Freshman annual essay ·
The Promise of Time
An Inquiry into the Presentation of Time in Plato’s Timaeus
In this essay 篇目
“ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην οὐκ ἔστιν.” - Timaeus, 22b
It all begins with a counting. One, two, three...... Socrates is counting the people present, those who were entertained by his speech yesterday, and who promised to give a speech today in return. This dialogue - or shall we say, a monologue? a speech of one person? - thus starts with that mysterious word, the word that confounds Parmenides to such an extent that he claims Socrates to be yet too young to learn of that difficulty.
But Socrates concludes the counting with something no less mysterious: at the end, he discovers that one person is absent. This person has no identity. All we know is the mere fact that he was one of the guests that were received by Socrates yesterday, and cannot be present today due to his illness. He breaks his promise, unwillingly (according to Timaeus, 17a), of entertaining Socrates in return.
A counting. A promise. From the very beginning, the problematic of time is inscribed into Timaeus. And not only at the beginning: this inscription is throughout the whole body of this text, like a crack, problematizing the speech, confusing it, making it dangerous. Just like every promise is, and should be, always at danger, always at the brink of its own non-fulfillment, this danger is transmitted to Timaeus’ own speech, as he promises to speak, “beginning from the birth of the cosmos and ending with the nature of man” (27a). Does he fulfill his promise? Can his promise ever be fulfilled? These are pressing questions, timely, timely questions.
But I should stop here, since the time is promising and it is not wise to waste it. Instead, I should advance courageously, with a prayer, with the promise, to dive into the whole problematic of time raised by Timaeus, as a part of his fulfillment of the promise: a dangerous promise......
I. Cosmos
What is time?
Timaeus seems, prima facie, definitive in answering this question. His statement of what time is runs as follows: “just as [the artisan god is] putting heaven in array, he makes of eternity, which abides in unity, an eternal likeness that goes according to number, that very thing we have named time” (37d). Here, time is claimed to be a “likeness that goes (moves) according to number”. The meaning of this phrase is the first thing I will examine.
Movement (εἶμι) as such is different from what we understand to be change, for the fact that movement always involves a direction. A change can occur qualitatively, like the yellowing of leaves in fall. But this change, in itself, does not have a particular direction. That is why we do not say the leaves are moving as in yellowing. Or when we add more salt into water, water is not said to move, but only to change into a saltier state. Now, since a likeness, or an image, is said to move, a latent directionality is implied and needs to be elucidated.
What kind of directionality does an image have? The kind most pertinent to our current study is the direction every image harbors in itself toward the original. It is common experience that, when an image is exhibited as an image, it points to something absent of which the image remains an image. When I see a picture of an acquaintance, the picture is pointing toward that acquaintance himself, or my memory of him. But this directionality is not yet aimed high enough. In both Republic and Phaedo, a power to conjure up ideas is attributed to images and perceptions, so that when seeing images and carefully discriminating them from the originals, we might gain the power to reach an ideal plane. This essential movement toward the pinnacle of dialectic is described in Republic through the expression of the divided line (510a) and the “turning around of the soul” (518d). Or as in Phaedo the ideas themselves, like “big itself” or “small itself”, are said to only be arrived at through the paradoxes generated in perceptions (101a), thus this different piece of text also holds that same kind of allowing for movement as properly belonging to image.
Yet directionality is not movement per se. A pointing toward the originals or the ideas is, at best, only a potential allowing for movement, so that in 19b Socrates is able to speak of his desire to see a still life painting of animals be transformed into motion. Then, how should the actualization of this potential to move occur?
In the case of a still life painting, it is rather difficult to say that the painting itself is moving toward the original or has any potential to. However, we recollect the original and our souls turn around, following the course laid down first within the image through that very directionality. In other words, my soul moves together with and guided by the image toward the original (a turning around, of course, does not imply any success of reaching the target; but it is movement on the part of the soul nonetheless). And, the image as an image, as being perceived and understood, is not outside the soul. The image, then, is animated in and through the soul to move toward the original.
By this interpretation, then, the constitution of the soul should precede the constitution of time as to allow for the movement to be carried out. This is exactly what happens in Timaeus. The constitution of time only fully starts after the completion of the cosmic soul (which is on a different scale from a mere human soul). Yet, a complication ensues: if the movement of the soul is said to be prior to the constitution of time, thus distinguished from time, how is it different?
Does it even make sense to say “prior to the constitution of time”? A time not yet time? It is worth noticing, however, that at least some sense of “a time not yet” is already implied in the definition of time in 37d. For instance, words like “just as” (ἅμα) and “abiding” (μένοντος), which seem to involve some temporal significations, are used to describe things not absorbed by time, like “putting heaven into array” and “eternity”. But before addressing this question of a time not yet, it is necessary to first determine what time is in Timaeus. At this point, I will only attempt to distinguish the two movements, i.e. the movement of the cosmic soul and the movement of time.
One defining distinction of the two movements is the respective absence and presence of visible bodies. In the description of the cosmic soul, we witness a circular motion at play: the circuits of Same and Other are said to transmit the message of occurrences throughout the soul (37b). The motion is said to be “wheeling smoothly” (37c) and the account (the message) swept along “without sound and noise” (37b). The smoothness here suggests an uninhibited motion, as if the circuits are both oiled so that no sound is made. What is the significance of this reference to sound? How do sound and noise matter specifically in this context? One likely interpretation has to do with the essential deferring characteristic of sound. Sound signifies a distance, a deferral from the true idea. Sound communicates and transmits only a delayed message the original of which lies buried within the mind of the other. But in the smooth wheeling motion of the cosmic soul, there is neither delay nor disturbance. This amounts to saying that, in the movement of the cosmic soul, the idea (original) is too close to the visible representation of it (likeness). The reduced distance between the original and the image incurs a necessary difficulty: if the image is reduced to the original, how should the movement maintain itself without collapsing into a state of self-sameness? The movement of the cosmic soul would be so swift that within it everything happens everywhere all at once so that there is hardly any time at all, and the image cannot be differentiated from the original. It is true that the particular things are said to be assigned to Same and Other depending on whether it is the same or the other, so there retains some differentiation between the realm of sensible things and ideas. But the differentiation in such an undisturbed movement is too small to be either noticeable or calculated. Therefore, time is impossible to be even as the movement of the cosmic soul, since time, qua image, requires a maintained distance between the image and its original. Accordingly, we see how underlying the constitution of time is really a principle of distance. And this proffers a whole new spatial dimension right in the middle of the problematic of time, thus foreshadowing the second beginning with χώρα in Timaeus.
Now that I have arrived at the underlying spatial principle, I shall turn to an elucidation of the other part of the expression: viz. what does it mean to “move according to number”? A preliminary clarification is necessary here: though it is not self-obvious that Euclid and Plato share the same understanding of number, let us assume, for present purposes, that they do. Now, let us consider the relation of movement and number.
According to Euclid’s definition, a number is “a multitude composed of units”, and a unit “that by virtue of which each of things that exist is called one”. Here we see a difficulty that parallels the previous difficulty of movement that precedes time: in the same way that a state of movement is characterized as preceding time, in this definition of unit a prior unity as “each” and a prior plurality as “things that exist” are spoken of. Before a number or a unit is even established, there is already a more originary sense of unity and plurality that the definitions of unit and number depend on. To fully determine the sense of number in light of this more originary unity (and plurality), we need to look into our own experience with numbers, that is, with the practice of counting.
One defining trait of number is the distinctness displayed by the countables it collects. If, let us say, two things are totally indistinct to each other, can any counting happen at all? Nor can anything be called one, if it appears to be many and one at the same time. In that case, any counting will be impossible, even if an inherent sense of manifoldness might be expressed, like in Parmenides an indistinguishable mass is spoken of (165b). Thus, the distinction as instituted by number is a difference between indistinct magnitudes and distinct collections of units. Distinctness implies a completeness of the unit, that each unit is oneness itself and cannot be complemented by any other. Different from an indistinct magnitude, a number as a multitude composed of units is a gathering of complete countables: the unit, as oneness itself, has to display a total singularity.
But what can be more complete in itself than the self-same originals, namely, the various units of the intelligible model that the artisan god looks upon? None. Number, under this context, is a multitude of originals. Then, the definition of time is now reinterpreted as a likeness moving according to the collection of originals. But what does this mean?
It first needs to be established that time is not number, but rather moves according to number. Therefore time cannot be in itself the original, but has to imitate the original via its motion, itself belonging to a realm of the “things that exist”. What kind of motion can fulfill this imitation? In 34a, the artisan god is said to have assigned the motion of revolution alone, which is claimed to be “especially attend[ing] intellect and prudence”, to the cosmic animal. If any movement should be spoken of as the most proximate to the originals, it can only be revolution. Why? Because revolution, as constant motion, does not exclude differentiation; yet it always returns to itself, thus maintaining a certain self-sameness. By that very movement, a self-differentiation (a differentiation that remains itself) is achieved, so that the moving thing can mimic that self-sameness of the original, without itself being the original. Time, in order to mimic eternity, has to move in this same way; as it can neither escape from motion or differentiation, nor can it not maintain self-sameness to the highest degree allowed for things that come to be. To move according to number, to the rule of originals, in that aspect, means to revolve.
Another differentiation has to be brought up. Not only is time different from number, time is also not a movement. It is a moving likeness. Therefore, this movement of revolution needs to be brought under the context of the image-original relationship in order to be fully comprehended. If we recall our previous analysis of the dynamic relationship between the image and the original, the perception and the idea, the kind of revolution that involves both can be demonstrated as the following.
Formerly, the dynamic relationship was characterized by two presupposed principles. First, the image and the original are brought under the same yoke of one cosmic soul. Thus, the image reaches for the original as the cosmic soul itself carries out the circling movement. Second, the distance between the image and the original should be maintained, otherwise the image and the original will be reduced into one state of indifference, thus making any movement impossible. To synthesize these two principles of movement, then, results into a palintropic state of motion: the image (or the imagery part of the soul) has to reach for the idea (or the ideal part of the soul) yet always turns about back upon itself. The image cannot lose its distinctness during the course of its circling, if time needs to be; thus by completing the circle, the image returns back upon itself to its original position. The completeness of the circle then only stresses the absolute lack contained within it, i.e. the radical distance from the original. As long as the radical distance between image and original is maintained (radical because the undisturbed movement of the cosmic soul in itself, as illustrated previously, cannot be characterized as time), time obtains.
But so far I have only dealt with this mode of motion in general. It is not yet determined in what way the image, in moving, is like the original, that is, how the directionality from the image to the original is established and maintained in the first place. And now I shall turn to this question.
If what we are dealing with here is really a still life painting, the task will be rather easy. The likeness would be said to be like the original only in a visible way. That is, the image resembles the original since the original has a certain look, which the image also shares. However, this is hardly the case if applied to the realm of εἶδος. Even if εἶδος can also mean “the look”, the look of an idea is not simply another visible image. This is where the former analogy of the image of the acquaintance breaks down: the remembrance triggered in that case is but another image layered with indexes to point toward even further memories, till infinity. But this is not the relationship depicted in this definition of time. Time, in this definition, is said to be nothing more nor less than an image of eternity; yet eternity is not a mere collection of infinite images, but is said to “abide in unity” (37d). The signification here is hard to pinpoint, yet one thing is clear: what is emphasized here of eternity is exactly its oneness.
A revisit to our former determination on the mode of movement of time is useful: I say previously that revolution, in its self-differentiation, most imitates the eternal original in its oneness, i.e. unity, by maintaining itself despite the differentiation. Entertaining this mode of movement, namely revolution, the image can be denoted as a one, as it maintains, in its circling back, its distinctness over and against the original in and through that dynamic relationship. In other words, the image that is time resembles its original not in the visible way (of pointing toward potentially infinite images), but in a more “prudent” and profound way, of sharing the unity of its original via acting as one end of the dynamic relationship over and against eternity, thus itself becoming a complete one, “an eternal likeness”. That is, even though time as a moving image is visible, the way the image refers to (and moves toward) the original is intelligible by remaining a different kind from the original.
To put it in a yet simpler way, we might consider an application of counting on this dynamic relationship. How many parts are involved in this dynamism? Two, from the most basic: the original, and the likeness. The likeness then is itself a countable kind. Being a countable kind, it shares the oneness of the original, and becomes like the original in that very way. This countability of time, however, cannot be achieved without the perception of a circular way of motion: by the perception of a revolution, time exhibits its self-sameness and its differentiation by always returning to the same position in heaven. Time thus exhibits its self-sameness in differentiation as differentiation in a tangible form, by always remaining in the visible realm and refusing to go all the way out into the invisible. Hence the prudence of revolution, i.e. its intelligibility, is not cut off from the sensible, but is exactly expressed by that visible circularity, by its remaining its own kind independent from the invisible space of originals. Throughout, a distance has to be maintained for the movement to hold.
Now, we have yielded a fruitful and adequate discussion on the nuances involved in the short phrase, that time is “an eternal likeness that goes according to number” (37d). From all the things said above, it is to be determined that time is a universal kind of image that moves through palintropic self-differentiation in order to imitate the self-same eternity, by its very distancing from eternity.
II. Chaosmos
Time is not said to be moving according to one, but according to number. Time, hence, should be intrinsically plural, as the universal moving image that holds under its sway particular moving images as (not unconditionally complete) countables to be counted. Yet, to be a countable necessarily means to be one. Time, therefore, should in its very movement articulate an interplay between oneness and manyness.
A general account of time can then be proffered. By its revolution, time, as an image, returns to itself, and the point to which this image always returns is the oneness it partakes of, namely, the image held to be one kind (γένος). Through this very oneness of the image within the image, the image imitates the original. This oneness, however, is not maintained if the image and the original collapse into one; the ἀπορία here is that the image can retain its oneness and be like the original only in so far as it remains absolutely distinct from the original. Therefore, by reaching for the original, the image has to distance itself from it and returns itself to the starting point: an eternal circling is thereby constituted. The movement outlined here thus collects in itself the respective moments of completeness and incompleteness: the complete circling only emphasizes the absolute lack encircled by it. If this account holds, a synthesis between incompleteness and completeness has to be available in the understanding of time: time has to be almost always partial, but as partial ones. This partiality of time is most reflected by the fact that time is less spoken of by Timaeus as a whole after the heavenly bodies are put into their places. Rather, what becomes prominent there is the respective measuring out of heavenly bodies by each other, marking off and guarding the numbers of time (38c), as partial organs of time; the comprehending image of time seems either forgotten, or suppressed.
Something even obscurer, and more threatening, raises its head as the comprehending image of time is suppressed. There in the account, a certain “twisting” is spoken of: that the circling motions of the wanderers are twisted by the circuit of Same (39a). This twisting of the planets not only makes the calculation of time more difficult (is not the miscalculation of time the first cause for the decline of the city in Republic?), but it also raises one other crucial question: why the circuit of Same?
It is already established that, to avoid being reduced to its original, a certain interruption has to be introduced into the heavenly motion. But why does it come from the more constant circuit of Same? There are at least two possible ways to treat of this account, without them being by any sense mutually exclusive. The first interpretation is to link this peculiarity with the subsequent account of human beings, that because human beings are mortals who inhabit a visible and bodily world, they are naturally more akin to the visible parts of time; any contact with the circuit of Same, then, will be a divine interruption from the normal course of perception. The other interpretation wedges in more on the side of the things themselves: that the lack preserved within the very constitution of time has to do with and maintains a certain relationship to the self-sameness described by the circuit of Same.
How can lack be related to self-sameness? How can lack be related to anything? A lack, in relation to X, can only be determined in the sense of “lack of X”. Therefore, it should be determined that the lack, that very interruption within the constitution of time which yet allows for the very constitution, is the lack of self-sameness, the absence of the original. However, this absence of the original is not characterized by Timaeus as an image, since an image is always implicated in a double-bind relationship to the original as one end. Rather, this absence is the very distance that allows for the movement to occur. In a sense, then, this lack is prior to the constitution of time: it is the second beginning, the beginning with χώρα. How is this second beginning anyhow different from the first beginning? Do I not already speak of a movement preceding time (a movement of the cosmic soul) earlier in this paper?
There are some crucial differences between χώρα and the motion of the cosmic soul. To start with, χώρα is not simply an image reduced to the original to a degree of indistinctness, as I establish is the case for the motion of cosmic soul. But is it not in Republic that Socrates defines a dream to “consist in believing a likeness of something to be not a likeness, but rather the thing itself to which it is like” (476c); and is χώρα not spoken of by Timaeus as “the very thing we look to when we dream” (52b)? Indeed. Yet it will be too early to conclude that χώρα is nothing but an image reduced to original - that is, an image getting too close to the original. First, is χώρα not spoken of as some “invisible and shapeless form” (51a), though in a difficult and problematic way? So that whatever image is attached to χώρα, e.g. the wet nurse, the mother, the receptacle, it is known that χώρα itself is none of these. And is χώρα not the very thing, in a partial sense, that allows for image, swept along as a phantasm, to hold fast to Being (52c)? Most importantly, χώρα is characterized, from the start of the second discourse, as a third kind, as one other countable, no matter how difficult it is (49a). By this standard, χώρα retains the subtle distinction from a reduced image: that it is still distinguished, regardless of the danger. Even if χώρα only pertains to dream, it is dream as such, being determined as a dream: a dream only becomes a dream when a person wakes up and reflects upon it in a waking lucidity. Being a third kind, moreover, already suggests that the other two kinds have to be held distinct; if this is the case, how can the two distinct kinds be completely reduced? Anyhow, χώρα cannot be a still-life image that only retains in itself very little motion, like the smooth and soundless circling of the cosmic soul. On the contrary, χώρα always possesses in itself a disequilibrium of powers, a shaking and being-shaken (52e). By these determinations, χώρα can never be reduced to an image that is reduced to the original. Yet the question about the non-linearity of χώρα and its precedence to time remains unaddressed. How does χώρα, itself moving, precede time?
What I am questioning here, essentially, is the localization of χώρα, a spacing of space, in relation to time, and - in so far as time is something “we have named” (37d) - to us. Where are the possible localities? Is χώρα really to be understood as prior to time? If we take the statement in Phaedrus seriously, that the speech “ought to be constructed like a living being [...] it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work” (264c), is it not significant that χώρα is situated at the very middle of this discourse, which is itself a temporal undertaking? But it is also explicitly said in 52d that “Being and Space and Becoming, three in a threefold way, are before the birth of heaven”. How to reconcile all these difficult claims?
Let us assume, for the present, that the localization is “in the middle of time”; it is first to be determined what “middle” means here. In 37e, Timaeus speaks of forms of time, that “ ‘was’ and ‘will be’ are forms of time that have come to be”. As “was” and “will be” take up the two ends of time, the middle then can naturally be determined as the present. The real ambiguity here, however, is whether the present is a form of time or not.
Timaeus does not really address this issue. All he says is that the two forms of time that have come to be are not applicable to the everlasting Being, whereas “is” alone is proper (38a). There is no clarification whatsoever whether “is” is a form of time or not. But there is no explicit argument against the present being a temporal form either, since it might very well be an unconditioned form of time, a form that “has not come to be”. Even when Timaeus says how it is inappropriate to say the everlasting Being “has become so now” (38a) he is not ruling out this possibility, for “has become so now” is already a mode of present contaminated with the past; and it is not unlikely that the present itself should be the proper form applied to Being.
But is this problematic status of the present not like that of χώρα? Does the present, perhaps, share with χώρα this peculiarity, that while it has to be thought in time, it remains somehow related to an outside of time (present to Being, χώρα to itself)?
III. Chronosmos
If χώρα, with respect to time, is located in the present, the present has to be understood in accord with what we have already gathered about χώρα. We say, χώρα is an amorphous form that holds in itself motions of disequilibrium. The present, then, has to be like χώρα in this way: to shake up the self-complacent motion of the cosmic soul and allow for time.
Time is then spaced out in its middle by the present, i.e. the presentation of Being. Yet the presentation of Being is also a presentation of the very absence of Being, as the spacing should signify a radical distance between time and its original, while also relating the image to Being so that the image still clings to Being (52c), for the countability of the image is exhibited through the spacing. What is presented, then, is immediately spaced out and retained, as if it jumps over to the other end, so that the presentation self-splits: the presentation remains no longer itself. By this very description, a new moment comes to be: the past.
But this past is not the past understood in our daily life. This past is the very pastness itself. As the presentation splits into its “being no longer”, it retains in itself the generative power that comes from presentation, a power to generate memories of itself. In other words, the self-splitting presentation gathers within itself a double signification: it is both a presentation that is the source for all images - including memories of itself - and an imaged now point. To put it more concretely, the present is always a mixed texture of the presentation of Being and an image perceived, but the presenting of the absent original is itself the very source of any image. At the very moment of presentation, we perceive images that are generated in the present by the present: the present, in this sense, has surpassed itself into its own past, being the very source of the images we perceive now. The past, retaining its power to present, is a past presentified, and prior to itself: what this prior to really signifies, then, is an atemporal past, a past before all past, the pastness itself that makes temporalization possible. The presentation, then, only circles back upon itself in its becoming past. And as the currently undergone presentation generates images, it also anticipates a new now that is pointed to by those images, and thus, the currently undergone now is spaced out into a future presentified. These encircling presentations describe the completeness of ones: by their very motion, they imitate the complete countables and hence become accorded to numbers. To count in time, then, is to count the presentified circularities, to count them as distinct nows. By this account, the locality of the present itself becomes a constant delocalization and relocalization into past and future. Thus, by starting with one possible locality as our hypothesis, the whole localization itself ends up being shaken. The relation of χώρα and present can be firmly drawn, but the price is a shaking up of the present itself.
Yet is the locality - or better, non-locality - of χώρα not expressed through this very movement of time? Is not the “prior to” of χώρα only understood in light of an understanding of the dynamism between presentation and pastness? It seems that the whole account of grounding time through space can be subverted. What I mean is, instead of grounding time with the spatial principle, as was premised earlier in the paper, it is always possible to arrive at space starting from the groundedness of time. This converse possibility is an implicit premise of this paper, for it was exploited when the spatial principle first appeared, being yielded from the temporal motion. The possibility is now clarified through my presentation of the motion of time, for this movement of time is actually the essential expression of spacing. Here, an ultimate circularity is laid out: a circular co-constitution of time and space, where each constitutes the other as its own complement.
Now it is time for a conclusion. This paper is confined in its scope and perspective, that it primarily inquires into the spatial for the sake of the temporal. This is due to the nature of the subject matter. The goal of this paper is set from the start to be an inquiry into time, not space. Though space is later discovered to be necessary for the inquiry, the course of this paper is still run very different from the other possible presentation in which space is set as the primary object for questioning. This being clarified, I will now turn to a representation of my work to help readers retrace the steps I take in this paper. This representation reflects different phases of this paper as defined by different layers of circularities that essentially characterize time. The four circularities are C1. the visible circular motion of heaven; C2. the circularity between image and the original; C3. a circularity of now and past (including future); C4. the ultimate circularity of time and space. These four circularities are interdependent expressions of one whole, and they often do overlap: C1 describes both a remaining within the visible and a radical outside, namely the absent original, thus expressing C2; C2 relates the very structure of our temporal experience C3 to that spacing of originals; C4 is the ultimate expression of the circularity of time with respect to space. All four circularities pertain to different layers of the signification of time. C1 pertains specifically to the perceived, whereas C2 links up the perceived to the intelligible. C3 is the most properly temporal (yet has to be in a sense atemporal) as it pertains to the forms of time and the structure in which time is experienced. Finally, C4 describes a general co-constitution of space and time. By this summary, the structure and content of this paper is clarified.
The end. The end at which time is dissolved. A dissolved time.
In 41b, the artisan god promises to hold heaven together, alongside time, from a possible dissolution, for his will is good. But at the beginning, the absent fourth is said to be ill despite his will. Then, should we ask if the will of the artisan god is to be trusted? What if time really is dissolved? Will time be saved?
Plato was already an old man when Timaeus was written. Death was on his doorstep. Perhaps also illness. Illness and death: do these things perhaps compose of the final dissolution of time, if not for the whole of time, at least for that part of time we call life? That will be another story, a story in which Plato makes his most beautiful promise, a promise on the soul.
But let things already said and done be. Let gods be prayed to. And let it be said that, for now, I have fulfilled my promise: a promise to promise, a promise to inquire, and a promise to present. If anything, I ask for your forgiveness: please, receive this likely discourse warmly, like a host to a guest.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
“ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην οὐκ ἔστιν.”
“啊,梭伦,梭伦,你们希腊人永远是孩子,希腊人中没有老人。”——《蒂迈欧》,22b
一切始于计数。一、二、三……苏格拉底正在数在场的人:昨天受他言辞款待、并承诺今天以一番言辞作为回报的人。这篇对话——或者我们该说,独白?一个人的言辞?——由此开始于那个神秘的字,那个令巴门尼德如此困惑,以至于他说苏格拉底还太年轻,尚不能理解其中困难的字。
但苏格拉底结束计数时,却发现了一件同样神秘的事:数到最后,他发现有一个人缺席。这个人没有身份。我们只知道,他是昨天受到苏格拉底款待的客人之一,今天却因病不能到场。他并不情愿地——按蒂迈欧在17a的说法——违背了回请苏格拉底的承诺。
一次计数。一个承诺。从一开始,时间的问题就被铭刻进《蒂迈欧》之中。而且不只在开端:这一铭刻贯穿整个文本,如同一道裂缝,使言辞充满问题,使它混淆,使它变得危险。正如每一个承诺总是、也应当总是处于危险之中,处于自身无法兑现的边缘,这种危险也传递给蒂迈欧自己的言辞,因为他承诺,要“从宇宙的诞生开始,以人的自然结束”(27a)。他兑现了承诺吗?他的承诺可能被兑现吗?这些问题迫在眉睫,是适时的、关乎时间的问题。
但我应该就此打住,因为时间充满希望,浪费它并不明智。相反,我应当勇敢地前进,带着祈祷,带着承诺,深入蒂迈欧在兑现其承诺的过程中提出的整个时间问题:一个危险的承诺……
一、宇宙(Cosmos)
什么是时间?
乍看之下,蒂迈欧对这一问题似乎给出了确定的回答。他对时间的陈述如下:“就在[工匠神]安排天穹的秩序时,他为那驻留于统一之中的永恒,造出了一个依数而行的永恒肖像,正是我们称为时间的东西”(37d)。这里,时间被称为一个“依数而行(运动)的肖像”。我首先要考察的,就是这一短语的意义。
运动(εἶμι)本身不同于我们所理解的变化,因为运动总是包含方向。变化可以发生在质的层面,例如秋天树叶变黄。但这一变化本身并没有一个特定的方向。这就是我们不把树叶变黄称为树叶在运动的原因。又如,我们往水里加更多的盐,不会说水在运动,只会说它变得更咸了。现在,既然一个肖像或图像被说成是在运动,那么其中就蕴含着某种潜在的方向性,需要加以阐明。
图像具有什么样的方向性?与我们当前研究最相关的,是每一个图像自身都怀有的、朝向原型的方向。一个图像作为图像展现出来时,会指向某个缺席之物,而图像始终是那个东西的图像;这是普遍的经验。当我看见一位熟人的照片时,照片指向的是那位熟人本人,或我对他的记忆。但这种方向性还没有瞄准足够高的位置。在《理想国》与《斐多》中,图像与感知都被赋予了唤起理念的能力,因此,当我们看见图像,并仔细区分图像与原型时,就可能获得抵达理念平面的能力。这个朝向辩证法顶点的根本运动,在《理想国》中通过分割线(510a)与“灵魂的转向”(518d)得到描述。或者,如《斐多》所说,“大本身”“小本身”之类的理念本身,只有通过感知中产生的悖论才能抵达(101a);因此,这另一篇文本也同样主张,允许运动这一特性本来就属于图像。
但方向性并非运动本身。指向原型或理念,充其量只是一种允许运动的潜能;因此在19b,苏格拉底才能说,他渴望看见画中静止的动物活动起来。那么,这一运动潜能的实现应当怎样发生?
在静止的绘画这一情形中,我们很难说画本身朝着原型运动,或者具有这种潜能。但我们回忆原型,我们的灵魂沿着图像通过那种方向性预先铺设的路线转向。换句话说,我的灵魂与图像一道,在图像的引导下朝原型运动——当然,转向并不意味着成功抵达目标,但无论如何,它都是灵魂一方的运动。而图像作为被感知、被理解的图像,并不在灵魂之外。因此,图像在灵魂之中并通过灵魂被赋予生命,朝原型运动。
按照这一解释,灵魂的构成应当先于时间的构成,以便让这一运动得以实行。《蒂迈欧》中发生的正是如此。只有在宇宙灵魂完成之后——宇宙灵魂与仅仅一个人的灵魂有着不同的尺度——时间的构成才充分开始。但复杂之处随即出现:如果灵魂的运动被说成先于时间的构成,因而有别于时间,那么二者究竟如何不同?
“先于时间的构成”这种说法,甚至有意义吗?一种尚未是时间的时间?不过值得注意的是,37d对时间的定义,已经至少蕴含着“尚未之时间”的某种意义。例如,“就在”(ἅμα)与“驻留”(μένοντος)这类似乎包含时间意涵的词,被用来描述尚未被时间吸收的事物,如“安排天穹的秩序”与“永恒”。但在处理尚未之时间的问题之前,必须先确定《蒂迈欧》中的时间究竟是什么。此刻,我只尝试区分这两种运动,即宇宙灵魂的运动与时间的运动。
两种运动的一个决定性区别,是可见物体分别在其中缺席与在场。在对宇宙灵魂的描述中,我们看见一种环形运动正在运作:“同”与“异”的回环将发生之事的消息传遍灵魂(37b)。这种运动被说成是“平顺地旋转”(37c),而说明——消息——“无声无响”地随之流传(37b)。这里的平顺暗示着一种毫无阻碍的运动,仿佛两个回环都上了油,因而不发出任何声音。这一对声音的提及有何意义?声音与噪音在这里具体为何重要?一种可能的解释涉及声音本质上的延宕特征。声音意味着距离,意味着相对于真实理念的延宕。声音只交流、传递迟到的消息,而它的原本深藏于他人的心灵之中。但在宇宙灵魂平顺的旋转运动中,既没有迟延,也没有扰动。这等于说,在宇宙灵魂的运动中,理念(原型)与其可见表征(肖像)靠得太近了。原型与图像之间距离的缩小,必然招致一个困难:如果图像被还原为原型,运动又如何维持自身,而不坍塌为自同一的状态?宇宙灵魂的运动会如此迅疾,以至于其中一切事物都在每一个地方同时发生,几乎不再有时间,图像也无法与原型区别。确实,个别事物据说会依其是同还是异而被分派给“同”与“异”,因此可感事物与理念的领域之间仍保有某种差别。但在这种不受扰动的运动中,差别太小,既无法被注意,也无法被计算。因此,时间即便作为宇宙灵魂的运动也不可能成立,因为时间作为图像,要求图像与原型之间维持一定的距离。由此我们看见,时间构成的底层其实是一条距离原则。这在时间问题的正中引入了一个全新的空间维度,预示着《蒂迈欧》中以χώρα开始的第二次开端。
既然已经抵达底层的空间原则,我将转而阐明那个表述的另一部分:所谓“依数而运动”究竟是什么意思?这里需要先作一项澄清:欧几里得与柏拉图对数是否具有相同理解,这并非不言自明,但为了眼下的目的,我们暂且假定如此。现在,让我们考察运动与数的关系。
按照欧几里得的定义,数是“由单位组成的多”,而单位是“每一个在着的事物凭之被称为一的东西”。这里出现了一个困难,与先前关于先于时间的运动的困难相互平行:正如某种运动状态被描述为先于时间,在这个单位的定义中,也已经说到了作为“每一个”的在先统一性,以及作为“在着的事物”的在先多样性。在一个数或单位尚未建立之前,就已经存在着更本源意义上的一与多,而单位和数的定义依赖于它们。为了依据这一更本源的一——与多——充分确定数的意义,我们需要考察自己关于数的经验,也就是计数实践。
数的一个决定性特征,是它所聚集的可计数者呈现出明确的区分。假如两个东西彼此全然无从区分,计数还可能发生吗?同样,如果某物同时显得既多又一,它也无法被称为一。在这种情况下,即便可能表达出某种内在的杂多性,如《巴门尼德》所说的不可区分的团块(165b),任何计数仍将是不可能的。因此,数所确立的区分,是未分明的量与明确区分的单位集合之间的差异。分明性意味着单位的完整:每一个单位都是一自身,不能由任何其他东西来补充。不同于未分明的量,数作为单位组成的多,是完整可计数者的聚集;单位作为一自身,必须呈现出彻底的单一性。
但有什么比自同一的原型——即工匠神所观照的可理解模型的诸单位——更完整于自身?没有。在这个语境中,数就是原型的多。因此,时间的定义现在可以重新解释为:依照原型集合而运动的肖像。但这是什么意思?
首先必须确立:时间不是数,而是依数而运动。因此,时间自身不可能是原型,而必须通过运动模仿原型,同时自身属于“在着的事物”的领域。什么样的运动能够完成这一模仿?在34a,工匠神被说成只把回转运动赋予宇宙这个动物,因为这种运动“尤其伴随着理智与审慎”。如果要说哪一种运动最接近原型,那只能是回转。为什么?因为回转作为持续的运动,并不排除差异化,却总是返回自身,从而维持某种自同一性。通过这一运动,自我差异化——一种保持自身的差异化——得以实现,使运动之物能够模仿原型的自同一性,而自身并不是原型。为了模仿永恒,时间必须以同样的方式运动;因为它既不能逃离运动或差异化,也不能不在生成之物所允许的最高程度上维持自同一性。从这个角度说,依数、依原型的规则而运动,就是回转。
还必须提出另一个区分。时间不仅不同于数,也不是一种运动。它是一个运动着的肖像。因此,为了充分理解这种回转运动,必须把它置于图像与原型的关系之中。如果回想我们此前对图像与原型、感知与理念之间动态关系的分析,那么包含双方的回转便可以如下展示。
此前,这一动态关系被刻画为预设着两条原则。第一,图像与原型同属一个宇宙灵魂的轭下。因此,随着宇宙灵魂自身实行回环运动,图像便朝向原型。第二,图像与原型之间的距离应当保持,否则二者将被还原为一个无差别的状态,使任何运动都不可能。综合这两条运动原则,就产生了一种回转折返的运动状态:图像——或灵魂中图像的部分——必须趋向理念——或灵魂中理念的部分——却又总是转而返回自身。如果时间要在,图像就不能在回环过程中失去其独特的区分;因此,完成圆圈时,图像便返回自身的原初位置。圆圈的完整只更加凸显了其中包含的绝对缺失,也就是与原型之间根本的距离。只要图像与原型之间的根本距离得到维持,时间便成立;之所以称这一距离为根本的,是因为如前所述,宇宙灵魂自身不受扰动的运动不能被刻画为时间。
但到目前为止,我只是在一般意义上处理了这种运动方式。图像在运动中究竟以何种方式类似原型,尚未得到确定;也就是说,图像通向原型的方向性最初究竟如何建立并维持。现在,我将转向这个问题。
如果我们这里处理的真是一幅静止的绘画,任务就相当容易。我们会说,肖像只在可见的方式上类似原型:原型有某种外观,图像也分享着这种外观,因此图像与原型相似。但应用到εἶδος的领域,这一说法便很难成立。即便εἶδος也可以意指“外观”,理念的外观也不只是另一个可见图像。这正是此前熟人图像的类比失效之处:那种情况下被触发的回忆,不过是另一个图像,层层叠着索引,指向更进一步的记忆,以至无穷。但时间定义中描述的并非这种关系。在这一定义中,时间不多不少,正是永恒的图像;然而,永恒不是无限图像的单纯集合,而被说成“驻留于统一之中”(37d)。这里的确切意涵很难把握,但有一点清楚:永恒在这里被强调的,恰恰是它的一。
重新考察我们此前对时间运动方式的规定,会有所帮助。我先前说,回转在其自我差异化中,尽管发生差异化仍维持自身,从而最充分地模仿永恒原型的一,即统一性。采取这一运动方式,也就是回转,图像就可以被称为一个,因为在回返中,它通过那一动态关系、并在其中,维持了自己相对于原型的独特区分。换句话说,作为时间的图像并非以可见的方式——指向潜在无限的图像——类似其原型,而是以一种更“审慎”、更深刻的方式:它作为与永恒相对的动态关系的一端,分享原型的统一性,由此自身成为一个完整的一,一个“永恒的肖像”。也就是说,即便时间作为运动的图像是可见的,图像指涉原型、朝原型运动的方式,却通过保持与原型不同的类而成为可理解的。
再说得简单一些,我们可以考虑在这一动态关系上进行计数。这个动态过程包含几个部分?最基本地说,两个:原型与肖像。于是,肖像本身就是一个可计数的类。作为可计数的类,它分享原型的一,并恰恰以这种方式变得类似原型。然而,没有对环形运动方式的感知,时间的这种可计数性就无法实现:通过对回转的感知,时间总是返回天穹中的同一位置,从而展示它的自同一性与差异化。由此,时间以可触知的形式,在差异化中把自同一性展示为差异化;它始终留在可见领域之内,拒绝完全走入不可见之中。因此,回转的审慎,即其可理解性,并未与可感者断裂,而恰恰由那可见的循环性表达出来,由它保持为自身这一类、独立于不可见的原型空间而表达出来。自始至终,必须维持距离,运动才能成立。
现在,我们已经对这一短语中的细微含义展开了充分而有成果的讨论:时间是“一个依数而行的永恒肖像”(37d)。根据以上一切,可以确定,时间是一种普遍的图像,它通过回转折返的自我差异化来运动,并恰恰通过与永恒拉开距离,模仿自同一的永恒。
二、混沌宇宙(Chaosmos)
时间并没有被说成依一而运动,而是依数而运动。因此,时间应当在内在上就是多:作为普遍的运动图像,它统摄诸特殊的运动图像,把它们作为有待计数的可计数者——这些可计数者并非无条件地完整。然而,成为可计数者必然意味着是一。因此,时间应当在其运动本身中,表达一与多之间的相互作用。
由此可以给出对时间的一般说明。通过回转,时间作为图像返回自身;而这一图像总是回返的那个点,就是它所分有的一,即图像被视作一类(γένος)。通过图像内部的这一图像之“一”,图像模仿原型。然而,如果图像与原型坍塌为一,这个“一”就无法维持;这里的ἀπορία在于:只有在图像保持与原型绝对有别的限度内,它才能保留自己的一,才能类似原型。因此,图像在趋向原型时,必须与原型拉开距离,并使自身返回起点:永恒的回环由此构成。这里勾勒的运动,因而把完整与不完整这两个环节分别聚集于自身之中:完整的回环,只凸显了它所围绕的绝对缺失。如果这一说明成立,那么,对时间的理解中就必须能够综合不完整与完整:时间几乎必须总是部分性的,却是作为部分性的一。时间的这种部分性,最充分地反映在以下事实中:天体被安置到各自位置之后,蒂迈欧就较少再把时间作为整体来谈论了。相反,突出起来的是天体相互之间各自的度量,它们作为时间的部分器官,标记并守卫时间的数(38c);包摄整体的时间图像,似乎不是被遗忘了,就是被压制了。
随着包摄整体的时间图像被压制,某种更晦暗、更具威胁的东西抬起了头。那段说明提到某种“扭转”:游星的回环运动被“同”的回环扭转(39a)。行星的这种扭转,不仅使时间的计算更加困难——《理想国》中城邦衰落的第一原因,不正是时间计算错误吗?——还提出了另一个关键问题:为什么是“同”的回环?
我们已经确立:为了避免被还原为原型,天体运动中必须引入某种中断。但为什么中断来自更恒定的“同”的回环?至少有两种可能的处理方式,二者丝毫不必相互排斥。第一种解释,是把这一特殊之处与随后对人的说明联系起来:由于人是居住在可见的、有身体的世界中的凡人,他们自然更亲近时间的可见部分;因此,任何与“同”的回环的接触,都会是对正常感知进程的神圣中断。另一种解释则更深入事物自身的一侧:时间构成本身中保留的缺失,与“同”的回环所描述的自同一性有关,并保持着某种关系。
缺失如何能与自同一性相关?缺失如何能与任何东西相关?相对于X的缺失,只能在“缺少X”的意义上得到规定。因此,应当确定:那种缺失,即时间构成内部却又使构成自身成为可能的中断,就是自同一性的缺失,就是原型的缺席。然而,蒂迈欧并没有把原型的这种缺席刻画为图像,因为图像总是作为一端,卷入与原型之间双重束缚的关系之中。相反,这种缺席恰恰是使运动得以发生的距离。于是,在某种意义上,这一缺失先于时间的构成:它就是第二次开端,以χώρα开始的开端。这第二次开端究竟怎样不同于第一次?我不是已经在本文前面说过一种先于时间的运动——宇宙灵魂的运动——了吗?
χώρα与宇宙灵魂的运动之间,存在几个关键区别。首先,χώρα并不只是一个被还原到与原型几乎无从区分的图像;我此前确立,宇宙灵魂的运动正是后一种情形。但在《理想国》中,苏格拉底不是把做梦定义为“相信某物的肖像并非肖像,而就是它所类似的那个事物自身”(476c)吗?蒂迈欧不也把χώρα说成“我们做梦时所望向的那个东西”(52b)吗?确实如此。然而,现在就断定χώρα只是一个被还原为原型的图像,也就是一个过于接近原型的图像,还为时过早。首先,χώρα不是被称为一种“不可见、无形状的形式”(51a)吗,尽管这一说法困难重重、充满问题?因此,无论什么图像被加在χώρα身上,例如乳母、母亲、容器,我们都知道χώρα自身并不是其中任何一个。而且,在某种局部意义上,χώρα不正是那个使图像——如幻影般被裹挟着的图像——紧攀于在的东西吗(52c)?最重要的是,从第二番论述的开头起,χώρα就被刻画为第三类,另一个可计数者,无论这有多困难(49a)。以此为准,χώρα保持着与被还原之图像的微妙区别:无论危险如何,它仍被区分出来。即便χώρα只属于梦,它也是梦本身,是被规定为梦的梦;只有当一个人醒来,并以清醒的明晰回望它时,梦才成为梦。此外,作为第三类,已经意味着另外两类必须保持有别;如果如此,这两个有别的类又如何能被彻底还原为一?无论如何,χώρα不可能是一幅只在自身中保留极少运动的静止图像,像宇宙灵魂平顺而无声的回环那样。相反,χώρα总在自身中拥有力量的不平衡,拥有摇撼与被摇撼(52e)。依照这些规定,χώρα绝不能被还原为一个已经被还原为原型的图像。然而,χώρα的非线性以及它先于时间的问题,仍未得到处理。χώρα自身也在运动,它如何先于时间?
这里我根本上追问的是χώρα的定位,即空间相对于时间的空间化;而由于时间是“我们命名的东西”(37d),这也就是相对于我们的定位。可能的位置在哪里?χώρα真的应当被理解为先于时间吗?如果我们认真对待《斐德罗》中的说法,认为言辞“应当像一个活物那样构造……它不能缺头少脚;它必须具有中段和两端,并被组合得彼此相宜、与整体相宜”(264c),那么,χώρα恰好位于这番论述的正中,而这番论述本身又是一项时间中的事业,这难道没有意义吗?但52d又明确说:“在、空间与生成,三者以三重方式,在天穹诞生之前就在。”如何调和这些困难的断言?
眼下,让我们假定,其定位是“时间的中间”;首先要确定,这里的“中间”是什么意思。在37e,蒂迈欧谈到时间的形式,说“‘曾在’与‘将在’是已经生成的时间形式”。既然“曾在”与“将在”占据时间的两端,中间便自然可以被确定为当下。然而,这里真正的含混之处在于:当下究竟是不是一种时间形式。
蒂迈欧并没有真正处理这一问题。他只是说,已经生成的两种时间形式都不适用于永恒的在,只有“在”才适合(38a)。他完全没有澄清,“在”究竟是不是一种时间形式。但同样也没有明确的论证反对当下成为时间形式,因为它完全可能是一种无条件的时间形式,一种“尚未生成”的形式。即便蒂迈欧说,将永恒的在说成“如今已经如此生成了”是不恰当的(38a),他也没有排除这一可能性;因为“如今已经如此生成了”已经是一种被过去污染的当下样式,而当下自身未必不是适用于在的恰当形式。
然而,当下这种成问题的地位,不正类似于χώρα的地位吗?当下或许与χώρα分享着这一特殊之处:虽然它必须在时间中被思考,却仍以某种方式与时间之外相关——当下与在相关,χώρα与它自身相关?
三、时间宇宙(Chronosmos)
如果χώρα相对于时间的位置在当下,那么我们必须依照已经获得的关于χώρα的认识来理解当下。我们说,χώρα是一种无定形的形式,自身包含着不平衡的运动。那么,当下就必须以这种方式类似χώρα:摇撼宇宙灵魂自满的运动,使时间成为可能。
于是,时间在其中间被当下,即在的呈现,间隔开来。然而,在的呈现同时也是在之缺席本身的呈现;因为这种间隔既应意味着时间与其原型之间的根本距离,也应把图像与在联系起来,使图像仍攀附于在(52c),因为图像的可计数性通过这一间隔得到了展示。因此,被呈现之物立即被间隔开,并被滞留,仿佛跃到另一端,使呈现发生自我分裂:呈现不再保持自身。通过这一描述,一个新的环节生成了:过去。
但这个过去并不是日常生活中所理解的过去。这个过去正是过去性本身。当呈现分裂为自身的“不再是”时,它仍在自身中保留着来自呈现的生成力量,一种生成关于自身之记忆的力量。换句话说,自我分裂的呈现把双重意涵聚集于自身之中:它既是作为一切图像——包括关于自身的记忆——之源泉的呈现,也是一个被图像化的现在点。更具体地说,当下总是在的呈现与被感知图像交织而成的混合织体,但对缺席原型的呈现,本身恰恰是任何图像的源泉。就在呈现的瞬间,我们感知到由当下在当下生成的图像;在这个意义上,当下已经越出自身、进入自己的过去,成为我们现在感知到的图像的源泉。过去保留着呈现的力量,是一个被现前化的过去,并且先于自身;因此,这一“先于”真正意味着一种无时间的过去,一个先于所有过去的过去,使时间化成为可能的过去性本身。于是,呈现只有在成为过去时,才回环到自身。而当我们当前经历的呈现生成图像时,它也预期着这些图像所指向的一个新的现在;由此,当前经历的现在又被间隔为一个被现前化的未来。这些回环的呈现描述了诸一的完整性:通过其运动本身,它们模仿完整的可计数者,因而与数相合。因此,在时间中计数,就是计数这些被现前化的回环,把它们数作有别的现在。按照这一说明,当下自身的位置成为了持续向过去与未来的去定位和再定位。由此,以一个可能的位置作为假说出发,定位自身的整体最终被摇撼了。χώρα与当下的关系可以被牢固建立,但代价是当下自身遭到了摇撼。
然而,χώρα的位置——或者更确切地说,非位置——不正是通过这一时间运动本身表达出来的吗?χώρα的“先于”,不正只有依据对呈现与过去性之间动态关系的理解,才能被理解吗?整个通过空间奠基时间的说明,似乎可以被颠倒。我的意思是,与其像本文前面所预设的那样,以空间原则奠基时间,我们也总可以从时间的被奠基性出发,抵达空间。这种反向的可能性是本文隐含的前提,因为空间原则第一次出现、从时间运动中被引出时,我们就已经运用了它。现在,通过我对时间运动的呈现,这一可能性得到了澄清,因为时间的这一运动,其实正是间隔作用的根本表达。这里展开了一个最终的循环:时间与空间循环地共同构成,彼此把对方构成为自身的补充。
现在到了作出结论的时候。本文的范围与视角是有限的:它主要为了时间而追问空间。这源于研究对象的性质。本文从一开始就把目标设为对时间、而非空间的探究。尽管后来发现空间是探究所必需的,本文的行进路线仍然与另一种可能的呈现大不相同;在后一种呈现中,空间会被设为首要的追问对象。澄清这一点之后,我将重新呈现本文的工作,以帮助读者追溯我在文中采取的步骤。这一重述依据本质上刻画时间的不同层次的循环,反映本文的不同阶段。四种循环分别是:C1,天穹可见的环形运动;C2,图像与原型之间的循环;C3,现在与过去——包括未来——的循环;C4,时间与空间最终的循环。这四种循环是同一个整体的相互依赖的表达,而且经常彼此重叠:C1既描述停留于可见者之内,也描述一个根本的外部,即缺席的原型,因此表达着C2;C2把我们的时间经验结构C3与原型的间隔联系起来;C4则是时间相对于空间的循环性的最终表达。四种循环分别属于时间意义的不同层次。C1专门涉及被感知者,而C2把被感知者与可理解者联系起来。C3最本真地属于时间——但在某种意义上却必须是无时间的——因为它涉及时间的形式,以及时间在其中被经验的结构。最后,C4描述空间与时间一般的共同构成。通过这一概述,本文的结构与内容得到澄清。
终结。时间在其中消解的终结。一个被消解的时间。
在41b,工匠神承诺,会将天穹连同时间一起维系起来,使之免于可能的消解,因为他的意志是善的。但在开头,缺席的第四人却被说成违背自身意愿而患病。那么,我们是否应当追问,工匠神的意志值得信任吗?如果时间真的消解了呢?时间会得到拯救吗?
柏拉图写作《蒂迈欧》时,已经是个老人了。死亡已在门前。也许疾病亦然。疾病与死亡:这些东西是否构成了时间最终的消解,即便不是整个时间,至少也是我们称为生命的那一部分时间的消解?那将是另一个故事,一个柏拉图在其中许下最美承诺的故事,一个关于灵魂的承诺。
但让已经说过、做过的事情就此在吧。让诸神受到祈祷吧。也让我们说,目前,我已经兑现了自己的承诺:一个承诺去承诺的承诺,一个承诺去探究的承诺,一个承诺去呈现的承诺。如果有什么需要请求,那就是你的宽恕:请像主人接待客人一样,温暖地接纳这番或然的言辞。