我们谈论的就不再是亚当,而是另一个作为亚当之属的人。既然只有犯罪他才是亚当,那么他作为亚当便不可能没有犯罪,因此没有不犯罪的自由,这与我们的前提相反。所以,概念必须在先。然而,若概念在先,亚当的概念就如同一个属,无论是否被谓述罪,亚当都还是亚当,因此罪对于作为亚当的他就无关紧要。这种情况下,他作为亚当就没有选择犯罪而非不犯罪的充足理由。他将是那头不知该喝水还是吃东西的驴。这违反充足理由律,因此荒谬。
疑难I的解答
- 数学符号体系
从无限序列∆中移除∂(或向其中添加∂),不会改变∆的乘积值,因为它仍然无限;表面上的移除(添加)只是使∂是否包含于∆变得晦暗(清晰)。
- 其形而上学意涵
亚当作为实体,其肯定内容与否定内容各自都是一个无限展开的序列。就移除(添加)一个谓词时,它们仍将相同内容保持为无限内容而言,每一个都先于谓述;就移除(添加)使谓词迄今是否包含在已展开的内容中、还是被排除在外变得晦暗(清晰)而言,每一个又都后于谓述。也就是说,若移除谓词“犯罪”,亚当仍是同一个无限实体“亚当”,只是他是否犯罪如今变得晦暗;若添加这一谓词,亚当也仍是亚当,只是现在澄清了他也犯罪。
疑难I的阐释
这一疑难之所以得到解答,是因为有穷而必然的本质与无限而偶然的存在被仔细区分开了。疑难产生于一开始对亚当概念的误解:把它理解为内容只包含有穷多个原初概念的复合概念,也就是一个本质。在这种情况下,添加或移除一个谓词,对亚当的概念就要么绝对本质,要么全无关系:因为“亚当”要么是一个种,通过作为其种差的谓词而被定义,失去这一谓词就会成为别的东西;要么作为不关心这一谓词的属而持续存在。换言之,正如2乘3得到6,而6只有带着3才是6,2则无论有无3都是2,亚当要么只有通过他的罪才是亚当,要么无论是否犯罪都还是亚当。但既然亚当是由无穷多个本质复合而成的偶然存在,他的内容就应当是一个由无限展开的谓词序列构成的无限。向其中表面上纳入(或从中排除)任何特定谓词,改变的不是其作为无限的内容,而只是在序列展开时,澄清某个元素是否被纳入(或排除)。换言之,一个存在从不作为已完成的整体被完全把握,而是作为展开着的无限,只在其部分中逐渐被澄清,表明它是否包含某个特定谓词。
疑难II
- 数学符号体系
一个包含互不重复的素数之无限序列∆的全部成员的集合,其基数为ℵ0,而实数集合ℝ的基数为ℵ1。
- 其形而上学意涵
若我们说,一个实体,比如亚当,其肯定内容与否定内容各自由互不重复的原初概念之无限序列构成,那就意味着各自都由离散元素构成。然而,实体的内容是无限可分的,也就是连续的。这意味着实体的内容不是由互不重复的原初概念组成的无限序列,从而与我们的前提相反。
疑难II的解答
- 数学符号体系
既然包含无限序列∆的全部成员的集合Ω,其基数为ℵ0,那么它的幂集,即包含Ω的一切子集的集合,其基数便为ℵ1。
- 其形而上学意涵
实体确实由肯定与否定的原初概念构成,但它也由这些概念所构成的东西,例如复合概念,构成;后者不可还原为原初概念,因为它们同样具有表达性。所以,自下而上地看,实体先由无穷多个原初概念构成,再由这些原初概念构成的东西构成,再由这些东西构成的更高事物构成,直至无限;自上而下地看,它可分为无穷多个实体,这些实体又各自由无穷多个其他实体构成,直至无限。
疑难II的阐释
这一疑难源于这样一个前提:实体直接仅由互不重复的原初概念构成。然而,这是一个错误前提。相反,原初概念是实体的组成部分,它们又构成其他组成部分,后者同样表达实体,因此不可还原为原初概念。设集合Ω包含某个实体中的全部原初概念。它是无限的,但可数。现在,既然每个复合概念都包含属于自己的原初概念集合,那么这个实体中所有复合概念与原初概念的集合,就是Ω的幂集。它是无限而不可数的。而正是这个集合,包含实体的全部内容。因此,实体包含一个不可数无限的元素集合,因而是连续的。
疑难III
- 数学符号体系
若元素∂被排除在序列∆之外,它就不被包含。
- 其形而上学意涵
若实体排除某个谓词,它就不包含这一谓词。否则,就违反了不矛盾律。例如,一个物理对象一旦被澄清为具有圆形,就绝不能再具有正方形,因为通过纳入圆的概念,它已经排除了正方形的概念。同样,亚当一旦犯过罪,就不可能没有犯过罪。然而,圆的东西当然可以变成方的,亚当也可以被救赎。这似乎与前提相反。
疑难III的解答
- 数学符号体系
虽然∂被排除在∆之外,却可以如此安排秩序:∆在无限处包含∂,但在任何确定部分中都排除它。
- 其形而上学意涵
虽然两个东西可以相互矛盾,但只要它们是一个实体的两个不同部分,就并不矛盾。过去犯罪的亚当,可以在未来被救赎。在类似意义上,如果此处这张纸是圆的,那么彼处那张纸可以是方的。
疑难III的阐释
这一疑难之所以出现,是因为对本质的有穷分析与对存在的无限分析被混淆了。有穷分析涉及一个确定的概念,即本质,它在形式上可写为|X, − Y|,X与Y是确定的值,以符号表示本质的肯定与否定内容。若X与Y不互素,就产生矛盾。另一方面,无限分析涉及一个不可确定的概念,即存在。类似于本质,一切存在在形式上都可写成|∂1, − ∂2|,其中∂1与∂2都是无穷多个互不重复的素数的乘积,以符号表示存在的肯定与否定内容。既然二者都是无限,它们就既非互素,也非不互素。同样,存在作为存在并不与自身冲突。然后,我们用无限序列∆1、∆2替换乘积值∂1、∂2。假设现在这个存在被表示为|∆1 = (… × 2 × 5 × 11 × …), −∆2 = − (… × 3 × 7 × 11 × …)|。在这种情况下,∆1与∆2不互素,因为二者都包含11。但既然它们无限,两个序列就都可按无穷多种方式排序。视排序而定,我们可能无限展开它们,却不碰到任何公约数。类比地,虽然一个存在可能在全局上与自身矛盾,其内容却可以如此排序,使局部永不出现矛盾。存在作为无限序列,因此总能被如此安排:要碰到矛盾,就必须经过无穷多个其他存在,而后者作为它的子序列。因此,若矛盾在有穷本质之中,人会立即看见它;而无限存在中的矛盾,则总能通过秩序化得到无限中介。
问题I
构造统觉着的自我与其感知的他者。
问题I的论证
自我是感知的中心。35前面我们看到,实体由一个无限展开的序列构成。而且,实体是连续的,因为其内容具有基数ℵ1。当神自下而上构造序列时,36祂看到的是,序列中无穷多个原初概念以及它们所构成的一切东西的展开。也就是说,当神看到包含肯定与否定原初概念的序列a、b、c、d……时,祂也看到集合序列{∅}、{a}、{b}、{a, b}、{c}、{a, c}……然而,作为人,我们是位于创造终点的造物,只能自上而下地认识实体。对我们而言,实体作为无限被给予,而我们最初只能在晦暗中感知它们。但随着实体被展开(我指的是,为了我们的认识,将实体的内容分析为其直接组成部分),并且其组成部分又依次被展开,37我们对实体就获得越来越多的清晰性,从而将感知的领域持续扩展到晦暗的领域。由于这种扩展是连续的,清晰与晦暗之间的界分就是无定限的。习惯上清晰的领域被称为自我,晦暗的领域则被称为他者。这两个领域连续,自我性与他者性也就连续。当我望向一面光线昏暗的镜子,我就在另一个之中感知自身。那些通过向万物的反映,清晰而普遍地看见自我的存在者,也就是自我认识持续展开者,是如人类这样的统觉自我;那些清晰领域相对停滞、或惯常遭受退缩者,则是动物、植物与无生命之物。当清晰的领域展开,人便在感知的同时生活。当它卷入(也就是为我们的认识而展开的内容重新落入晦暗),人便在麻木中消逝。人活着,自我性就从他者性中生成。人死去,生成就反向发生。
问题II
构造统一的形式及其杂多的质料。
问题II的论证
形式是组织杂多的中心。38既然有些实体展开,而另一些被卷入其中,实体便组织成一种层级。每个实体都是统一体,因为一切复合概念都是统一体。但这里的统一性是外延性的,因为序列如今无限,并且包含矛盾元素;神在创造世界时,创造了一个涉及每个本质的总体,因而涉及无穷多个矛盾,尽管没有任何矛盾在局部发生(附释I,4)。这些矛盾连续分布,因为实体是连续的,正如盐溶于水。当某些实体展开时,它们涉及的矛盾比其他实体更多,因而变得不和谐。反之,有些实体是和谐的。和谐的实体与自身的抵牾较少,因此更加统一。实体在展开时,往往会卷入更多不和谐,正如只是喝下更多盐水,往往就会摄入更多盐;所以,卷入的序列往往比展开的序列更和谐。因此,实体越卷入,往往就越统一。而且,既然一切实体都在同一个连续体中,一个实体就卷入另一个实体。和谐的实体由此成为一个收摄更大不和谐的枢纽,因为它是更统一的表达,分歧的诸表达被卷入其中。人们称这个枢纽为形式。若实体在展开时拥有更少和谐,它就变得较少表达,直到最终分散为一种被动内容,即质料,由诸多起收摄作用的形式来收摄。一个事物在收摄质料、丰富自身内容而不使自身分散时,就活着;也就是说,当它感知更多东西时,也力求在和谐中感知它们。因此,虽然我们通过眼睛来看,也就是通过内容在清晰性中展开的感知器官来看,我们却依靠心脏而活,也就是依靠一种生命器官:它自身虽卷在晦暗中,却主动为我们的感知生活提供被它卷入的、相适合的质料,因为它是一台无声的机器,供应我们的生命之血。通过这些生命器官,我们活着时,就以质料为食物而生成自身。我们死去时,生成便反向发生。
推论
生命中介于感知,即展开,与营养,即卷入之间。卷入时,清晰性减少,统一性却往往增加。展开时,清晰性增加,统一性却往往减少。二者都趋向死亡,因为人要么落入麻木,要么分散为诸多同样麻木的东西。39
问题III
构造空间与时间。
问题III的论证
空间与时间是存在之物的秩序。40无数矛盾在连续的实体之间分布,而其分布依循神所规定的秩序。秩序不同,矛盾的分布也就不同,在某些部分可能比在另一些部分更为集中。假设两个实体展开了相同数量的矛盾,但在一个实体中,矛盾集中于不同部分;在另一个中,矛盾均匀分布于整个实体。那么两个实体便同样和谐。然而,当二者展开时,前者遭遇剧烈变动的和谐状态,后者却没有这种遭遇。于是,前者被说成按时间排序,后者被说成按空间排序。因为观看风景时,人并不会瞬间收进整片风景。相反,每一瞥都由无穷多个动觉构成,它们逐部分地组织视野。只是因为这些动觉未能在感知中创造一种内在分化的韵律,所感知者才被视为空间。但若一个事物在展开时,在可区分的环节中分散又重新聚集,它就是时间。当一个瞬间以近乎绝对的强度生活,又几乎立即因骤然陷入不和谐而消逝,再聚集为下一个瞬间,就生成了一种韵律;没有这种韵律,就没有时间。因此,空间是同质的时间,时间是差异化的空间。既然一切实体都连续,它们的矛盾也就连续。而且,实体展开时,其中矛盾的分布也连续变化。因此,实体展开时,时间与空间不仅各自生成自身,也生成彼此:正如雕塑能够显露其韵律,音乐能够显露其广袤。
问题IV
构造实体及其现象。
问题IV的论证
实体是展开的序列。41随着序列展开,我们的感知在内容上有所增加。实在性不关心和谐、不和谐或它们的分布,只衡量获得了多少内容:|+ 2, − 3|的内容少于|+ (2 × 5), − (3 × 7)|,因此较不实在,尽管二者同样自洽。更具体地说:“I am loving(我正在爱)”表达的东西,不同于“I love(我爱)”或“I am in love(我处于爱中)”,但三者同样指示一个由处于其中的“我”所经验的绵延,因为“爱”表示一种持续状态;所以,“我正在爱”所表达的差异,必定有别于单纯被经验的时间。说“我正在爱”,我只是意图从“我爱”这一原子化状态中展开它的内在分化,表明自己愿意坦白承认因爱而承受的一切。这种分化不关心时间,也不关心时间所缓解的矛盾。爱的激情可以充满矛盾,也可以极为短暂,却并不因此显得较少实在,42只要其内容在分散之前展开了足够的内在差异。表达这样具体展开的实在性的,就是实体。一切东西都力求实在性,因此一切东西都力求展开;卷入时,它就是抽象,或现象。
附释II
1.
由于一个世界序列包含一切存在与本质,我们在形式上便能够从中抽取任何序列,它通常对应以下某一范畴(附释I,1):一、纯粹虚无、纯粹理念、本质与存在。容易看出,一不涉及任何否定,而纯粹虚无不涉及任何真实内容,因此二者都不同于具有无限而矛盾之内容的实体。纯粹理念是同义反复。视从实体中抽取它的方式而定,我们要么只保留有穷的肯定内容,要么只保留有穷的否定内容,因此可以说,向一个理念,例如正义本身,添加任何其他概念,都会使它被过分扩张或过分否定。本质是肯定与否定内容都有限的抽取物。至于存在,尽管它们可能从其他存在中被抽取出来,却总直接意味着无限与一切存在的整个总体,因为它们连续地融入彼此,其间没有任何界分是确定的。所以,这种抽取只是对世界序列的重新排序,选择使它的某一方面而非另一方面更加清晰地显露。然而,一切抽取都是这样的重新排序,其差异取决于选择了哪个方面,以及通过这一排序要展开实体的多少内容。
2.
抽象或现象,都在较大或较小程度上指示实体。当现象失去这种指示而接近有穷,也就是当它卷入时,就变得更像本质。例如,颜色具有实体性,因为它是指示对象所反射之光的现象。但当它被保持为不关心其他概念,正如本质不关心添加给它的东西时,它就会失去实体性,虽永不完全失去,并成为纯粹现象。反之,这样一个准本质,在变得越来越被规定时,可能重新实体化,也可能理念化。也就是说,通过诸多否定与肯定,现象可能逐渐展开为完整的实体,其内容不断丰富。这就是实体化。也可能在规定它时,其内容的展开使它接近一个纯粹理念。这就是理念化。现在,既然一切可被抽取的序列都属于同一个连续的世界序列,它们就只是其中持续生成的抽象或现象,本质与存在由此相互生成;因为这里的无限与有穷只是相对概念,衡量概念展开到何种程度。同样,理念、一与纯粹虚无,也都处于持续的生成中。于是,我们理解了生成问题的起源:它起源于对实体、实体所蕴含的各种抽象以及其间成立的中介关系的预设。
3.
但这并非神的视角。我们将世界视作被给予之物,祂却与我们不同,从自身表达出世界,也就是从内属于神圣知性、处于最初状态的原初概念总体中表达世界。因此,对祂而言,每个实体都在其构成元素中完全展开。另一方面,我们永远不能直观这些作为世界真正元素的原初概念,因为我们的认识依赖抽象,而抽象只是自上而下对特定方面的拣选,始终指示其所出自的实体,因此也始终暗示某种尚待从隐蔽源头中展开的剩余。所以到此为止,我们的知识只是不恰切的,因为实体遮蔽了我们的视野。Deus Absconditus,隐匿的神。祂永恒地用生成问题,以及比佩涅洛佩的编织更无休无止的展开,来折磨我们。但若我们渴望恰切地认识事物,就需要认识原初概念。这意味着,我们必须彻底离开实体的领域。新旧科学之间的张力就在这里:前者离地飞翔,后者仍停留在地面。
第四部
让我们重新概括第三部确立的等价关系,以便更牢固地奠基它。
当概念的复合趋向无限,我们便遭遇实体,即单子。每个单子展开为一个有序序列,牵连着其他序列的总体。既然所有这些序列本身都是秩序,每个单子就是秩序的秩序,也就是说,每个单子都是对一切单子之总体的一个视角。因此,一切单子都牵连于每一个单子,因为它们作为被这个单子排序的无穷多个秩序,在其中表达自身。这些表达形成诸多无定限的范畴,例如本质、存在等等;每个范畴都多少是对那个牵连一切的单子的抽象,因为它们各自都不完整地展开它。然而,由于神直接认识所有原初概念,一切单子都在祂的知识中完全展开。所以,从一切视角而来的全部秩序的总体,也就是世界,对于祂都是作为前定和谐而直观的。
莱布尼茨将知识区分为:清晰的、明白的、恰切的与直观的。43清晰的,是人知道其为真却无法给出说明的东西,例如艺术家知道如何画好,却不能解释自己的才能。明白的,是人知道其为真,而且能够说明的东西,因为人知道构成它的概念,例如,若我知道人是“理性的动物”,我就明白地认识“人”。恰切的,是人在每个细节上都认识的东西。但人可以以符号的或直观的方式恰切地认识某物。也就是说,要么通过符号认识一切真理的总体,要么认识真理本身。虽然我们向往直观的知识,但对人而言,只有符号的知识是可能的。因为我们位于创造的终点,世界作为实体被给予我们。即使无限地展开它,我们得到的也只是更多实体,或指示实体的抽象,却永远不是原初概念,而唯有通过原初概念,真理才能被完全澄清。因此,要真正接近神圣知识,我们就必须先摧毁这个世界,一切原初概念都藏在其下。
但符号术恰恰为我们实现了这种摧毁,因为世界通过它的符号体系而被去自然化。与抽象不同,符号是任何内容的无差别替代物。它是自我封闭的纯粹可能性,也就是“无论什么”。在其中,与实在性连续展开的无限可能视域,被浓缩为一个同质的对象。符号既能表示实在之物,也能表示可能之物。它不指示任何生成,因为它直接设定全部可能性的总体,正如数学中的未知数x直接设定一切可能的量。换言之,一切符号都具有表达性。与指示实体的抽象或指示原本的图像不同,符号只把自身表达为直接而总体的东西。通过符号,表达问题才首次作为表达问题本身显现。
借助符号,我们迅速抵达一切原初概念,因为可以直接设定它们,正如在微积分中设定无穷小量。也就是说,我们不再无限展开实体以寻找原初概念,而是假定这一展开已经完成,用符号表示所寻找的原初概念。原初概念连同它们从实体中的无限生成,就此被浓缩为符号对象。如此设定的原初概念,不可能指示任何实体,因为它们与实体的关系是纯粹的不确定。但若原初概念不是从实体中生成的,实体也就不是从原初概念中生成的。于是,单子与原初概念、本质和存在一起被直接设定,它们都是同样不被生成的表达,每一个都只能通过一组形式原则与规则来定义。
莱布尼茨的符号术,恰恰是表述这些规则的尝试。通过它,我们看到,原初概念、本质与存在,都作为一个被普遍秩序所包容的结构总体的表达而相互融贯。也就是说,我们瞥见了一切单子的前定和谐。诚然,我们仍无法直观这一和谐,但借助符号,仍然能够辨认它的形式结构。因此,至少在形式上,一种普遍单子论被确立了。
从这种普遍单子论来看,生成问题被改写成模拟问题。生成只在创造的终点涌现,在那里,世界在视角中作为一个可无限展开的实体被给予我们。由于我们总只能从对我们更清晰、因而更实在的东西,也就是我们自身,开始展开,世界作为单子的总体,就对我们成为一个不断退入晦暗的视域。世界的实在性,也就是其自明性,由此奠基于首先给予某个特殊单子的自明性。在实在中实施这一奠基,把一切单子奠基于一个单子中的单子论,就是特殊单子论。
现在,形而上学与逻辑之间的相互奠基便能得到完整阐释。由于形而上学首先追求将一切在者奠基于在的生成活动,它就是特殊单子论。就此而言,它将一切单子及其可能秩序奠基于一个实在且自明的秩序,即某个特殊单子,也就是我的绝对自我。然而,逻辑只要通过符号研究纯粹可能性,就是普全数学,或普遍单子论。它通过澄清实在性必须与可能性融贯其中的普遍结构,来奠基形而上学。因此,没有逻辑的形而上学并非可能,因为它将失去作为一切在者的科学所追求的绝对普遍性,从而退化为单纯的世界观。而没有形而上学的逻辑则并非实在,因为它将缺乏自明性。只有借助这两种单子论,我们才能接近既直观又普遍的神圣知识。形而上学在特殊明见性展开时将它们奠基于一个系统,逻辑则保障系统性本身;唯有二者结合,才能完成新科学。正如“没有内容的思想是空的,没有概念的直观是盲的”,44没有形而上学的逻辑只是形式,没有逻辑的形而上学则是神话。
最后,让我们阐明莱布尼茨新科学的结构。经验科学研究特殊秩序与那个唯一的最终秩序的关系,形而上学研究这个最终秩序本身,而逻辑研究一般意义上的一切秩序。因此,逻辑是关于可能性的普遍符号科学,也就是普全数学,它同时奠基形而上学与经验科学,将一种持续存在的数学符号体系引入二者,正如我们在数理物理学中所见。但逻辑又在形而上学上得到奠基,因为它自身也浸润着一种在历史中生成的自明性,而这种自明性的生成本身又需要专门的考察。45
尾声
在《神义论》接近结尾处,莱布尼茨讲述了一个很有博尔赫斯意味的故事。塞克斯图斯·塔奎尼乌斯拜访阿波罗的神谕,想知道自己的未来。得知未来后,他请求阿波罗改变自己的命运,以免最终成为恶人。阿波罗声称,自己只是神谕之神,无力做到这一点。于是,塞克斯图斯愤怒地离开,并实现了自己的命运。忒奥多罗斯偶然听到了这番对话,便前往雅典,在雅典娜神庙中睡着了。在梦中,女神引领他观看一座由无穷多个世界构成的金字塔,顶峰就是实在世界,也是最辉煌的世界。
如果没能看到,美的不仅是顶端的世界,更是一切世界的整个秩序,也就是金字塔本身,我们便误解了这个故事。唯有认识整体,才能看出部分之美,正如神若不先看到一切可能者,就不能选择最好的世界来使之实在。因此,若不知道可能者的总体,就无法为实在者给出它何以实在的理由。
只有普全数学让人瞥见这一理由。例如,只有规定光从A点到B点能够经过的一切路径(若无代数这样的数学符号体系,这种规定几乎不可能),我们才能确定哪一条路径“最好”,进而为实际路径作出辩护,因为它恰恰就是这条“最好”的路径。46但那些不曾梦见一切可能者之总体的人,即使从阿波罗的神谕得知了一切实在者,对最好之物依然全然盲目。伦理学作为对最好之物的观照,对他们是不可能的;相反,他们在必然性之下流泪。47借助普全数学,我们梦见总体,才首次从针对命运的苦涩与怨恨中解脱出来。因此,智慧女神与自由女神,是同一个女神。
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——。《逻辑学》。A. V. Miller译。New York: Humanity Books, 1969。
马丁·海德格尔。《逻辑的形而上学基础》。Michael Heim译。Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984。
——。“论真理的本质”。John Sallis译。载David Farrell Krell编《基本著作》,111—138页。New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993。
埃德蒙德·胡塞尔。《形式逻辑与先验逻辑》。Dorion Cairns译。The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969。
——。《逻辑研究》。J. N. Findlay译。New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970。
——。《算术哲学》。Dallas Willard译。Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003。
伊曼努尔·康德。《纯粹理性批判》。Marcus Weigelt译。London: Penguin Group, 2007。
雅各布·克莱因。《希腊数学思想与代数的起源》。Eva Brann译。New York: Dover Publications, 1968。
G. W.莱布尼茨。《哲学论文集》。Roger Ariew与Daniel Garber译。Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989。
——。《神义论:论神的善》。E. M. Huggard译。London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,无出版日期。
柏拉图。《巴门尼德》。Mary Louise Gill译。Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996。
——。《智者》。Seth Benardete译。Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986。
Susan Rothstein。“体”。载Maria Aloni与Paul Dekker编《剑桥形式语义学手册》,360—366页。Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016。
F. W. J.谢林。《论现代哲学史》。Andrew Bowie译。Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994。
Heinrich von Siebenthal。《新约研究古希腊语语法》。Oxford: Peter Lang, 2019。
注释
G. W.莱布尼茨,《神义论:论神的善》,E. M. Huggard译(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,无出版日期),372—373页。
↩马丁·海德格尔,《逻辑的形而上学基础》,Michael Heim译(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984),107页。
↩同上,106页。
↩G. W.莱布尼茨,“普遍符号术序言”,载《哲学论文集》,Roger Ariew与Daniel Garber译(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989),5页。
↩同上,8页。
↩雅各布·克莱因,《希腊数学思想与代数的起源》,Eva Brann译(New York: Dover Publications, 1968),尤其参见第9章。
↩关于算术作为符号演算之地位的进一步讨论,参见埃德蒙德·胡塞尔,《算术哲学》,Dallas Willard译(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003),尤其第11章。
↩“所以,当我思考一个千边形,也就是具有一千条等边的多边形时,并不总去考虑边、相等或一千重(即十重的立方)的自然,而是在心中用这些词(其意义只晦暗而不完善地向心灵呈现)代替我关于这些事物的理念,因为我记得自己知道这些词的含义,并决定此时无须解释。我通常把这种既见于代数、也见于算术,事实上几乎无处不在的思维,称为盲目的或符号的思维。”参见莱布尼茨,“关于知识、真理和理念的沉思”,载《哲学论文集》,24—25页。
↩同上,“普遍符号术序言”,6页。
↩“我同意您,为了确立某种坚实之物,彻底检验我们的一切假定至关重要……如果[笛卡尔]严格遵循我所谓沉思的线索,我相信他本来能够达成第一哲学……我承认,尚未能以原本打算投入的全部细心,阅读他的所有著作;我的朋友们知道,事情恰好是,在读他之前,我几乎已经读过所有新哲学家。最先落入我手中的,是培根和伽桑狄……所以,我倾向于赞赏所有将最微小的真理追究至最深处的人;因为我知道,完满地理解一个真理,无论它看似多么渺小、多么容易,都是重要的。这才是走得很远,并最终建立发现之术的道路;发现之术依赖于对最容易之物的认识,但必须是最明白、最完满的认识……”同上,“致富歇书”,1—5页。
↩海德格尔早期对莱布尼茨的解读,带有强烈的贬抑态度。他在1928年讲座中铺陈的“拆解”结构如下:1.莱布尼茨的逻辑学说可还原为其判断理论;2.其判断理论围绕“内属(inesse)”问题,即谓词在主词中的包含;3.由于“内属”已意味着一与多、自我与他者等等之间的生成,莱布尼茨的逻辑其实奠基于单子论这一形而上学学说,而一般意义上的逻辑也奠基于形而上学;4.由于单子论必须探究生成问题,或海德格尔所谓“超越性”问题,莱布尼茨真正关心的只是“在”的问题,尽管他自己并未充分意识到。通过这一“拆解”,海德格尔因此将莱布尼茨的哲学还原为自己《在与时间》事业的一条脚注。参见海德格尔,《逻辑的形而上学基础》。
↩莱布尼茨,“数值符号术示例”,载《哲学论文集》,10—14页。
↩同上,“关于知识、真理和理念的沉思”,24页。
↩海德格尔是这一立场最相关且最雄辩的代表之一。若要一瞥他关于“本质”问题的自我解释,参见马丁·海德格尔,“论真理的本质”,John Sallis译,载David Farrell Krell编《基本著作》(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993),111—138页。
↩正是这一困难,使亚里士多德提出不存在最高属这一禁令。他解释说,假定存在一个最高属,那么便没有理由说明,为什么会有一个最初的差异从这个未分化的属中产生,以生成它下面的种。参见亚里士多德,《形而上学》,Joe Sachs译(Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 2019),43页。
↩为简便起见,我没有使用Benardete对此词的译法,即“诸种的共同编织(the weaving together of the species)”。参见柏拉图,《智者》,Seth Benardete译(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986),57页。
↩我略微改动了措辞,以适应本文语境,但未损及原文表达的大意。参见同一作者,《巴门尼德》,Mary Louise Gill译(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996),135页。
↩克莱因,《希腊数学思想与代数的起源》,82—99页。
↩G. W. F.黑格尔,《逻辑学》,A. V. Miller译(New York: Humanity Books, 1969),82—110页。
↩关于斯宾诺莎哲学语境中表达问题的进一步讨论,参见吉尔·德勒兹,《哲学中的表现主义:斯宾诺莎》,Martin Joughin译(New York: Zone Books, 1997)。
↩关于一种类似此处所述之辩证沉浸状态的彻底而详尽的分析,参见G. W. F.黑格尔,《精神现象学》,A. V. Miller译(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977),67—79页。
↩事实上,谢林的评论更加尖刻,他将莱布尼茨的哲学称为“发育不全的斯宾诺莎主义”。我不同意这一判断,因为我认为,他也忽略了普全数学与代数在塑造莱布尼茨哲学方面的重要性。参见F. W. J.谢林,《论现代哲学史》,Andrew Bowie译(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),75—84页。
↩为免这一例子冒犯读者的同情心,须说明,我只是从莱布尼茨那里借来它:“狗会逃离曾打过它的棍子,因为记忆向它重现了棍子造成的疼痛。”参见莱布尼茨,“以理性为基础的自然与恩典的原则”,载《哲学论文集》,208页。
↩Siebenthal简要概述了这些范畴。与他的图式不同,我将时态与体分开,因为我认为二者是不同范畴,并将在下一条注释与本文第三部中给出理由。我也不考虑动词的名词性形式,因为这些主要只涉及动词的内容,不直接表达规定事件的关系。关于他的图式,参见Heinrich von Siebenthal,《新约研究古希腊语语法》(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2019),88页。
↩对语法体的这种理解,建立在对以下段落的解释上:“……语法体……标示Smith(1991)所谓‘视点体’,即感知谓词所指事件的视点。主要的语法体是完成体与未完成体,大体对应于以下对比:事件是从位于其运行时间之外的外部视点被感知,还是从位于其运行时间之内的内部视点被感知。”正如第三部将说明的,相对于这一段呈现的较传统的时间性解释,我主张一种不专属于时间的语法体解释。我不将未完成体首先看作对被经验之绵延的指示,而将它看作对这一经验的具体性的指示。也就是说,说“I am noticing(我正在注意到)”时,我并非暗示我的注意有一段运行时间,因为注意到是瞬间的。或者,说“I am loving(我正在爱)”时,我所暗示的并不等同于“I love(我爱)”或“I am in love(我处于爱中)”。然而,由于其词汇体,三者都指示着一个由身处当下的我所经验的绵延。因此,“我正在爱”所表达的差异,不能只是对被经验之绵延的暗示。相反,通过未完成体,我只是暗示这一行动的内容并非原子化的,而具有内在分化与复杂性。尽管内容的这种分化常常标志着时间上的分化,关键却不是时间本身。换言之,我主张,在这段文字使用的“运行时间”一语中,本质的不是“时间”,而是“运行”,也就是分化。进一步的细节参见Susan Rothstein,“体”,载Maria Aloni与Paul Dekker编《剑桥形式语义学手册》(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016),360—366页。
↩胡塞尔写下“reell”时,也试图传达类似含义。这里所指出的是,“实在的”并不只是粗糙实在论的某些陈词滥调所暗示的“客观的”“在那里”“实证地存在的”。相反,实在性首先意味着,作为我们经验的内容而具体、充实的东西。因此莱布尼茨说:“一个可能事物,就是具有某种本质或实在性的东西,也就是能被明白理解的东西。”那么,实在的就是被明白地认识为包含无限量本质的东西。它的对立面是潜在性。按照莱布尼茨的说法,“一个人必将遭遇的一切,已经潜在地包含在他的自然或概念中,正如圆的性质包含在其定义中。”而且,关于回忆式的知识理论,他声称:“我们的灵魂潜在地知道所有这些事,只需注意就能认出真理。”因此,潜在的东西既不较少客观,也不较少必然,而只是表达存在中潜隐而尚不明白的东西。参见莱布尼茨,“论自由与可能性”,载《哲学论文集》,21页;“形而上学谈”,45、58页。另参见同上,41页。
↩“我的回答是,那些本质以及关于它们的所谓永恒真理,都不是虚构的。相反,它们可以说存在于某个理念领域中,即存在于神自身之中;神是一切本质以及其他一切存在的源头……所以,永恒真理必须在某个绝对的、或形而上学上必然的主体中存在,也就是在神之中……”也就是说,尽管本质在神中形式地存在,它们的内容却只是尚未发展为完整实在性的潜在可能。虽然有些本质比另一些更“实在”或更完满,它们都同样未达到实在性本身,即存在。参见同上,“论事物的最终起源”,151—152页。
↩与这一主题相关的论文,除《偶然真理的来源》(1685—1689?)外,还有《论偶然性》(1686?)、《论自由》(1689?)、《动力学示例》(1695)。参见同上,28、96、133页。
↩同上,“偶然真理的来源”,98—100页。
↩同上,“论事物的最终起源”,151页。
↩莱布尼茨在另一处也说:“严格说来,可以说没有任何被造实体对任何其他东西施加形而上学的作用或流入。”他由此推出身体与灵魂之间不存在流入。参见同上,“最初真理”,33页。
↩然而,这一比喻只适用于规定过程,也就是人看待概念的方式。概念向我们显现为确定的或不确定的。但如第一部所说,所有原初概念与复合概念作为神的表达,都是共同永恒的。对神而言,虽然概念可以有穷或无限,它们却都已经同样确定。神自身之中并不存在规定一个概念的过程,创造也不在时间中进行。相反,神将世界看作祂直接被设定的永恒自我表达,即祂的言辞。因此,作为存在的内容而构成存在的所有有穷复合概念,即本质,都已经作为祂的表达从祂流溢。祂唯一确实要决定的(这是莱布尼茨与斯宾诺莎的分歧所在),是这个表达总体如何排序,也就是存在的世界如何受到规制。参见同上,“论自由与可能性”,19—21页;“形而上学谈”,39—40页;“以理性为基础的自然与恩典的原则”,211页;“单子论”,218页。
↩同上,“论事物的最终起源”,150页。
↩“因为,接受了人人都接受的必然性概念,即其反面蕴含矛盾的东西恰恰就是必然的东西之后,只需考察证明与分析的自然,就很容易看出,确实可能有,而且必须有某些真理,无法通过任何分析还原为同一真理或矛盾原则;这些真理具有无限的理由序列,只有神完全认识它们。而且很容易看出,这正是一切被称为自由而偶然之物的自然,尤其是那些涉及时空的东西。上文已经从宇宙各部分的无限性本身,以及事物的相互渗透与关联,充分说明了这一点。”参见同上,“论自由”,98页。
↩同上,“形而上学谈”,65—66页;“以理性为基础的自然与恩典的原则”,208—209页;“单子论”,216页;“新论序言”,296页。
↩再次提醒,我们只是从人的视角,用“构造”这一观念描述神的创造。所有被构造的内容,无论原初概念还是复合概念,都已经被神表达。这里,可以说,神真正“创造性”的活动,只在于祂对这些无限多样、共同永恒的表达所作的排序。
↩关于展开这一主题的进一步讨论,参见吉尔·德勒兹,《褶子:莱布尼茨与巴洛克》,Tom Conley译(London: The Athlone Press, 1993)。
↩同上,“最初真理”,34页;“形而上学谈”,51—52页;“致阿尔诺书信选”,88—89页;“自然的新系统”,142页;“单子论”,222页。
↩同上,“形而上学谈”,65页;“致阿尔诺书信选”,78、88页;“自然的新系统”,140—141页;“以理性为基础的自然与恩典的原则”,208—209、211页。
↩本文用extension或extensity(外延、广延)同时指称莱布尼茨所谓“extension”,即空间,以及“duration”,即时间。参见同上,“关于富歇反对意见的札记”,146—147页;“致德·沃尔德书信选”,175、178、179、184页;“致德·博斯书信选”,199页。
↩莱布尼茨常不仔细区分“实体”“形式”“实体形式”“实体统一性”等术语,因为这些概念确实彼此交叠。然而,他在一处将实体性与统一性区分开:“我并非说,在没有真正统一性的事物中没有任何实体性的东西,或只有表象,因为我承认,它们总具有的实在性或实体性之多,恰与进入其构成的东西所具有的真正统一性之多相同。”在另一处,他说:“事物或为具体,或为抽象。具体事物或是实体,或是substantiata……Substantiata是聚集体……”对莱布尼茨而言,“实在性”或“实体性”与“完满”同义,而“完满”无非就是被包含的本质之量。尽管形式的某种统一性总是必要的,一个东西只要包含这些统一体,即使它自身相对分散,仍可以被称为“实体性的”。参见同上,“致阿尔诺书信选”,86—89页;“致德·博斯书信选”,200页。另参见同上,“评米开朗琪罗·法尔德拉”,103页;“论事物的最终起源”,150页;“致德·沃尔德书信选”,178、179、181页;“致普鲁士王后索菲·夏洛特书”,186页;“单子论”,220页。
↩“因为我们必须承认,仅仅包含几何概念的裸露广延,不可能具有作用与承受的能力。”虽然这里的“承受(passion)”更是一个物理学概念,我们心理上的激情也遵循同一原则。参见同上,“动力学示例”,130页。
↩同上,“关于知识、真理和理念的沉思”,24—25页。
↩伊曼努尔·康德,《纯粹理性批判》,Marcus Weigelt译(London: Penguin Group, 2007),86页。
↩关于逻辑通过主体性奠基而生成这一主题的进一步研究,参见埃德蒙德·胡塞尔,《逻辑研究》,J. N. Findlay译(New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970);《形式逻辑与先验逻辑》,Dorion Cairns译(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969)。
↩莱布尼茨,《哲学论文集》,“形而上学谈”,54—55页。
↩“伦理精神的语言是法律与简单的命令,以及哀诉,而这种哀诉更像是为必然性流下一滴眼泪。”参见黑格尔,《精神现象学》,396页。
↩