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The Persian Constitutional Debate in Herodotus
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The passage 3.80~3.83 of Herodotus’ histories has a rather peculiar setting. Right after the brutal massacre of Magis, the Persian conspirators start a discussion on what is the best possible political organization for them to set up. The question itself perhaps is urgent; the conspirators are in a phase of transition, and there are probably hidden instabilities that require an immediate decision upon the form of government. But why does Herodotus choose to narrate this discussion right after giving an account of the whole affair of that slaughter, and the festival named after it?
Some might say that the answer is obvious: because things just happened in history in that objective, chronological order. The passage says “five days later...the men...consulted with one another about the whole state of affairs”, and what they consulted with one another is just what Herodotus later recounts.
But this answer is far from satisfying. First, we do see here and there how Herodotus does not proceed in a chronological order, but rather diverges from the original topic, sometimes even diverges within what is already a digression; and sometimes he brings in mythical stories and hear-says as if they were true events. To write an objective chronology as understood in our own day is not his only concern. Second, there is an incongruity between the starting paragraph and the rest of the passage. When the starting paragraph states that “the men consulted about the whole state of affairs”, it would be expected, if Herodotus is fully devoted to the chronological enterprise, of him to attempt to bring everything in those speeches into his own narration; and since it’s hardly the case that the discussion he recounts covers the entire real conversation, we would be less confident in stating that things actually happened in that way, unmixed with the historian’s own deliberations. But the most suspicious statement comes at the end of that paragraph, when he says “now there are some Hellenes who do not believe the following speeches took place at all, but they certainly did”. Without offering any ground for his rather strong assertion, he abruptly introduces those speeches on what is the best government, which supposedly happened five days after the coup.
At least two questions can be asked on this single statement. First, why didn’t some Hellenes believe that those speeches had taken place? And second, why did Herodotus so strongly believe in its truth? Herodotus answers neither of those explicitly, but rather immediately starts to recount the three speeches in a vein as if he were personally present at the discussion.
We may indeed question the veracity of this whole account. But the more important question is, if the actuality of the discussion itself is dubious, why does Herodotus insist on presenting it in the way it is? It’s imperative for us now to refine our initial question. It’s not only worth asking why is this discussion following a bloodshed, but also taken as a whole, why is it there at all? But before inquiring into the reason of its presentation as such, it is first required of us to understand what it is and how is its presentation like.
At first glance, the whole section is a discussion about all the possible alternatives of political systems Persia can take on itself after the coup. Otanes, Megabyzos and Darius are the three speakers who support democracy, oligarchy and monarchy respectively, each at his own turn. We will consider the content of the arguments later. But first, what is strange about this whole discussion is the very fact that it can hardly be recognized as a discussion at all. First, there are only three people presenting their speeches, whereas the others remain mysteriously silent. Second, there is no lively back and forth we would expect from a normal conversation. If people are genuine about their own statements, they would attempt to present their argument more than once to convince others. However, what Herodotus depicts here are three well formed speeches which are not followed up by further arguments, but rather lead to the unanimous agreement upon Darius’ proposal. As Herodotus himself describes, these are “three opinions presented at the meeting”, instead of a real discussion. This structure of well-formed speeches exudes a suspicious aura of artificiality, which adds more to our reasonable doubt to the veracity of this episode.
If we look into the content of the three arguments, the picture becomes more complicated. Otanes is the first to speak. He supports democracy because he supposes that tyranny is inherently incapable of checking the vice of the tyrant. On the other hand, the rule of the majority can hold every person in power accountable for his action. Next speaks Megabyzos. He agrees with the first part of Otane’s speech, but he argues an oligarchy of the best, educated men (including the conspirators themselves) is more desirable than the undisciplined rule of the mass. Here we see the presuppositions on both sides do not coincide. For Otanes, the majority is composed of intelligent and effective subjects, whereas for Megabyzos it’s rather the other way around. And when Darius comes onto the stage, he again offers a different argument. In effect, Darius argues five things. First, monarchy is superior because the monarch alone is the best man. Second, the monarch can withhold the factional conflicts. Third, the fact that every factional conflict, whatever the scale and whatever the form of government there is currently, would necessarily give rise to one ruler overpowering others, automatically proves the superiority of the monarchy. Moreover, since Persians are liberated by one person, namely Cyrus, they should preserve that form of one-person rule. And finally, it is better to continue the ancestral tradition.
If we examine the content within each of the speeches, we notice how much Darius’ speech differs from the other two. It is evident how his supposition that the monarch is the best person counters against the preceding opinions. Moreover, if we look into his other arguments, we notice that most of those arguments are really spurious. For instance, the third argument really is saying that because something is necessary it is good and desirable. But there is an unbridgeable gap between necessity and goodness; the fact that it is necessary for the universe to end up in heat death does not prove that heat death is a more desirable state for a human being. And if we take the last two arguments, they are even more questionable, as there are countless examples we can give of unagreeable ancestral traditions; what is best of ancient times might not be best for now, much less for all eternity.
If we examine the question more closely, what is asked of the best form of government can be translated into what is the best rule. And any form of rule requires one or more rulers, who are the most essential part of any government. Then we could say, the question that really is implicated is “who is or are the best ruler or rulers?”, which ultimately amounts to “who should rule”? But as we see, except for the beginning, Darius is really dodging the question most of the time. In spite of arguing for the monarch as being the best ruler, he answers to questions unasked, mixing the necessary ruler with the best ruler on one hand, mistaking who used to rule for who should rule on the other.
To be short, Darius has given more arguments in support of his opinion than other proponents, but most of them are ineffective. And we can reduce his second argument to a consequence of the first supposition; since it is only by the monarch’s capability to “maintain silence about his plans to oppose enemies”, which in turn relies upon his “ha[ving] the best judgment”, that he could check the factional bloodshed. So that his only genuine argument is that, monarchy is the best because the monarch is the best man. But unlike Megabyzos, who also argues for the rule of the best, only his is in a plural, Darius does not proffer a ground for stating that the monarch is the best man. Is it because of the lineage, of the education he receives, or anything else? His reticence on this matter renders his whole speech even shakier.
But it is Darius’ opinion that prevails. The fact that all of the remaining people vote for Darius alone is shocking. And we have to collect all the multiple threads laid out before into one whole in order to form a plausible interpretation of this episode. This is the task I will undertake for the rest of this paper.
Before, I express the suspicion of the genuineness of this episode. It seems as if this “discussion” about the best government is more of a fictive nature than what really happens. Then, taking that as a starting point, I raise a question about the purpose of this figment. If what I say is plausible, then why is Herodotus intentionally inserting this episode into his narrative?
One probable answer is that he is actually conveying his own opinion via the mouths of these historical figures. It is even more tempting on our part to place his voice totally on one figure, and there seems to be good reasons for doing so. After all, what’s more shocking than the moment when Otanes claims to give up the power to the people? Can’t we take it for granted that Herodotus is advocating for democracy through Otanes?
Probably we should. But in doing so, we have to realize it is more than possible that we are conferring our own prejudices upon Herodotus, rather than letting Herodotus talk to us. We have to be more careful here in order to avoid inadequate judgments.
Let’s return to one former question. What is Herodotus doing in this section? According to my previous interpretation, here Herodotus is essentially presenting three opinions. But he doesn’t present these three opinions in a monotonous way. He assigns each of them to a real historical figure with a name. Moreover, these named figures are not mere purveyors of words. Their speeches are fleshed out each in its own way, implying certain personalities and characteristics of the speaker. With Darius, the speech seems more flimsy and redundant, while with Megabyzos, it also contains that personal addition, namely his affirmation that they themselves “of course are included” among the best men. With Otanes, it seems he would be the most possible candidate for Herodotus’ own opinion, but at the very end of this section, we see how he asks for the privilege of not being ruled under the monarch as a quid pro quo for his exiting the king competition. And this only problematizes his initial position, as he is probably not advocating democracy at his own cost. In other words, each proponent has his motivations and complexities, as a real person would have.
But how does this tie in to our persistent question, namely, why does Herodotus do all of these? If he really is advocating for one form of government over the other, wouldn’t it be simpler if he just argues for it himself? If it is really his intention to put one form of government over the other, what is stopping him from doing that explicitly?
To be honest, these are still, or perhaps will remain to be, undetermined matters. But it is a question more than important. What is displayed in this section is the determining paradigm of political questioning throughout all human history in its most succinct form, while the solution given is unsatisfactory. Or, if Herodotus is really stopped at fully expressing his opinion on this most important matter, it would also be the most beneficial to ask what is stopping him; is it inherent in the matter itself that it cannot be revealed in its total clarity?
One clue that probably can shed light upon this problem is the very statement of the first paragraph. Herodotus says, “now there are some Hellenes who do not believe the following speeches took place at all, but they certainly did”. Herodotus here is rather insistent on telling those speeches, as we noted previously; but he is confronted with resistance from the disbelieving Hellenes. Herodotus does not say why do some Hellenes disbelieve these speeches, but to us it would also be incredible if these speeches actually happened. In some sense, we the audience would be in the same position with those unconvinced Hellenes. But this seems to be too obvious. If Hellenes disbelieve these speeches merely on factual grounds, Herodotus’ insistence seems then to be too idiotic, since he does not even try to prove its actual existence. Compared with other places where he explicitly says something is trustworthy to him because it is relevant to a god, or some event does not happen because it would be too burdensome for the person concerned to do so, his assertion here is just too abrupt. And if we consider how people in Herodotus’ text in general are so susceptible to rumors and hear-says, we would be suspicious that those Hellenes will distrust the account because of facts alone. Or if we grant that this interpretation is possible, it is still very uninteresting.
Then, if those Hellenes reject this story not based solely on facts, why are they disbelieving it? It is possible that they are swayed over by their own biases and refuse to admit that Barbarians are capable of comparing forms of government other than monarchy. This explanation, however, can only solve half the mystery. It still does not answer why is Herodotus so insistent upon giving this account even if it is obvious that it is not factually convincing. Is he here merely trying to set the records straight on the part of barbarians?
Another clue for further exploration into the problem might come from the structure of the episode taken as a whole. Before we see how these speeches of the best government is preceded by violence; and what is following after these speeches is the treachery of Darius. And as for the speeches themselves, the presumed altruism of Otanes is succeeded by the touch of selfishness on the part of Megabyzos, which in turn is followed by a further overstepping of Darius’. And the arguments within these speeches also undergo a gradual transition from genuineness to deception. We could say, then, a genuine discussion on one of the most important issues concerning any human being is here surrounded by a miasma of blood and betrayal, and ultimately degenerates into a competition for personal gain.
But the violence, the treachery and the degeneration are the political realities par excellence. Unlike the speeches that trouble us so much, these unwelcome events are the unquestioned history itself. We as the audience as well as Herodotus as the author seldom have or express doubts on these evils and brutalities. Rather, we shall say, it is exactly what we expect from reading histories. It has become the very sense of political history as such: a narration of political events in their bare and brutal reality.
This is the very circumstance in which the discussion on the best form of government is framed. Here, it is not inappropriate to draw a comparison with other thinkers to clarify my point. Let’s take the example of Republic.
In Republic, a city is built. It is not a real city, however. It is a city that only exists in speech. It is within Socrates’ and any other character’s power to design the city as he sees fit. And even if the city tumbles for its dysfunction or bad design, there are no real consequences. All that which happens in Republic is hypothetical, or we could say theoretical. It is transcendent with respect to real life.
Not so with Herodotus. As a historian, there is an intrinsic limitation in his speech: he has to remain in the realm of the concrete. He cannot abstract himself from political realities and speculate what might be the best political organization; he is bonded in a world where political decisions are accompanied by real life consequences. That has to be the central subject of his speech.
But does Herodotus totally disregard the realm of the beyond? Or is it possible not to venture outside the real world into the speculative at all? As a genuine thinker, it does not befit him to merely compile events in a chronological order. He understands himself, as the very start of his histories reveals, as to not leave great deeds unsung. He purports, then, to sing what is the great; or it’s more proper to say that he intends to teach what is great.
In this line of interpretation, the first paragraph of 3.80~3.83 seems to reveal itself as the place where Herodotus’ teaching is concealed the most. What is great and true is often inextricable from the brutalities committed by actors in a political reality. The most fundamental question, when posed, is often reduced to treachery by ambitious men. However, even this is often the case, Herodotus is still insistent upon posing it to the audience, inserting it into the middle of all those evils. And isn’t the fact that these speeches are posed within that very period of transition only adds to its uniqueness? For the Hellenes, it is a message that even the Persians have to ponder over that most fundamental question before it is turned into a folly, or exactly because it can so easily be turned into a folly that we have to be insistent on it.
There is still one remaining question, namely, why are those Hellenes disbelieving, if not for factical reasons or their prejudices? Or, to ask this question in a different form, who are those disbelieving Hellenes? One probable answer, if my interpretation is not totally aberrant, would be those people deeply imbued with opinions, those people who reduce the whole section into a mere presentation of opinions but are blind to that possibility opened by those speeches to a genuine thinking on this most fundamental matter of human life. What they are disbelieving, then, is not so much that the episode actually happened, but rather that it is of any value to them. In other words, it is also perfectly compatible for one person to take this whole episode as factical but disregards the authenticity thereof, and be a believing person who really is disbelieving, but only believes his own opinions.
Thus far we have inquired much into this text. What is left unasked, however, is still too numerous. I would only enumerate a few for further inquiries. The first question, of course, is the one that is opened up by Herodotus and remains the most important question for any serious political thinker, namely, what is the best form of government? Another question pervades throughout my inquiry but is not dealt with fittingly. That is, what is history as such? Does history have to be related primarily to the concrete world? Last but not least, in what sense is Herodotus a historian, when we see how he often conceals his teachings behind multiple coverings of the study of history? Is Herodotus a historian at all......?
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
希罗多德《历史》3.80—3.83这一段的情境颇为奇特。在对玛吉僧侣的残酷屠杀刚刚结束后,波斯的密谋者们便开始讨论:对他们来说,可以建立的最佳政治组织是什么。这个问题本身或许十分紧迫;密谋者们正处于一个过渡阶段,可能还有某些隐而未显的不稳定因素,要求他们立即决定政府的形式。但为什么希罗多德选择在叙述完这场屠杀的全部经过以及以此命名的节日之后,紧接着讲述这场讨论呢?
有人或许会说,答案显而易见:因为历史上的事情就是依照这一客观的时间顺序发生的。文中说:“五天之后……那些人……就整个事态相互商议”,而他们彼此商议的内容,也就是希罗多德随后叙述的那些。
但这个答案远不能令人满意。首先,我们处处都能看到,希罗多德并不总是按时间顺序展开,而是会偏离原来的话题,有时甚至在已经离题的叙述中再次岔开;有时,他还会引入神话故事和传闻,仿佛它们就是真实发生的事件。撰写一部我们今天所理解的客观编年史,并不是他唯一关心的事情。其次,开头一段与这一节其余部分之间存在着不协调。开头一段说,“那些人就整个事态相互商议”;如果希罗多德完全致力于编年叙事,我们便会期待他试图将那些发言中的一切都纳入自己的叙述;而他所复述的讨论几乎不可能涵盖真实谈话的全部,因此,我们也就更难有把握地断言,事情实际上就是如此发生的,其中没有掺入历史学家自己的斟酌。但最可疑的陈述出现在这一段的末尾,他说:“有些希腊人不相信以下这些发言曾经发生过,但它们的确发生了。”他没有为这一相当强硬的断言提供任何根据,便突然引出了那些有关最佳政府的发言,据说它们发生于政变五天之后。
仅就这一句话,我们至少可以提出两个问题。第一,为什么有些希腊人不相信那些发言曾经发生过?第二,为什么希罗多德如此坚信它们是真实的?希罗多德并未明确回答其中任何一个,而是立即开始叙述这三篇发言,那口吻仿佛他亲自参加了这场讨论。
我们确实可以质疑这整个记述的真实性。但更重要的问题是:如果讨论本身是否实际发生过尚且可疑,希罗多德为什么仍然坚持以这种方式呈现它?现在,我们必须进一步明确最初的问题。值得追问的不仅是为什么这场讨论接在一场流血事件之后,而且是,作为一个整体,它究竟为什么会出现在这里?不过,在探究它为何如此呈现之前,我们首先必须理解它是什么,以及它是怎样被呈现的。
乍看之下,这整个部分是在讨论政变之后波斯可以采纳的所有可能的政治制度。奥塔涅斯、梅加比佐斯和大流士这三位发言者依次支持民主制、寡头制和君主制。稍后我们会考察这些论证的内容。但首先,整个讨论奇怪的地方在于,它几乎根本不能被认作一场讨论。第一,只有三个人发表演说,其余人则神秘地保持沉默。第二,其中并没有正常谈话中我们所期待的生动往复。如果人们真诚地相信自己的陈述,他们便会试图不止一次地提出自己的论证,以说服他人。然而,希罗多德在这里描绘的是三篇结构完整的演说,它们之后没有进一步的争辩,而是直接通向对大流士提议的一致赞同。正如希罗多德自己所描述的,这是“会上提出的三种意见”,而非一场真正的讨论。这种由结构完整的演说构成的形式,散发着一种可疑的人为气息,使我们更有理由怀疑这一插曲的真实性。
如果考察这三种论证的内容,情形就变得更加复杂了。奥塔涅斯第一个发言。他支持民主制,因为他认为僭主制从本性上就无法制约僭主的恶德。反之,多数人的统治能够让每一个掌权者都为自己的行为负责。随后发言的是梅加比佐斯。他赞同奥塔涅斯演说的第一部分,但他认为,由那些最优秀、受过教育的人——包括密谋者们自己——组成的寡头统治,比没有纪律的群众统治更为可取。这里我们看到,双方的预设并不一致。对奥塔涅斯来说,多数人是由明智且能有效行动的主体组成的;对梅加比佐斯来说,情况却恰好相反。而当大流士登场时,他又提出了另一套论证。实际上,大流士论证了五件事。首先,君主制之所以优越,是因为君主一人就是最优秀的人。其次,君主能够遏制派系冲突。第三,无论规模如何,也无论当下采取何种政体,每一场派系冲突都必然使一个统治者脱颖而出、压倒其他人,这一事实自动证明了君主制的优越性。此外,既然波斯人是由一个人,也就是居鲁士,解放的,他们就应该保留这种一人统治的形式。最后,延续祖先的传统总是更好的。
如果考察每一篇演说内部的内容,我们就会注意到,大流士的演说与另外两篇有多么不同。他假定君主是最优秀的人,这显然与先前的意见相抵触。而且,如果考察他的其他论证,我们会发现,其中大多数其实都是似是而非的。例如,第三个论证实际上是在说:因为某件事是必然的,所以它就是好的、值得追求的。但必然性与善好之间存在着无法跨越的鸿沟;宇宙必然以热寂告终这一事实,并不能证明热寂对人类来说是一种更值得追求的状态。而如果看最后两个论证,它们就更值得怀疑了,因为我们可以举出无数令人无法赞同的祖先传统;古代最好的东西,未必对当下仍然最好,更不用说对整个永恒而言了。
如果更仔细地考察这个问题,对最佳政府形式的追问可以转化为对最佳统治的追问。而任何统治形式都需要一个或多个统治者,他们是任何政府最根本的部分。于是我们可以说,这里真正隐含的问题是:“谁是最好的统治者?”它最终归结为:“谁应该统治?”但正如我们看到的,除了开头,大流士大部分时间其实都在回避这个问题。他没有论证君主何以是最好的统治者,而是在回答并未被提出的问题:一方面将必然会出现的统治者与最好的统治者混淆,另一方面又将过去由谁统治误当作应该由谁统治。
简言之,大流士提出了比其他倡议者更多的论证来支持自己的意见,但其中大多数都没有效力。而他的第二个论证也可以还原为第一个预设的后果;因为君主之所以能够制止派系间的流血冲突,只是凭借他“对自己反击敌人的计划保持沉默”的能力,而这一能力又依赖于他“拥有最好的判断力”。因此,他唯一真正的论证就是:君主制是最好的,因为君主是最优秀的人。但不同于梅加比佐斯——后者也主张由最优秀者统治,只是他的最优秀者是复数——大流士并没有为君主是最优秀的人这一说法提供根据。是因为血统,还是他所受的教育,或是别的什么?他在这个问题上的缄默,使整个演说显得更加站不住脚。
然而,最终获胜的却是大流士的意见。其余所有人都只投票支持大流士,这个事实令人震惊。我们必须将此前铺陈的多条线索收拢为一个整体,才能对这一插曲形成一种可信的解读。这就是本文余下部分将要承担的任务。
前面,我对这一插曲的真实性表示了怀疑。这场关于最佳政府的“讨论”,似乎更多是虚构,而非真正发生过的事情。那么,以此为出发点,我便提出了一个关于这段虚构的目的的问题。如果我的说法可信,希罗多德为什么要有意将这一插曲放进自己的叙述中?
一个可能的答案是,他实际上是在借这些历史人物之口传达自己的意见。对我们而言,更诱人的做法是将他的声音完全归于某一个人物,而这么做似乎也有充分的理由。毕竟,还有什么比奥塔涅斯宣称要将权力交给人民的那一刻更令人震惊呢?我们难道不能理所当然地认为,希罗多德正在通过奥塔涅斯倡导民主制吗?
或许我们应该这样理解。但在这样做时,我们必须意识到,我们很可能是在将自己的偏见加诸希罗多德,而不是让希罗多德向我们说话。这里我们必须更加谨慎,以免作出不恰切的判断。
让我们回到先前的一个问题。希罗多德在这一部分究竟做了什么?按照我此前的解读,希罗多德在这里本质上是呈现了三种意见。但他并未以单调的方式呈现这三种意见。他将每一种意见都赋予了一个有名有姓的真实历史人物。而且,这些有名字的人物并不仅仅是传递话语的人。他们的演说各有其血肉,暗示着发言者的某种个性和特征。大流士的演说显得更加薄弱而冗余;梅加比佐斯的演说中也包含了那个私人性的补充,也就是他肯定他们自己“当然也包括”在最优秀的人当中。至于奥塔涅斯,他似乎最有可能是希罗多德自己意见的代言人,但在这一部分的最末,我们看到,他要求获得不受君主统治的特权,以作为自己退出王位竞争的交换条件(quid pro quo)。这只会使他最初的立场更加成问题,因为他倡导民主制,或许并没有打算自己付出代价。换句话说,每一位倡议者都有自己的动机和复杂性,正如一个真实的人所会有的那样。
但这一切又如何与我们始终坚持的问题联系起来,也就是:希罗多德为什么要做这些?如果他确实是在提倡一种政府形式优于另一种,那么他自己直接为之论证,不是更简单吗?如果他的意图确实是将一种政府形式置于另一种之上,那么是什么阻止了他明确地这么做?
坦白说,这些仍然是,或许也将一直是,无法确定的问题。但这是一个极其重要的问题。这一部分以最简洁的形式,展示了贯穿人类全部历史、规定政治追问方式的范式,所给出的解决方案却并不令人满意。或者,如果希罗多德在这一最重要的问题上,确实受阻而无法充分表达自己的意见,那么,追问究竟是什么阻碍了他,也会极有益处;是否正是这一问题本身的某种内在性质,使它无法在完全的明晰中被揭示出来?
或许能够照亮这个问题的一条线索,恰好就是第一段中的那句陈述。希罗多德说:“有些希腊人不相信以下这些发言曾经发生过,但它们的确发生了。”正如我们先前指出的,希罗多德在这里相当坚持要讲述这些发言;但他遭遇了那些不相信它们的希腊人的抵抗。希罗多德没有说,为什么有些希腊人不相信这些发言,不过对我们来说,如果这些发言确实发生过,也同样令人难以置信。在某种意义上,作为读者的我们会与那些未被说服的希腊人处在相同的位置。但这似乎又太显而易见了。如果希腊人仅仅基于事实而不相信这些发言,那么希罗多德的坚持便显得过于愚蠢,因为他甚至没有试图证明它们确实发生过。别处,他会明确地说,某件事对他而言是可信的,因为它与某位神有关;或者,某件事并没有发生,因为那么做对相关的人来说会太过艰难。与那些地方相比,他在这里的断言实在太突兀了。而如果我们考虑到,希罗多德文本中的人总体上是多么容易受谣言和传闻影响,那么我们就会怀疑,那些希腊人是否仅仅因为事实而不信任这个记述。或者,即便承认这种解读有可能,它也仍然十分无趣。
那么,如果那些希腊人并非仅仅基于事实而拒绝这个故事,他们为什么不相信呢?有可能,他们受到自身偏见的左右,不愿承认蛮族有能力比较君主制以外的政府形式。然而,这个解释只能解开谜团的一半。它仍然无法回答:即便这个记述显然在事实层面并不令人信服,希罗多德为什么还如此坚持要讲述它?他在这里仅仅是想替蛮族澄清事实吗?
进一步探究这一问题的另一条线索,或许来自这一插曲整体的结构。此前我们看到,这些有关最佳政府的发言之前是暴力;而这些发言之后则是大流士的欺诈。至于发言本身,奥塔涅斯那被假定的无私之后,接着的是梅加比佐斯的一点自私,而后者又接续着大流士更进一步的越界。这些发言内部的论证,同样经历了从真诚到欺骗的逐渐转变。那么我们可以说,一场有关每一个人都切身相关的最重要问题之一的真诚讨论,在这里被鲜血与背叛的瘴气包围,并最终堕落为一场争夺个人利益的竞争。
但暴力、欺诈与堕落,恰恰就是最典型的(par excellence)政治现实。不同于那些令我们如此困扰的发言,这些令人不快的事件,就是未经质疑的历史本身。作为读者的我们,以及作为作者的希罗多德,对于这些罪恶和残酷,很少怀有或表达怀疑。毋宁说,这正是我们阅读历史时所预期的东西。它已经成为政治历史本身的意义:对政治事件赤裸而残酷的现实的叙述。
有关最佳政府形式的讨论,正是被置于这样的境况中。在这里,为了阐明我的观点,与其他思想家作一个比较并无不妥。让我们以《理想国》为例。
在《理想国》中,一座城邦被建立了起来。但它并非真实的城邦,而是一座只存在于话语中的城邦。苏格拉底以及任何其他人物,都有能力依照自己认为合适的方式设计这座城邦。即使这座城邦因功能失调或设计不善而崩塌,也不会产生真实的后果。《理想国》中发生的一切都是假设性的,或者说是理论性的。相对于真实生活而言,它是超越的。
希罗多德则并非如此。作为一名历史学家,他的言说具有内在的限度:他必须留在具体事物的领域中。他无法将自己从政治现实中抽离,去思辨什么可能是最佳的政治组织;他被约束在一个政治决定伴随着真实生活后果的世界里。这必须成为他言说的中心主题。
但希罗多德是否就完全无视彼岸的领域呢?又或者,完全不走出真实世界、不涉足思辨,是否可能?作为一位真正的思想家,仅仅按时间顺序编排事件并不符合他的身份。正如他的《历史》一开篇便揭示的,他对自己的理解,是不让伟大的事迹无人歌颂。那么,他意欲歌颂伟大之物;或者,更恰切地说,他意在教导何谓伟大。
沿着这一解读,3.80—3.83的第一段似乎显露为希罗多德将其教诲隐藏得最深的地方。伟大而真实的事物,常常与政治现实中的行动者所犯下的残酷暴行纠缠不清。最根本的问题一经提出,便往往被野心家化为欺诈。然而,即便情况经常如此,希罗多德仍然坚持将这一问题提出给读者,将它插入所有那些罪恶的中间。而这些发言恰恰发生于那一过渡时期,难道不也只是增加了它的独特性吗?对于希腊人来说,这传达着一个信息:即使波斯人也不得不思考这一最根本的问题,尽管它随后便化为愚行;又或者,恰恰因为它如此容易化为愚行,我们才必须坚持追问它。
仍然还有一个问题:如果不是出于事实上的理由或偏见,那些希腊人为什么不相信呢?或者,换一种方式来问:那些不相信的希腊人究竟是谁?如果我的解读并非完全离题,一个可能的答案就是,那些深深浸染于意见之中的人:他们将这一整个部分还原为意见的单纯陈列,却看不到这些发言所开启的可能性,也就是对人类生活中这一最根本的问题进行真正思考的可能性。那么,他们所不相信的,与其说是这一插曲确实发生过,不如说是它对他们有任何价值。换句话说,一个人完全可以把这一整个插曲当作事实,却又无视其中的本真性,成为一个自以为相信、实际上却并不相信的人,而只是相信自己的意见。
到这里,我们已经对这个文本进行了许多探究。但仍有太多问题没有被提出。我只列举其中几个,留待进一步研究。第一个问题,当然就是希罗多德开启的那个问题,它仍然是任何严肃的政治思想家最重要的问题:最佳的政府形式是什么?另一个问题贯穿我的全部探究,却没有得到妥善处理,那就是:历史本身是什么?历史是否必须首先与具体的世界相关联?最后,同样重要的是,当我们看到希罗多德经常将自己的教诲隐藏在历史研究的层层遮蔽之后时,他是在什么意义上成为一名历史学家的?希罗多德究竟是不是一名历史学家……?