Gui Ruiyan

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Time, Causality, and Life in Driesch

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When Shakespeare hammers out that great line “time is out of joint” he might have no inkling how this formula, capturing the essential truth, might resound throughout centuries. When time is unhinged, no other thing stays the same. Life is also included.

Hans Driesch, in his essay on the science of life, famously claims life to be an element independent of chemical and physical processes, thus unhinging life from its multiple manifestations. In this paper, I will try to draw materials from Hans Driesch to inquire into the relationship between time, causality and life. First, I want to point out the underlying antinomy between the concepts of time and harmony, and to expose the tension between them. From there, I would incorporate the concept of cause into the structure, which Driesch deems to be essential for the study of life. Thus laying the foundation for preparatory considerations, I would try to venture into that dark realm where time and life is entangled and try to shed light on what, when time is out of joint, life might become.

Time and harmony are two different concepts that receive different analyses in Driesch. This by itself is remarkable when we see how closely akin these two are, and how they are not explicitly related by him. Nevertheless, they are irreducible to each other and deserve to be treated each independently first.

Regarding the problem of embryology and time, Driesch remarks “every embryological process occupies a particular and specific temporal position within a well-ordered sequence of events, i.e. a particular relative (my emphasis) moment in this sequence at which it is due.” (p. 75) Three things are worth noticing here. First, the temporal order here is an objective order. The sequence of events are pre-established, and each temporal position is as if assigned to each specific process. Second, the temporal positioning is in no way absolute, but is only meaningful in differential relations to other positions. Third, the term due needs some further explanation. To be short, perhaps a bit too short, being due means a certain process is ordered to happen at a given temporal position. But the ambiguity of this definition is raised by Driesch himself, when he admits that there is “the question whether an embryonic process n happens to be realized because the process n − 1 has occurred or because the result of this process does exist.” (p. 76) In other words, it remains doubtful if the “cause” of the event at question is the physical-chemical manifestations of the preceding process, or rather a yet unknown regulative mechanism at work.

From these points, we could conclude with Driesch that biological time really is harmonious. First, there is a pre-established order in which a manifold of processes are fit, or, since both words are used to translate the same Greek word, harmonized. Second, as the manifoldness is retained while each maintains its independence from others in a differential structure, we could say this is a harmony of parts rather than one indivisible whole. And from here we have to raise the question, why does this temporal harmony not show up in the later list of kinds of harmonies?

Some might argue that it does show up and might suggest us taking each harmony kind for close examinations. This task I would gladly undertake. The first kind of harmony is the harmony that achieves a whole organism at the end of all independent processes. The fact that this harmony only shows up at the end of development is sufficient for its elimination as a possible candidate standing for the temporal harmony. Temporal harmony is a harmony that is retained in progress, that is, at every minute stage of its development. It does implicate the harmony as an end result, but is not reducible to the final outcome. The second kind seems to be a more appropriate candidate: this harmony dictates the “unfailing relative condition of formative causes and cause-recipients” (p. 78), and what can be more germane to time than causality? However, by second glance, the ambiguity once brought up returns. At this stage, Driesch himself does not yet know if temporal positioning results from “real” “manifest” physical-chemical causality or some other regulations, then how is it possible to arbitrate that the temporal harmony is equivalent to the harmonious relation between cause and effect? In other words, if it turns out that temporal positioning requires no cause-effect relationship, it still remains harmonious, only not of the causal kind. Thus these two harmonies, though related, are irreducible. And the final kind, viz. the harmony of different functions of the organism, is farther removed from the temporal one, since time is primarily linked to existence and how it endures, rather than how it is used and handled. Thus, it becomes clear, but no less curious, that in this threefold harmony, time does not have its place.

Why is it? It would not be without benefits if we take one crucial remark of his into account. In his summary of Spemann’s and Mangold’s experiments, Driesch observes how “it seems as if there were a continuous stream of becoming at the basis of the embryological process, of which the visible embryonic phases are nothing but indexes.” (p. 76) To spell out the full significance of this insight, it would be necessary to address some possible oppositions. It might be said that this is a mere summary of one particular experiment and should not be taken out of its context and be overgeneralized. However, the person who raises this argument simply is not seeing how this remark is meant to be a general one, as just right after this summary Driesch claims “all this relates to embryology proper exclusively” (p. 76). Or, it might be argued that this is a mere assumption on his part and thus no positive or definitive conclusion can be drawn out of it. But it should be noted that here I am more interested in analyzing the thought of Driesch and following his footsteps to see where it can lead up to rather than trying to make up one scientific theory. These are my guideline motivations that I shall not stray from.

Now, we can return to this passage. Here, time is portrayed as a continuous stream of becoming that underlies all phases. However, this portrayal is, to say the least, ambiguous. We have to venture different interpretations to see which one seems to fit the most. First, is Driesch simply saying that time is that which is shown after every seemingly static phase is magnified to include every minute movement? This is not so for he says “this ultimate continuous foundation seems to give its temporal position to every single embryological performance” (p. 76); this stream is thus not merely a chaotic flux but also plays a determinant role. Then, is Driesch here saying that time is the ultimate cause of different phases? This seems to be implausible, as Driesch views time as a foundation, not a cause. Foundation is that which proffers possibility, instead of causal necessity. Foundation is that which makes it possible to build constructs upon it, rather than the constructing power itself. If the foundation is identified to a cause and the temporal relationship to a causal one, the foundation itself will be involved as one part in the whole process of becoming. But if time is a mere foundation that cannot be a cause, in order to avoid being incorporated into the temporal sequence, then how can it at the same time be the whole that is composed of a continuous series of becoming? In other words, if time is that foundation which is separate from the superficial temporal order, then it will not give forth or impose order upon the sequence by necessity. But if time itself is one primal cause, it cannot stop being one cause among many and thus being assigned one particular temporal position. This is absurd since time is also that whole stream of becoming to which temporal positions only belong as a part; a whole cannot be contained by itself as a part. Some might think that this puzzle can be solved by distinguishing between logical order and temporal order, that is, they might propose that time as a foundation is logically prior but not temporally. But this “solution” neglects two facts. First, the characterization that Driesch gives to the foundational time is not that of a logical category. Rather, it is a concrete experience of “continuous stream.” Second, the relationship, as we have established, between foundational time and temporal order is harmonious; but in a logical a priori construct we either only have imposition of the mental order over nature, or we are at a loss to see how mind and nature can retain their independence while working together. Either way the question remains as how is the foundational time related to manifest time. How can a temporal harmony be maintained while time is forever at odds against itself? Here, time really is out of joint.

But we would not be confident in saying so before another concept is fully examined. That is the concept of cause. Before now, the concept of cause in my discussion has been taken more at its face value, that is, as it is commonly used. Causality thus understood denotes a necessary relationship between one event and the other event that follows upon it. This is not how exactly Driesch would put it. Actually, he talks about causes even before the discussion about time and harmony is elaborated, and there he differentiates two qualified types of causes. The distinction runs as follows.

The first type of causes are those responsible for specifications. It means that these causes make possible for any given change to develop at a certain time, and on which each of these changes is dependent. This is one very curious definition, if we consider how he later calls these causes “prospective potencies”. As he defines it previously in his treatise, a prospective potency denotes a possible fate of the part under question. However, how can that which only gives off possibility be rightly called a cause, when cause seems to always involve a certain necessity? This might be explained away by taking into account the fact that a cause is nearly always determined retroactively. In other words, it is only when the effect has already taken place, a cause which makes this happening possible can be revealed. And it is in this retroactive perspective the cause seems to be influenced by the effect, so that its necessary binding is loosened. It is just like an archaeologist can never speak of causes in full confidence, but can only draw upon her inferences thereof. However, this conception of causes can already raise all the important questions. But we should first finish up the summary of the other type and draw a general conclusion from both.

The second type of causes are responsible for the localization of processes. By these causes taking effect, the locality where a certain developmental process will take place is determined. These are also called stimuli by Driesch. In other words, this type of causes determines where and of what parts of the original equipotential system should be transformed into that specificity.

Now, if we take both types of causes and consider what in general causes are, we would notice how these two types of causes both implicate something going off the wrong track. The stimuli select an initial position in which a transformation would occur, but this is merely selective and could not lead up to the transformation itself. The potencies, on the other hand, give off a scope of future possibilities, yet no binding necessity is inherent in such causes. With both conceptions of causality, the thing that makes it causal in the first place, viz. necessity, seems to be missing.

A further question needs to be posed. We have to ask whether this missing cause is a negligence on part of Driesch himself, or is it missing because it is yet unknown, or is it missing simply because it is not there? And we would need to try out all different possible candidates to fit the lacunae there. First, one might argue, the missing cause is simply a mixture of both the stimulus and the potency. However, once the overall picture is delineated, this proposal can no longer hold. As we formulate, the stimulus determines the locality, that is the starting point, whereas the potency gives possible end results. But how is that scope of possible end results narrowed down to the one actually realized? If this is already fixed by the stimulus, then potency itself would only be one illusion, and the starting place would predetermine the end result through and through, and this would just be one other variant of the evolotio theory. Since the two types of causes do always hold between themselves a lapse of time, with one determining the starting place whereas the other offering the possible end results, this gap does seem to be unbridgeable and is left open for something missing in between. Then, shall we say that missing cause is the actual fate of the embryo? This is unlikely as well, as this has already been termed prospective value by Driesch and can relate to nothing but the ultimate formed organism. This gap can also be shown by how Driesch is characterizing the causal harmony: for him, the unfailing nature of cause and cause-recipient is not a mere fact, but rather one mystery that needs to be formulated into a question. He sets forth the idea of harmony not simply as an observation, but also as a springboard for further inquiry: why and how is there such harmony? What fills up the gap between cause and effect, past and future? What bridges this impossibility and precipitates such a leap of faith? Though at this stage these questions still remain mysterious, I would argue that Driesch is well aware of it and is determined to solve this mystery. But now at least we do know that which is lacking in between, i.e. the missing cause, is not a void, as it has produced and given forth that actualizing power which links the two other causes together to form one unity. Nature just loves to hide.

These are not the only insights Driesch has to share on the concept of cause. Even if this concept is problematic, he still insists that the science of life, or even any other science, cannot be dealt with without it. He contrasts cause with another popular notion called functional dependence. He believes that causality is superior than functional dependence even though he does not specify why. This, however, preference can be explained convincingly now that we have considered time and causality respectively.

Where does functional dependence differ from causality other than the fact that one is an atemporal construct and the other not? A mere functional dependence does not specify any direction in which the events would proceed. To be clear, this preference of temporality does not run against an aspiration to universality or eternity. Even though Driesch does want to establish the general law of the science of life, which he calls the nomothetic ideal, we have to bear in mind that there is a distinction between two universalities. The first is the atemporal type in which things regulated under principles are static and immobile, the ideal of which is Euclidean geometry. The other is a universality that endures and stretches throughout all times, in which things move and change under certain general rules. And if we translate this distinction to our understanding of functional dependence versus causality, we would notice how the latter is inextricable from the universality persisting throughout a continuous stream of becoming while the former is almost entirely self-sufficient and atemporal.

After this is established, we are still unclear why the temporal type of universality is integral to the project of a science of life. Now we need to return to our preliminary analyses of time and cause. First we see how in the temporal harmony there is always that continuous stream of becoming that is underlying the presumably fixed temporal positions. Then, when we inquire into the problem of causality we see there is always a missing cause. So, if it is possible for us to equate that temporal order of fixed positions with the causal relations between events, as is very likely, would not that primordial giving forth of time be exactly that cause gone missing? But here we have to be utmost careful. Since when can I claim causal relations to be the same with temporal order? Is it not the case that I have previously refuted the equivalence between temporal harmony and causal harmony?

It might seem that I am contradicting myself, but this really is not so. For during the course of this paper, the respective conceptions of time and cause have both undergone thorough transformations. Here for clarification I will try to outline the new conceptions. First, time is differentiated into that which gives forth, an original, foundational time, and that fixed temporal order. As for cause, I have delineated one class of relative causes, those which are distributed according to whether they determine the given starting place or the possible prospects, and the missing cause, that ineffable necessity which makes the embryo leap from one phase to another. And in both cases, we would see one side is really the primordial moving force whereas the other either a latency or a manifestation. And it is by this sense, we could equate the moving parts on both sides, or at least we could draw a very close analogy of both. And it is only after this modification that I can reestablish the equivalence of temporal harmony to causal harmony, whereas before, there is really an incompleteness on both sides, with the interrelation between original or foundational time and the sequential order unarticulated and the missing cause not yet brought into the picture. However, we should still maintain that asymmetry even when we are drawing this analogical equivalence: the temporal harmony is solely concerned with happenings, whereas the causal harmony focuses on real manifest relationships between the sequential events. Another asymmetry might be that original time gives temporal positioning, whereas the missing cause connects the already temporally separate cause and cause recipient; and in this sense time is probably more original than causality as such. Indeed, every causality seems to presuppose temporality, but not every temporal occurrence is necessarily a cause or effect of the other. Nonetheless, the analogy still holds since the missing cause is as different from manifest causal relations as original time is from the temporal order: the missing cause itself is not included in the causal chain but only holds the two occurrences together; and this causal relation is a temporal relation.

By establishing this analogical equivalence, the previous paradox of time being both a foundation and a cause can be partially solved. Time is indeed a foundation in the sense that it can never be incorporated into the temporal becoming itself, but it is also a cause in the sense that it gives forth and necessitates all becoming. Original time, as well as the missing cause, being the necessity that is outside of temporal or causal sequence, has the familiar name of freedom.

However, this does not by any means resolve the tension or exhaust the questions that could be asked. This only means a preliminary structure of time and cause intertwined is established. It remains to be seen how harmony proper is possible, e.g. how does the differentiation of time into the original over against the fixed order still retain the integrity of time as one unity? But now we have to move on to our next task, that is to explain why is this integral for the science of life.

By meticulously laying out his experiments and observations, Driesch successfully achieves the task he sets himself to do: to differentiate life from all physical-chemical processes. His whole project culminates in the birth of the idea of E factor, which he conceives as the element of nature that denotes life. But before giving it a more detailed treatment, one would have to resolve an apparent contradiction.

If, that is, functional dependence should not become the ideal of science, then why is Driesch giving the general rule of life in a function format? This, however, only seems to be contradictory. If we again draw upon that previous distinction of two kinds of universalities, we would realize that what Driesch is opposing is not so much the form of mathematical function, but rather the atemporality thereby implied. Here the function does obtain, but only in such a way as not to relegate temporal occurrences out from considerations. We still know perfectly well that it is the three factors that lead to the formed organism, but not vice versa.

Now we could turn to E factor itself. What is this E factor other than the missing cause that necessitates a certain form to occur but not others? If we apply our thought to this function given, which states that the ultimate prospective value is a codetermination of size, location and E, we would notice how the size and position are determinants of the starting place, whereas the equipotentiality of the system offers the prospective potencies; then E factor really is this missing cause that is left. And if we consider how this E factor is really revealed to be a shorthand for that Aristotelian concept of being-at-work-staying-itself, we would not be surprised to draw that equivalence. By this stage, we have established a double relationship, that E factor being synonymous to the missing cause is also synonymous to original time. Once this is established, there would be no wonder how the intimate relationship to temporality and causality is crucial for the science of life and should never be dispensed with. Life, in its essence, is always temporal.

Would this be counter-intuitive? Is it not the case that Driesch seems to treat life as an element that remains stable throughout, as a form that imposes itself upon the material, instead of some mysterious cause, much less time, that amorphous, absolute stream of becoming? This would not be a problem once we see how 1. time as a force endures itself and thus retains a minimum unity; 2. time, no matter being embryological time or not, always entails self-differentiation, which is the basic feature of any life; 3. being-at-work-staying-itself never implicates immobility, but is always a movement involving stability. The more important question that should be drawn from this intimate relationship is that the temporality under discussion here seems to be limited to embryological time, but can time really bear any limit? Does it mean there are always different kinds of time, that there is always the time of an other? Or is Driesch here merely linking time to embryology without limiting the absoluteness of it? Unfortunately these questions can only be raised in a preliminary manner but not dealt with in this paper. One thing that does need to be pointed out is that, original time still retains its form as a stream of becoming, but a cause, even a missing one, seems always to be in singular. Is life, when detached from all manifest processes, more akin to time or causality? Driesch seems to embrace the latter without reservation. But as we have seen in the work of Spemann, this remains to be a problem. Is not Spemann’s description of life as “psychical processes” just reflective of that plural stream of becomings? Indeed, there seems to be two interpretations of E factor whose differences would raise major issues. If the former asymmetries between time and causality are brought into consideration as well, one interpretation would state that E factor, being more akin to original time that gives, is the pouring forth of life; whereas the other would identify E factor to that missing cause which only connects, thus is only one element within nature. We could say the former is the dynamical interpretation, while the latter is the elemental interpretation. But this does not amount to saying that the two interpretations are mutually exclusive; there can be no causal relationship that is not intimate to time as well as no temporality that does not at least involve some kind of causal determination. What I am saying is only the two structures, being as germane to each other as possible, remain irreducible. And this is why I insist in bringing temporality into consideration, together with cause and life; now I hope this motivation is well defended, and in either way the synonymous relationship between time and life is well established.

But time is out of joint. Then life, being necessarily temporal, would also be out of joint. This would not be a question if we consider how the different manifestations of life are not really the E factor itself. Indeed, it seems that, being one element, life is really a monad; it is as if instead of the Cartesian cogito, we have a vivo that is set against the world. If life is in opposition to the chemical-physical world, then how do we live in such a world, and how are we born into this world? How is it possible for things at odds against each other to be held in one harmony? This paradox will not be solved until we abandon the notion of opposition. Life as a phenomenon, as is said by Driesch, is self-differentiation. It is differential, but not oppositional. Or better, we could say, life is positional. To clarify my point, I only need to give one example. With every spatial experience, there are undeniably two dimensions, here and there. It is impossible for me to step out of my being always here, this being here is thus absolute; but this does not stop me from reaching there and changing my position, thus I always remain in some kind of relation to another there. This cannot be considered as waiting for a dialectical resolution, however, since the differences are not to be sublated into one higher unity; rather, the differences are irreducible in every case. In such a differential system, one has absolution in lieu of resolution: each difference is becoming absolute, but still is held in one stream of becoming.

Thus is also the case with life. Life is not at odds with itself; rather, life is the eternal becoming different from itself. Life eternally returns. And this is also the case with life being positionally different from physical-chemical processes as Driesch would be likely to describe; this is not a radical opposition but a difference. They are irreducible but always intertwined in one harmony, like a bow and a lyre. Then, we could also see how other related questions that remain unsolved can be examined under a new light: time, life and causality here are elaborated into one intimate structure of differential harmony. One articulation would encapsulate the relationship in its truth: life is a time-driven cause.

In the concluding passage, it is befitting of me to offer a brief review of the paper as a whole. First, I argue time is a harmonious structure, and from there I both differentiate from and relate the temporal harmony to the causal harmony. Then, I describe the intricate structures of time, causality and life, thus raising the question of alternative conceptions of life different from Driesch. And because of the necessarily intimate relationship among the three structures, it is impossible to substitute temporal cause with atemporal functional dependence. Finally, I offer one example of the spatial differential system as the model for differential harmony, to elucidate the harmonious intimacy within time and life and also between them. And up to this point, it has become possible to address one last question previously raised: namely, why is temporal harmony not included in the list of harmonies? I would argue that, if Driesch is not simply negligent of it (which seems very doubtful as he starts to describe harmony right after talking about time and also describes harmony in a vein reminiscent of his preceding remarks), he is prevented from doing so because his attachment to the elemental interpretation of E factor makes him incapable of taking the pouring forth of time into account.

This paper is in no way not preliminary. Due to the lack of space, most of the important questions can only be touched upon. For instance, merely giving an example in no way explains the phenomenon of differential harmony, and the part and whole problem of time remains untreated in and for itself but is merely glazed over under the tacit agreement of what self-differentiation means, which again presupposes a philosophical framework. But I hope this paper would satisfy as a starting place for further inquiry with many fundamental questions raised.