Preceptorial essay ·
On Aristotle’s Doctrine of Elements
The Aristotelian cosmos is composed of moving elements. An understanding of these motions of elements is necessary for an understanding of Aristotle’s cosmology. Therefore, in this paper, I will briefly examine the question: what is Aristotle’s doctrine of moving elements?
Motion, according to Aristotle in his Physics, is the ‘activation of potency qua potency’ (Physics, III 1, 201a 10). To inquire into any kind of motion, therefore, is to inquire into the activity and potency that belong to the moving thing. Both activity and potency are facets that delineate the thinghood of a thing. But what kind of thing is an element?
Elements are simple and natural bodies. They are thereby distinguished from artifacts and composites. Being bodies, these elements have certain forms and activities. Hence elements are not pure material (ὕλη). Moreover, since most elements are inanimate, their motions should be distinguished from those of animals. It is against these four, i.e. artifacts, composites, matter and animals, therefore, the genus of elements is to be determined and clarified.
1. Contra Artifacts
Different from artifacts, natural bodies have physical forms preceding them; human beings are born from human beings, but chairs are not born from chairs. According to Aristotle, elements are neither actualized from nor put into work by the sources in the soul (Metaphysics, VII 7, 1032b 1), but the sources of their motions pre-exist physically as localized principles of formation or teleological destinations, i.e. natural places. These always extant physical forms of the elements are pre-ordered into a topological hierarchy,
But since place is the limit of what encompasses, and the extremity and the center encompass all the things moving upward and downward, it in a certain way becomes the form of what is encompassed, it is to its like that a body moves when it moves to its own place. (De Caelo, IV 3, 310b 5)
And we say that what encompasses pertains to form, what is encompassed to matter. And this distinction exists in every genus. For in [the category] of quality as in of quantity, there is what is more the way form is, and what is more the way matter is. And in the case of what has to do with place it is the same way: up pertains to what is defined, down pertains to matter. (De Caelo, IV 4, 312a 10)
Elements move to their natural place to be fully actualized among their own kind. We could conceive of this ordering in such terms as if the ordered cosmos were an animal. This does not stray far from the Aristotelian doctrine, since one cannot maintain that Aristotle necessarily believes the cosmos to be inanimate, as he ascribes life to the outermost sphere and categories such as ‘right’ and ‘left’, which only properly belong to animate things, to this heaven (De Caelo, II 2). This conception, analogical at least, is helpful. Elements in their right place can therefore be conceived as organs of this eternal animal, which have their own organic, functional forms that distinguish each from the others. These natural places are, accordingly, not uniform spaces, but are boundaries, as Aristotle always insists, that both encompass and form bodies into ‘organs’.
To trace the history of elements and their motions, we start from when one such simple body first comes to be. Let us suppose a particular fire is generated among other particular earth elements. This nascent fire is already stabilized in its form, but this form has not yet been fully actualized. This form of fire is ‘what is more the way form is’, the most form-like form, and hence the form of the most encompassing. This ‘encompassing-ness’ of fire, in its gradual actualization, sustains its upward motion, so that as it arrives at the extremity of the cosmos, it is fire. The same works for earth, which has the most material form, and only is earth when it arrives at the place where it is the most encompassed, namely, the center. The center of the cosmos is therefore indeed a limit and a formative principle, but it only pertains to the least form-like form. Intermediate between fire and earth are air and water. This ordering of the cosmos is always extant, though elements come to be and pass away, because, formally, the outermost sphere neither comes to be nor passes away, and its shape always ordains the same hierarchy of formations, i.e. extremity (the most encompassing), middle (the intermediary), center (the most encompassed); physically, elements only transform among themselves, but do not all pass away at once, so that there always remains the matter out of which the ordered cosmos is to be recomposed, and the order is always maintained as a whole in its potency; moreover, since it is highly unlikely that there is one such instant in which the universe is totally devoid of one element so that all of one element is transformed into others, one is safe to assume that the order is also maintained in its actuality.
Two other things are noteworthy about this pre-established order. First, this ordering is potentially infinite,
For there is nothing to prevent there being one or more intermediates between the contraries, as in the case of colors. For ‘intermediate’ and ‘center’ are said of things in many ways. (De Caelo, IV 5, 312a 30)
The preliminary division of the order into four primary places is therefore permeated by all kinds of mediation and gray areas. Second, this order is asymmetrical. Such asymmetry is most manifest in the intermediate elements,
Each of the bodies having both heaviness and lightness, then, has heaviness in its own space (whereas earth has heaviness everywhere), but does not have lightness, except in those in which it rises.
That is also why if a supporting body is removed each spatially moves to the body next below it, air to the space of water, water to that of earth. But air will not spatially move upward into the space of fire, if the fire is done away with, except by force...... (De Caelo, IV 5, 312b 1)
The intermediate elements never naturally move up. This displays an asymmetry between the encompassing and the encompassed, the forming and the formed. When material is lacking, lower forms descend in order to replace the material, yet when higher forms are lacking, these lower forms do not elevate themselves. Lower forms are only elevated when the material is profuse, like water expelled by earth from the center is pushed upwards. But is this upward push a compulsion? If so, how can the middle be a natural place for water, when water is only compelled by earth to move there? The intermediates therefore display a curious structure of nature and compulsion that is dependent upon the structure of form and matter. At this point we can only conjecture what such asymmetry implies metaphysically, if there is any such thing implied. To make this asymmetry between form and matter more explicit, since water has a nature to form earth and be formed by air, once earth is lacking, water is left as the most material form among the rest of elements, and is to be used as matter and formed at the center. Yet when fire is lacking, air does not move upward. So it seems that a form is easily converted into material by a higher form when matter is lacking, but what is used as matter is not easily converted in the reverse direction, in the same sense that a general can easily replace a soldier, but he ought not to replace his king. To convert matter into form is therefore unnatural, and can only be done through compulsion. Water is only pushed upward by the profuse matter, the profuseness of which forces water to be more encompassing and more form-like. Yet from this it does not follow that air, water and earth all share the same natural place (the center), if only earth is more compelling than others and is able to force others out of that shared space. As it is unlikely that at any moment the center is totally devoid of earth, the natural cosmic order almost always persists, and each element is assigned to its usual place. But since what is natural is in a way what is usual, any change in this ordering is in this sense incidental to nature, and where water stays usually, hence, is where it should stay naturally. Moreover, water is indeed compelled by earth to move upwards, but only in an insignificant sense. For it is natural of water, the second lowest form, to be ‘compelled upwards when earth, the lowest form, is present’, but ‘descend when such material is lacking’. The same structure inheres in air,
For air is naturally both light and heavy. Insofar as it is light, it produces spatial movement upward, when it is pushed and gets a starting-point [of movement] from a capacity, and again downward insofar as it is heavy. (De Caelo, III 2, 301b 20)
To fully elucidate this structure, it would be helpful to consider that, for Aristotle, the potency of a particular thing is to a large extent already determined by the being of this thing. In a similar vein, the structure laid out here ordains that the way a thing is to be compelled by another thing is already inherent in the nature of this thing. It is the nature of water to be compelled upwards by earth, just as it is the nature of air to be also easily compelled. ‘The very capacity to be compelled in some specific way by some specific other thing’ thus belongs to the very nature of a thing. This is so for water and air as well. However, these natures are not arbitrarily dictated. Rather, they cohere with the asymmetry between form and matter: just as it is ‘reasonable’ (ἔυλογον) for a lower form to only be elevated when it is compelled, but to descend into material when no such compulsion is present, it is ‘natural’ for water to rise when earth is present and profuse, and fall when earth is lacking. Insofar as elements are compared to artifacts, therefore, I hope I have successfully laid out the pre-established cosmic order which is physically extant and which determines, topologically, the sources of the motions of these elements. Such an order is different from the order inherent in the soul, whence only artifacts come to be.
2. Contra Composites
Elements are simple bodies. Their simplicity consists, most primarily, in their forms. It is therefore from their simplicity of form we should derive their simplicity of motion. However, Aristotle never provides an explicit argument that helps us see how the simplicity of motion is to be necessitated by the simplicity of form. For him, it seems to be a natural conclusion that a simple body shall move simply. We are not sure if this is only a premise taken for granted, or if he has either metaphysical or physical reasons to believe that this is the case. Anyhow, we can easily imagine simple bodies move randomly in an infinitely intricate way, as Democritus and Plato both did, and question how might Aristotle exclude such a conception from his cosmology.
We start from forms of body. Three principles can be abstracted from a body, length, breadth and depth. Length by itself generates lines, together with breadth generates surfaces, with both breadth and depth generates complete bodies. Yet these principles are ways in which a body is complete and continuous, but are not distinct forms of body. For any part of a body is constituted by these three dimensions. These dimensions alone therefore do not differentiate one part of body from another, but only bodies in general from other kinds of magnitudes. Yet a form is supposed to be that difference which describes a species out of its genus, and our genus here is one singular body, i.e. the cosmos, and not magnitude in general. Accordingly, the only forms we can resort to here in order to differentiate one part of body from the others are the following: starting-point, middle and end. Starting-point is that which is the most material and encompassed, whereas end is that which is the definition and the highest form. The most encompassed part of a body is its center, and the definition of a body is its extreme surface. Therefore, the most primary forms correspond to the three primary places, i.e. center, intermediary, and extremity, as I have maintained in the first section of this paper. The simplicity of form is manifest in the simplicity of place. What remains is to include the simplicity of motion into this relationship as well.
A simple body has a simple nature. This means that it only has one singular form to actualize. Consequently, by its nature, fire should do nothing else but arrive at the extremity, at least in terms of locomotion. Yet what does it mean for fire to ‘do nothing else but arrive at the extremity’? It means, first of all, that any wandering or aberrant course is forbidden to fire. Fire has to always move, by its nature, in the shortest path to arrive at its natural destination. Since fire moves between two contraries, namely, the center and the extremity, the shortest path of its motion is necessarily a straight line. It is due to this the geometrical simplicity of straight lines is added to the simplicity of the nature of a body, and not because straight lines and elements share a nominal sameness in their respective ‘simplicity’. In other words, it is not because elements are simple bodies that partake of simplicity in one way (formal simplicity) that they have to, by this reason alone, have linear motions that partake of simplicity in another way (geometrical simplicity). For the unique thing about their motion is not that they move linearly, but rather that they move ‘up’ and ‘down’ in the shortest path possible to their natural destination. The geometrical simplicity is there only in service to the simplicity of form. Otherwise, if it is the geometrical simplicity alone that satisfies the requirement, earth could move down to the center in an arc, since a circular path is also geometrically simple, or move linearly, but at a dissimilar angle to reach the central region. Yet neither actually happens, and earth elements always move directly downward (De Caelo, II 14, 296b 15), i.e. neither in arcs nor in parallel but in straight lines at similar angles, so that they reach their destination in the shortest path possible, and have the center and nowhere else, not even the neighborhood of center, as their sole target.
The fifth element, viz aether, can also be conceived partially under the same schema. Aether has one singular nature, namely, to encompass the All. This nature is eternal and has no contrary. The singularity of this nature therefore requires that aether does nothing but to always encompass, and if it moves, to always move in an encompassing way. On this account, aether can be formed in no other shape but a sphere, and can move no other way but circularly. For sphere is the primary shape that encompasses. It of all bodies with a given surface area encompasses the most space, and a circle of all planes with a given circumference encompasses the greatest area, as demonstrated by Archimedes. Though earlier than Archimedes, this property of spheres and circles is probably also known to Aristotle (De Caelo, II 4, 287a 25). The sphere is the primary encompassing thing also because it encompasses singularly and completely, whereas other rectilinear shapes rely upon several surfaces, each of which can be produced indefinitely (De Caelo, II 4, 286b 10). Therefore, compared to the sphere, other bodies are not formed simply to encompass, but all have their redundancies. Just as earth takes the shortest path to actualize its form most simply, aether is shaped and moved in the simplest way to actualize its end of ‘encompassing’. The simplicity of elemental motions is hence to be understood as a real, viz not nominal, consequence of the simplicity of their nature. Aether is shaped and moved simply, not because it, being a simple body, by this determination alone should be simple in every aspect. But rather that the spherical shape and the circular motion are the ‘most effective ways’ for aether to actualize its singular nature, so that through these, aether does nothing redundant but to bring out its form. To use Leibniz’s terms, these simplicities do not cohere merely because they are all called ‘simplicities’, but because they follow upon each other via the principle of sufficient reason.
3. Contra Matter
Elements are bodies, but bodies are not matter. Though elements can be used as matter by higher forms, as earth is formed and encompassed by water, they are separate from matter as such. In De Caelo, the relationship elements have to matter is the most clear in their coming to be and their motion. This is reasonable, since for Aristotle, the matter of a thing is synonymous to the potency a thing possesses. Consequently, to inquire, with respect to matter, into the coming to be of an element in contradistinction to its motion is the same as to inquire into the respective structures of activity versus potency an element has, in its coming to be as opposed to moving.
First, when an element comes to be,
For just as in other cases the underlying subject must be formless and shapeless (for in this condition it would be most capable of receiving shape, like the ‘all-receptive’ written about in the Timaeus), in the same way too the elements must be considered as matter. That is why indeed, being separate from their qualitative differences, they are capable of changing into each other. (De Caelo, III 8, 306b 15)
A few things can be concluded from the passage above. An element comes to be through other elements and among other elements. Yet during this coming to be, there is no matter actually separate from these elements. For if so, this matter shall either be an element by its own right or an absurd being that is without any quality (De Caelo, III 6, 305a 20). Therefore, in its coming to be, an element has its nature or quality imprinted onto the totality of its matter, so that no remainder of matter should be able to be separated from this being. Earth is only divisible into earth, and any part of fire is still fire (De Caelo, III 3, 302a 15).
The nature or form matter receives when an element comes to be is a mixture of contraries. This conforms to the general schema Aristotle lays out in his Metaphysics (Metaphysics, XII). Fire is formed only in lightness, earth only in heaviness, whereas water and air in a mixture of both. The all receptive matter is imprinted more or less by these two contraries. This ‘more or less’, however, is not due to the amount of matter taken up by the form, since magnitude is itself a form, but how well or distinctly a form is imprinted to the matter. As one form takes up the matter more well and distinctly, its contrary should take up the same matter less so. Moreover, since a form and its contrary can be thought of as the presence and absence of one singular form, the more a form is present in matter, the less matter-like a formed thing is, and vice versa. It is in this way Aristotle can first interpret the opposition between earth and fire as an opposition between the less form-like and the more form-like. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that whether a form is like matter or not has no bearing on its absolute form-ness, so to speak. The form of earth, despite being matter-like, still remains an active principle, and earth always moves to be formed at the center nonetheless. Thus, we can conclude that in coming to be, an element has its nature imprinted onto the totality of its matter, while its nature is a mixture of two contraries. The potency of an element here is therefore a transformative potency. Just as in coming to be matter receives a nature, so is the matter of an element equally receptive of a different nature. These received natures are active principles, not passive ones. Water and air have both heaviness and lightness, and these two contraries are both active in either one of them. Via such receptiveness of matter, therefore, elements always have the potency to transform into each other.
However, when elements move spatially, a different aspect of their matter is emphasized,
Yes, and since the same thing that is capable of being made healthy is receptive of disease, if it is moved insofar as it is capable of being made healthy, it moves toward health, if it is moved insofar as it is [capable of being made] diseased, toward disease. But the heavy and light, more than these, appear to have within themselves the starting-point, because their matter is closer to substance. A sign of this is that spatial movement belongs to independent things, and in coming to be is the last of the movements, so that this movement would be primary with respect to substance. When, then, air comes to be from water and light from heavy, it progresses upward. And at the same time it is light, and is no longer becoming so, but in that place is. It is evident, then that being potentially, going toward actuality, it is progressing to that place, quantity, and quality where the actualization of its quantity and quality and place lie. And it is due to the same cause too that what already exists and is earth or fire moves toward its own place if there is nothing impeding it. (De Caelo, IV 3, 310b 30)
Instead of receiving a different form or active principle, matter is now a potency that only passively resists the already received nature. One shall understand this better if one recalls the Aristotelian form-matter schema. The two contrary forms are opposed to each other, whereas the underlying matter is said to oppose both contraries in quite another way. The potency of fire by which fire is either sustained in its upward motion or not is not there because this potency has received a nature contrary to that of fire, i.e. heaviness, since fire is unconditionally light, but that matter qua matter passively resists the actualization of the form of fire. This potency enables fire to be forcibly removed from the extremity, to be moved or poised contrary to its nature, or to come to be somewhere that is not its proper place, but it does not actively destroy that nature, i.e. fieriness, of the thing to which it belongs, i.e. fire. In other words, this potency is a passive potency, which is only receptive of a contrary nature to the extent that such opposition remains transitory and insignificant compared to the preponderance of its current nature. Unlike that which is indifferent to health and disease and is capable of receiving both contraries, fire, once it comes to be, can only naturally move upwards and has a preponderant inclination to do so.
Therefore, one might say that in the process of coming to be and passing away, elements have their activity and potency structured in one way, so as to receive different active principles, while in motion they have them structured in a quite different way, so as to leave room for the actualization of one already stabilized nature. It remains a question whether these two structures are communicable. The answer to this question largely hinges on how one interprets the following statement,
For nothing contrary to nature is eternal. (De Caelo, II 3, 286a 15)
If one takes this to mean nothing should impede the natural motion of a thing for all time, one in a sense answers in the negative, that locomotion has no effect on the nature of a thing. But if one takes this to also mean nothing that is continually inhibited from its natural motion and is continually forced to stay at a place where it does not belong can endure in its nature, one admits that locomotion and transformation, and their respective structures of activity and potency, are communicable, so that where a thing is determines what it shall become, and what a thing is shall determine, conversely, whereto it shall move. Indeed, this consequence seems to be implied by Aristotle himself, when he decides in his Physics that locomotion is first in time, in addition to its being first in the teleological sense, so as to cause all other motions, including coming to be (Physics, VIII 7, 260b 30), and when he organizes places by a hierarchy of formations. Therefore, I incline to take the affirmative, and speculate that at its own place, an element actualizes its own nature; removed from that place, it is positioned contrary to its nature, and its matter passively suffers from a formation too transitory and unstable to be, e.g. fire being placed at the center, which formation is contrary to its pre-stabilized nature, e.g. fieriness as lightness, in a most insignificant way; yet as this contrary formation is kept continually, it stops being merely transitory but is stabilized, thus changing the original nature of this element irreversibly: transforming fire into earth, for instance.
4. Contra Animals
Elements and animals (by animals I mean animate things) are different kinds of being,
That is why one must not look for up and down, right and left, and front and back in every body, but only in those that, being animate, have a starting-point of movement within them. For in inanimate ones we do not see the starting-point from which the movement derives (for some things do not move at all, whereas others, though they do move, do not do so in every direction alike––for example, fire moves upward only and earth toward the center). (De Caelo, II 2, 284b 30)
That is, more than anything else, animals have within themselves the starting-point of motion, whereas fire and earth do not. Yet Aristotle seems to contradict himself on this point when he later maintains that
But the heavy and light, more than these, appear to have within themselves the starting-point, because their matter is closer to substance. (De Caelo, IV 3, 310b 30)
This apparent contradiction, however, can be resolved by what directly follows upon the passage quoted above,
For nourishment too, when nothing prevents it, and what is capable of being made healthy, insofar as nothing restrains it, proceed immediately. But what causes the movement is what produces it at the start, what removed the hindrance, or from which the thing rebounded, as was said in our first accounts, in which we determined that none of these things moves itself. (De Caelo, IV 3, 311a 5)
In other words, though these simple bodies seem to have their starting-points of motion intrinsic to themselves, they nonetheless rely upon other things to initiate this motion. This statement becomes more intelligible once we notice the subtlety with which Aristotle first introduces the natural motions,
For we say that all natural bodies and magnitudes are intrinsically capable of moving with respect to place. For nature we say is the starting-point of movement for them. (De Caelo, I 2, 268b 15)
And if we conjoin this to another passage, we are equipped with all the pieces we need to finally complete the puzzle and grasp how elements are to be distinguished from animals,
Since nature is a starting-point of movement within the thing itself, a capacity is a starting-point of movement within another thing, or within the thing itself insofar as it is other, and all movement is either in accord with nature or by force, the one in accord with nature (for example, that of a stone downward), will be made faster by force, whereas the one contrary to nature will be wholly due to it. (De Caelo, III 2, 310b 15)
Like animals, elements have intrinsic formative principles that correspond to their natural places, which are formative principles localized. This principle in fire is its lightness, whose actualization requires fire to move to the extremity, where fire naturally belongs; so fire moves by itself. But fire does not transform by itself. Once fire comes to be, it is fixed in its singular form to always move upward. In this sense, fire is different from animals, that it does not move ‘in every direction alike’. Animals can move freely because their principles are transformative principles, i.e. souls that are ‘form of forms’ (De Anima, III 8, 432a 1), and animals can use their soul to change many subsidiary forms they also possess. Elements, however, only possess the locomotive principle determined by their singular nature. In other words, though elements have the potency to be transformed and be moved, they only possess the active principle for the latter. By contrast, plants, animals and human beings can always ‘transform’ so as to move to and rest at different places, overcoming the natural heaviness or lightness of their physical bodies, for even plants do take root downwards and stretch upwards inexorably; while elements can only passively undergo one determinate kind of motion due to the simplicity of their nature.
Therefore, regarding the process of transformation, elements only possess the capacity but not the principle. The transformative principle is either ‘in another thing or within the thing insofar as it is other’. This conforms to my earlier determination, that when an element is continually compelled away from its natural place, it might change in form. Fire has the capacity to be changed by others, not the nature to change on its own. But regarding the process of locomotion, elements possess both the capacity and the nature. Yet since they lack the transformative principle, of which the locomotive principle is ultimately derivative, they are not capable of removing the obstacle before them by themselves, for they do not move in a free way that can either circumvent or destroy that obstacle. Thus they rely upon incidental occurrences to actualize their nature.
I wish I have explained the distinction between animals and elements as clearly as I can. Yet this discussion only covers four of the five elements. The fifth element, i.e. aether, is exempt from the earlier determination, since this element seems to possess life,
We think about these stars as bodies only, that is, as units having a certain order, altogether inanimate. But we should conceive of them as participating in action and life. (De Caelo, II 12, 292a 20)
But if those elements that do not move freely are said to be dispossessed of life, how can aether, which also moves in a singular way, be said to ‘participate in action and life’?
Aristotle provides one possible way to answer this question. He says,
That is why one should think the action of the stars to be like that of animals and plants. For here the actions of human beings are in fact most numerous, since it is possible to attain many goods, so that it is possible to do many things in action, and for the sake of other ones. (What is in the best state, by contrast, has no need of action, since it is itself the for-the-sake-of-which......) The actions of the other animals, on the other hand, are fewer, and of the plants perhaps one small one. For either there is some one thing which they may attain, as there is for a human being too, or the many things are a route toward the best one. (De Caelo, II 12, 292b 1)
The transformative principle within all animals revolves around the ultimate end. Animals do many things only so that they can be in the best state. By contrast, heaven has already reached the best state in its eternal circular motion, and it moves not in order to become actualized in its nature, since it does not move between contraries, but to remain in its unceasing state of life and action. Of what use then is the transformative principle to it, when heaven is itself the highest form in the cosmos? Stars need no art, no instrument, no education, no custom, no freedom to move every which way, as they stay in eternal bliss and happiness. They transcend all sublunar principles, for all these principles are laborious. They subsist only in the divine,
But then neither is it reasonable that the heaven remains eternal because a soul necessitates it. For it is not possible for this sort of life to be painless and blessedly happy for a soul. For it necessarily, with respect to its movement, involves force––if indeed it moves the primary body in another way than with its natural spatial movement, and moves it continuously––and to be unleisured and deprived of all thought-involving ease, if indeed it does not have, as does the soul of mortal animals, the relaxation of the body that comes about in sleep. Instead, it is necessary that a fate of some Ixion, eternal and indefatigable, restrain it. (De Caelo, II 1, 284a 25)
Both transformation and locomotion for sublunar bodies require force. Since to transform means to change nature, transformation is necessarily contrary to some nature, if not the predominant one. And to move spatially always entails, for sublunar bodies, an overcoming of resistance. Locomotion is an adornment only for stars, but labor for all other bodies: these bodies have to move against compulsion in order to move at all. No principle for sublunar things, therefore, befits divinity. To use Aristotle’s formulation, the simplicity aether has is that of happiness, while the simplicity of the other elements is of an inferior kind, the kind which is analogous to that of plants, who are capable of doing only one thing due to their powerlessness, not due to their divinity.
To conclude, in this paper I have compared elements with artifacts, composites, matter and animals, so as to better delineate their thinghood. As opposed to artifacts, the formative principles of elements are physically extant and localized by natural places. Elements move to these natural places in order to fully actualize their forms that are already intrinsic to them as locomotive principles. Next, in contrast to composites, elements possess a formal simplicity. This formal simplicity is related to the simplicity of destination. From there, the motive simplicity of elements can be deduced via the principle of sufficient reason. Then, in contrast to matter, I distinguish two kinds of potencies elements possess. The first potency is a transformative potency, or the capacity to receive a different form. The second potency is a passive potency, or the capacity to either actualize, or not, a nature that is already within the thing. The actualization of the latter potency takes the form of locomotion, since locomotion of all motions changes a substance the least. I also speculate that these two potencies are communicable, so that when a body is poised at a place contrary to its nature long enough, it shall be destroyed by that very fact, directly or indirectly, and be transformed into something else. Following this, I distinguish elements from animals by their incapacity to transform on their own. I maintain that elements do not possess in themselves the transformative principle, but only the capacity to be transformed by something else, e.g. a place contrary to its nature, though both elements and animals possess the locomotive principle to move to their natural habitats. Such a habitat for human beings would be their city, for instance. But since animals also possess the transformative principles in themselves, i.e. souls, they can more or less change their destinations and habitats. This capacity to change, however, is limited by the ultimate end, i.e. happiness. Aether is therefore superior to all other elements and beings, since it persists in the state of happiness for all eternity. It moves leisurely, as if asleep. And the cosmos is in its arms, as if the world were but a dream by the divine.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
亚里士多德的宇宙由运动着的元素构成。要理解亚里士多德的宇宙论,就必须理解元素的这些运动。因此,本文将简要考察这样一个问题:亚里士多德关于运动元素的学说是什么?
按照亚里士多德在《物理学》中的说法,运动是“潜能作为潜能的实现”(《物理学》III 1,201a 10)。因此,追问任何一种运动,就是追问属于运动之物的活性与潜能。活性与潜能都是刻画事物之为事物的方面。但元素是一种什么样的事物?
元素是简单的自然物体。由此,它们区别于人造物与复合物。作为物体,元素具有一定的形式与活性。因此,元素并不是纯粹的质料(ὕλη)。此外,由于大多数元素没有生命,它们的运动也应与有生命者的运动相区分。因此,元素这一属,应当在与人造物、复合物、质料和有生命者这四者的对照中得到规定与澄清。
1. 与人造物相对
不同于人造物,自然物体有在先的自然形式;人由人生出,椅子却不由椅子生出。按照亚里士多德的说法,元素既不是由灵魂中的源头实现,也不是由它们投入运作(《形而上学》VII 7,1032b 1);相反,元素运动的源头作为定位了的成形原则或目的论的终点,即自然位置,预先就在自然中存在。元素这些始终存在的自然形式,已经预先排列成一个拓扑层级:
但由于位置是包容者的界限,而最外端与中心包容一切向上和向下运动的事物,它便在某种意义上成为被包容者的形式;物体移向其自身的位置时,正是移向与自身相似者。(《论天》IV 3,310b 5)
我们说,包容者属于形式,被包容者属于质料。这一区分存在于每一个属中。因为在质的范畴中,正如在量的范畴中,既有更像形式的东西,也有更像质料的东西。在与位置相关的情形中,同样如此:上属于已规定者,下属于质料。(《论天》IV 4,312a 10)
元素移向其自然位置,以便在自身同类之中充分实现。我们可以把这种秩序设想为:有序的宇宙仿佛是一个动物。这并没有远离亚里士多德的学说,因为我们不能断言亚里士多德必然认为宇宙没有生命;他把生命归于最外层天球,并将本来只恰当地属于有生命者的“右”“左”等范畴归于这一天穹(《论天》II 2)。这种至少在类比意义上的构想是有帮助的。因此,处于恰当位置的元素可以被设想为这个永恒动物的器官,它们拥有各自有机的、功能性的形式,以此彼此区分。相应地,这些自然位置并不是同质的空间,而是亚里士多德一贯坚持的界限,既包容物体,又把物体塑造成“器官”。
要追溯元素及其运动的历史,我们从某个这样的简单物体最初生成之时开始。假设某一团火在其他具体的土元素之间生成。这团新生的火,其形式已经稳定,但这一形式尚未完全实现。火的形式是“更像形式的东西”,是最具形式性的形式,因而是最具包容性的形式。火的这种“包容性”,在逐渐实现的过程中维持着它的向上运动;于是,当它抵达宇宙最外端时,它才真正是火。土也是如此:它具有最具质料性的形式,只有抵达被最充分包容的位置,即中心时,才真正是土。因此,宇宙中心确实是一个界限与成形原则,但只属于最不具形式性的形式。气与水则介于火与土之间。尽管元素生成消亡,宇宙的这一秩序却始终存在,因为在形式上,最外层天球既不生成,也不消亡,它的形状始终规定着同一套成形层级:最外端——最具包容性者,中间——中介者,中心——被最充分包容者;在自然层面,元素只在彼此之间转化,不会同时全部消亡,因此,总有质料留下,有序宇宙将由它重新组成,而秩序也总在其潜能中作为整体得到维持;此外,宇宙在某个瞬间完全没有某一种元素、该元素的全部都转化为其他元素,这种情形极不可能,因此我们可以放心假定,秩序也在其实在性中得到维持。
关于这一预先确立的秩序,还有两点值得注意。第一,这种秩序在潜能上是无限的:
因为没有什么妨碍对立者之间存在一个或多个中间者,正如颜色的情形。因为“中间”与“中心”被以许多方式用于事物。(《论天》IV 5,312a 30)
因此,将秩序初步划分为四个首要位置的安排,贯穿着各种中介与灰色地带。第二,这一秩序是不对称的。这种不对称在中间元素中表现得最明显:
因此,每一个既有重又有轻的物体,在其自身空间中都具有重——而土在任何地方都有重——却并不具有轻,除非在那些它会于其中上升的东西之中。
因此,如果支撑的物体被移走,每一个物体都会在空间上移向紧接其下的物体:气移向水的空间,水移向土的空间。但如果火被消除,气并不会向上移入火的空间,除非受到强迫……(《论天》IV 5,312b 1)
中间元素从不自然地向上运动。这显示了包容者与被包容者、成形者与被成形者之间的不对称。质料缺失时,较低的形式下降,以替代质料;但较高的形式缺失时,这些较低的形式并不会自行提升。只有质料充盈时,较低形式才会被抬高,例如水被土从中心排挤出去,从而被推向上方。但这种向上推动是一种强迫吗?如果如此,水只是被土强迫移向中间,中间又怎么能是水的自然位置?因此,中间元素展现出一种奇特的自然与强迫的结构,而这一结构依赖于形式与质料的结构。眼下,我们只能推测这种不对称在形而上学上意味着什么——如果它确实有所意味的话。为了更明确地揭示形式与质料之间的不对称,可以这样说:由于水具有赋形于土、被气赋形的本性,一旦土缺失,水就在剩余元素中成为最具质料性的形式,要在中心被当作质料使用并接受赋形。但当火缺失时,气并不向上运动。由此看来,当质料缺失时,一个形式很容易被更高形式转化为质料,但被用作质料者却不容易反向转化;这就好像将军可以轻易替代士兵,却不应替代君王。因此,把质料转化为形式并非自然,只能通过强迫完成。水只有在质料充盈时才被推向上方,质料的充盈迫使水变得更具包容性、更像形式。然而,由此并不能推出气、水、土都拥有同一个自然位置——中心——而只是土比其他元素更有强制力,能把它们从共享空间中逼出去。由于中心不大可能在任何时刻完全没有土,自然的宇宙秩序几乎总是持续着,每种元素被分派到其通常的位置。但自然者在某种意义上就是通常如此者,因此,这一秩序的任何改变,在这个意义上都是相对于自然的偶然;水通常停留的地方,也就是它自然应当停留的地方。此外,水确实被土强迫向上运动,但这只是在一个无足轻重的意义上。因为水作为次低的形式,其自然本性就是:“当最低形式——土——在场时,被迫上升”,而“当这种质料缺失时,则下降”。同一结构也内在于气:
因为气在自然上既轻又重。就其轻而言,当它被推动,并从某种能力中获得[运动的]起点时,它产生向上的空间运动;就其重而言,又产生向下的运动。(《论天》III 2,301b 20)
要充分阐明这一结构,考虑以下一点会有帮助:对亚里士多德而言,一个具体事物的潜能,在很大程度上已经由这个事物的在所规定。类似地,这里展开的结构规定,一个事物会怎样被另一事物强迫,已经内在于这个事物的本性。被土强迫向上,是水的本性,正如容易受到强迫也是气的本性。因此,“被某个特定的其他事物以某种特定方式强迫的能力本身”,属于事物的本性。水与气同样如此。然而,这些本性并非任意规定的。相反,它们与形式和质料之间的不对称相互一致:正如较低形式只有在受到强迫时才被提升,而在没有这种强迫时便下降为质料,这是“合理的”(ἔυλογον);当土在场且充盈时水上升、土缺失时水下降,也就是“自然的”。因此,通过元素与人造物的比较,我希望自己已经成功展示了预先确立的宇宙秩序:它在自然中存在,并以拓扑方式规定这些元素运动的源头。这种秩序不同于灵魂内部的秩序,只有人造物才从后者中生成。
2. 与复合物相对
元素是简单物体。它们的简单性首先在于其形式。因此,我们应当从形式的简单性推出运动的简单性。然而,亚里士多德从未给出明确的论证,说明运动的简单性如何由形式的简单性必然推出。对他而言,简单物体应当简单地运动,似乎是个自然的结论。我们无法确定,这只是一个被视作理所当然的前提,还是他有形而上学或自然学的理由相信如此。无论如何,我们很容易像德谟克利特和柏拉图那样,想象简单物体以无限复杂的方式随机运动,并追问亚里士多德如何将这种构想排除在其宇宙论之外。
我们从物体的形式开始。可以从一个物体中抽象出三条原则:长、宽、深。长本身产生线,与宽一道产生面,再与宽和深一道产生完整的物体。但这些原则只是物体完整且连续的方式,而非物体的不同形式。因为物体的任何部分,都由这三个维度构成。因此,仅凭这些维度,并不能把物体的一个部分与另一部分区分开,只能把一般的物体与其他种类的量区分开。然而,形式应当是从属中刻画出种的差异;而这里的属,是一个单一的物体,即宇宙,而不是一般的量。相应地,为了把物体的一个部分与其他部分区分开,我们在这里能够诉诸的形式只有以下三者:起点、中间与终点。起点是最具质料性、被最充分包容者;终点则是规定,是最高形式。物体中被最充分包容的部分是中心,而物体的规定则是其最外表面。因此,最首要的形式对应于三个首要位置,即中心、中间与最外端,正如我在本文第一节中所主张的。形式的简单性显现于位置的简单性中。剩下的任务,就是也把运动的简单性纳入这一关系。
简单物体具有简单的本性。这意味着,它只有一个单一的形式有待实现。因此,按照火的本性,至少就位移而言,它除了抵达最外端之外,什么也不应做。但火“除了抵达最外端之外什么也不做”,究竟是什么意思?首先,这意味着火不允许有任何游移或偏离的路线。火按其本性,必须始终沿最短路径运动,以抵达其自然终点。由于火在两个对立者——中心与最外端——之间运动,其运动的最短路径必然是一条直线。正因为如此,直线在几何上的简单性才被加到物体本性的简单性之上,而不是因为直线与元素在各自的“简单性”上共享一个名称。换句话说,不能仅仅因为元素是以一种方式——形式上的简单性——分有简单性的简单物体,就断言它们必须具有以另一种方式——几何上的简单性——分有简单性的直线运动。因为它们运动的独特之处,不在于沿直线运动,而在于它们沿通向自然终点的最短可能路径“向上”与“向下”运动。几何上的简单性在这里只服务于形式的简单性。否则,如果单凭几何上的简单性便足以满足要求,那么土也可以沿弧线下降至中心,因为圆形路径在几何上同样简单;或者沿直线但以不同角度抵达中心区域。然而,两者都并不实际发生,土元素总是径直向下运动(《论天》II 14,296b 15):既不是沿弧线,也不是沿平行线,而是沿相似角度的直线,使它们沿最短可能路径抵达终点,并只把中心而非任何其他地方——甚至不是中心附近——作为唯一目标。
第五元素,即以太,也可以部分地在同一图式下被理解。以太具有一个单一的本性,即包容大全。这一本性是永恒的,没有对立者。因此,这一本性的单一性要求以太除了始终包容之外不做任何事;而如果它运动,就始终以包容的方式运动。据此,以太不能被塑成球体以外的形状,也不能以圆周运动以外的方式运动。因为球体是包容的首要形状。在给定表面积的所有物体中,球体包容最大的空间;在给定周长的所有平面图形中,圆包容最大的面积,正如阿基米德所证明的。虽然亚里士多德早于阿基米德,但他很可能也知道球与圆的这一性质(《论天》II 4,287a 25)。球体是首要的包容者,还因为它单一而完整地包容;其他直线形状则依赖几个表面,而每一个表面都可以无限延展(《论天》II 4,286b 10)。因此,相较于球体,其他物体并非仅仅为包容而成形,而都带有冗余。正如土沿最短路径、以最简单的方式实现其形式,以太也以最简单的方式成形和运动,来实现其“包容”的目的。因此,元素运动的简单性,应被理解为其本性简单性的实在后果,而非名义上的后果。以太成形简单、运动简单,并不是因为它是简单物体,便仅凭这一规定就应当在所有方面都简单;相反,是因为球形与圆周运动是以太实现其单一本性的“最有效方式”,通过它们,以太只使自身形式显现,不做任何多余之事。借用莱布尼茨的术语,这些简单性并非仅仅因为都被叫作“简单性”才相互一致,而是因为它们通过充足理由原则相互推出。
3. 与质料相对
元素是物体,但物体不是质料。尽管元素可以被更高形式用作质料,如土被水赋形并包容,它们却与质料本身有别。在《论天》中,元素与质料的关系,在元素的生成与运动中最为清楚。这是合理的,因为对亚里士多德而言,事物的质料与它所拥有的潜能同义。因此,就质料而言,区分元素的生成与运动并加以探究,等于探究元素在生成与运动中分别具有怎样的活性与潜能的结构。
首先,当一个元素生成时:
因为正如在其他情形中,底层的基体必须无形式、无形状——处于这种状态,它最能接受形状,正如《蒂迈欧》中所写的“全接受者”——同样,也必须把元素视作质料。因此,当它们与质的差异分离时,就能够相互转化。(《论天》III 8,306b 15)
从上面这段话可以得出几点结论。一个元素通过其他元素、并在其他元素之间生成。但在生成期间,并没有实际独立于这些元素的质料。否则,这种质料要么本身就是一种元素,要么就是一个毫无性质的荒谬在者(《论天》III 6,305a 20)。因此,在生成中,一个元素的本性或性质被印入其质料的全体,不应有任何质料的残余能够从这一在者中分离出来。土只能分为土,而火的任何部分仍然是火(《论天》III 3,302a 15)。
元素生成时质料所接受的本性或形式,是对立者的混合。这符合亚里士多德在《形而上学》中展开的一般图式(《形而上学》XII)。火只在轻中成形,土只在重中成形,而水与气则在二者的混合中成形。全接受的质料或多或少地被这两个对立者印刻。不过,这一“或多或少”并不取决于被形式占据的质料的量,因为量本身也是形式,而取决于形式被印入质料时有多充分、多分明。一个形式越充分、越分明地占据质料,其对立者就越少以同样的程度占据这同一质料。此外,由于一个形式及其对立者可以被看作某个单一形式的在场与缺席,形式在质料中越充分在场,被赋形之物就越不像质料,反之亦然。亚里士多德正是这样,首先把土与火之间的对立解释为较不具形式性者与较具形式性者之间的对立。但应牢记,一个形式是否像质料,并不影响它可以说是绝对的形式性。土的形式尽管像质料,却仍是一个主动原则,而土仍总是向中心运动,以在那里获得成形。于是我们可以得出结论:在生成中,一个元素的本性被印入其质料的全体,而这一本性是两个对立者的混合。因此,元素在这里的潜能是一种转化潜能。正如质料在生成中接受一种本性,元素的质料也同样能够接受另一种本性。这些被接受的本性是主动原则,而非被动原则。水与气都既重又轻,而这两个对立者在每一个之中都是主动的。因此,通过质料的这种可接受性,元素始终具有相互转化的潜能。
然而,当元素在空间中运动时,其质料的另一面被强调出来:
是的,由于同一个能够变得健康的东西也能接受疾病,如果它就其能够变得健康而言被推动,就向健康运动;如果就其[能够]患病而言被推动,就向疾病运动。但重者与轻者比这些东西更显得自身具有运动的起点,因为它们的质料更接近实体。一个迹象是,空间运动属于独立之物,在生成中是最后的运动,因此这种运动在实体上应当是首要的。那么,当气由水生成、轻由重生成时,它便向上行进。与此同时,它是轻的,不再是正在变轻,而是在那个位置上在。因此,显而易见:潜在地在着、朝实在性行进的东西,正在移向其量、质与位置的实现所在的位置、量与质。同样也是由于这个原因,已经存在并且是土或火的东西,只要没有阻碍,就会移向自身的位置。(《论天》IV 3,310b 30)
此时,质料不再接受一个不同的形式或主动原则,而成为一种只被动地抵抗已接受本性的潜能。如果回想亚里士多德的形式—质料图式,这一点就更容易理解。两个相反形式彼此对立,而底层质料则以完全不同的方式与这两个对立者都相对。火凭之能够或不能维持向上运动的潜能,并不是因为这一潜能接受了与火相反的本性,即重,因为火是无条件地轻;而是质料作为质料,被动地抵抗火的形式的实现。这一潜能使火能够被强行移离最外端,能够以违反其本性的方式被移动或放置,或者能够在不属于其恰当位置的地方生成;但它并不主动摧毁自己所属事物——火——的本性,即火性。换句话说,这一潜能是一种被动潜能,它只在以下限度内接受相反本性:与其当前本性的优势地位相比,这种对立仍然短暂而无足轻重。不同于既可接受健康也可接受疾病、对二者不作区分的东西,火一旦生成,就只能自然地向上运动,并具有这样做的压倒性倾向。
因此,可以说,在生成与消亡的过程中,元素的活性与潜能以一种方式组织,以接受不同的主动原则;而在运动中,它们则以完全不同的方式组织,为一种已经稳定的本性的实现留下空间。这两种结构能否相通,仍是一个问题。答案在很大程度上取决于如何解释以下断言:
因为没有任何违反自然的东西是永恒的。(《论天》II 3,286a 15)
如果把它理解为,没有什么应当永远阻碍一个事物的自然运动,那么在某种意义上,就是给出了否定的答案:位移并不影响事物的本性。但如果把它也理解为,一个不断受到自然运动阻碍、不断被强迫停留在不属于其自身位置的事物,不可能在其本性中持久维系,那么我们就承认了位移与转化、以及它们各自的活性与潜能结构是相通的:事物在哪里,决定它将成为什么;而事物是什么,反过来决定它将移向哪里。确实,当亚里士多德在《物理学》中判定位移不仅在目的论上首要,而且在时间上也首要,从而引起包括生成在内的所有其他运动(《物理学》VIII 7,260b 30),以及当他以成形层级来安排位置时,似乎已经暗示了这一后果。因此,我倾向于肯定的回答,并推测:一个元素处于自身位置时,实现其本性;被移离这一位置时,便被放在违反其本性的位置上,其质料被动承受一种过于短暂、不稳定而不足以真正在的成形,例如火被置于中心;这一成形以最无足轻重的方式,与此前已稳定的本性——例如作为轻的火性——相对立。但如果这一相反成形被持续保持,它就不再仅仅短暂,而是稳定下来,从而不可逆地改变这个元素原有的本性:例如,将火转化为土。
4. 与有生命者相对
元素与动物——这里“动物”指有生命的事物——是不同种类的在者:
因此,不应在每一个物体中寻找上下、左右、前后,而只应在那些有生命、内部具有运动起点的物体中寻找。因为在无生命者中,我们看不见运动由之产生的起点——有些事物根本不运动,而另一些虽然运动,却不能同样地朝每个方向运动;例如,火只向上运动,土只向中心运动。(《论天》II 2,284b 30)
也就是说,最重要的是,有生命者自身具有运动起点,而火与土没有。然而,亚里士多德后来作出如下主张时,似乎在这一点上自相矛盾:
但重者与轻者比这些东西更显得自身具有运动的起点,因为它们的质料更接近实体。(《论天》IV 3,310b 30)
不过,这一表面矛盾可以通过紧接上述引文的内容得到解决:
因为营养在没有什么阻止它时,以及能够变得健康的东西在没有什么抑制它时,也都立即进展。但引起运动的,是最初产生它的东西、移除了阻碍的东西,或事物由之反弹的东西,正如我们在最初的论述中所说;在那里,我们已确定,这些东西没有任何一个自行使自身运动。(《论天》IV 3,311a 5)
换句话说,虽然这些简单物体的运动起点似乎内在于自身,它们仍依赖其他事物来启动这一运动。一旦注意到亚里士多德最初引入自然运动时的细微措辞,这一断言就更容易理解:
因为我们说,一切自然物体与量,都在内在上具有相对于位置而运动的能力。因为我们说,自然是它们运动的起点。(《论天》I 2,268b 15)
如果再把它与另一段话联系起来,我们便获得了完成拼图所需的所有部分,最终可以把握元素应当如何区别于有生命者:
由于自然是事物自身内部的运动起点,能力则是另一事物内部、或事物自身就其为他者而言的运动起点,而一切运动不是合乎自然,就是出于强力,所以合乎自然的运动——例如石头向下的运动——会因强力而加速,而违反自然的运动则完全由强力造成。(《论天》III 2,310b 15)
像有生命者一样,元素具有内在的成形原则,与其自然位置相对应;自然位置则是定位了的成形原则。火中的这一原则是轻,其实现要求火移向最外端,也就是火自然所属之处;因此,火由自身而运动。但火并不由自身而转化。一旦火生成,它就固定在其单一形式中,总是向上运动。在这个意义上,火不同于有生命者,它不能“同样地朝每个方向”运动。有生命者能够自由运动,是因为它们的原则是转化性原则,即作为“形式之形式”的灵魂(《论灵魂》III 8,432a 1);它们能用灵魂改变自己同时拥有的许多从属形式。然而,元素只有由其单一本性规定的位移原则。换句话说,虽然元素具有被转化和被移动的潜能,但只拥有后者的主动原则。相比之下,植物、动物和人总能“转化”,从而移往并停留于不同位置,克服其物理身体自然的重或轻;因为即便植物也会不断向下扎根、向上伸展。而元素由于本性的简单,只能被动地经历一种确定的运动。
因此,就转化过程而言,元素只拥有能力,却不拥有原则。转化原则要么“在另一事物之中”,要么“在事物自身就其为他者而言之中”。这符合我先前的规定:一个元素不断被强迫离开其自然位置时,它的形式可能发生改变。火具有被他者改变的能力,而不具有自行改变的本性。但就位移过程而言,元素既有能力,也有本性。然而,由于它们缺乏转化原则,而位移原则最终又派生于转化原则,它们便不能自行移除面前的障碍,因为它们并不以能够绕开或摧毁障碍的自由方式运动。因此,它们依赖偶然事件来实现自己的本性。
我希望自己已尽可能清楚地解释了有生命者与元素之间的区别。然而,这一讨论只涵盖五种元素中的四种。第五元素,即以太,不受此前规定的约束,因为这种元素似乎拥有生命:
我们把这些星辰仅仅当作物体,也就是说,当作具有某种秩序、全无生命的单位。但我们应当把它们理解为分有行动与生命的东西。(《论天》II 12,292a 20)
但如果不能自由运动的元素被说成没有生命,那么同样只以单一方式运动的以太,又如何能被说成“分有行动与生命”?
亚里士多德为这一问题提供了一种可能的回答。他说:
因此,应当把星辰的行动理解为类似动物和植物的行动。因为在这里,人的行动事实上最多,这是因为人可能获得许多善,因而可能在行动中做许多事情,并为了另一些事情而行动。(相比之下,处于最佳状态者不需要行动,因为它自身就是所为之目的……)其他动物的行动则较少,植物也许只有一个微小的行动。因为要么有某一个东西是它们能够获得的,正如人也有这样的东西;要么,诸多事物是通向最善者的道路。(《论天》II 12,292b 1)
所有有生命者内部的转化原则,都围绕最终目的运作。有生命者做许多事情,只是为了能够处于最佳状态。相比之下,天穹在其永恒的圆周运动中已经抵达最佳状态;它运动,并非为了实现自身本性,因为它并不在对立者之间运动,而是为了保持其永不止息的生命与行动状态。既然天穹自身就是宇宙中的最高形式,转化原则对它还有什么用处?星辰不需要技艺、工具、教育、习俗,也不需要朝任意方向运动的自由,因为它们停留于永恒的福乐与幸福之中。它们超越一切月下原则,因为这些原则全都劳苦。它们只存续于神圣之中:
然而,认为天穹因为灵魂迫使它而保持永恒,也不合理。因为这种生活对灵魂而言,不可能无痛苦而幸福。就其运动而言,它必然包含强力——如果灵魂确实以不同于其自然空间运动的方式推动首要物体,并持续推动它——也必然无暇闲适、被剥夺一切伴随思想的安逸,如果它不像有死动物的灵魂那样,拥有睡眠中身体获得的松弛。相反,必定有某种伊克西翁式的命运,永恒而不知疲倦地束缚着它。(《论天》II 1,284a 25)
对月下物体而言,转化与位移都需要强力。由于转化意味着改变本性,它即便并非违反占主导地位的本性,也必然违反某种本性。而空间中的运动,对月下物体而言,总是意味着克服阻力。位移只有对星辰才是装饰,对其他一切物体都是劳作:这些物体必须逆着强迫而运动,才能够运动。因此,没有任何月下事物的原则适用于神明。用亚里士多德的表述,以太拥有的简单性是幸福的简单性,而其他元素的简单性则是较低等的,类似植物的简单性:植物之所以只能做一件事,是由于无力,而不是由于神性。
总而言之,本文将元素与人造物、复合物、质料和有生命者相比较,以更清楚地刻画元素之为事物。相对于人造物,元素的成形原则在自然中存在,并由自然位置加以定位。元素移向这些自然位置,以充分实现已经作为位移原则内在于它们的形式。其次,相对于复合物,元素具有形式上的简单性。这种形式简单性与终点的简单性相关。由此,可以通过充足理由原则推出元素运动的简单性。接着,相对于质料,我区分了元素拥有的两种潜能。第一种是转化潜能,即接受另一种形式的能力。第二种是被动潜能,即实现或不实现已经内在于事物的本性的能力。后一种潜能的实现采取位移的形式,因为在一切运动中,位移对实体的改变最少。我也推测,这两种潜能是相通的:一个物体若在违反其本性的位置停留得足够久,便会直接或间接地因这一事实而被摧毁,转化成别的东西。在此基础上,我依据元素不能自行转化这一点,将它们与有生命者区分开。我主张,元素自身不具有转化原则,而只具有被其他东西——例如违反其本性的位置——转化的能力;尽管元素与有生命者都拥有位移原则,能够移向其自然栖居之处。对人而言,这样的栖居之处例如就是城邦。但由于有生命者自身还拥有转化原则,即灵魂,它们能够或多或少地改变自己的终点与栖居之处。然而,这一改变能力受最终目的——幸福——所限制。因此,以太优于其他一切元素与在者,因为它永远持续处于幸福状态。它悠然运动,仿佛沉睡。宇宙则在它怀中,仿佛世界不过是神明的一场梦。