Gui Ruiyan

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The Persian Constitutional Debate in Herodotus

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The passage 3.80~3.83 of Herodotus’ histories has a rather peculiar setting. Right after the brutal massacre of Magis, the Persian conspirators start a discussion on what is the best possible political organization for them to set up. The question itself perhaps is urgent; the conspirators are in a phase of transition, and there are probably hidden instabilities that require an immediate decision upon the form of government. But why does Herodotus choose to narrate this discussion right after giving an account of the whole affair of that slaughter, and the festival named after it?

Some might say that the answer is obvious: because things just happened in history in that objective, chronological order. The passage says “five days later...the men...consulted with one another about the whole state of affairs”, and what they consulted with one another is just what Herodotus later recounts.

But this answer is far from satisfying. First, we do see here and there how Herodotus does not proceed in a chronological order, but rather diverges from the original topic, sometimes even diverges within what is already a digression; and sometimes he brings in mythical stories and hear-says as if they were true events. To write an objective chronology as understood in our own day is not his only concern. Second, there is an incongruity between the starting paragraph and the rest of the passage. When the starting paragraph states that “the men consulted about the whole state of affairs”, it would be expected, if Herodotus is fully devoted to the chronological enterprise, of him to attempt to bring everything in those speeches into his own narration; and since it’s hardly the case that the discussion he recounts covers the entire real conversation, we would be less confident in stating that things actually happened in that way, unmixed with the historian’s own deliberations. But the most suspicious statement comes at the end of that paragraph, when he says “now there are some Hellenes who do not believe the following speeches took place at all, but they certainly did”. Without offering any ground for his rather strong assertion, he abruptly introduces those speeches on what is the best government, which supposedly happened five days after the coup.

At least two questions can be asked on this single statement. First, why didn’t some Hellenes believe that those speeches had taken place? And second, why did Herodotus so strongly believe in its truth? Herodotus answers neither of those explicitly, but rather immediately starts to recount the three speeches in a vein as if he were personally present at the discussion.

We may indeed question the veracity of this whole account. But the more important question is, if the actuality of the discussion itself is dubious, why does Herodotus insist on presenting it in the way it is? It’s imperative for us now to refine our initial question. It’s not only worth asking why is this discussion following a bloodshed, but also taken as a whole, why is it there at all? But before inquiring into the reason of its presentation as such, it is first required of us to understand what it is and how is its presentation like.

At first glance, the whole section is a discussion about all the possible alternatives of political systems Persia can take on itself after the coup. Otanes, Megabyzos and Darius are the three speakers who support democracy, oligarchy and monarchy respectively, each at his own turn. We will consider the content of the arguments later. But first, what is strange about this whole discussion is the very fact that it can hardly be recognized as a discussion at all. First, there are only three people presenting their speeches, whereas the others remain mysteriously silent. Second, there is no lively back and forth we would expect from a normal conversation. If people are genuine about their own statements, they would attempt to present their argument more than once to convince others. However, what Herodotus depicts here are three well formed speeches which are not followed up by further arguments, but rather lead to the unanimous agreement upon Darius’ proposal. As Herodotus himself describes, these are “three opinions presented at the meeting”, instead of a real discussion. This structure of well-formed speeches exudes a suspicious aura of artificiality, which adds more to our reasonable doubt to the veracity of this episode.

If we look into the content of the three arguments, the picture becomes more complicated. Otanes is the first to speak. He supports democracy because he supposes that tyranny is inherently incapable of checking the vice of the tyrant. On the other hand, the rule of the majority can hold every person in power accountable for his action. Next speaks Megabyzos. He agrees with the first part of Otane’s speech, but he argues an oligarchy of the best, educated men (including the conspirators themselves) is more desirable than the undisciplined rule of the mass. Here we see the presuppositions on both sides do not coincide. For Otanes, the majority is composed of intelligent and effective subjects, whereas for Megabyzos it’s rather the other way around. And when Darius comes onto the stage, he again offers a different argument. In effect, Darius argues five things. First, monarchy is superior because the monarch alone is the best man. Second, the monarch can withhold the factional conflicts. Third, the fact that every factional conflict, whatever the scale and whatever the form of government there is currently, would necessarily give rise to one ruler overpowering others, automatically proves the superiority of the monarchy. Moreover, since Persians are liberated by one person, namely Cyrus, they should preserve that form of one-person rule. And finally, it is better to continue the ancestral tradition.

If we examine the content within each of the speeches, we notice how much Darius’ speech differs from the other two. It is evident how his supposition that the monarch is the best person counters against the preceding opinions. Moreover, if we look into his other arguments, we notice that most of those arguments are really spurious. For instance, the third argument really is saying that because something is necessary it is good and desirable. But there is an unbridgeable gap between necessity and goodness; the fact that it is necessary for the universe to end up in heat death does not prove that heat death is a more desirable state for a human being. And if we take the last two arguments, they are even more questionable, as there are countless examples we can give of unagreeable ancestral traditions; what is best of ancient times might not be best for now, much less for all eternity.

If we examine the question more closely, what is asked of the best form of government can be translated into what is the best rule. And any form of rule requires one or more rulers, who are the most essential part of any government. Then we could say, the question that really is implicated is “who is or are the best ruler or rulers?”, which ultimately amounts to “who should rule”? But as we see, except for the beginning, Darius is really dodging the question most of the time. In spite of arguing for the monarch as being the best ruler, he answers to questions unasked, mixing the necessary ruler with the best ruler on one hand, mistaking who used to rule for who should rule on the other.

To be short, Darius has given more arguments in support of his opinion than other proponents, but most of them are ineffective. And we can reduce his second argument to a consequence of the first supposition; since it is only by the monarch’s capability to “maintain silence about his plans to oppose enemies”, which in turn relies upon his “ha[ving] the best judgment”, that he could check the factional bloodshed. So that his only genuine argument is that, monarchy is the best because the monarch is the best man. But unlike Megabyzos, who also argues for the rule of the best, only his is in a plural, Darius does not proffer a ground for stating that the monarch is the best man. Is it because of the lineage, of the education he receives, or anything else? His reticence on this matter renders his whole speech even shakier.

But it is Darius’ opinion that prevails. The fact that all of the remaining people vote for Darius alone is shocking. And we have to collect all the multiple threads laid out before into one whole in order to form a plausible interpretation of this episode. This is the task I will undertake for the rest of this paper.

Before, I express the suspicion of the genuineness of this episode. It seems as if this “discussion” about the best government is more of a fictive nature than what really happens. Then, taking that as a starting point, I raise a question about the purpose of this figment. If what I say is plausible, then why is Herodotus intentionally inserting this episode into his narrative?

One probable answer is that he is actually conveying his own opinion via the mouths of these historical figures. It is even more tempting on our part to place his voice totally on one figure, and there seems to be good reasons for doing so. After all, what’s more shocking than the moment when Otanes claims to give up the power to the people? Can’t we take it for granted that Herodotus is advocating for democracy through Otanes?

Probably we should. But in doing so, we have to realize it is more than possible that we are conferring our own prejudices upon Herodotus, rather than letting Herodotus talk to us. We have to be more careful here in order to avoid inadequate judgments.

Let’s return to one former question. What is Herodotus doing in this section? According to my previous interpretation, here Herodotus is essentially presenting three opinions. But he doesn’t present these three opinions in a monotonous way. He assigns each of them to a real historical figure with a name. Moreover, these named figures are not mere purveyors of words. Their speeches are fleshed out each in its own way, implying certain personalities and characteristics of the speaker. With Darius, the speech seems more flimsy and redundant, while with Megabyzos, it also contains that personal addition, namely his affirmation that they themselves “of course are included” among the best men. With Otanes, it seems he would be the most possible candidate for Herodotus’ own opinion, but at the very end of this section, we see how he asks for the privilege of not being ruled under the monarch as a quid pro quo for his exiting the king competition. And this only problematizes his initial position, as he is probably not advocating democracy at his own cost. In other words, each proponent has his motivations and complexities, as a real person would have.

But how does this tie in to our persistent question, namely, why does Herodotus do all of these? If he really is advocating for one form of government over the other, wouldn’t it be simpler if he just argues for it himself? If it is really his intention to put one form of government over the other, what is stopping him from doing that explicitly?

To be honest, these are still, or perhaps will remain to be, undetermined matters. But it is a question more than important. What is displayed in this section is the determining paradigm of political questioning throughout all human history in its most succinct form, while the solution given is unsatisfactory. Or, if Herodotus is really stopped at fully expressing his opinion on this most important matter, it would also be the most beneficial to ask what is stopping him; is it inherent in the matter itself that it cannot be revealed in its total clarity?

One clue that probably can shed light upon this problem is the very statement of the first paragraph. Herodotus says, “now there are some Hellenes who do not believe the following speeches took place at all, but they certainly did”. Herodotus here is rather insistent on telling those speeches, as we noted previously; but he is confronted with resistance from the disbelieving Hellenes. Herodotus does not say why do some Hellenes disbelieve these speeches, but to us it would also be incredible if these speeches actually happened. In some sense, we the audience would be in the same position with those unconvinced Hellenes. But this seems to be too obvious. If Hellenes disbelieve these speeches merely on factual grounds, Herodotus’ insistence seems then to be too idiotic, since he does not even try to prove its actual existence. Compared with other places where he explicitly says something is trustworthy to him because it is relevant to a god, or some event does not happen because it would be too burdensome for the person concerned to do so, his assertion here is just too abrupt. And if we consider how people in Herodotus’ text in general are so susceptible to rumors and hear-says, we would be suspicious that those Hellenes will distrust the account because of facts alone. Or if we grant that this interpretation is possible, it is still very uninteresting.

Then, if those Hellenes reject this story not based solely on facts, why are they disbelieving it? It is possible that they are swayed over by their own biases and refuse to admit that Barbarians are capable of comparing forms of government other than monarchy. This explanation, however, can only solve half the mystery. It still does not answer why is Herodotus so insistent upon giving this account even if it is obvious that it is not factually convincing. Is he here merely trying to set the records straight on the part of barbarians?

Another clue for further exploration into the problem might come from the structure of the episode taken as a whole. Before we see how these speeches of the best government is preceded by violence; and what is following after these speeches is the treachery of Darius. And as for the speeches themselves, the presumed altruism of Otanes is succeeded by the touch of selfishness on the part of Megabyzos, which in turn is followed by a further overstepping of Darius’. And the arguments within these speeches also undergo a gradual transition from genuineness to deception. We could say, then, a genuine discussion on one of the most important issues concerning any human being is here surrounded by a miasma of blood and betrayal, and ultimately degenerates into a competition for personal gain.

But the violence, the treachery and the degeneration are the political realities par excellence. Unlike the speeches that trouble us so much, these unwelcome events are the unquestioned history itself. We as the audience as well as Herodotus as the author seldom have or express doubts on these evils and brutalities. Rather, we shall say, it is exactly what we expect from reading histories. It has become the very sense of political history as such: a narration of political events in their bare and brutal reality.

This is the very circumstance in which the discussion on the best form of government is framed. Here, it is not inappropriate to draw a comparison with other thinkers to clarify my point. Let’s take the example of Republic.

In Republic, a city is built. It is not a real city, however. It is a city that only exists in speech. It is within Socrates’ and any other character’s power to design the city as he sees fit. And even if the city tumbles for its dysfunction or bad design, there are no real consequences. All that which happens in Republic is hypothetical, or we could say theoretical. It is transcendent with respect to real life.

Not so with Herodotus. As a historian, there is an intrinsic limitation in his speech: he has to remain in the realm of the concrete. He cannot abstract himself from political realities and speculate what might be the best political organization; he is bonded in a world where political decisions are accompanied by real life consequences. That has to be the central subject of his speech.

But does Herodotus totally disregard the realm of the beyond? Or is it possible not to venture outside the real world into the speculative at all? As a genuine thinker, it does not befit him to merely compile events in a chronological order. He understands himself, as the very start of his histories reveals, as to not leave great deeds unsung. He purports, then, to sing what is the great; or it’s more proper to say that he intends to teach what is great.

In this line of interpretation, the first paragraph of 3.80~3.83 seems to reveal itself as the place where Herodotus’ teaching is concealed the most. What is great and true is often inextricable from the brutalities committed by actors in a political reality. The most fundamental question, when posed, is often reduced to treachery by ambitious men. However, even this is often the case, Herodotus is still insistent upon posing it to the audience, inserting it into the middle of all those evils. And isn’t the fact that these speeches are posed within that very period of transition only adds to its uniqueness? For the Hellenes, it is a message that even the Persians have to ponder over that most fundamental question before it is turned into a folly, or exactly because it can so easily be turned into a folly that we have to be insistent on it.

There is still one remaining question, namely, why are those Hellenes disbelieving, if not for factical reasons or their prejudices? Or, to ask this question in a different form, who are those disbelieving Hellenes? One probable answer, if my interpretation is not totally aberrant, would be those people deeply imbued with opinions, those people who reduce the whole section into a mere presentation of opinions but are blind to that possibility opened by those speeches to a genuine thinking on this most fundamental matter of human life. What they are disbelieving, then, is not so much that the episode actually happened, but rather that it is of any value to them. In other words, it is also perfectly compatible for one person to take this whole episode as factical but disregards the authenticity thereof, and be a believing person who really is disbelieving, but only believes his own opinions.

Thus far we have inquired much into this text. What is left unasked, however, is still too numerous. I would only enumerate a few for further inquiries. The first question, of course, is the one that is opened up by Herodotus and remains the most important question for any serious political thinker, namely, what is the best form of government? Another question pervades throughout my inquiry but is not dealt with fittingly. That is, what is history as such? Does history have to be related primarily to the concrete world? Last but not least, in what sense is Herodotus a historian, when we see how he often conceals his teachings behind multiple coverings of the study of history? Is Herodotus a historian at all......?