Senior preceptorial essay ·
The Roadmap to Transcendental Phenomenology
In this essay 篇目
This paper attempts to sketch Husserl’s complete picture of the ideal science and its ramifications as put forward in the Crisis in order to locate preliminarily, but as accurately as possible, where transcendental phenomenology fits in his schema. I shall begin the task, no matter how imperfectly, and to begin it all parts of the Crisis are to be mobilized.
We start off, historically and necessarily, at the grounding lifeworld presented to us in our natural attitude. In this naturally present world we have “sciences” only in a rudimentary sense, i.e. “sciences” as practical and subjective know-hows. But as the first philosopher (Thales, or Solon, or who preceded them) ushered in the first interest in the totality of the world (θαυμάζειν), the theoretical attitude in the pregnant sense was introduced and habitualized.1 We now become spectators of the world and take interest in the “structures” of it in itself. Different structures become objects idealized for science, and form thematic regions, such as the study of shapes (geometry), the study of locomotion (mechanics), the study of change (chemistry), etc. Among all these regions, the mathematical ones are the most brilliant and privileged. Historically, mathematics holds three achievements crucial for the later development of sciences: 1. The idealization of all physical shapes through geometry; 2. The idealization of all surrounding “beings” through arithmetic; 3. The formalization of all “beings” that reduces them with all their particularities into a universal “anything whatsoever” through algebra. Galilean mathematical physics further exploits a hypothesis that the change in an infinity of, if not the totality of, properties of natural bodies corresponds to the change in their shapes, or to the same effect, there are infinitely many properties of bodies that are mathematizable. In order to determine the indirectly mathematical relations between these infinitely many properties of bodies in our surrounding lifeworld, Galileo devised the first clarified project of experimental science. A circuit is thus established by Galileo between the mathematical world of idealized objects and the subjectively relative lifeworld of practices, i.e. the verificatory circuit between theories and experiments.
It is worth distinguishing more carefully the second and the third achievements of mathematics. Through idealization, objects or beings we experience in our lifeworld are reduced to abstract monads, mathematical units, or “ones.” These units are idealized objects, no matter if they are considered “measures” such as “meters” “centimeters” “seconds” or simply “the pure notions of oneness.” They are considered higher “sources” or “origins” of our subjectively relative appearances and things we encounter in the lifeworld. Then through formalization, or in Husserl’s own words, through “arithmetization,” a further universalization is accomplished, such that the theoretical objects are leveled with the empirical things. An algebraic symbol can stand for any magnitude and is indifferent to what is being represented. It can represent either something ideal, such as a multitude of pure ones, or something empirical and imperfect, such as the volume of this very table without idealizing anything. The exact nature of this arithmetization requires further determination, which cannot be effected here, but three consequences of it are of great importance: 1. This arithmetization allows a “complete” resumption (we see later that this “completeness” here is only provisional) of the lifeworld into the mathematically scientific world, since this scientific world is no longer ontologically different from our lifeworld as the “source” is ontologically different from its “copy.” That is, the lifeworld is mathematically determinable as lifeworld, and nothing in our lifeworld is not in principle subject to mathematical determination. 2. This, however, also means the scientific world has to now incorporate the “Heraclitean flux” of subjectivity. Positive sciences with their mathematical formalism must now take in the absolute and unlimited horizonality as such of our lifeworld and unify everything under one science of “horizons.” Thus is born formal ontology, i.e. “the theory of manifolds,”2 which is more traditionally called mathesis universalis. This is the science that studies how “anything whatsoever” is to be related to any other “anything whatsoever.” In this notion of “anything whatsoever” is implicated “any possible object,” so that instead of singular “things” or real “objects,” what is investigated is each “an infinite horizon of possible objects,” as each is indeterminate and represented only by a symbol. Finally, only under this pure study of horizons as such can the absolute horizon be thematized in mathematical science. In other words, through incorporating the subjectively relative lifeworld, mathematics has become a science of “any possible world as such,” a science of pure “worldliness.” 3. Yet this achievement of mathematical science that in a way “reactivates” the lifeworld is also a forgetting. It is even the most dangerous kind of forgetting. But before we investigate this aspect thoroughly, we need a recapitulation of our roadmap so far.
We start from empirical practical “pseudosciences” in the lifeworld and move to mathematics. Mathematics and the Galilean impulse of the mathematization of nature then initiates the elevation of “pseudosciences” into exact positive sciences. But the achievement of arithmetization in mathematics also brings about a reintegration of the lifeworld inside the mathematically scientific world, so that the lifeworld is now thoroughly mathematical, and all the positive sciences studying regions belonging to the lifeworld are thus unified under the theory of manifolds. This picture seems complete in principle. Yet we notice something is amiss in this sketch: where in this roadmap is “first philosophy” or “metaphysics,” the science of Being and beings as such? Metaphysics as the science of Being is the science of the sources of all things or the science of the most actual things. I shall not get into the weeds of giving a precise definition for metaphysics, for this is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet two things at least are clear: 1. Formal ontology cannot be metaphysics, since it is the science of “any possible thing” and as such it is indifferent to actuality or potentiality. What is actual is but an instance of the most general “anything whatsoever.” 2. No empirical positive science can ever be metaphysics either, since each science of this kind is concerned only with a particular region of being, but not with the universal region of the highest things where all other regions are implicated.
Yet metaphysics must be somewhere on this map. Indeed, it is precisely in the mediating position between formal ontology and empirical sciences. For if formal ontology is concerned with “universality” and empirical sciences with “actuality,” then metaphysics must be a synthesis of both as it is the science of the “universal actuality.”
Now we are in a position to see more clearly the danger latent in arithmetization. Though arithmetization “reactivates” the lifeworld inside the mathematically scientific world, it reactivates it in such a way that is prone to mislead. Within formal ontology, horizons are not presented as horizons, but rather as sedimented “objects” or “symbols,” since they when arithmetized lack the fundamental characteristic of an “unfoldability.” Any horizon is revealed to us little by little in a determinate order as if it were an unfolding scroll. We first perceive, for instance, the front side of a body, then co-perceive other sides implied through the front side. We can then move to the other side to reactivate the co-perceptions sedimented or implied in our first perception. This is an example of the network of self-evidences, in which one intuition is transmitted to other implied potential intuitions that, when activated, harmonize with it. Through this network of corroborating and harmonizing potential and activated self-evidences (“ontic validities”), our objective reality is constituted. This objective reality is just the actuality we are inquiring into.
Then we must say that formal ontology is necessary but insufficient for instituting a metaphysics. Without it, the absolute horizon of the world remains stubbornly unthematic, and any philosophical interpretation of the totality tends to be a particular “worldview,” e.g. the idiosyncrasies of the Pre-Socratics. Though someone like Plato or Aristotle might have successfully broached a genuine metaphysics, this achievement seems more accidental than methodologically justified. Without a formal ontology through which we can construct any possible thing whatsoever, how are we able to tell if our “abstraction” from all regions of empirical sciences and practical interests is thorough enough? One should not miss here the similarity between the formal ontologist’s attitude and the transcendental phenomenologist’s attitude. Just as the phenomenologist is neutral toward any ontic validity, the formalistic-logician-algebraist-ontologist is neutral toward any pre-given object. The key distinction here is that though the phenomenologist is neutral toward all ontic validities, he is not oblivious of them. He holds before him the totalizing universal horizon expanded through formal ontology, but also at the same time traces the actuality constituted in a network of harmonizing validities.
Imagine this network to be like a nighttime map that displays manmade illumination, which illumination in this case represents self-evidence. Depending on how they define metaphysics, metaphysicians either look to where this network tends to be the most illuminated (the central region of the most certain Being), or where this network has the densest nexus of possible illumination (the region of the most concrete and substantial Being), or where it is bounded by drastic diminishment in illumination (the minimal requirement for any possible thing to be meaningfully and stably considered “actual”), or this network itself (anything logically possible is here considered somehow “actual”), etc. Metaphysicians, however, take this network as given, and inquire only into the structures of the region they confine metaphysics to. That is, they investigate the general laws under which things in this region behave and sometimes even how this region relies on some of its sub-regions and is constituted by them, without necessarily looking into the infinite totality of this network and every constitution implied therein, nor the activity of constitution itself. An exact tracing out of this network of constitutive activities, i.e. transcendental phenomenology, begins with the most originary self-evidence: the apodicticity of the primal ego, and investigates how this primary self-evidence constitutes all other self-evidences into a harmonious totality. Therefore, only a most genuine “first philosophy” qua the inquiry of “the roots of all things (ῥιζώματα πάντων)” can coincide with transcendental phenomenology.
One must be extremely careful as one compares transcendental phenomenology with first philosophy or metaphysics. Transcendental phenomenology is the study of the constituting activity that constitutes regions, not the study of any region itself. It is only metaphysical insofar as it relies on an apodictic self-evidence, yet this self-evidence for the phenomenologist is only a marker that helps the tracing out of the whole harmonious network of activity, but not the subject matter itself. That is why Descartes, according to Husserl, did not fully carry out the transcendental task. The fundamental problem of transcendental phenomenology is the problem of constitution, not of the region of primary and original self-evidence. A philosophy that stops at the problem of primary region necessarily involves mythical constructs. This is why Husserl calls the world revealed by transcendental phenomenology “the world of depth,” since it is “interested” in nothing other than the progressive tracing out or the working through of each constituting activity, whereas sciences, including metaphysics in the usual sense, are interested merely in the structures of constituted regions and their mutual dependencies. If ever transcendental phenomenology is to be considered metaphysical, it is only because in tracing out its transcendental problem of constitution, it has necessarily made the network of all meanings and validities intelligible and grounded in the most originary self-evidence of the primal ego, though this grounding in the absolute self-evidence per se is only a part of the infinite task of transcendental phenomenology to analyze all constitutions. In other words, though imbued with the metaphysical impulse of grounding, a phenomenologist also takes “interest” in the work itself, hence attaining a teleology of the infinite task that is forever at work and stays itself, and the metaphysical impulse, taken in the most general sense of an impulse to attain true grounding, is by no means incompatible with the phenomenologist’s attitude. Yet metaphysics in the narrow sense of the study of Being is interested only in what is “properly Being,” thus what region is “properly” or “normally” the most real or the most actual, and is not necessarily interested in the totality of the network constituted through the common root of transcendental subjectivity. In other words, the metaphysician remains in the particular interest in certain regions, while the phenomenologist has transcendentally reduced all regions, and is only the neutral spectator of this totality.
Let us see where we are on the roadmap now. Between formal ontology and empirical sciences, we locate metaphysics. Yet this metaphysics attains its genuine meaning only if it is transformed by transcendental phenomenology, i.e. when transcendental phenomenology “flows into” it. Transcendental phenomenology is the hidden depth that constitutes all these regions, i.e. empirical sciences, metaphysics (what Husserl calls “material ontology”) and formal ontology, in their mutual relations. Metaphysics is transformed insofar as the primary region it ought to work on is clarified, namely, the universal and pre-given lifeworld that is the ultimate ground of actuality. Metaphysics is then transformed into an “ontology of the lifeworld.” Yet we cannot help but notice that here metaphysics is only one exemplary science transformed through phenomenology. Indeed, after one has taken up and habitualized the phenomenologist’s attitude, one’s whole life is transformed, so is one’s scientific praxis in any discipline. One is always ready to take up the phenomenologist’s attitude again and again conducting any particular science. But this means that this science has become “indexical” of phenomenology: it has established in itself a habituality to conduct one back to the same phenomenology again and again. In Part III B of the Crisis, psychology is one such indexical science.
Indeed, psychology is privileged among empirical sciences, since despite the rather toilsome roadmap I sketched above, psychology hints at a “shortcut,” a “hidden path in the woods,” so that it by its own domain of problems points to transcendental phenomenology without being necessarily transformed by it beforehand. Yet if this road has fewer steps, it by no means suggests that it is easy. The difficulty is readily apparent as one reads from Appendix X, the supposed outline for the continuation of the Crisis, that “transcendental phenomenology has, as opposed to the limited horizon of psychology that is bound to the scope of self-objectification (after the reduction), the truly absolute horizon.”3 In a manner not entirely clear to us, psychology, even after it is fully transformed through phenomenology, remains distinct from it. Despite the obscurity of the state of destination, the steps of this other approach to arrive at transcendental phenomenology are nonetheless clear.
The movement is initiated by an impulse of the psychologist to attain the proper subject matter of his science. That is, like the natural scientist who attains the abstract region of bodies, the psychologist attempts to achieve a parallel task to attain a complementary abstraction of spiritual things. This is a necessary first step. But then the psychologist is involved in a difficulty: though he attempts to reduce every external object through an abstraction, he nonetheless of necessity must retain an intentional object that hovers in the soul. No such obstacle impedes the natural scientist’s abstraction, as he always only talks about objective truths without involving any subjective relativity. Without attaining transcendental phenomenology this strange fact of asymmetry between the two complementary abstractions should remain the greatest puzzle. Yet for the achieved phenomenologist, this puzzle is resolved as he comprehends the fundamental structure of intentionality: for the natural scientist, his theme is a definite constituted objectivity, and it as such has a relatively stabilized and self-enclosed horizon; whereas for the aspiring psychologist, he takes on the subject as his theme, which simply cannot be a constituted and self-enclosed object (such as “soul” or “psyche”), but must be thematized and “caught” precisely in its subjective act of constitution. The object is a unity of sedimented validities that can either be reactivated or remain latent, and this object can be simply identified with this unity where all latent validities remain enfolded. In this sense an object is already abstract. As a product that only hints at the source, it can be studied purely on its own. Yet the subject proper is this very activity of synthesis that must be carried out concretely. No complementary abstraction, therefore, can yield for psychology a subject deprived of its activity of self-objectification and self-constitution, but must always posit the intentional object as its derivative accoutrement.
This strange inclusion, at first not phenomenologically clarified to the aspiring psychologist, of the intentional object in the abstract region of subjectivity implodes this region. For now the soul proper, or the pure subject, though supposedly an abstraction, is nonetheless self-sufficient and concrete, since it can constitute any objectivity for itself. The soul, qua the abstract thing, is now seen to be the absolute “source” of everything.4 Through this abstraction, therefore, psychology has by necessity led to the complete transcendental reduction and the first establishment of transcendental phenomenology. Yet, as psychology remains a region grounded in the pre-given world, it is nonetheless a positive science only indexical of the “pure psychology,” i.e. transcendental phenomenology. It stays positive psychology when the psychologist studies the ego as he studies a region that has its own empirical laws regulating the entities belonging to this region, but it becomes transcendental phenomenology when the psychologist starts to look into only the constitutive problems of all regions. In this sense, psychology is analogous to metaphysics, since it also becomes genuine only through the transformation effected by transcendental reduction, while remaining distinct from phenomenology par excellence for being a region among many, no matter how privileged it is as a region.

Now I have provided a general sketch of a roadmap to transcendental phenomenology as traced out by Husserl in the Crisis. Let us trace the beaten tracks again so as to recollect. First, we have quasi-scientific praxis in the lifeworld. Through idealization we move to mathematics. Mathematics combined with the Galilean hypothesis then elevates all those pseudosciences to exact empirical sciences. At this stage, we have the bifurcation of our approaches. One could either go the direction indicated in Part II, so as to inquire into an ontology of the lifeworld (an ontology of the paramount reality or actuality), or go the other direction indicated in Part III B, so as to inquire into a pure psychology. The first route is longer and has to go through the detour of arithmetization and formal ontology to arrive at metaphysics, which then indicates transcendental phenomenology. The second route is a shortcut that takes up psychology among the plurality of empirical sciences. It expands the resistance psychology poses against mathematization and sees in this resistance an impulse to abstract a region proper to itself that directly points to transcendental phenomenology. Though this roadmap is imperfect in many ways, I hope it is helpful in guiding readers through the complexities involved in one of the profoundest works of philosophy, understood here as a science and not as a mystical charlatanry.
Notes
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
篇目
本文尝试勾勒胡塞尔在《危机》中提出的理想科学及其诸分支的完整图景,以初步但尽可能准确地确定先验现象学在这一图式中的位置。无论这项工作多么不完善,我都将着手开始;而要开始,就必须调动《危机》的全部内容。
在历史上,也在必然性上,我们的出发点都是在自然态度中呈现给我们的、作为根据的生活世界。在这个自然地在场的世界里,我们只在萌芽的意义上拥有“科学”,也就是说,作为实践的、主观的操作知识的“科学”。但随着第一位哲人——泰勒斯、梭伦,或早于他们的人——开启了对世界总体性的最初兴趣(θαυμάζειν),孕育着丰富意义的理论态度便被引入,并成为习惯。1现在,我们成为世界的旁观者,对世界自身的“结构”产生兴趣。不同的结构成为科学所理念化的对象,形成主题性的区域,例如对形状的研究(几何学)、对位移的研究(力学)、对变化的研究(化学),等等。在所有这些区域中,数学的区域最为辉煌,也最具特权。从历史上看,数学有三项对后来科学发展至关重要的成就:1. 通过几何学将一切物理形状理念化;2. 通过算术将周遭一切“在者”理念化;3. 通过代数将一切“在者”形式化,把它们连同其全部特殊性一起还原为普遍的“任意某物”。伽利略的数学物理学进一步运用了这样一个假说:自然物体即便并非全部性质,其无限多的性质的变化也对应着形状的变化;或者用同样的意思说,物体有无限多的性质可以被数学化。为了确定周遭生活世界中物体的这无限多性质之间间接的数学关系,伽利略构想出了第一个得到澄清的实验科学方案。由此,他在理念化对象的数学世界与主观相对的实践生活世界之间建立起一个回路,即理论与实验之间的验证回路。
数学的第二项与第三项成就值得作更细致的区分。通过理念化,我们在生活世界中经验到的对象或在者被还原为抽象的单子、数学单位,或“一”。无论这些单位被视作“米”“厘米”“秒”之类的“尺度”,还是仅仅被视作“纯粹的一之概念”,它们都是理念化的对象。它们被视为我们在生活世界中遭遇的主观相对的显象与事物的更高“源泉”或“起源”。随后,通过形式化,或者用胡塞尔自己的话说,通过“算术化”,进一步的普遍化得以完成,使理论对象与经验事物处于同一层面。一个代数符号可以代表任何量,而不问所代表的究竟是什么。它既可以代表某种理念的东西,例如许多个纯粹的一,也可以代表某种经验的、不完善的东西,例如这张桌子本身的体积,而不将任何东西理念化。这种算术化的确切本性还需要进一步规定,本文无法完成这一工作;但它的三个后果至关重要:1. 这种算术化允许生活世界被“完全”收回数学科学的世界之内——我们稍后将看到,这里的“完全”只是暂时的——因为这个科学世界不再像“源泉”与其“摹本”那样,在本体论上不同于我们的生活世界。也就是说,生活世界作为生活世界可以获得数学规定;生活世界中的任何东西,原则上都不在数学规定之外。2. 但这也意味着,科学世界现在必须纳入主体性的“赫拉克利特之流”。具有数学形式体系的实证科学,现在必须把生活世界本身绝对而无限的视域性纳入其中,并将一切统一于一门关于“视域”的科学之下。由此诞生了形式本体论,即“流形理论”,2更传统的名称则是普全数学(mathesis universalis)。这门科学研究“任意某物”如何与任何其他“任意某物”发生关联。“任意某物”这一概念蕴含着“任何可能的对象”,因此,研究的不是个别的“事物”或实在的“对象”,而是每一个“可能对象的无限视域”,因为每一个都是未规定的,只由一个符号来代表。最终,只有通过这种对视域本身的纯粹研究,绝对视域才可能在数学科学中成为主题。换句话说,通过纳入主观相对的生活世界,数学成为了研究“任何可能世界本身”的科学,成为纯粹“世界性”的科学。3. 然而,数学科学的这项成就在某种意义上“重新激活”了生活世界,同时却也是一种遗忘。它甚至是最危险的一种遗忘。不过,在深入考察这一面之前,我们需要回顾目前为止的路线。
我们从生活世界中经验的、实践的“伪科学”出发,走向数学。数学与伽利略将自然数学化的冲动,继而开启了把“伪科学”提升为精确的实证科学的进程。但数学中算术化的成就,也使生活世界重新被整合进数学科学的世界,使生活世界如今彻底成为数学的,而所有研究生活世界所属区域的实证科学也因此统一于流形理论之下。这幅图景在原则上似乎是完整的。但我们注意到,这幅草图中缺少了某种东西:研究在以及在者本身的科学——“第一哲学”或“形而上学”——在这条路线上位于何处?形而上学作为关于在的科学,是关于一切事物之源泉的科学,或关于最具实在性之事物的科学。我不准备深入形而上学精确定义的繁难之中,因为这超出了本文的范围。但至少有两点是清楚的:1. 形式本体论不可能是形而上学,因为它是关于“任何可能事物”的科学,因而对实在性或潜能性不作区分。实在者只是最普遍的“任意某物”的一个实例。2. 任何经验的实证科学同样都不可能是形而上学,因为每一门这样的科学只关心在的某个特殊区域,而不关心最高事物的普遍区域,其他一切区域都蕴含于其中。
但形而上学必定位于这张图中的某处。确实,它恰恰处于形式本体论与经验科学之间的中介位置。因为,如果形式本体论关心的是“普遍性”,而经验科学关心的是“实在性”,那么形而上学作为关于“普遍实在性”的科学,就必须是二者的综合。
现在,我们能够更清楚地看见算术化中潜藏的危险了。算术化虽然在数学科学世界之内“重新激活”了生活世界,却以一种容易误导人的方式激活它。在形式本体论内部,视域不是作为视域呈现,而是作为沉淀下来的“对象”或“符号”呈现,因为视域在被算术化时缺失了“可展开性”这一根本特征。任何视域都像一卷逐渐展开的卷轴,按照确定的次序一点一点地向我们揭示。例如,我们先感知一个物体的正面,随后共感知通过正面所蕴含的其他侧面。接着,我们可以移到另一侧,重新激活沉淀或蕴含在最初感知中的共感知。这是明见性网络的一个例子:在这个网络中,一个直观被传递给其他隐含的、潜在的直观,而这些直观一旦被激活,就与它相互和谐。通过这个由相互印证、相互和谐的潜在与已激活的明见性——“在者有效性”——所构成的网络,我们的客观现实被构成。这一客观现实正是我们正在追问的实在性。
因此我们必须说,形式本体论对于建立形而上学是必要的,却并不充分。没有它,世界的绝对视域就会顽固地停留在非主题状态,而对总体性的任何哲学解释都容易成为某一种特殊的“世界观”,例如前苏格拉底哲人们各自独特的见解。即便柏拉图或亚里士多德这样的人或许成功开启了真正的形而上学,这一成就也显得更多是偶然的,而非在方法上得到充分证明的。如果没有一种形式本体论,允许我们构造任何可能的事物,我们又如何判断,自己从经验科学与实践兴趣的所有区域中作出的“抽象”已经足够彻底?这里不应忽视形式本体论者的态度与先验现象学家的态度之间的相似。正如现象学家对任何在者有效性保持中立,形式主义者—逻辑学家—代数学家—本体论者也对任何预先给予的对象保持中立。关键的区别在于:现象学家虽然对一切在者有效性保持中立,却并不将它们遗忘。他把通过形式本体论展开的、总体化的普遍视域持守在眼前,同时又追踪着在相互和谐的有效性网络中被构成的实在性。
可以把这个网络想象成一张显示人造灯光的夜间地图;在这里,灯光代表明见性。根据对形而上学的不同定义,形而上学家或者望向网络中趋于最明亮的地方——最确定之在的中心区域;或者望向可能的光照联系最为密集的地方——最具体、最实在之在的区域;或者望向光照急剧减弱而形成的边界——使任何可能事物能够有意义且稳定地被视作“实在”的最低要求;或者望向这个网络本身——此时,任何逻辑上可能的东西,都以某种方式被视作“实在”,等等。然而,形而上学家把这个网络当作已经给予的,只探究他们划给形而上学的那个区域的结构。也就是说,他们考察这个区域中事物据以活动的普遍法则,有时甚至考察这一区域如何依赖其某些子区域、又如何由它们构成,却不必考察这个网络的无限总体及其所蕴含的每一项构成,也不必考察构成活动本身。对这一构成活动网络的精确追踪,即先验现象学,则从最本源的明见性——原初自我的确然明见性——开始,考察这一最初的明见性如何把其他一切明见性构成一个和谐的总体。因此,只有最本真的“第一哲学”,作为对“万物之根(ῥιζώματα πάντων)”的追问,才能与先验现象学重合。
在比较先验现象学与第一哲学或形而上学时,必须极其谨慎。先验现象学研究的是构成诸区域的构成活动,而不是任何区域自身。它只在依赖某种确然明见性的意义上是形而上学的;但对现象学家而言,这一明见性只是有助于追踪整个和谐活动网络的标记,而非研究对象本身。正因如此,在胡塞尔看来,笛卡尔并未彻底完成先验任务。先验现象学的根本问题是构成问题,而不是首要而本源的明见性区域的问题。停留在首要区域问题上的哲学必然涉及神话式的构造。这就是胡塞尔将先验现象学揭示的世界称作“深度世界”的原因:它所“感兴趣”的,无非是逐步追踪、逐一贯通每一种构成活动;而科学,包括通常意义上的形而上学,只关心已构成区域的结构及其相互依赖。如果先验现象学可以被视作形而上学,那也只是因为,它在追踪其先验的构成问题时,必然已经使一切意义与有效性的网络成为可理解的,并将其奠基于原初自我最本源的明见性之中;尽管在绝对明见性中的这一奠基本身,只是先验现象学分析一切构成的无限任务的一部分。换句话说,现象学家虽然充满形而上学的奠基冲动,却也对这项工作本身抱有“兴趣”,从而达到一种无限任务的目的论:它永远工作着,并保持自身。形而上学冲动,如果在最普遍的意义上被理解为达到真正奠基的冲动,就绝不与现象学家的态度矛盾。然而,狭义的形而上学作为关于在的研究,只关心什么“本真地是在”,因而只关心哪个区域“本真地”或“通常地”最为现实、最为实在,却不必关心通过先验主体性这一共同根源所构成的网络总体。换句话说,形而上学家仍然停留在对特定区域的特殊兴趣之中,而现象学家已经对一切区域施行先验还原,只是这一总体的中立旁观者。
让我们看看现在走到了路线图的哪里。在形式本体论与经验科学之间,我们找到了形而上学。然而,只有经过先验现象学的改造,即当先验现象学“流入”它之中时,这种形而上学才获得真正的意义。先验现象学是隐匿的深层,它在相互关联之中构成所有这些区域:经验科学、形而上学——胡塞尔称之为“质料本体论”——以及形式本体论。形而上学之所以得到改造,是因为它应当研究的首要区域得到了澄清,即作为实在性最终根据的、普遍且预先给予的生活世界。于是,形而上学被转化为“生活世界的本体论”。但我们不能不注意到,这里的形而上学只是经现象学改造的一门典范科学。事实上,一旦一个人采取了现象学家的态度,并使它成为习惯,他的整个生活都会被改造,他在任何学科中的科学实践亦然。无论从事哪一门特殊科学,他都随时准备一次又一次地采取现象学家的态度。但这意味着,这门科学已经成为现象学的“指引”:它在自身之中建立了一种习惯性,一次又一次地把人带回同一个现象学。在《危机》第三部分B中,心理学就是这样一门起指引作用的科学。
确实,心理学在经验科学中具有特殊地位。尽管我在上文勾画的路线颇为艰辛,心理学却暗示了一条“捷径”、一条“隐秘的林间小路”:它凭借自身的问题领域,就指向先验现象学,而不必预先经由先验现象学的改造。然而,这条道路的步骤即便更少,也绝不意味着它容易。当我们在附录X——据认为是《危机》续篇的提纲——中读到以下文字时,困难便立刻显现:“先验现象学,相对于心理学被束缚于自我客体化范围之内的有限视域(还原之后),具有真正的绝对视域。”3即使心理学已经完全通过现象学获得改造,它仍以一种我们尚不完全清楚的方式区别于现象学。尽管终点的状态依然晦暗,通过另一条进路抵达先验现象学的步骤却仍然清楚。
这一运动开始于心理学家的一种冲动:获得其科学真正所属的研究对象。也就是说,正如自然科学家获得物体的抽象区域,心理学家也尝试完成一项平行的任务,获得精神事物的互补抽象。这是必要的第一步。但随后,心理学家陷入了一个困难:尽管他尝试通过抽象排除每一个外部对象,他仍然必然要保留一个悬浮于灵魂之中的意向对象。自然科学家的抽象并不遭遇这样的障碍,因为他始终只谈论客观真理,不涉及任何主观相对性。在达到先验现象学之前,这两种互补抽象之间不对称的奇异事实,必然仍是最大的谜题。然而,对已经达到现象学的研究者而言,随着他理解意向性的根本结构,这一谜题便得到了解决:对自然科学家而言,主题是某个确定的、已构成的客观性,因此具有相对稳定而自我封闭的视域;而对仍在寻路的心理学家而言,他把主体作为主题,而主体根本不可能是一个已构成、自我封闭的对象——如“灵魂”或“心灵”——它必须恰恰在其主观的构成活动中被主题化、被“捕获”。对象是沉淀的有效性的统一,这些有效性既可以被重新激活,也可以保持潜伏;对象可以直接等同于这种统一,一切潜伏的有效性都仍褶叠于其中。在这个意义上,对象已经是抽象的。它作为只暗示源泉的产物,可以纯粹就其自身得到研究。然而,真正的主体恰恰是这种必须具体实行的综合活动。因此,任何互补抽象都不可能为心理学提供一个被剥离了自我客体化与自我构成活动的主体,而必须始终将意向对象设定为主体派生出来的附属物。
意向对象竟被纳入主体性的抽象区域——这一点对仍在寻路的心理学家来说,起初尚未得到现象学的澄清——而这种奇异的纳入使这个区域发生内爆。因为现在,真正的灵魂,或纯粹主体,虽然据说是一种抽象,却仍然自足而具体,因为它可以为自身构成任何客观性。灵魂作为抽象之物,现在被看作一切事物的绝对“源泉”。4因此,通过这一抽象,心理学必然导向彻底的先验还原,以及先验现象学的最初建立。然而,由于心理学仍然是一个奠基于预先给予的世界之中的区域,它仍是一门实证科学,只是指向“纯粹心理学”,即先验现象学。当心理学家像研究一个区域那样研究自我,把它看作拥有自身经验法则、调节该区域所属诸实体的区域时,它仍是实证心理学;但当心理学家开始只考察所有区域的构成问题时,它就成为先验现象学。在这个意义上,心理学类似于形而上学,因为它也只有通过先验还原所带来的改造才成为本真的,同时,由于它终究是诸多区域中的一个,无论这个区域有多大特权,它仍然区别于最严格意义上的现象学。

至此,我已对胡塞尔在《危机》中追踪出的通向先验现象学的路线作了一个总体勾勒。让我们再循着走过的路,作一次回顾。首先,我们拥有生活世界中的准科学实践。通过理念化,我们走向数学。数学与伽利略假说相结合,又把所有这些伪科学提升为精确的经验科学。在这个阶段,我们的进路发生分叉:或者沿第二部分指示的方向,探究生活世界的本体论——最高现实性或实在性的本体论;或者沿第三部分B指示的另一方向,探究纯粹心理学。第一条路线较长,必须绕经算术化与形式本体论,抵达形而上学,再由形而上学指向先验现象学。第二条路线是一条捷径,从诸经验科学中选取心理学。它展开了心理学对数学化的抵抗,并在这种抵抗中发现一种冲动:抽象出一个真正属于心理学自身的区域,从而直接指向先验现象学。尽管这张路线图在许多方面都不完善,我仍希望它能帮助读者穿行于这部最深刻的哲学著作之一的复杂性之中;这里的哲学被理解为科学,而不是神秘主义的骗术。