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Time, Causality, and Life in Driesch
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When Shakespeare hammers out that great line “time is out of joint” he might have no inkling how this formula, capturing the essential truth, might resound throughout centuries. When time is unhinged, no other thing stays the same. Life is also included.
Hans Driesch, in his essay on the science of life, famously claims life to be an element independent of chemical and physical processes, thus unhinging life from its multiple manifestations. In this paper, I will try to draw materials from Hans Driesch to inquire into the relationship between time, causality and life. First, I want to point out the underlying antinomy between the concepts of time and harmony, and to expose the tension between them. From there, I would incorporate the concept of cause into the structure, which Driesch deems to be essential for the study of life. Thus laying the foundation for preparatory considerations, I would try to venture into that dark realm where time and life is entangled and try to shed light on what, when time is out of joint, life might become.
Time and harmony are two different concepts that receive different analyses in Driesch. This by itself is remarkable when we see how closely akin these two are, and how they are not explicitly related by him. Nevertheless, they are irreducible to each other and deserve to be treated each independently first.
Regarding the problem of embryology and time, Driesch remarks “every embryological process occupies a particular and specific temporal position within a well-ordered sequence of events, i.e. a particular relative (my emphasis) moment in this sequence at which it is due.” (p. 75) Three things are worth noticing here. First, the temporal order here is an objective order. The sequence of events are pre-established, and each temporal position is as if assigned to each specific process. Second, the temporal positioning is in no way absolute, but is only meaningful in differential relations to other positions. Third, the term due needs some further explanation. To be short, perhaps a bit too short, being due means a certain process is ordered to happen at a given temporal position. But the ambiguity of this definition is raised by Driesch himself, when he admits that there is “the question whether an embryonic process n happens to be realized because the process n − 1 has occurred or because the result of this process does exist.” (p. 76) In other words, it remains doubtful if the “cause” of the event at question is the physical-chemical manifestations of the preceding process, or rather a yet unknown regulative mechanism at work.
From these points, we could conclude with Driesch that biological time really is harmonious. First, there is a pre-established order in which a manifold of processes are fit, or, since both words are used to translate the same Greek word, harmonized. Second, as the manifoldness is retained while each maintains its independence from others in a differential structure, we could say this is a harmony of parts rather than one indivisible whole. And from here we have to raise the question, why does this temporal harmony not show up in the later list of kinds of harmonies?
Some might argue that it does show up and might suggest us taking each harmony kind for close examinations. This task I would gladly undertake. The first kind of harmony is the harmony that achieves a whole organism at the end of all independent processes. The fact that this harmony only shows up at the end of development is sufficient for its elimination as a possible candidate standing for the temporal harmony. Temporal harmony is a harmony that is retained in progress, that is, at every minute stage of its development. It does implicate the harmony as an end result, but is not reducible to the final outcome. The second kind seems to be a more appropriate candidate: this harmony dictates the “unfailing relative condition of formative causes and cause-recipients” (p. 78), and what can be more germane to time than causality? However, by second glance, the ambiguity once brought up returns. At this stage, Driesch himself does not yet know if temporal positioning results from “real” “manifest” physical-chemical causality or some other regulations, then how is it possible to arbitrate that the temporal harmony is equivalent to the harmonious relation between cause and effect? In other words, if it turns out that temporal positioning requires no cause-effect relationship, it still remains harmonious, only not of the causal kind. Thus these two harmonies, though related, are irreducible. And the final kind, viz. the harmony of different functions of the organism, is farther removed from the temporal one, since time is primarily linked to existence and how it endures, rather than how it is used and handled. Thus, it becomes clear, but no less curious, that in this threefold harmony, time does not have its place.
Why is it? It would not be without benefits if we take one crucial remark of his into account. In his summary of Spemann’s and Mangold’s experiments, Driesch observes how “it seems as if there were a continuous stream of becoming at the basis of the embryological process, of which the visible embryonic phases are nothing but indexes.” (p. 76) To spell out the full significance of this insight, it would be necessary to address some possible oppositions. It might be said that this is a mere summary of one particular experiment and should not be taken out of its context and be overgeneralized. However, the person who raises this argument simply is not seeing how this remark is meant to be a general one, as just right after this summary Driesch claims “all this relates to embryology proper exclusively” (p. 76). Or, it might be argued that this is a mere assumption on his part and thus no positive or definitive conclusion can be drawn out of it. But it should be noted that here I am more interested in analyzing the thought of Driesch and following his footsteps to see where it can lead up to rather than trying to make up one scientific theory. These are my guideline motivations that I shall not stray from.
Now, we can return to this passage. Here, time is portrayed as a continuous stream of becoming that underlies all phases. However, this portrayal is, to say the least, ambiguous. We have to venture different interpretations to see which one seems to fit the most. First, is Driesch simply saying that time is that which is shown after every seemingly static phase is magnified to include every minute movement? This is not so for he says “this ultimate continuous foundation seems to give its temporal position to every single embryological performance” (p. 76); this stream is thus not merely a chaotic flux but also plays a determinant role. Then, is Driesch here saying that time is the ultimate cause of different phases? This seems to be implausible, as Driesch views time as a foundation, not a cause. Foundation is that which proffers possibility, instead of causal necessity. Foundation is that which makes it possible to build constructs upon it, rather than the constructing power itself. If the foundation is identified to a cause and the temporal relationship to a causal one, the foundation itself will be involved as one part in the whole process of becoming. But if time is a mere foundation that cannot be a cause, in order to avoid being incorporated into the temporal sequence, then how can it at the same time be the whole that is composed of a continuous series of becoming? In other words, if time is that foundation which is separate from the superficial temporal order, then it will not give forth or impose order upon the sequence by necessity. But if time itself is one primal cause, it cannot stop being one cause among many and thus being assigned one particular temporal position. This is absurd since time is also that whole stream of becoming to which temporal positions only belong as a part; a whole cannot be contained by itself as a part. Some might think that this puzzle can be solved by distinguishing between logical order and temporal order, that is, they might propose that time as a foundation is logically prior but not temporally. But this “solution” neglects two facts. First, the characterization that Driesch gives to the foundational time is not that of a logical category. Rather, it is a concrete experience of “continuous stream.” Second, the relationship, as we have established, between foundational time and temporal order is harmonious; but in a logical a priori construct we either only have imposition of the mental order over nature, or we are at a loss to see how mind and nature can retain their independence while working together. Either way the question remains as how is the foundational time related to manifest time. How can a temporal harmony be maintained while time is forever at odds against itself? Here, time really is out of joint.
But we would not be confident in saying so before another concept is fully examined. That is the concept of cause. Before now, the concept of cause in my discussion has been taken more at its face value, that is, as it is commonly used. Causality thus understood denotes a necessary relationship between one event and the other event that follows upon it. This is not how exactly Driesch would put it. Actually, he talks about causes even before the discussion about time and harmony is elaborated, and there he differentiates two qualified types of causes. The distinction runs as follows.
The first type of causes are those responsible for specifications. It means that these causes make possible for any given change to develop at a certain time, and on which each of these changes is dependent. This is one very curious definition, if we consider how he later calls these causes “prospective potencies”. As he defines it previously in his treatise, a prospective potency denotes a possible fate of the part under question. However, how can that which only gives off possibility be rightly called a cause, when cause seems to always involve a certain necessity? This might be explained away by taking into account the fact that a cause is nearly always determined retroactively. In other words, it is only when the effect has already taken place, a cause which makes this happening possible can be revealed. And it is in this retroactive perspective the cause seems to be influenced by the effect, so that its necessary binding is loosened. It is just like an archaeologist can never speak of causes in full confidence, but can only draw upon her inferences thereof. However, this conception of causes can already raise all the important questions. But we should first finish up the summary of the other type and draw a general conclusion from both.
The second type of causes are responsible for the localization of processes. By these causes taking effect, the locality where a certain developmental process will take place is determined. These are also called stimuli by Driesch. In other words, this type of causes determines where and of what parts of the original equipotential system should be transformed into that specificity.
Now, if we take both types of causes and consider what in general causes are, we would notice how these two types of causes both implicate something going off the wrong track. The stimuli select an initial position in which a transformation would occur, but this is merely selective and could not lead up to the transformation itself. The potencies, on the other hand, give off a scope of future possibilities, yet no binding necessity is inherent in such causes. With both conceptions of causality, the thing that makes it causal in the first place, viz. necessity, seems to be missing.
A further question needs to be posed. We have to ask whether this missing cause is a negligence on part of Driesch himself, or is it missing because it is yet unknown, or is it missing simply because it is not there? And we would need to try out all different possible candidates to fit the lacunae there. First, one might argue, the missing cause is simply a mixture of both the stimulus and the potency. However, once the overall picture is delineated, this proposal can no longer hold. As we formulate, the stimulus determines the locality, that is the starting point, whereas the potency gives possible end results. But how is that scope of possible end results narrowed down to the one actually realized? If this is already fixed by the stimulus, then potency itself would only be one illusion, and the starting place would predetermine the end result through and through, and this would just be one other variant of the evolotio theory. Since the two types of causes do always hold between themselves a lapse of time, with one determining the starting place whereas the other offering the possible end results, this gap does seem to be unbridgeable and is left open for something missing in between. Then, shall we say that missing cause is the actual fate of the embryo? This is unlikely as well, as this has already been termed prospective value by Driesch and can relate to nothing but the ultimate formed organism. This gap can also be shown by how Driesch is characterizing the causal harmony: for him, the unfailing nature of cause and cause-recipient is not a mere fact, but rather one mystery that needs to be formulated into a question. He sets forth the idea of harmony not simply as an observation, but also as a springboard for further inquiry: why and how is there such harmony? What fills up the gap between cause and effect, past and future? What bridges this impossibility and precipitates such a leap of faith? Though at this stage these questions still remain mysterious, I would argue that Driesch is well aware of it and is determined to solve this mystery. But now at least we do know that which is lacking in between, i.e. the missing cause, is not a void, as it has produced and given forth that actualizing power which links the two other causes together to form one unity. Nature just loves to hide.
These are not the only insights Driesch has to share on the concept of cause. Even if this concept is problematic, he still insists that the science of life, or even any other science, cannot be dealt with without it. He contrasts cause with another popular notion called functional dependence. He believes that causality is superior than functional dependence even though he does not specify why. This, however, preference can be explained convincingly now that we have considered time and causality respectively.
Where does functional dependence differ from causality other than the fact that one is an atemporal construct and the other not? A mere functional dependence does not specify any direction in which the events would proceed. To be clear, this preference of temporality does not run against an aspiration to universality or eternity. Even though Driesch does want to establish the general law of the science of life, which he calls the nomothetic ideal, we have to bear in mind that there is a distinction between two universalities. The first is the atemporal type in which things regulated under principles are static and immobile, the ideal of which is Euclidean geometry. The other is a universality that endures and stretches throughout all times, in which things move and change under certain general rules. And if we translate this distinction to our understanding of functional dependence versus causality, we would notice how the latter is inextricable from the universality persisting throughout a continuous stream of becoming while the former is almost entirely self-sufficient and atemporal.
After this is established, we are still unclear why the temporal type of universality is integral to the project of a science of life. Now we need to return to our preliminary analyses of time and cause. First we see how in the temporal harmony there is always that continuous stream of becoming that is underlying the presumably fixed temporal positions. Then, when we inquire into the problem of causality we see there is always a missing cause. So, if it is possible for us to equate that temporal order of fixed positions with the causal relations between events, as is very likely, would not that primordial giving forth of time be exactly that cause gone missing? But here we have to be utmost careful. Since when can I claim causal relations to be the same with temporal order? Is it not the case that I have previously refuted the equivalence between temporal harmony and causal harmony?
It might seem that I am contradicting myself, but this really is not so. For during the course of this paper, the respective conceptions of time and cause have both undergone thorough transformations. Here for clarification I will try to outline the new conceptions. First, time is differentiated into that which gives forth, an original, foundational time, and that fixed temporal order. As for cause, I have delineated one class of relative causes, those which are distributed according to whether they determine the given starting place or the possible prospects, and the missing cause, that ineffable necessity which makes the embryo leap from one phase to another. And in both cases, we would see one side is really the primordial moving force whereas the other either a latency or a manifestation. And it is by this sense, we could equate the moving parts on both sides, or at least we could draw a very close analogy of both. And it is only after this modification that I can reestablish the equivalence of temporal harmony to causal harmony, whereas before, there is really an incompleteness on both sides, with the interrelation between original or foundational time and the sequential order unarticulated and the missing cause not yet brought into the picture. However, we should still maintain that asymmetry even when we are drawing this analogical equivalence: the temporal harmony is solely concerned with happenings, whereas the causal harmony focuses on real manifest relationships between the sequential events. Another asymmetry might be that original time gives temporal positioning, whereas the missing cause connects the already temporally separate cause and cause recipient; and in this sense time is probably more original than causality as such. Indeed, every causality seems to presuppose temporality, but not every temporal occurrence is necessarily a cause or effect of the other. Nonetheless, the analogy still holds since the missing cause is as different from manifest causal relations as original time is from the temporal order: the missing cause itself is not included in the causal chain but only holds the two occurrences together; and this causal relation is a temporal relation.
By establishing this analogical equivalence, the previous paradox of time being both a foundation and a cause can be partially solved. Time is indeed a foundation in the sense that it can never be incorporated into the temporal becoming itself, but it is also a cause in the sense that it gives forth and necessitates all becoming. Original time, as well as the missing cause, being the necessity that is outside of temporal or causal sequence, has the familiar name of freedom.
However, this does not by any means resolve the tension or exhaust the questions that could be asked. This only means a preliminary structure of time and cause intertwined is established. It remains to be seen how harmony proper is possible, e.g. how does the differentiation of time into the original over against the fixed order still retain the integrity of time as one unity? But now we have to move on to our next task, that is to explain why is this integral for the science of life.
By meticulously laying out his experiments and observations, Driesch successfully achieves the task he sets himself to do: to differentiate life from all physical-chemical processes. His whole project culminates in the birth of the idea of E factor, which he conceives as the element of nature that denotes life. But before giving it a more detailed treatment, one would have to resolve an apparent contradiction.
If, that is, functional dependence should not become the ideal of science, then why is Driesch giving the general rule of life in a function format? This, however, only seems to be contradictory. If we again draw upon that previous distinction of two kinds of universalities, we would realize that what Driesch is opposing is not so much the form of mathematical function, but rather the atemporality thereby implied. Here the function does obtain, but only in such a way as not to relegate temporal occurrences out from considerations. We still know perfectly well that it is the three factors that lead to the formed organism, but not vice versa.
Now we could turn to E factor itself. What is this E factor other than the missing cause that necessitates a certain form to occur but not others? If we apply our thought to this function given, which states that the ultimate prospective value is a codetermination of size, location and E, we would notice how the size and position are determinants of the starting place, whereas the equipotentiality of the system offers the prospective potencies; then E factor really is this missing cause that is left. And if we consider how this E factor is really revealed to be a shorthand for that Aristotelian concept of being-at-work-staying-itself, we would not be surprised to draw that equivalence. By this stage, we have established a double relationship, that E factor being synonymous to the missing cause is also synonymous to original time. Once this is established, there would be no wonder how the intimate relationship to temporality and causality is crucial for the science of life and should never be dispensed with. Life, in its essence, is always temporal.
Would this be counter-intuitive? Is it not the case that Driesch seems to treat life as an element that remains stable throughout, as a form that imposes itself upon the material, instead of some mysterious cause, much less time, that amorphous, absolute stream of becoming? This would not be a problem once we see how 1. time as a force endures itself and thus retains a minimum unity; 2. time, no matter being embryological time or not, always entails self-differentiation, which is the basic feature of any life; 3. being-at-work-staying-itself never implicates immobility, but is always a movement involving stability. The more important question that should be drawn from this intimate relationship is that the temporality under discussion here seems to be limited to embryological time, but can time really bear any limit? Does it mean there are always different kinds of time, that there is always the time of an other? Or is Driesch here merely linking time to embryology without limiting the absoluteness of it? Unfortunately these questions can only be raised in a preliminary manner but not dealt with in this paper. One thing that does need to be pointed out is that, original time still retains its form as a stream of becoming, but a cause, even a missing one, seems always to be in singular. Is life, when detached from all manifest processes, more akin to time or causality? Driesch seems to embrace the latter without reservation. But as we have seen in the work of Spemann, this remains to be a problem. Is not Spemann’s description of life as “psychical processes” just reflective of that plural stream of becomings? Indeed, there seems to be two interpretations of E factor whose differences would raise major issues. If the former asymmetries between time and causality are brought into consideration as well, one interpretation would state that E factor, being more akin to original time that gives, is the pouring forth of life; whereas the other would identify E factor to that missing cause which only connects, thus is only one element within nature. We could say the former is the dynamical interpretation, while the latter is the elemental interpretation. But this does not amount to saying that the two interpretations are mutually exclusive; there can be no causal relationship that is not intimate to time as well as no temporality that does not at least involve some kind of causal determination. What I am saying is only the two structures, being as germane to each other as possible, remain irreducible. And this is why I insist in bringing temporality into consideration, together with cause and life; now I hope this motivation is well defended, and in either way the synonymous relationship between time and life is well established.
But time is out of joint. Then life, being necessarily temporal, would also be out of joint. This would not be a question if we consider how the different manifestations of life are not really the E factor itself. Indeed, it seems that, being one element, life is really a monad; it is as if instead of the Cartesian cogito, we have a vivo that is set against the world. If life is in opposition to the chemical-physical world, then how do we live in such a world, and how are we born into this world? How is it possible for things at odds against each other to be held in one harmony? This paradox will not be solved until we abandon the notion of opposition. Life as a phenomenon, as is said by Driesch, is self-differentiation. It is differential, but not oppositional. Or better, we could say, life is positional. To clarify my point, I only need to give one example. With every spatial experience, there are undeniably two dimensions, here and there. It is impossible for me to step out of my being always here, this being here is thus absolute; but this does not stop me from reaching there and changing my position, thus I always remain in some kind of relation to another there. This cannot be considered as waiting for a dialectical resolution, however, since the differences are not to be sublated into one higher unity; rather, the differences are irreducible in every case. In such a differential system, one has absolution in lieu of resolution: each difference is becoming absolute, but still is held in one stream of becoming.
Thus is also the case with life. Life is not at odds with itself; rather, life is the eternal becoming different from itself. Life eternally returns. And this is also the case with life being positionally different from physical-chemical processes as Driesch would be likely to describe; this is not a radical opposition but a difference. They are irreducible but always intertwined in one harmony, like a bow and a lyre. Then, we could also see how other related questions that remain unsolved can be examined under a new light: time, life and causality here are elaborated into one intimate structure of differential harmony. One articulation would encapsulate the relationship in its truth: life is a time-driven cause.
In the concluding passage, it is befitting of me to offer a brief review of the paper as a whole. First, I argue time is a harmonious structure, and from there I both differentiate from and relate the temporal harmony to the causal harmony. Then, I describe the intricate structures of time, causality and life, thus raising the question of alternative conceptions of life different from Driesch. And because of the necessarily intimate relationship among the three structures, it is impossible to substitute temporal cause with atemporal functional dependence. Finally, I offer one example of the spatial differential system as the model for differential harmony, to elucidate the harmonious intimacy within time and life and also between them. And up to this point, it has become possible to address one last question previously raised: namely, why is temporal harmony not included in the list of harmonies? I would argue that, if Driesch is not simply negligent of it (which seems very doubtful as he starts to describe harmony right after talking about time and also describes harmony in a vein reminiscent of his preceding remarks), he is prevented from doing so because his attachment to the elemental interpretation of E factor makes him incapable of taking the pouring forth of time into account.
This paper is in no way not preliminary. Due to the lack of space, most of the important questions can only be touched upon. For instance, merely giving an example in no way explains the phenomenon of differential harmony, and the part and whole problem of time remains untreated in and for itself but is merely glazed over under the tacit agreement of what self-differentiation means, which again presupposes a philosophical framework. But I hope this paper would satisfy as a starting place for further inquiry with many fundamental questions raised.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
莎士比亚锤炼出“时间脱了节”这一伟大诗句时,或许并未料到,这个抓住本质真理的表述会如何响彻数个世纪。时间一旦脱榫,其他一切也都不再如故。生命亦在其中。
汉斯·德里施在其关于生命科学的论著中,以一个著名论断把生命说成独立于化学和物理过程的要素,从而使生命与其多种表现脱离了榫合。本文将尝试从德里施那里汲取材料,探究时间、因果与生命之间的关系。首先,我想指出时间与和谐这两个概念之间潜在的二律背反,并揭示两者之间的张力。随后,我将把“因”(cause,兼有本原〔archē〕之义)这一概念纳入结构之中;德里施认为,因对于生命研究至关重要。这样为预备性的思考奠基之后,我将尝试冒险进入时间与生命相互纠缠的幽暗领域,试图照亮这样一个问题:当时间脱了节,生命可能变成什么。
时间与和谐是两个不同的概念,在德里施那里得到了不同的分析。当我们看到它们有着如此密切的亲缘关系,却又未被他明确联系起来时,这件事本身就值得注意。不过,两者不能相互还原,值得首先各自独立地加以处理。
关于胚胎学与时间的问题,德里施说:“每一个胚胎学过程,都在一个秩序井然的事件序列中占据一个特殊而具体的时间位置,即在这一序列中,它应当发生的那个特殊的相对时刻”(第75页;强调为笔者所加)。这里有三点值得注意。第一,这里的时间秩序是一种客观秩序。事件的序列是预先建立的,每一个时间位置仿佛都被分配给了某个特定的过程。第二,这种时间定位绝不是绝对的,而只有在与其他位置的差异关系中才有意义。第三,应当发生(due)这个说法还需要进一步解释。简短地说——也许过于简短——应当发生意味着,某个过程被安排在一个给定的时间位置发生。但是,德里施本人也提出了这一定义的歧义。他承认存在这样一个“问题:一个胚胎过程n之所以得到实现,是因为过程n − 1已经发生,还是因为这一过程的结果确实存在”(第76页)。换言之,所讨论事件的“因”,究竟是先前过程的物理化学表现,还是一种尚未为人所知、正在起作用的调节机制,仍然存疑。
由此,我们可以和德里施一起得出结论:生物学时间确实是和谐的。首先,存在一个预先建立的秩序,诸多过程被安置其中;或者说,由于“安置”与“和谐”都曾被用于翻译同一个希腊词,这些过程被和谐化了。其次,在一个差异结构中,每个过程都保持着相对于其他过程的独立性,而杂多性也得到保留,因此,我们可以说,这是诸部分的和谐,而非一个不可分割的整体。由此,我们必须追问:为什么这种时间性的和谐,没有出现在后来对和谐种类的列举之中?
有人可能认为它确实出现了,并建议我们仔细检视每一种和谐。我很愿意承担这一任务。第一种和谐,是在所有独立过程结束时实现一个完整有机体的和谐。仅仅这一和谐只在发育结束时出现的事实,就足以把它排除在时间性和谐的可能候选者之外。时间性的和谐,是在进展之中,即在发育的每一个细微阶段中始终得到保持的和谐。它确实蕴含作为最终结果的和谐,但不能被还原为最后的结果。第二种似乎更为合适:这种和谐规定“形成性之因与受因者之间不会失误的相对条件”(第78页);还有什么比因果关系与时间更为密切呢?然而,再仔细看,先前提出的歧义又回来了。到了这一步,德里施自己还不知道,时间定位究竟来自“真实的”“显现的”物理化学因果关系,还是其他调节机制,那么,又如何能够断定时间性的和谐等同于因与果之间的和谐关系?换言之,如果时间定位最终被证明并不需要因果关系,它仍然是和谐的,只不过不是因果性的和谐。因此,这两种和谐尽管相关,却不可相互还原。最后一种,即有机体不同功能的和谐,则离时间性的和谐更远,因为时间首先与存在及其如何绵延有关,而非与存在如何被使用和处置有关。于是,事情变得清楚了,但仍然同样令人好奇:在这三重和谐中,时间并无其位置。
为什么会这样?考虑他的一句关键评论,或许不无裨益。在总结施佩曼与曼戈尔德的实验时,德里施指出:“仿佛在胚胎学过程的根基处,存在着一道连续的生成之流,而可见的胚胎阶段,无非是它的指示”(第76页)。要阐明这一洞见的全部意义,就必须回应一些可能的反对意见。有人可能说,这不过是对某个特定实验的总结,不应脱离语境、被过度泛化。但提出这一论点的人,恰恰没有看到,这句话本来就是一般性的,因为就在这一总结之后,德里施马上宣称:“这一切都专门涉及胚胎学本身”(第76页)。或者,有人可能认为,这不过是他的一个假定,因此不能从中得出任何肯定或确定的结论。但应当注意,我在这里更感兴趣的,是分析德里施的思想,沿着他的足迹看它能通向何处,而不是试图提出一种科学理论。这些是引导我的动机,我不会偏离它们。
现在,我们可以回到这一段话。这里,时间被描绘为一条在所有阶段之下涌动的、连续的生成之流。然而,这一描绘至少是含混的。我们必须尝试不同的解读,看看哪一种最为适合。首先,德里施是否仅仅在说:把每一个看似静止的阶段放大,使其中每一个细微的运动都包含进来,所显现的就是时间?并非如此,因为他说:“这一最终的连续基础,仿佛把时间位置给予了每一种胚胎学表现”(第76页);因此,这条流并非仅仅是混沌的流变,还发挥着规定作用。那么,德里施是否在说,时间是各个不同阶段的最终之因?这似乎也不太可能,因为德里施把时间看作基础,而非因。基础提供的是可能性,而非因果必然性。基础使得在其上建造构造物成为可能,却不是建造的力量本身。如果把基础等同于因,把时间关系等同于因果关系,那么,基础本身就会作为一个部分被卷入整个生成过程。但如果为了避免被纳入时间序列,时间只能是不能充当因的纯粹基础,那么,它又如何能同时成为由连续生成序列构成的整体?换言之,如果时间是与表层时间秩序分离的基础,它就不会必然地生成或强加秩序于那个序列。但如果时间本身是一个原初之因,它就无法避免成为众多因中的一个,并因此被分配一个特定的时间位置。这是荒谬的,因为时间同时又是那一整条生成之流,诸时间位置仅仅作为部分属于它;一个整体不可能作为部分被它自己包含。有人也许认为,只要区分逻辑秩序与时间秩序,就能解决这一难题;也就是说,他们可能提出,作为基础的时间在逻辑上先于其他东西,却不是在时间上先于它们。但这一“解答”忽视了两个事实。第一,德里施对基础性时间的刻画,并不是对某种逻辑范畴的刻画,而是关于“连续之流”的一种具体经验。第二,如前所述,基础性的时间与时间秩序之间的关系是和谐的;但在一种逻辑的先天构造中,要么只有精神秩序对自然的强加,要么我们就无法理解,心灵与自然如何能在共同发挥作用的同时保持各自的独立性。无论哪一种情况,问题都仍然是:基础性的时间如何与显现的时间相关?时间永远与自身相抵牾时,时间的和谐又如何能够保持?在这里,时间确实脱了节。
不过,在充分考察另一个概念之前,我们还不能有把握地这样说。那就是“因”的概念。此前,本文对因这一概念更多地采用了其表面含义,也就是它通常被使用的意义。如此理解的因果性,指称一个事件与随后而来的另一个事件之间的必然关系。但德里施并不完全这样表述。事实上,在展开时间与和谐的讨论之前,他就已经谈到了因,并在那里区分了两种有所限定的因。这一区分如下。
第一种因负责特殊化。这意味着,这些因使任何给定的变化都能够在某个时间发展起来,而每一种变化都依赖于它们。考虑到他随后把这些因称作“前瞻潜能”,这一定义就显得十分奇特。按照他此前在论著中的定义,前瞻潜能指的是所讨论部分的一种可能命运。但是,一个只给予可能性的东西,怎么能被正当地称为因,而因似乎总涉及某种必然性呢?考虑到因几乎总是被回溯性地确定的,这也许就可以解释。换言之,只有当结果已经发生,使这一发生成为可能的因才能被揭示。而恰恰在这种回溯性的视角中,因似乎受到了结果的影响,以至于其必然的约束变得松动。这就像考古学家永远不能完全有把握地谈论因,而只能借助对此所作的推断。然而,对因的这种理解已经可以引出所有重要的问题。不过,我们应该先完成对另一种因的概述,再从两者中得出一般性的结论。
第二种因负责过程的定位。通过这些因的作用,某个发育过程将发生于何处便得到确定。德里施也把它们称为刺激。换言之,这种因规定,原初等势系统的哪些部分、在什么位置,应该被转化为那种特殊性。
现在,如果我们把两种因放在一起,思考“因”一般而言是什么,就会注意到,这两种因都意味着某种偏离了正轨的东西。刺激选择了转化将要发生的起始位置,但这仅仅是选择,不能导致转化本身。另一方面,潜能给出了未来可能性的范围,却没有任何具有约束力的必然性内在于这种因之中。在这两种因果观中,那最初使因果成为因果的东西,即必然性,似乎都不见了。
还需要提出进一步的问题。我们必须问,这个缺失的因,究竟是德里施本人的疏忽,还是因为它尚不为人所知,抑或仅仅因为它并不在那里?我们需要尝试所有不同的可能候选者,来填补这一缺口。首先,有人可能认为,缺失的因不过是刺激与潜能两者的混合。然而,一旦整体图景得到勾勒,这一提议就无法成立了。按照我们的表述,刺激决定位置,也就是起点,而潜能则给出可能的最终结果。但是,那一范围的可能结果,是如何收缩为实际实现的那个结果的?如果这一点已经由刺激所确定,那么潜能本身就只是一个幻觉,起点会彻底预先决定最终结果,而这不过是预成论(evolotio)的另一种变体。由于这两种因之间总有一段时间间隔,一种决定起点,另一种提供可能的结果,所以这一鸿沟似乎无法跨越,并为中间某个缺失的东西保留着空位。那么,我们是否应该说,缺失的因就是胚胎的实际命运?这也不大可能,因为德里施已经把它称作“前瞻值”,它只能与最终形成的有机体相关。这一缺口也可以从德里施对因果和谐的刻画中看出来:对他来说,因与受因者之间不会失误的性质,并非一个纯粹事实,而是一个必须被表述为问题的谜团。他提出和谐观念,不仅把它当作观察结果,还把它当作进一步探究的跳板:为什么以及如何会有这样的和谐?是什么填满了因与果、过去与未来之间的鸿沟?是什么跨越了这一不可能性,促成了这样一次信仰的跃迁?尽管到这一步,这些问题依旧神秘,我仍认为,德里施对此十分清楚,并决意解开这个谜团。不过,现在我们至少知道,中间所缺少的东西,即那个缺失的因,并非虚无,因为它已经产生并给予了那种实现的力量,把另外两种因联系为一个统一体。自然就是喜欢隐藏。
关于“因”这一概念,德里施要告诉我们的洞见并不止于此。即使这一概念问题重重,他仍坚持认为,没有它,生命科学乃至任何其他科学都无法得到处理。他把因与另一个流行概念“函数依赖”相对照。他相信,因果性优于函数依赖,尽管他并未具体说明原因。然而,既然我们已经分别考察了时间与因果,这种偏好现在便能得到有说服力的解释。
除了一个是无时间的构造、另一个不是之外,函数依赖与因果性究竟有何区别?纯粹的函数依赖并不规定事件将沿着哪个方向进展。需要澄清的是,这种对时间性的偏好,并不违背对普遍性或永恒的追求。尽管德里施确实想建立生命科学的一般法则,并把它称作立法性的理想,我们仍必须记住,两种普遍性之间存在区别。第一种是无时间的类型,其中,在原则之下受到规定的事物是静止不动的,其理想是欧几里得几何。另一种则是绵延并贯穿一切时间的普遍性,其中,事物依照某些一般规则运动、变化。如果把这一区分转译到对函数依赖与因果性的理解中,我们就会注意到:后者无法脱离那在连续生成之流中持续着的普遍性,而前者则几乎完全自足,并且是无时间的。
确立这一点之后,我们仍不清楚,为什么时间性类型的普遍性是生命科学这一方案不可或缺的部分。现在,我们必须回到对时间与因的初步分析。首先,我们看到,在时间性的和谐中,那些被设想为固定的时间位置之下,总有一道连续的生成之流。其次,在探究因果性问题时,我们看到,总有一个缺失的因。那么,如果我们能够把由固定位置构成的时间秩序,等同于事件之间的因果关系——而这似乎很有可能——那时间的原初给予,岂不正是那个失踪的因?但这里必须极其谨慎。我何时能够宣称因果关系与时间秩序相同?我此前不是已经反驳过时间性和谐与因果性和谐的等同性了吗?
我似乎在自相矛盾,但事实并非如此。因为在本文的进程中,时间与因各自的概念,都经历了彻底的转变。为了澄清这一点,我将在这里尝试勾勒这两个新概念。首先,时间被区分为那给予者,即原初的、基础性的时间,与固定的时间秩序。至于因,我勾勒出了一类相对的因,它们依照自己规定的是给定起点还是可能前景而被分配;以及那个缺失的因,即使胚胎从一个阶段跃向另一个阶段、无法言说的必然性。在这两种情形中,我们都会看到,一方其实是原初的运动力量,而另一方则是一种潜伏或一种表现。正是在这个意义上,我们可以把两边的运动部分等同起来,或至少可以对两者作出十分密切的类比。也只有经过这一修正,我才能重新建立时间性和谐与因果性和谐的等同性;而在此之前,两边其实都不完整:原初或基础性的时间与序列秩序之间的相互关系尚未得到表达,缺失的因也尚未被带入图景。不过,即便在建立这一类比的等同关系时,我们仍应保留那种不对称性:时间性的和谐只关涉发生,而因果性的和谐则着眼于相继事件之间真实而显现的关系。另一种不对称性也许是,原初时间给予时间定位,而缺失的因则连接已经在时间上分离的因与受因者;在这个意义上,时间也许比因果性本身更加原初。事实上,每一种因果关系似乎都预设着时间性,但并非每一个时间性的发生都必然是另一个发生的因或果。尽管如此,类比仍然成立,因为缺失的因与显现的因果关系之间的差异,正如原初时间与时间秩序之间的差异:缺失的因本身并不被包含在因果链中,它只是把两个发生维系在一起;而这种因果关系,就是一种时间关系。
通过建立这一类比性的等同关系,先前关于时间既是基础又是因的悖论,便可以得到部分解决。在时间永远不能被纳入时间性的生成本身这一意义上,它确实是一种基础;但在它给予并使一切生成成为必然这一意义上,它又是一种因。原初时间与缺失的因,作为位于时间或因果序列之外的必然性,有一个我们熟悉的名字:自由。
然而,这丝毫没有化解张力,也没有穷尽一切可被提出的问题。这只意味着,一个时间与因相互交织的初步结构得以建立。和谐本身如何可能,仍有待考察;例如,时间被区分为原初时间与固定秩序两端时,如何仍然保有时间作为一个统一体的完整性?但现在,我们必须进入下一个任务,即解释为什么这一切对生命科学不可或缺。
通过细致铺陈实验与观察,德里施成功完成了他为自己设定的任务:把生命与一切物理化学过程区分开来。他的整个方案最终在E因子这一观念的诞生中达到顶点;他把它理解为自然中指称生命的要素。但在更详细地处理它之前,我们必须先解决一个表面的矛盾。
也就是说,如果函数依赖不应成为科学的理想,为什么德里施又以函数的形式给出生命的一般法则?不过,这只是看起来矛盾。如果再次借助此前对两种普遍性的区分,我们就会意识到,德里施反对的,与其说是数学函数的形式,不如说是这种形式所蕴含的无时间性。这里,函数确实成立,但它成立的方式,并不会把时间性的发生排除在考虑之外。我们仍然十分清楚,是那三个因子导致了有机体的形成,而非相反。
现在可以转向E因子本身了。除了那个使某一种形式而非其他形式必然出现的缺失的因之外,E因子还能是什么呢?如果我们把思想应用于这个给定的函数——它表明,最终的前瞻值由大小、位置与E共同规定——就会注意到,大小与位置规定了起点,而系统的等势性则提供了前瞻潜能;于是,E因子就确实是余下的那个缺失的因。而如果我们考虑到,这个E因子其实最终被揭示为亚里士多德那个“在活动中保持自身(being-at-work-staying-itself)”概念的简写,那么,建立这一等同关系也就不足为奇了。到了这一步,我们建立了一种双重关系:E因子既与缺失的因同义,也与原初时间同义。一旦这一点成立,我们就不会再惊讶于:生命科学与时间性、因果性之间的密切关系为何至关重要,且永远不可舍弃。生命在其本质上始终是时间性的。
这会不会违反直觉?德里施难道不是似乎把生命看作一个自始至终稳定的要素,一种把自身施加于材料的形式,而非某种神秘的因,更不是时间那无定形的、绝对的生成之流吗?只要我们看到如下三点,这就不成问题:1. 时间作为一种力量自身绵延,因此保有最低限度的统一;2. 时间无论是否为胚胎学时间,总蕴含着自我差异化,而这是一切生命的基本特征;3. 在活动中保持自身从来不意味着不动,而总是一种包含稳定性的运动。由这一密切关系引出的更重要问题是:这里讨论的时间性似乎被限制为胚胎学时间,但是,时间真的能够承受任何限制吗?这是否意味着,总有不同种类的时间,总有一个他者的时间?还是说,德里施在这里只是把时间与胚胎学联系起来,并未限制时间的绝对性?遗憾的是,本文只能初步提出这些问题,而不能加以处理。不过,有一点必须指出:原初时间仍保有生成之流的形式,而因,即便是一个缺失的因,似乎总是单数的。生命一旦与所有显现的过程分离,它究竟更接近时间,还是更接近因果性?德里施似乎毫无保留地拥抱了后者。但正如我们在施佩曼的工作中所见,这仍然是一个问题。施佩曼把生命描述为“心理过程”,难道不正反映了那一条复数的生成之流吗?事实上,对E因子似乎存在两种解释,它们之间的差异会引出重大问题。如果把此前时间与因果性之间的不对称也纳入考虑,一种解释会说,E因子更接近那给予的原初时间,因此它是生命的涌出;而另一种解释则会把E因子等同于那个仅仅进行连接的缺失的因,因而它只是自然内部的一个要素。我们可以把前者称为动力性解释,把后者称为要素性解释。但这并不意味着两种解释彼此排斥;不存在不与时间密切相关的因果关系,正如不存在至少不涉及某种因果规定的时间性。我所说的仅仅是:这两个结构,尽管彼此尽可能密切相关,仍然不可相互还原。这也正是为什么我坚持把时间性与因、生命一起纳入考虑。现在,我希望这一动机已经得到充分辩护,而无论采取哪种解释,时间与生命之间的同义关系都已得到确立。
但是,时间脱了节。那么,必然具有时间性的生命,也会脱节。如果考虑到生命的各种表现其实并非E因子本身,这本不应成为问题。事实上,作为一个要素,生命似乎真的是一个单子;仿佛我们不再拥有笛卡尔式的我思(cogito),而是拥有一个与世界相对而立的我活(vivo)。如果生命与化学物理世界相对立,那么,我们又如何在这样一个世界中活着,又如何诞生于这个世界?彼此抵牾的事物,如何能够被维系在同一种和谐之中?只有放弃对立观念,这个悖论才能得到解决。正如德里施所说,生命作为一种现象,是自我差异化。它是差异性的,而非对立性的。或者,更确切地说,我们可以说,生命是位置性的。要澄清这一点,我只需举一个例子。每一种空间经验,无可否认都包含两个维度:此处与彼处。我不可能走出自己的始终在此,因此,这一在此是绝对的;但这并不妨碍我抵达彼处、改变位置,所以我总与另一个彼处保持某种关系。然而,不能把这理解为等待辩证解决的状态,因为这些差异并不是要被扬弃为一个更高的统一体;相反,在每一种情形中,差异都不可还原。在这样的差异系统中,人们得到的是解缚(absolution),而非解决(resolution):每一种差异都在成为绝对者,却仍被维系于同一条生成之流中。
生命亦是如此。生命并不与自身抵牾;相反,生命是永恒地变得不同于自身。生命永恒回归。生命与物理化学过程在位置上有所不同——德里施或许会这样描述——也是同样的情形;这不是一种根本的对立,而是一种差异。两者不可相互还原,却又总在同一种和谐中相互交织,如弓与琴。于是,我们也能看到,其他仍未解决的相关问题,如何可以在新的光照下得到考察:时间、生命与因果性在这里被展开为差异性和谐的一个密切结构。有一个表述能够在其真理中把握这一关系:生命是一种由时间驱动的因。
在结尾,适宜对全文作一个简短回顾。首先,我论证时间是一个和谐的结构,并由此把时间性的和谐与因果性的和谐既区分开,又联系起来。然后,我描述了时间、因果与生命的复杂结构,从而提出了不同于德里施的其他生命观的问题。由于这三个结构之间必然具有密切关系,不可能以无时间的函数依赖替代时间性的因。最后,我以空间的差异系统为例,把它作为差异性和谐的模型,阐明时间与生命各自内部,以及两者之间和谐的密切关系。到了这里,就可以回应此前提出的最后一个问题:为什么时间性的和谐没有被列入诸和谐之中?我认为,如果德里施并非仅仅疏忽了这一点——这似乎十分可疑,因为他在讨论完时间之后便开始描述和谐,而且描述和谐时的思路也令人想起他此前的评论——那么,阻止他这样做的,就是他对E因子的要素性解释的依恋,使他无法把时间的涌出纳入考虑。
本文无论如何都只是初步的。限于篇幅,多数重要问题只能略加触及。例如,仅仅举出一个例子,无论如何都不能解释差异性和谐这一现象;时间的部分与整体问题,也并未得到就其自身的处理,而只是在对“自我差异化”含义的默契之下被一笔带过,这又预设了一个哲学框架。但我希望,本文能够凭借其提出的许多根本问题,成为进一步探究的一个起点。