Gui Ruiyan

Paper / 论文 ·

Speech and Demonstration in Euclid

Date from document metadata / 日期据原稿文件信息

Editorial title / 本版编拟标题

Generally speaking, the only access we have to examine thought of others is through their speech and writings. However, it is much more problematic when interpreting mathematical works, either because opinions hold that mathematical thought is solely of objective truth hence no subjective voice of the author is involved, or because the general lack of “arguments” thereof implicates an impersonal narration of facts without real thinking going on. One way or another, the obstacle against our proper interpretation of mathematical works lies in the fact that, they are rarely considered to be a genuine discourse.

But Euclid does speak. And as he speaks, he has a certain style; this style limits and is limited by the peculiar practice he is carrying on. Let’s briefly consider what’s the significance of this.

Speech is used to convey thought and to express it, but is also used to achieve some end. A teacher speaks in order to teach, whereas a doctor speaks in order to heal. So it is fair to say that speech corresponds to the art of the speaker and is limited by that very art. It is limited in the sense of bringing about end results required of that art. But it also limits that art itself in the sense that it is only by that very form of speech the desired result can be brought forth. Thus we could be confident to say, the speech of Euclid is limited by the art he practices, and is limited to bring about ends inherent in that art.

But what is that art practiced by Euclid? Many names are assigned to it; one of its earlier names is geometry. Geo- means relating to earth, whereas -metry comes from -meter, which denotes “measurer”. However, it’s somehow shocking that in Book I, these two terms, taken separate or conjoined, only appear with traces. There are moments when it’s required to compare angles with angles, lines with lines; but this is far from the common notion we have of measurements, where numbers seem to be so inextricable. On this case, the most illuminating example comes from Proposition 47, where the squares on two sides containing the right angle of the right angle triangle is said to be equal to the square on the side subtending the right angle. This is later known in a different form under the name Pythagorean Theorem. However, it is very curious how numbers are not involved at all in this proposition; all that is required is to compare figures and to proceed in terms of figures. On the other case, that is the involvement of geo, the trace seems to be completely obliterated. There seems to be no mention to anything resembling earth. However, I would argue that it is only concealed. The fact that within the three sides of a triangle one is named “base” speaks to that earthy legacy. Base is that which is laid under others to support and to provide stability. It seems to be only one minute detail, but when the structure of Book I is taken into account, we could see how this detail is only one analogue that reflects the whole. Starting from definitions, postulates and common notions, we gradually proceed through all propositions with the general pattern that later ones are ofttimes built upon earlier ones. Earlier propositions provide the ground for later propositions, while the three preliminary parts provide the ground for all propositions. The whole procedure of Book I, thus understood, is earthy, or grounded, in a world where gravity holds sway. To avoid being superficial, we have to consider the preceding remarks not only in metaphorical terms; what I argue is that the original experience of being pulled down to earth is inherent when translated into geometry: either it stands, or it falls.

To clarify my point, let’s briefly turn to a comparison with Socratic dialectics. Socrates also lays down hypotheses, though sometimes he actually starts with someone else’ hypothesis, or even starts with a question. Let’s say in Meno, Socrates first postulates that “virtue is teachable”, which turns out to be contradictory with the fact that there is no teacher of virtue. He doesn’t conclude with the statement that “virtue then is not teachable”, however, since there’s also strong argument that virtue is indeed teachable, i.e. virtue is knowledge (which is teachable). In other words, the interlocutors are left in a conundrum, where only a modification of the original hypothesis can rescue them. Nevertheless, the modified hypothesis is also problematic, if not more so. One can ask, for instance, without knowledge as measure in the first place, how can true opinions to be judged as both being true and being opinions? The story of divine dispensation is even more ironical and absurd, as now a knowledge of the divine is proclaimed: I know that the divine is good (which is a seriously doubtful and ambiguous statement according to our experiences with Greek gods in general) and will dispense true opinions (which seems more suspicious!). And if we do accept this statement, we end up being agnostics: we could not know what’s true and what’s false, everything is in the hands of gods, and there’s no point of pursuing knowledge. In conclusion, at the end of Socratic dialectics, we are equally confounded as before, if not more so. But this is not the case with Euclidean proceedings. Most of the times he proceeds from secured grounds; even if when he starts from a false hypothesis, like in proposition 6, he can rule out the false hypothesis and gain the true one at the end of his demonstration. The possible hypotheses are definite both in meaning and in number; in other words, different from Socratic procedures, Euclid rules out any shaky ground. It either stands, or it falls; as I said above.

It remains to be shown how does Euclid actually practice his art with his speech. However, before that, what is required first is to explain his art as a whole, which means the two elements in our preceding remarks should be related to each other. It would be too grand a project to try to expound everything in detail, hence what is attempted here is only preliminary.

To measure the ground requires the ground to be stable enough to be stood upon. If the ground is mushy like swamps, or changing like sand, it cannot be measured. In other words, the ground has to be solid and impenetrable. But to measure is also to compare distinct bodies; it requires enclosure and finitude. The proper units for measuring are thus bounded figures; an infinitely large area cannot be measured: it is out of proportion. Aside from these, let’s consider one basic fact: a grovelling animal cannot measure the ground, since it’s too close to it. To measure the ground thus requires both the capability and motivation to stand upright; that is, to distance oneself from the plane in which one is moving, and to transcend into air to take in the grounded figures as a whole. One defining feature of geometry, therefore, is the motivation to transcend earth. Thus, we have extracted from our experience multiple prerequisite and determining factors for Euclid to perform his art: the use of 1. impenetrable and solid and 2. distinct and enclosed figures; 3. the capability and motivation to transcend and distance oneself from the ground.

By this point, a twist has been effected. As we start off inquiring into Euclid’s art, we end up inquiring into Euclid himself. The questions we pose turn out to be: Who is Euclid? Or, to be more general, who is the geometrician? And so far we have concluded that Euclid is someone who has been motivated to transcend the ground and measure it as it is divided up into figures. We conclude, in effect, that Euclid is someone who is motivated to stand up and look down. But how is he anyhow different from any of us homo erectus; how is he picking up that banal activity of standing and looking and transforming it into an art? Essentially, how should we interpret his thought and speech that makes him Euclid and from those defining traits collects his art as a whole?

What is the task before us is hence not only to relate those defining traits or merely detect traces of a legacy, but to delineate the contours of a whole in which these traits and his work are closely articulated. Before, we’ve only looked at different threads, but as good detectives, what’s required of us is to knit these different leads into one chain of evidence that can shed light upon the whole. Thus, it’s required of our art that we interpret and reconstruct. Speech is the natural starting place for any interpretation.

Earlier, we described the upright posture of any aspiring geometrician. But taken as a whole, this uprightness cannot stop at the merely physical level. If we examine closely the language Euclid uses, what he aspires to is the pure construction of figures in his speech. Euclid’s synistēmi means “to set together”; we may understand this setting-together architectonically, as the erecting of a figure upon the prior ground of shared premises. Each construction thus builds upon an established foundation while laying the ground for what follows.

But we have to be careful here. There are several times when Euclid explicitly sets his task at constructing figures, and usually these occasions are pivotal for the later proceedings of his work. For instance, the very first three propositions of Book I are about constructions and lay the ground for later usages, e.g. in Proposition 11 an equilateral triangle needs to be constructed first in order to draw a line perpendicular to the given one. Without these construction propositions, the very possibility of other propositions would be undermined. But this only leads to a question: what about those propositions whose goal seems unrelated to constructions? Are those propositions grounded by constructions themselves about constructions? We do seem to see something more with those not explicitly constructive propositions. For one thing, with constructive propositions, we proceed from givens to a new creation through our own rational imagination led by Euclid’s speech; whereas with other propositions, we proceed from givens to prove a relationship between these givens. Essentially, with the former we are making new things out of old, but with the latter we stay put with the givens only to explicate what is already there. This only adds more confusion, however, as we see in every proposition a certain action on our part is taken; if in some propositions, what’s executed there is not construction, then what is it? The action taken there is more or less constructive; we need to create something new there enabling us to prove an existing relationship. Here we are again drawn into a circle: we see how we need to construct something, but after the construction is completed, the relationship shows itself as pre-existing the construction.

Let’s look to a particular example. Proposition 47 states how the square described on the side subtending the right angle of a right angle triangle is equal to the squares described on the remaining sides. Before the construction, we are not sure if this enunciation is true or false. It is only after the construction of multiple figures within that we see the relationships clearly; but even without these constructions, the same squares are already there, thus already exhibiting the relationships.

But this circle is not a contradiction, as I have stated above. It is rather a common experience. But how do we give an appropriate name for this action? What is Euclid really doing here?

Again, we have to attend to his speech more closely. There is one unmistakable give-away of Euclid’s speech: he is one of the rare people who insistently use the third person imperative in Greek. In short, he says “let there be a triangle” instead of “here I draw a triangle”. The nuance here is important. He is not creating something in an active sense; rather, he is invoking his object. Before his invocation, the triangle is already as a figure, is already articulated into a certain relationship with other figures. The action taken is not a creation ex nihilo, but a conjuring up. What is “constructed” is already out there awaiting: it is, strictly speaking, a re-construction.

Hence, the art Euclid performs, in essence, is a pure reconstruction. But what is pure about it if it is reconstruction? A reconstruction, as the name suggests, always is predated by something; it is always tainted by a pre-history. How can it be pure?

What is to be determined is the sense of purity. People have opinions, and opinions build upon each other; layered opinions are called presuppositions. One way to attain to purity is to swipe away those presuppositions and recover the origin, the pure source. In this way, even if a history is involved, what is reconstructed is nevertheless something pure, as the origin is unmixed with opinions. But how are we certain this is the sense fit for Euclid?

To be sure, we don’t know. But we may venture an educated guess. It is factical that human beings are embodied, which means we live largely in a world governed by senses, and the most dominating one is vision. We are hence living surrounded by images. But human beings are given another gift, which is called imagination, which simply means that we can produce images. But this ability to imagine points to something unusual, thus pivotal, for all human beings: to produce images means to recognize those products as images of something, that is, of the originals. When I see my drawing of the spider in my room, or when I imagine the spider crawling to hunt, I know these are mere images, are products produced by something else, by an origin. If I don’t know about the origin, I would not be able to produce any image intentionally or creatively, since either I would have no images whatsoever, or would mistake images for unshakable truths and fail to “produce” freely. But this also means that, via these images I could attain to the originals: every image points outwards for the originals. We could thus reconstruct the originals through the visual images present to us.

Can we say this is what Euclid is doing? Or is this what geometricians are doing in general?

The first human being who stands up (or is she a human being only afterwards?) must be shocked by the view resulted from this mere change of perspective. She still retains that awkward posture in midair and does not feel stable. Before her lies the vastness of land. From far to near everything is illuminated and distinct, but infinitely many and kaleidoscopic. The land is cut into different strips governed by different beings, all taking its own share. And, for the sake of this standing up, she is enabled to look up and stare at that source of all light with ease; and as a result, she feels pained in the vision of it.

Euclid is the one who stands up. But instead of directing his vision solely to the source and getting burned by it, he directs his vision to the earth, to the geo. The earth is cut into distinct, articulated shapes in the constant illumination brought by the sun. These are images shining forth under the reign of light and invoking light to show themselves. The purity of these images is a purity brought by light, it is a transparency, a clarity, or a luminosity. Considered this way, what the Euclidean art really amounts to is a bringing under light, a clarification. It is the recovery of the source in images through images. But how does Euclid achieve that? Does he ever really achieve that?

Let’s consider something called night. Night is the antithesis of day, it is the realm of darkness where everything is shrouded and concealed. It is the time when the source itself only reveals itself as an image of itself, which is the moon. Sun is said to be chased out of bounds during the night. Or let’s consider something called eclipse. A moment of darkness befalls the realm of light, blocking out the constant outpouring from the source. Are there eclipses in Euclid’s speech, or even nights?

When Euclid proceeds with his art, there is one central thing missing. He is looking at figures as bounded, but he never really mentions space; it’s as if he is staring at only plots of land, but never the land itself. What is the essence of that space which is concealed in the background that allows these figures to be the way they are? To once more make use of the night-day image, what is that vast space of darkness in which the sun is immersed and is periodically chased out of bounds?

This leads to one other omission. Night and day divides into the most natural unit of time. Without that intruding realm of darkness, the constant exposure under light expels time from its reign. Can we find any genuine depiction of time in Euclid speech? Apparently, there is a sequence of one proposition following the other, but it is difficult to ascertain the essence of this sequence. Let’s consider what is required to form a genuine sequence of time: the past precedes the present, which again precedes the future. However, with Euclid, there seems to be one constantly dominating present. What is at focus is the present proposition that we are working on, the past is resorted to as a ground, but is never fully brought into the discussion. Euclid never says “this step is possible because we have proven it in the previous proposition”. Rather, if we examine closely his speech, his tense is almost always the present tense. In addition, the very fact that we can always resort to the past as a ground points out how there is one crucial difference between Euclidean “past” and genuine past. The past is always uncertain in our experience, as our memory can always blur. But with Euclid, the past is something which is constantly standing and can be ideally retraced. This is also the same with the future. Even if a certain proposition might be useful for later propositions, what is demonstrated is not its usefulness as a means for the future, but rather its completeness and fullness as itself at the present. In addition, it’s hardly shocking how in his treatment of propositions he nearly never applies motion to the figure, though some might argue there are occasional semi-motions involved, which never really take the central stage. To oversimplify, we could say the Euclidean art is a paradoxical ascension, a movement proper, to the eternal realm of light that is purified from any movement.

In other words, what is lacking in Euclid is exactly the lack itself. Concealment is itself concealed. But as the name of geometry suggests, it is never possible for a geometrician to dispense with the earth entirely, where dwells darkness. Geometry in general is a practice of dianoia, which strives upward but is forever obstructed. By that sense, can we say anything is different with Socrates, the lover of wisdom? Before, when I drew such a clear line between Euclid and Socrates, was I mistaken......?