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Speech and Demonstration in Euclid
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Generally speaking, the only access we have to examine thought of others is through their speech and writings. However, it is much more problematic when interpreting mathematical works, either because opinions hold that mathematical thought is solely of objective truth hence no subjective voice of the author is involved, or because the general lack of “arguments” thereof implicates an impersonal narration of facts without real thinking going on. One way or another, the obstacle against our proper interpretation of mathematical works lies in the fact that, they are rarely considered to be a genuine discourse.
But Euclid does speak. And as he speaks, he has a certain style; this style limits and is limited by the peculiar practice he is carrying on. Let’s briefly consider what’s the significance of this.
Speech is used to convey thought and to express it, but is also used to achieve some end. A teacher speaks in order to teach, whereas a doctor speaks in order to heal. So it is fair to say that speech corresponds to the art of the speaker and is limited by that very art. It is limited in the sense of bringing about end results required of that art. But it also limits that art itself in the sense that it is only by that very form of speech the desired result can be brought forth. Thus we could be confident to say, the speech of Euclid is limited by the art he practices, and is limited to bring about ends inherent in that art.
But what is that art practiced by Euclid? Many names are assigned to it; one of its earlier names is geometry. Geo- means relating to earth, whereas -metry comes from -meter, which denotes “measurer”. However, it’s somehow shocking that in Book I, these two terms, taken separate or conjoined, only appear with traces. There are moments when it’s required to compare angles with angles, lines with lines; but this is far from the common notion we have of measurements, where numbers seem to be so inextricable. On this case, the most illuminating example comes from Proposition 47, where the squares on two sides containing the right angle of the right angle triangle is said to be equal to the square on the side subtending the right angle. This is later known in a different form under the name Pythagorean Theorem. However, it is very curious how numbers are not involved at all in this proposition; all that is required is to compare figures and to proceed in terms of figures. On the other case, that is the involvement of geo, the trace seems to be completely obliterated. There seems to be no mention to anything resembling earth. However, I would argue that it is only concealed. The fact that within the three sides of a triangle one is named “base” speaks to that earthy legacy. Base is that which is laid under others to support and to provide stability. It seems to be only one minute detail, but when the structure of Book I is taken into account, we could see how this detail is only one analogue that reflects the whole. Starting from definitions, postulates and common notions, we gradually proceed through all propositions with the general pattern that later ones are ofttimes built upon earlier ones. Earlier propositions provide the ground for later propositions, while the three preliminary parts provide the ground for all propositions. The whole procedure of Book I, thus understood, is earthy, or grounded, in a world where gravity holds sway. To avoid being superficial, we have to consider the preceding remarks not only in metaphorical terms; what I argue is that the original experience of being pulled down to earth is inherent when translated into geometry: either it stands, or it falls.
To clarify my point, let’s briefly turn to a comparison with Socratic dialectics. Socrates also lays down hypotheses, though sometimes he actually starts with someone else’ hypothesis, or even starts with a question. Let’s say in Meno, Socrates first postulates that “virtue is teachable”, which turns out to be contradictory with the fact that there is no teacher of virtue. He doesn’t conclude with the statement that “virtue then is not teachable”, however, since there’s also strong argument that virtue is indeed teachable, i.e. virtue is knowledge (which is teachable). In other words, the interlocutors are left in a conundrum, where only a modification of the original hypothesis can rescue them. Nevertheless, the modified hypothesis is also problematic, if not more so. One can ask, for instance, without knowledge as measure in the first place, how can true opinions to be judged as both being true and being opinions? The story of divine dispensation is even more ironical and absurd, as now a knowledge of the divine is proclaimed: I know that the divine is good (which is a seriously doubtful and ambiguous statement according to our experiences with Greek gods in general) and will dispense true opinions (which seems more suspicious!). And if we do accept this statement, we end up being agnostics: we could not know what’s true and what’s false, everything is in the hands of gods, and there’s no point of pursuing knowledge. In conclusion, at the end of Socratic dialectics, we are equally confounded as before, if not more so. But this is not the case with Euclidean proceedings. Most of the times he proceeds from secured grounds; even if when he starts from a false hypothesis, like in proposition 6, he can rule out the false hypothesis and gain the true one at the end of his demonstration. The possible hypotheses are definite both in meaning and in number; in other words, different from Socratic procedures, Euclid rules out any shaky ground. It either stands, or it falls; as I said above.
It remains to be shown how does Euclid actually practice his art with his speech. However, before that, what is required first is to explain his art as a whole, which means the two elements in our preceding remarks should be related to each other. It would be too grand a project to try to expound everything in detail, hence what is attempted here is only preliminary.
To measure the ground requires the ground to be stable enough to be stood upon. If the ground is mushy like swamps, or changing like sand, it cannot be measured. In other words, the ground has to be solid and impenetrable. But to measure is also to compare distinct bodies; it requires enclosure and finitude. The proper units for measuring are thus bounded figures; an infinitely large area cannot be measured: it is out of proportion. Aside from these, let’s consider one basic fact: a grovelling animal cannot measure the ground, since it’s too close to it. To measure the ground thus requires both the capability and motivation to stand upright; that is, to distance oneself from the plane in which one is moving, and to transcend into air to take in the grounded figures as a whole. One defining feature of geometry, therefore, is the motivation to transcend earth. Thus, we have extracted from our experience multiple prerequisite and determining factors for Euclid to perform his art: the use of 1. impenetrable and solid and 2. distinct and enclosed figures; 3. the capability and motivation to transcend and distance oneself from the ground.
By this point, a twist has been effected. As we start off inquiring into Euclid’s art, we end up inquiring into Euclid himself. The questions we pose turn out to be: Who is Euclid? Or, to be more general, who is the geometrician? And so far we have concluded that Euclid is someone who has been motivated to transcend the ground and measure it as it is divided up into figures. We conclude, in effect, that Euclid is someone who is motivated to stand up and look down. But how is he anyhow different from any of us homo erectus; how is he picking up that banal activity of standing and looking and transforming it into an art? Essentially, how should we interpret his thought and speech that makes him Euclid and from those defining traits collects his art as a whole?
What is the task before us is hence not only to relate those defining traits or merely detect traces of a legacy, but to delineate the contours of a whole in which these traits and his work are closely articulated. Before, we’ve only looked at different threads, but as good detectives, what’s required of us is to knit these different leads into one chain of evidence that can shed light upon the whole. Thus, it’s required of our art that we interpret and reconstruct. Speech is the natural starting place for any interpretation.
Earlier, we described the upright posture of any aspiring geometrician. But taken as a whole, this uprightness cannot stop at the merely physical level. If we examine closely the language Euclid uses, what he aspires to is the pure construction of figures in his speech. Euclid’s synistēmi means “to set together”; we may understand this setting-together architectonically, as the erecting of a figure upon the prior ground of shared premises. Each construction thus builds upon an established foundation while laying the ground for what follows.
But we have to be careful here. There are several times when Euclid explicitly sets his task at constructing figures, and usually these occasions are pivotal for the later proceedings of his work. For instance, the very first three propositions of Book I are about constructions and lay the ground for later usages, e.g. in Proposition 11 an equilateral triangle needs to be constructed first in order to draw a line perpendicular to the given one. Without these construction propositions, the very possibility of other propositions would be undermined. But this only leads to a question: what about those propositions whose goal seems unrelated to constructions? Are those propositions grounded by constructions themselves about constructions? We do seem to see something more with those not explicitly constructive propositions. For one thing, with constructive propositions, we proceed from givens to a new creation through our own rational imagination led by Euclid’s speech; whereas with other propositions, we proceed from givens to prove a relationship between these givens. Essentially, with the former we are making new things out of old, but with the latter we stay put with the givens only to explicate what is already there. This only adds more confusion, however, as we see in every proposition a certain action on our part is taken; if in some propositions, what’s executed there is not construction, then what is it? The action taken there is more or less constructive; we need to create something new there enabling us to prove an existing relationship. Here we are again drawn into a circle: we see how we need to construct something, but after the construction is completed, the relationship shows itself as pre-existing the construction.
Let’s look to a particular example. Proposition 47 states how the square described on the side subtending the right angle of a right angle triangle is equal to the squares described on the remaining sides. Before the construction, we are not sure if this enunciation is true or false. It is only after the construction of multiple figures within that we see the relationships clearly; but even without these constructions, the same squares are already there, thus already exhibiting the relationships.
But this circle is not a contradiction, as I have stated above. It is rather a common experience. But how do we give an appropriate name for this action? What is Euclid really doing here?
Again, we have to attend to his speech more closely. There is one unmistakable give-away of Euclid’s speech: he is one of the rare people who insistently use the third person imperative in Greek. In short, he says “let there be a triangle” instead of “here I draw a triangle”. The nuance here is important. He is not creating something in an active sense; rather, he is invoking his object. Before his invocation, the triangle is already as a figure, is already articulated into a certain relationship with other figures. The action taken is not a creation ex nihilo, but a conjuring up. What is “constructed” is already out there awaiting: it is, strictly speaking, a re-construction.
Hence, the art Euclid performs, in essence, is a pure reconstruction. But what is pure about it if it is reconstruction? A reconstruction, as the name suggests, always is predated by something; it is always tainted by a pre-history. How can it be pure?
What is to be determined is the sense of purity. People have opinions, and opinions build upon each other; layered opinions are called presuppositions. One way to attain to purity is to swipe away those presuppositions and recover the origin, the pure source. In this way, even if a history is involved, what is reconstructed is nevertheless something pure, as the origin is unmixed with opinions. But how are we certain this is the sense fit for Euclid?
To be sure, we don’t know. But we may venture an educated guess. It is factical that human beings are embodied, which means we live largely in a world governed by senses, and the most dominating one is vision. We are hence living surrounded by images. But human beings are given another gift, which is called imagination, which simply means that we can produce images. But this ability to imagine points to something unusual, thus pivotal, for all human beings: to produce images means to recognize those products as images of something, that is, of the originals. When I see my drawing of the spider in my room, or when I imagine the spider crawling to hunt, I know these are mere images, are products produced by something else, by an origin. If I don’t know about the origin, I would not be able to produce any image intentionally or creatively, since either I would have no images whatsoever, or would mistake images for unshakable truths and fail to “produce” freely. But this also means that, via these images I could attain to the originals: every image points outwards for the originals. We could thus reconstruct the originals through the visual images present to us.
Can we say this is what Euclid is doing? Or is this what geometricians are doing in general?
The first human being who stands up (or is she a human being only afterwards?) must be shocked by the view resulted from this mere change of perspective. She still retains that awkward posture in midair and does not feel stable. Before her lies the vastness of land. From far to near everything is illuminated and distinct, but infinitely many and kaleidoscopic. The land is cut into different strips governed by different beings, all taking its own share. And, for the sake of this standing up, she is enabled to look up and stare at that source of all light with ease; and as a result, she feels pained in the vision of it.
Euclid is the one who stands up. But instead of directing his vision solely to the source and getting burned by it, he directs his vision to the earth, to the geo. The earth is cut into distinct, articulated shapes in the constant illumination brought by the sun. These are images shining forth under the reign of light and invoking light to show themselves. The purity of these images is a purity brought by light, it is a transparency, a clarity, or a luminosity. Considered this way, what the Euclidean art really amounts to is a bringing under light, a clarification. It is the recovery of the source in images through images. But how does Euclid achieve that? Does he ever really achieve that?
Let’s consider something called night. Night is the antithesis of day, it is the realm of darkness where everything is shrouded and concealed. It is the time when the source itself only reveals itself as an image of itself, which is the moon. Sun is said to be chased out of bounds during the night. Or let’s consider something called eclipse. A moment of darkness befalls the realm of light, blocking out the constant outpouring from the source. Are there eclipses in Euclid’s speech, or even nights?
When Euclid proceeds with his art, there is one central thing missing. He is looking at figures as bounded, but he never really mentions space; it’s as if he is staring at only plots of land, but never the land itself. What is the essence of that space which is concealed in the background that allows these figures to be the way they are? To once more make use of the night-day image, what is that vast space of darkness in which the sun is immersed and is periodically chased out of bounds?
This leads to one other omission. Night and day divides into the most natural unit of time. Without that intruding realm of darkness, the constant exposure under light expels time from its reign. Can we find any genuine depiction of time in Euclid speech? Apparently, there is a sequence of one proposition following the other, but it is difficult to ascertain the essence of this sequence. Let’s consider what is required to form a genuine sequence of time: the past precedes the present, which again precedes the future. However, with Euclid, there seems to be one constantly dominating present. What is at focus is the present proposition that we are working on, the past is resorted to as a ground, but is never fully brought into the discussion. Euclid never says “this step is possible because we have proven it in the previous proposition”. Rather, if we examine closely his speech, his tense is almost always the present tense. In addition, the very fact that we can always resort to the past as a ground points out how there is one crucial difference between Euclidean “past” and genuine past. The past is always uncertain in our experience, as our memory can always blur. But with Euclid, the past is something which is constantly standing and can be ideally retraced. This is also the same with the future. Even if a certain proposition might be useful for later propositions, what is demonstrated is not its usefulness as a means for the future, but rather its completeness and fullness as itself at the present. In addition, it’s hardly shocking how in his treatment of propositions he nearly never applies motion to the figure, though some might argue there are occasional semi-motions involved, which never really take the central stage. To oversimplify, we could say the Euclidean art is a paradoxical ascension, a movement proper, to the eternal realm of light that is purified from any movement.
In other words, what is lacking in Euclid is exactly the lack itself. Concealment is itself concealed. But as the name of geometry suggests, it is never possible for a geometrician to dispense with the earth entirely, where dwells darkness. Geometry in general is a practice of dianoia, which strives upward but is forever obstructed. By that sense, can we say anything is different with Socrates, the lover of wisdom? Before, when I drew such a clear line between Euclid and Socrates, was I mistaken......?
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
一般而言,我们考察他人思想的唯一途径,就是通过他们的言说与书写。然而,解释数学著作时,这就成了更大的问题:有的看法认为,数学思想仅仅涉及客观真理,因此并不包含作者主观的声音;或者,也可能因为其中普遍缺乏“论辩”,似乎暗示这只是一种不涉及真正思考的、非个人的事实叙述。无论哪种情况,妨碍我们恰当解释数学著作的障碍,都在于这样一个事实:它们很少被视为真正的话语。
但欧几里得确实在言说。而当他言说时,他有一种特定的风格;这一风格限制着他所从事的独特实践,也被这一实践所限制。让我们简要思考,这意味着什么。
言说被用来传达和表达思想,也被用来达成某个目的。教师言说是为了教导,医生言说则是为了医治。因此,我们可以恰当地说,言说对应着言说者的技艺,并受这一技艺限制。它受到限制,是说它必须带来该技艺所要求的最终结果。但它也限制着技艺本身,因为只有通过这一特定的言说形式,预期的结果才得以产生。因此,我们可以确信地说,欧几里得的言说受到他所实践的技艺的限制,被限定于实现内在于那一技艺的目的。
但欧几里得所实践的究竟是什么技艺?人们赋予它许多名称,其中一个较早的名字是几何学(geometry)。Geo-意味着与大地相关,而-metry来自-meter,意指“测量者”。然而,颇令人惊讶的是,在第一卷中,这两个词无论分开还是合起来,都只留下些许踪迹。书中有时要求以角比较角,以线比较线;但这与我们通常理解的测量仍相去甚远,因为在通常的测量中,数似乎不可分离。就这一点而言,最具启发性的例子来自命题47:直角三角形中,包含直角的两边上的正方形之和,等于直角对边上的正方形。后来,这以一种不同的形式被称为毕达哥拉斯定理。然而,奇特的是,这个命题完全没有涉及数;所要求的一切,只是比较图形,并且始终按照图形来推进。至于另一点,即geo的参与,其踪迹似乎已被彻底抹去。似乎没有任何地方提到类似大地的东西。但我会主张,它只是被隐藏了。三角形三边中有一边被称为“底边”,这一事实就说明了这一来自大地的遗产。底,是被放置在其他东西下面,用来支撑它们并提供稳定性的东西。这似乎只是一个微小细节,但当我们考虑第一卷的结构时,就会看到,这个细节只是映照整体的一个类似物。从定义、公设和共同观念开始,我们逐渐推进到所有命题,其一般模式是,后来的命题往往构筑在先前的命题之上。先前的命题为后来的命题奠基,而三个预备部分则为所有命题奠基。如此理解,第一卷的整个进程就是属于大地的,或者说,它在一个由重力支配的世界中有其根基。为了避免流于表面,我们不能只把前面的论述当作比喻来理解;我的主张是,被拉向大地的原初经验,在被转写为几何时依然内在于其中:它要么站得住,要么就倒下。
为澄清这一点,让我们简要转向与苏格拉底辩证法的比较。苏格拉底也设定假说,尽管有时他实际上从别人的假说开始,甚至从一个问题开始。比如在《美诺》中,苏格拉底首先假定“美德可以传授”,而这与不存在美德教师这一事实相矛盾。然而,他并没有以“那么,美德不可传授”作结,因为同样有强有力的论证表明,美德确实可以传授,即美德是知识,而知识可以传授。换句话说,对话者被留在一个困境之中,只有修改原初假说才能把他们救出来。但修改后的假说即便不是更有问题,也依然有问题。例如,人们可以问,如果一开始没有知识作为尺度,正确意见如何能够被判定为既是正确的,又是意见?神圣恩赐的说法则更加反讽而荒谬,因为这里如今宣称了一种关于神的知识:我知道神是善的(根据我们通常与希腊诸神打交道的经验,这一论断极其可疑而暧昧),并且会赐予正确意见(这似乎更加可疑!)。如果我们接受这一说法,最终就会成为不可知论者:我们无法知道何者为真、何者为假,一切都掌握在诸神手中,追求知识就毫无意义。总之,在苏格拉底辩证法的结尾,我们即便没有比之前更困惑,也至少仍同样困惑。但欧几里得的推进方式并非如此。大多数时候,他从稳固的基础出发;即便从一个错误假说开始,比如命题6,他也能够在证明的结尾排除错误假说,获得正确假说。可能的假说无论在意义上还是在数量上都是确定的;换句话说,与苏格拉底的过程不同,欧几里得排除任何不稳固的基础。它要么站得住,要么就倒下,正如我上面所说的。
还有待说明的是,欧几里得究竟如何通过言说实践自己的技艺。但在此之前,首先需要解释他的技艺作为一个整体是什么,也就是说,要把我们前面谈论的两个要素互相联系起来。试图详细阐述一切将是一个过于宏大的计划,因此这里所作的尝试仅仅是预备性的。
测量大地,要求大地足够稳定,可以让人立于其上。如果地面像沼泽一样泥泞,或像沙地一样变动,就无法测量。换句话说,地面必须坚固、不可穿透。但测量也是比较不同的物体;它要求封闭与有限。因此,适合测量的单位是有边界的图形;一个无限大的区域无法测量:它不成比例。除此之外,让我们考虑一个基本事实:一只匍匐的动物无法测量地面,因为它离地面太近。因此,测量地面既要求直立起来的能力,也要求这样的动机;也就是使自己与正在其中活动的平面拉开距离,超升到空中,从整体上把握地面上的图形。因此,几何的一个界定性特征,是超越大地的动机。这样,我们已经从经验中提取出欧几里得施展其技艺的多个前提和规定性因素:使用1.不可穿透而坚固的、2.彼此区分且封闭的图形;以及3.超越地面、与之拉开距离的能力和动机。
到了这里,发生了一个转折。我们从探究欧几里得的技艺出发,最终却在探究欧几里得本人。我们提出的问题变成了:欧几里得是谁?或者,更一般地说,几何学家是谁?到目前为止,我们得出的结论是,欧几里得是一个受到驱动,要超越大地、把它作为被划分为图形的大地来测量的人。实际上,我们得出的结论是,欧几里得是一个受到驱动,要站起来向下看的人。但是,这又使他与我们任何一个直立的人有何不同?他如何拾起站立与观看这一平常的活动,并将其转化为一门技艺?归根结底,我们应当如何解释使他成为欧几里得的思想与言说,并从那些界定性的特征中,将他的技艺聚集为一个整体?
因此,我们面前的任务,不仅是把那些界定性特征联系起来,或仅仅侦查某种遗产的踪迹,而是要勾勒出一个整体的轮廓,在其中,这些特征与他的著作紧密地衔接起来。此前,我们只是观察了不同的线头;但作为好的侦探,我们所要做的,是把这些不同线索编织成一条能够阐明整体的证据链。因此,我们的技艺要求我们解释和重新构筑。言说是任何解释的自然起点。
此前,我们描述了每一个有志成为几何学者的直立姿态。但从整体看,这种直立不能仅仅停留在身体层面。仔细考察欧几里得所使用的语言便会发现,他向往的是在言说中对图形的纯粹构筑。欧几里得的synistēmi意为“置于一起”;我们可以从建筑的意义上理解这种置于一起:在共同前提这一先在的根基上,将一个图形竖立起来。每一次构筑由此既建立在已有的基础上,又为后续的推进奠下地基。
但在这里我们必须小心。欧几里得有好几次明确把自己的任务设定为构筑图形,而这些场合通常对著作后面的推进至关重要。例如,第一卷最初三个命题就是关于构筑图形的,它们为后来的运用奠下地基:比如在命题11中,首先需要构筑一个等边三角形,才能在给定直线上立起一条垂线。没有这些构筑命题,其他命题得以成立的根基便会动摇。但这只会引出一个问题:那些目标看起来与构筑无关的命题,又该如何理解?那些由构筑奠基的命题,自身也是关于构筑的吗?在那些并不明确以构筑为目的的命题中,我们确实似乎看到了更多东西。一方面,在构筑命题中,我们通过由欧几里得的言说引导的理性想象,从给定者推进到一个新的造物;而在其他命题中,我们从给定者出发,证明这些给定者之间的关系。根本上,前者是从旧物制造新物,后者则停留在给定者那里,只把已经存在的东西阐明出来。然而,这只会增加困惑,因为我们看到,在每一个命题中,我们自己都采取了某种行动;如果有些命题中执行的并非构筑,那么那究竟是什么?在那里采取的行动多少具有构筑性;我们需要创造某个新东西,才能证明一个既存关系。这里,我们又被卷入一个循环:我们看到自己需要构筑某物,但在构筑完成后,那一关系却显现为先于构筑存在。
让我们看一个具体例子。命题47陈述了这样一点:直角三角形中,直角对边上所作的正方形,等于其余两边上所作的正方形之和。在构筑之前,我们无法确信这一陈述是真还是假。只有在其中构筑出多个图形以后,我们才清楚地看到这些关系;但即便没有这些构筑,同样的正方形也已经在那里,因此已经展示着那些关系。
但正如我上面所说的,这个循环不是矛盾。相反,它是一种普通经验。然而,我们如何为这一行动给出一个恰当的名称?欧几里得在这里真正做的是什么?
我们再次需要更加细致地注意他的言说。欧几里得的言说有一个无可误认的显露之处:他是少数坚持在希腊语中使用第三人称命令式的人之一。简而言之,他说的是“让这里有一个三角形”,而不是“我在这里画一个三角形”。这一细微差别很重要。他并非在主动的意义上创造某物,而是在唤起自己的对象。在他的唤起之前,三角形就已经作为一个图形存在,已经与其他图形衔接成某种关系。所采取的行动不是无中生有的创造,而是一种召唤。“被构筑”的东西早已在那里等待着:严格地说,这是一种重新构筑。
因此,欧几里得所实践的技艺,在本质上是一种纯粹的重新构筑。但如果是重新构筑,它又纯粹在哪里?顾名思义,重新构筑总有某物先于它存在;它总被一段前史浸染。它如何能够纯粹?
有待确定的是纯粹的意义。人有意见,而意见又一层层构筑在彼此之上;层叠的意见被称为预设。达到纯粹的一种方式,是扫去这些预设,恢复原初,恢复纯粹的源头。这样,即便牵涉了历史,所重新构筑的仍然可以是纯粹之物,因为原初没有混入意见。但我们如何确信,这正是适合欧几里得的意义?
诚然,我们不知道。但我们可以试作一种有根据的猜测。人是具身的,这是一个事实,意味着我们很大程度上生活在由感官支配的世界中,而其中最有支配力的是视觉。因此,我们生活在图像的环绕之中。但人也获得了另一种天赋,称为想象力,简单地说,就是我们能够生产图像。然而,这一想象能力,指向对所有人而言某种不同寻常、因而至关重要的事情:生产图像,就意味着把这些产物认作某物的图像,也就是原物的图像。当我看见自己画出的房间里的蜘蛛,或者想象蜘蛛爬行着去捕猎时,我知道这些只是图像,是由某个别的东西、某个原初产生的产物。如果我不知道原初,就无法有意地或创造性地生产任何图像,因为我或者根本不会拥有图像,或者会把图像错认成不可动摇的真理,无法自由地“生产”。但这也意味着,我可以经由这些图像抵达原物:每个图像都向外指示原物。由此,我们可以通过呈现给我们的视觉图像重新构筑原物。
我们可以说,这就是欧几里得所做的吗?或者,这就是几何学家一般所做的事情吗?
第一个站起来的人(或者,她是否只有在此后才是一个人?),一定被仅仅改变视角所带来的景象震惊了。她仍在半空中维持着那种笨拙姿态,感到不稳。在她面前,大地浩瀚展开。从远到近,一切都被照亮,清晰可辨,却又无穷无尽、万花筒般变幻。大地被切分成不同的地带,由不同存在者支配,各自占据自己的一份。而由于这一直立,她能够轻易仰头,凝视一切光的源头;结果,她在看见它时感到痛楚。
欧几里得就是那个站起来的人。但他并非把目光仅仅投向源头而被它灼伤,而是把目光投向大地,投向geo。在太阳带来的持续照明中,大地被切分成彼此分明、互相衔接的形状。这些是在光的统治下闪耀的图像,它们唤来光,以展示自身。这些图像的纯粹,是光带来的纯粹,是一种透明性、一种清晰性,或一种明亮性。这样考虑,欧几里得的技艺真正所做的,就是把事物带入光中,就是澄清。它通过图像,在图像中恢复源头。但欧几里得如何达成这一点?他究竟是否真正达成过?
让我们考虑某种叫作夜晚的东西。夜晚是白昼的反面,是一切被遮蔽、被隐藏的黑暗领域。它是这样的时间:源头本身仅仅以自身的图像显露自身,这一图像就是月亮。据说,太阳在夜间被驱逐出界。或者,让我们考虑某种叫作日食的东西。一刻黑暗降临于光的领域,遮断源头不断的倾注。在欧几里得的言说中,是否有日食,甚至是否有夜晚?
当欧几里得施展他的技艺时,有一样核心之物缺席了。他看着有边界的图形,却从未真正提及空间;仿佛他只是盯着一块块土地,却从未看大地本身。那个隐藏在背景中、容许这些图形如其所是的空间,其本质是什么?再次使用昼夜的形象来说,那片浩瀚的黑暗空间是什么,太阳浸在其中,又周期性地被驱逐出界?
这引向另一个遗漏。昼与夜分隔出最自然的时间单位。没有那个入侵的黑暗领域,恒常暴露于光下便将时间驱逐出了自己的统治范围。我们能在欧几里得的言说中找到任何真正的时间描写吗?显然,存在着一个命题接着另一个命题的次序,但很难确定这一次序的本质。让我们考虑,构成一个真正的时间次序需要什么:过去先于现在,现在又先于未来。然而,在欧几里得那里,似乎存在着一个始终占支配地位的现在。焦点在于我们正在处理的当前命题,过去被诉诸为基础,却从未被充分带入讨论。欧几里得从不说:“这一步之所以可能,是因为我们在先前的命题中已经证明过它。”相反,如果仔细考察他的言说,其时态几乎总是现在时。此外,我们总能诉诸过去作为基础,这一事实本身就指出,欧几里得的“过去”与真正的过去之间存在一个关键差异。在我们的经验中,过去总是不确定的,因为记忆总可能模糊。但对欧几里得来说,过去是持续站立着、可以在理念中重新追溯的东西。未来也是如此。即便某个命题可能对后来的命题有用,被证明的并非它作为未来手段的有用性,而是它本身在当下的完整性与充实性。此外,他在处理命题时几乎从不把运动施加于图形,也并不令人惊讶,尽管有人可能认为,偶尔有某种准运动参与其中,但它们从未真正占据中心舞台。过分简化地说,欧几里得的技艺是一种悖论性的上升,一种恰当意义上的运动,升向从任何运动中净化出来的永恒光明领域。
换句话说,欧几里得所缺少的,恰恰是缺少本身。隐藏本身被隐藏了。但正如几何学这个名字所暗示的,几何学家永远不可能完全舍弃大地,而黑暗就居住在那里。一般而言,几何是一种dianoia(推理性思维)的实践,它努力向上,却永远受阻。在这个意义上,我们还能说,它与苏格拉底,这位智慧的爱者,有什么不同吗?此前,我如此清楚地在欧几里得与苏格拉底之间划出界线时,我是否错了……?