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Number and Its Ideal History
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Numbers are products of an ideal history, and this history has to be questioned. This, however, does not amount to saying that numbers are merely contingent constructions, or that they do not have an a priori significance. Anyone who is familiar with Euclid and his method can be assured of this, that every demonstration in Elements is itself a working-through of ideas, thus an ideal history at work. Suppose someone who has not read Euclid before is confronted with proposition 47 in Book I, the enunciation does not immediately reveal the totality of the truth of this proposition to him. Rather, he has to proceed step by step in an ordered sequence to arrive at the final conclusion, where the whole proof of the enunciation is accomplished. Only then can he reflect upon the starting place and connect the origin with the subsequent history into one whole. Hence, we could say that every demonstration in Elements has an inherent historical structure.
However, this historicity does not do harm to the universal validity of Euclid’s claim, demonstration or method. The fact that aprioricity does not exclude historicity in Euclid urges us to inquire again into the relationship between history and mathematical truths, thus to inquire into inquiry (ἱστορία) itself. This, perhaps, is too grand a task to undertake here. But it will remain the underlying thread and rationale for the following thoughts in this paper.
Some might think it questionable to apply the historicity manifested by a proposition to an idea, the two being different in kind. The idea of number, blossoming into a definition, should be given from the start, whereas the proposition is merely the synthetical usage of these definitions. Hence, one might argue, a definition by its very nature should be analytical and ahistorical (which is synonymous to unquestionable, as now inquiries are prohibited). By that argument, we are in an impasse.
Nevertheless, we should pursue the set out goal dauntingly. The reason is as follows. First, a definition is not the same as a postulate. A postulate literally is a begging for others to accept, hence is not required to be well founded in reason. But a definition should be well founded, since it is a boundary (ὅρος) that delimits the gathering (λόγος), and should itself be articulate in speech, through speech, at least partially. Hence, different from a postulate, a definition should withstand inquiry, instead of refusing to be questioned at all.
Second, an idea is also different from a definition, though intimately related. The reason is that, an idea (εἶδος) is that which is seen, whereas a definition (ὅρος) is merely a boundary. Roughly speaking, an idea is a positive manifestation of the thing under discussion, whereas a definition is a negative articulation of it with other things. In other words, an idea shows an original and unified intuition of the source, whereas a definition delineates an adumbration that is demarcated by other adjacent realms. Therefore, a definition is already a negative and relational composite that has to be dependent upon an originality (ἀρχή) prior to it; and this prior experience can only be accessed through a historical questioning into the source.
So far, I have justified my attempt to question into the historical origin of numbers. But two questions still remain, viz. by what method could I achieve what I set off to do, and is this reactivation of the original experience really achievable? Notwithstanding these concerns, perhaps the best course here is to lay out the whole process of my working-through-thought first, and only afterwards to reflect upon the successes and failures of my method respectively.
The natural starting place for an inquiry into numbers can only be its definition. Euclid defines number as “a multitude composed of units”, and from here we can already notice two interesting things. First, Euclid differentiates a multitude (πλῆθος) from a number, in spite of the fact that for him a number seems to be plural as well. The predication implicates that a number is more of a subcategory for multitude. Another thing worth noticing is how a unit is defined differently from numbers. For Euclid, therefore, the equivalence of a unit to a number is not as natural as in modern day mathematics. This leads to a general observation: an idea of number is not immediately given in the Euclidean context, but has to be traced back to the definition of a unit, thus opening up a new beginning for our task.
The definition for units is relatively richer than that for numbers, and even more intriguing. Euclid defines the unit as “that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one”. The complexity is immediately present. First, a unit is not one, but merely that which allows something to be called one. How should we understand this statement? The most intuitive way seems to be equating this mathematical unit with the physical unit we encounter in daily life. For instance, we can say a chair is a unit, since “chair” allows all those that are chairs to be called “one”. Or, we might say a meter is such a unit as well.
However, is this understanding not, perhaps, too real? We have to examine this question more closely. When we use any physical unit, what is it that we are using? Some might say that it is very simple: my perception of the chair gives the chair as a unit. But does this perception of the chair come first already as a “one”? Before I can determine my perception of the chair as a perception of one, I have to already possess, according to Euclid, a something by virtue of which one can be called one. Then is that idea of “chair” the unit, in lieu of the physical reality perceived by me? But what is that “idea” of chairs that is independent of real chairs?
Then let it be hypothesized that the idea of chair is the unit. This can be illustrated by the example of a meter as well. The meter is determined by a real stick situated in France; however, it does not seem to be the case that, when the meter stick shortens over time, the meter per se should also be modified accordingly. Thus, in the other example, we might hypothesize the idea of meter to be the unit. This now seems to suffice as a proper understanding.
But this understanding soon encounters its own demise. The reason is as follows. With the idea of chair being the unit, only chairs can be counted. The same with meters. The definition, however, designates the unit proper to “each of the things that exist”. Chairs or meters can hardly encompass the whole scope of “each of the things that exist”. Thus, we can only speak of chairs as singular instances of things that exist, but if we claim a chair is a unit we are making the same mistake Meno makes as he gives many particular answers to one question concerning the whole. The same applies to the generalization into physical units as a totality. The fact that physical units are already ideal gives us pause. Plus, there is no reason to believe that things that exist can only signify physical realities. Therefore, we can conclude that the unit is necessarily more universal than its individual instantiations; the fact that we can call a chair a unit does not shed light to the unit itself.
But even this conclusion is not radical enough. I would claim, rather, that the unit is nothing like a physical unit. The “chair”, therefore, is nothing like a mathematical unit. My reason is twofold. First, the definition can be understood in two ways. It can either mean “anything by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one is a unit”, or “only that by virtue of which everything that exist is called one is a unit”. The difference lies in this: in one case, a unit is merely a general name for all common names we use in daily life; in the other, a unit is that universality itself. To give an example, one can think of how “all things” (τα πάντα) is different from “the All” (το πᾶν); one being a loose set for all particular cases, the other being a particularized universal, a totality. With the alternative understanding, a unit is not a general name loosely applied to all physical realities, and the “chair” would no longer be considered a rigorously mathematical unit, since it can only be applied within limits and is hence excluded from the universal proper. The second reason supports the first, as Euclid is no longer dealing with magnitudes but moves beyond “the things that exist” and proceeds towards a further realm. In this definition, he draws the line between the unit and the things that exist, and one cannot help but raise the question, i.e. does the unit exist as a thing? The very fact that he seems to separate the things and the unit implies, however, a more transcendent attitude. Hence, it now becomes difficult to say that a chair is an example of a unit, when the existent belongs to a realm affected and operated on by units, but not vice versa.
The other way to think about this is to consider, if the mathematical unit is really a physical, hence finite and non-absolute, unit, what will happen. The ἀπορία is revealed when one is asked the question “is ‘chair’ one unit, and with ‘meter’ makes two”? The finite unit itself then has to be counted through another unit, which requires a unit of units. But this would lead to an impasse ad infinitum. Therefore, by this account, I feel confident to say that the Euclidean mathematical unit is one species apart from the normal physical unit we speak of.
Let this definition be studied more carefully. One is something different from a unit. By virtue of a unit, a thing can be called one. But there is another latent difficulty: what is this “each” (ἕκαστον) prior to being called “one”? how to bridge this gap of “calling” and “naming”? what is a calling?
Perhaps to proceed in the best course, we have to start from the less manifest. Let us address, first, the question of calling. A human, maybe all too human, reaction is to ask who calls what. This naturally assumes the caller to be in a standing opposite relationship to the called. Hence arises the distinction between convention and nature. Is this “calling”, then, an arbitrary designation, or a befitting confluence with the things themselves? But here perhaps we can resort to Plato’s Cratylus and finds an easy way out: naming is a movement toward, a spinning to, and an inquiry into the thing’s history. And “calling something one” is, in the mean time, to inquire into the thing’s oneness.
But the unit allows each thing that exist to be called one. The “each” thus signifies the originary experience in which a oneness is latent and unsounded in an equally originary experience of plurality, τα ὄντα. When this experience, however, is intuited in its mathematical and categorial rigor, can be named and inquired. The unit, as that which allows for this inquiry, is hence historicity itself. And mathematics, together with the idea of mathesis universalis, is nothing else than a universal historicity of things.
But let us retrace the steps and set out another beginning. Perhaps I am relying on the easy way too much, and have to take away that ladder from now on, and pose the question yet again: what is a number? what is a unit?
The fact that, in this definition of units, an originary contradistinction between unity and plurality is given, suggests more than a prior realm of wild significations. Rather, this origination also determines, to a certain extent, the necessary transition from units to numbers. Let us consider any scenario in which a plurality of things is given, and each is called one. What does this mean?
It means a counting has to follow. Before me stand all kinds of objects, chairs, tables, lights, water bottles and books. Each of them is called one, and this calling has to incorporate all things that exist, in the form of “each”, i.e. one after the other. If before me lies but a undifferentiated multitude, none can be called one; but if there is but one unity, there is no each. To relate the multitude to the unity, a counting has to be established.
Is counting really what Euclid means here? This can be answered from multiple angles. Apart from the fact that in order to mediate “each” and “things that exist”, a counting has to be, the usage of “one” in Euclid also reinforces this signification. For one thing, Euclid does not say that a number is composed of “ones”, even though each thing is said to be one. One plausible explanation is that, “one” is singularly applied to an “each”, as that which is presented, in contradistinction to an absence; but units, as things eternal, as historicities, cannot be absent. To avoid sounding too metaphysical, I will now turn to further clarify this difference and deepen it.
Let us consider counting and different histories respectively. Counting is the most originary form in which things show themselves in the modality of a mathematical “each”. “Each” does not mean an “all at once”. Rather, what is presented in front of me is only a thing in itself, hence is exclusively not many. However, in its singular existence, it brings forth something absent into its aura, in which the absence is still preserved as something different. “Each”, in its essence, signifies a standing out among many in its totality, a self-differentiation, a one-by-one singularity against singularity, hence a counting. A counting is thus a retentional modification of all other things in their own differentiated temporal positionings; or rather, counting itself constitutes time. And here we have a corresponding type of history, the history in which a prior temporal position is inquired and retraced, thus a remembrance.
But a second type of history has to be distinguished here carefully. A unit is not a unit for counting, but is rather that which allows for things that exist to be called one, thus that which allows for counting. As counting is the most originary constitution of time, what a unit signifies is exactly that which gives forth time: a historicity. Let us consider this for a better understanding. Every moment is a composite of past, present and future, since I always retain the memory of the past and lean towards the anticipation of the future. But what first establishes that difference between the past and the present, the present and the future? The Now, as a wellspring that intensifies the present, always fulfills and differentiates it from other modifications with a most rich intuition. The Now, as soon as it enters consciousness, is temporally modified to leave room for the all-renewing Now and self-splits into the past. This Now, now, allows for a different type of history: a history that does not in futile attempt to retrace infinitely the next farthest past, but inquires into this Now itself, into its original presentation, into its true beginnings. This history, different from remembrance, is called recollection.
This history of recollection, thus, is aimed at the origin of time. And its unit is thus the mathematical unit proper; a unit outside of time, an eternal unit of things that exist. Its object is not particular histories, but rather historicities themselves. In a number, therefore, what are collected are not past, present and future, but different Nows - different original presentations.
Then what is a number? Is number not always involved in counting? But perhaps that is exactly how number moves beyond mere counting. Numbers, as a multitude composed of units, are always eternal co-presentations of the origins. In this sense, it is not just any multitude, but a multitude that gathers itself into an atemporal unity, which can in this way not just be retained and remembered, but also recollected, and enable us to partake of the divine (since numbers are composed of units, but not “ones”, they are already one realm beyond the existing things). Time, as a moving image of the eternal, should always be related to numbers. Numbers themselves are not counted; on the contrary, it is things that are counted to numbers.
Another mystery can now be solved. The wild realm of significations, the prior meanings of “each” and “things” as unity and plurality, is in fact not prior, but rather a resulted counting founded upon the original mathematical units. It is not the case that we encounter each of the things that exist first and then decide to call them “ones”, but because we partake of units and numbers, that things become countable, and this gives rise retroactively to a temporal experience of unity and plurality, which is not independent from our mathematical experience. To put it simply, our mathematical experience is our original experience. A subversion is made whenever we call the mathematical experience something derivative, or unoriginal; the mathematical experience is, when moving in time, how we see and intellect different Nows as origins, and synthesize them into a living present.
Is it not uncanny that we set off to inquire into numbers, but end up inquiring into inquiries (or, inquirabilities) themselves? But perhaps this is not really a shock, since I can now complete the circle, by simply commenting that my method coincides with my content. Nevertheless, I should still observe my method and replace the coincidence with a necessity.
What I do here is not merely coincidental, since this is not an imposition on my part to make the raw materials conform to a predetermined structure. On the contrary, it is numbers themselves that invoke, by necessity, such a reflection. Numbers are not mere formal indexes, but are themselves the essential guiding threads to the questioning of a whole and its different origins.
I shall feel content now as an outline for the ideal history of numbers is presented. To conclude in an aphoristic way, perhaps it is not far off if I claim that the ideal history of numbers is the ideal history proper, an ideal history of ideal history. But some questions are still not dealt with as delicately, or explained as clearly as possible in this paper due to the length limit. These questions will be expounded further in my other undertakings that will soon ensue.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
数是某种理念历史的产物,而这一历史必须被追问。然而,这并不等于说,数仅仅是偶然的构造,或者它们没有先天的意义。任何熟悉欧几里得及其方法的人,都可以确信这一点:《几何原本》中的每一个证明,本身就是对理念的一次贯通,因而是一段正在进行的理念历史。假设一个此前未读过欧几里得的人,面对第一卷的命题47,命题的陈述并不会立刻向他揭示这一命题真理的全体。相反,他必须沿着有序的次第一步步推进,抵达最终结论,在那里,对该陈述的整个证明才告完成。只有此时,他才能回顾出发点,把原初与随后发生的历史连成一个整体。因此,我们可以说,《几何原本》中的每一个证明都有一种内在的历史结构。
然而,这一历史性并不损害欧几里得主张、证明或方法的普遍有效性。在欧几里得那里,先天性并不排斥历史性;这一事实促使我们重新探究历史与数学真理之间的关系,从而去探究那探究(ἱστορία)本身。这也许是一个过于宏大的任务,无法在这里承担。但它仍将是本文随后思考的潜在线索与理由。
有人也许认为,把一个命题所表现的历史性应用于理念,是值得怀疑的,因为两者种类不同。数的理念展开为一个定义,应当从一开始就被给予,而命题不过是这些定义的综合运用。因此,有人可能会主张,定义按其本性就应当是分析的、非历史的(这与不可质疑是同义的,因为探究如今被禁止了)。循着这一论证,我们就陷入僵局。
尽管如此,我们还是应当无畏地追求已经设定的目标。理由如下。首先,定义不同于公设。公设的字面意义,是乞求他人接受,因此并不要求它在理性上有充分根据。但定义应当有充分根据,因为它是一道界限(ὅρος),划定某种聚集(λόγος)的边界,并且它本身应当至少部分地在言说中、通过言说得到清晰表达。因此,与公设不同,定义应当经受得住探究,而不是干脆拒绝被质问。
其次,理念也不同于定义,尽管两者密切相关。原因在于,理念(εἶδος)是被看见的东西,而定义(ὅρος)仅仅是一道界限。粗略地说,理念是所讨论之物的肯定性显现,而定义则是它与其他事物之间的否定性衔接。换句话说,理念展示对源头原初而统一的直观,而定义则勾勒出一个由相邻领域界定的轮廓。因此,定义已经是一种否定的、关系性的复合物,必然依赖于先于它的某种原初性(ἀρχή);而这一在先经验,只有通过对源头的历史性追问才能抵达。
至此,我已经为自己追问数之历史起源的尝试给出了理由。但仍有两个问题:我可以用何种方法达成最初的目标,以及对原初经验的这一重新激活是否真的能够达成?尽管有这些顾虑,也许这里最好的道路,是先陈列出我贯通思考的整个过程,然后再分别反思这一方法的成功与失败。
探究数的自然起点,只能是数的定义。欧几里得把数定义为“由单位构成的众多”,由此我们已经可以注意到两个有趣之处。首先,欧几里得把众多(πλῆθος)与数区分开来,尽管对他而言,数似乎也具有复数性。这一谓述意味着,数更像是众多的一个子范畴。另一个值得注意之处,是单位与数如何被不同地定义。因此,对欧几里得来说,将一个单位等同于一个数,并不像在现代数学中那样自然。这引出一个总体观察:在欧几里得的语境中,数的理念并非直接给定,而是必须被追溯到单位的定义,由此为我们的任务开启一个新的开端。
单位的定义比数的定义相对丰富,也更引人入胜。欧几里得把单位定义为“凭借它,存在着的诸事物中的每一个都被称为一的东西”。复杂性立刻呈现出来。首先,单位不是一,而仅仅是使某物能够被称为一的东西。我们应当如何理解这一表述?最直观的方式,似乎是将数学单位与日常生活中遇到的物理单位等同起来。例如,我们可以说,一把椅子是一个单位,因为“椅子”使所有作为椅子的东西都能够被称为“一”。或者,我们也可以说,一米同样是这样的单位。
然而,这一理解是否也许过于实在了?我们必须更仔细地考察这一问题。当我们使用任何物理单位时,我们使用的究竟是什么?有人也许会说,这很简单:我对椅子的知觉,把椅子给予为一个单位。但对椅子的这一知觉,从一开始就已经是作为一个“一”出现的吗?在我能够把自己对椅子的知觉规定为对一个一的知觉之前,按照欧几里得的说法,我就已经必须拥有某个东西,凭借它,一才可以被称为一。那么,单位是否是“椅子”的理念,而非我所知觉到的物理实在?但独立于现实椅子的那个椅子“理念”,又是什么?
那么,让我们假设,椅子的理念就是单位。这也可以用米的例子来说明。米由一根存放在法国的实际标尺确定;然而,当米尺随着时间缩短时,米本身似乎不应相应地被改变。因此,在另一个例子中,我们也可以假设,米的理念就是单位。现在,这似乎足以构成一种恰当理解。
但这一理解很快遇到了自身的灭亡。理由如下。如果椅子的理念是单位,那么只有椅子可以被计数。米也一样。然而,定义却把恰当的单位规定为适用于“存在着的诸事物中的每一个”的东西。椅子或米很难囊括“存在着的诸事物中的每一个”的全部范围。因此,我们只能把椅子说成存在着的诸事物的个别实例;但如果宣称一把椅子就是一个单位,我们就犯了与美诺相同的错误:面对一个关乎整体的问题,却给出许多特殊的答案。这也适用于将物理单位作为一个全体的普遍化。物理单位已经具有理念性,这一事实使我们停下来思考。此外,也没有理由相信,存在着的诸事物只能指物理实在。因此,我们可以得出结论:单位必然比其个别实例更为普遍;我们可以把一把椅子称为一个单位,这一事实并不能阐明单位本身。
但即便这一结论也还不够彻底。相反,我要主张,单位完全不像物理单位。因此,“椅子”完全不像数学单位。我的理由有两方面。首先,这个定义可以有两种理解。它既可以意味着“任何凭借它,存在着的诸事物中的每一个能够被称为一的东西,都是单位”,也可以意味着“唯有凭借它,存在着的一切事物都能够被称为一的东西,才是单位”。差别在于:一种情况下,单位只是我们日常使用的一切通名的一个总称;另一种情况下,单位就是那一普遍性本身。举例来说,我们可以思考“万物”(τα πάντα)与“大全”(το πᾶν)的差别:前者是一切特殊情况的松散集合,后者则是被个体化的普遍者,一个总体。按后一种理解,单位不是松散地应用于一切物理实在的一般名称,而“椅子”也就不再会被视为严格的数学单位,因为它只能在一定限度内适用,因而被排除在恰当的普遍性之外。第二个理由支持第一个理由:欧几里得已经不再处理量,而是超越“存在着的诸事物”,向一个更远的领域推进。在这个定义中,他在单位与存在着的诸事物之间划出界线,使人忍不住提出这样的问题:单位是否作为一个事物存在?然而,他似乎把事物与单位分开这一事实本身,就暗示了一种更为超越的态度。因此,现在已经很难说,椅子是单位的一个例子,因为存在者属于一个由单位施以影响和操作的领域,而反之则不然。
另一种思考这一问题的方式,是考虑如果数学单位确实是一个物理的、因而有限而非绝对的单位,会发生什么。当我们被问到“‘椅子’是否是一个单位,与‘米’合起来就构成两个?”时,ἀπορία,即困境,就显露出来了。这个有限单位本身,就必须通过另一个单位来计数,这要求一个单位的单位。但这会导致无穷无尽的僵局。因此,根据这一论证,我有信心说,欧几里得的数学单位,与我们通常谈论的物理单位属于不同种类。
让我们更仔细地研究这个定义。一是不同于单位的某物。凭借单位,一个事物可以被称为一。但这里还潜藏着另一个困难:在被称为“一”之前,这个“每一个”(ἕκαστον)是什么?如何跨越“称呼”与“命名”之间的这一间隙?称呼是什么?
也许,为了走最好的道路,我们必须从不那么显明者开始。首先,让我们处理称呼的问题。一个人的、也许太人的反应,是问谁在称呼什么。这自然假定称呼者与被称呼者处于对立关系。由此产生了约定与自然之间的区分。那么,这一“称呼”是任意的指定,还是与事物自身恰当的汇流?但在这里,也许我们可以诉诸柏拉图的《克拉底鲁》,找到一条容易的出路:命名是朝向事物的运动,是向它旋转,是对其历史的探究。而“把某物称为一”,同时就是探究该物的一性。
然而,单位使存在着的诸事物中的每一个都能被称为一。因此,“每一个”指示那种原初经验:在其中,一性潜藏着、尚未被探明,而它处于一个同样原初的多性经验之中,即τα ὄντα,存在着的诸事物。然而,当这一经验在其数学与范畴的严格性中被直观时,它就可以被命名和探究。单位作为使这一探究成为可能的东西,因此就是历史性本身。而数学,连同普全数学(mathesis universalis)的理念,不是别的,正是事物的一种普遍历史性。
但让我们重新追踪这些步骤,再设置一个开端。也许我过于依赖那条容易的道路,必须从此拿走那架梯子,再一次提出问题:数是什么?单位是什么?
在单位的这一定义中,统一性与多性之间的原初对立已然给出;这一事实所暗示的,不只是一个在先的、野生意义的领域。相反,这一发源还在一定程度上规定了从单位到数的必然过渡。让我们考虑任何一种场景:诸多事物被给予,其中的每一个都被称为一。这意味着什么?
这意味着,计数必然随之发生。我面前立着各式各样的对象:椅子、桌子、灯、水瓶和书。每一个都被称为一,而这一称呼必须以“每一个”的形式,也就是一个接着一个地,涵盖一切存在着的事物。如果我面前只有一片无差别的众多,就没有任何东西能够被称为一;但如果只有一个统一者,就没有“每一个”。要把众多与统一者联系起来,就必须确立计数。
计数真的是欧几里得在这里的意思吗?这可以从多个角度回答。要在“每一个”所表示的逐一性与“存在着的诸事物”所表示的多性之间建立中介,就必须有计数;除此之外,欧几里得对“一”的使用也加强了这一含义。因为,尽管每一个事物都被说成是一,他却不说数由若干“一”构成。一种可信的解释是:“一”单独地应用于某个“每一个”,指它作为呈现者,与缺席者相对;但单位作为永恒之物,作为诸历史性,却不可能缺席。为了避免显得过于形而上学,我现在转而进一步澄清并深化这一区别。
让我们分别考虑计数与不同的历史。计数是事物以数学的“每一个”这一样式显现自身的最原初形式。“每一个”并不意味着“一下子全都”。相反,呈现在我面前的,只是一个事物自身,因此排他地不是多。然而,在其独一的存在中,它把某种缺席者带入自身的氛围,而在那里,缺席仍然被保留为某种不同的东西。“每一个”在本质上指示着在众多的全体中凸显,一种自我差异化,一种逐一地以独一性对着独一性的方式,因而就是计数。因此,计数就是对其他一切事物在各自差异化的时间位置上的持留变式;或者更确切地说,计数本身构成时间。在这里,我们有一种相应的历史,即探究、追溯先前时间位置的历史,因此是一种记忆。
但这里必须谨慎区分第二种历史。单位不是用于计数的单位,而是使存在着的诸事物各自能够被称为一的东西,因此是使计数成为可能的东西。既然计数是时间最原初的构成,单位所指示的就恰恰是给予时间者:一种历史性。让我们进一步考虑,以便更好地理解。每一刻都是过去、现在与未来的复合,因为我总是持留着过去的记忆,并倾向于对未来的期待。但最初是什么确立了过去与现在、现在与未来之间的差别?当下,作为使现在增强的源泉,总是以最丰富的直观充实现在,使之与其他变式区别开来。当下,一进入意识,就在时间上发生变式,为那使一切更新的当下腾出位置,并自我分裂为过去。这个当下,如今容许了另一种历史:这种历史并非徒劳地试图无限追溯下一个最遥远的过去,而是探究这一当下自身,探究它的原初呈现,探究它真正的开端。这种不同于记忆的历史,叫作回忆。
因此,这一回忆的历史朝向时间的起源。而它的单位,因此就是恰当意义上的数学单位:一个时间之外的单位,属于存在着的诸事物的一个永恒单位。它的对象不是特殊的历史,而是诸历史性本身。因此,在一个数中,被聚集起来的不是过去、现在和未来,而是不同的当下——不同的原初呈现。
那么,数是什么?数难道不是总与计数有关吗?但也许,数恰恰以这种方式超出了单纯的计数。数作为由单位组成的众多,总是诸原初的永恒共呈现。在这个意义上,它并非任意一种众多,而是把自身聚集为一个无时间的统一体的众多;它由此不仅可以被持留、被记住,还可以被回忆,并使我们分有神圣(因为数由单位、而非由若干“一”构成,所以它们已经处于超出存在着的诸事物的一个领域)。时间,作为永恒者运动着的影像,应当总与数相关。数本身不被计数;相反,是事物被计数为数。
如今,另一个谜也能够解开。那一野生意义的领域,即“每一个”作为统一性与“诸事物”作为多性的在先意义,实际上并非在先,而是奠基于原初数学单位的计数结果。并不是我们先遇见存在着的诸事物中的每一个,然后才决定把它们称为“一”;相反,是因为我们分有单位与数,事物才变得可数,而这又回溯性地产生了统一性与多性的时间经验,这一经验并不独立于我们的数学经验。简单地说,我们的数学经验就是我们的原初经验。每当我们把数学经验称为派生的或非原初的东西,就发生了一次颠倒:数学经验在时间中运动时,就是我们如何把不同的当下看见并理解为原初,又把它们综合为一个活的当下。
我们出发时探究的是数,最后却在探究那些探究(或可探究性)本身,这难道不诡异吗?但也许这实际上并不令人震惊,因为现在,只要指出我的方法与内容相合,我就能够完成这一循环。不过,我仍然应当审视自己的方法,以必然性取代这一巧合。
我在这里所做的并非仅仅出于巧合,因为这并非我强加于原材料,使之符合一个预先规定的结构。相反,是数本身必然地唤起了这样的反思。数不是单纯的形式标记,而本身就是追问一个整体及其不同原初时,本质性的引导线索。
如今,数的理念历史的提纲已经呈现,我应当感到满足。以箴言的方式作结,如果我主张,数的理念历史就是恰当意义上的理念历史,是关于理念历史的理念历史,这也许并不离题。但由于篇幅限制,本文有些问题尚未得到尽可能细致的处理或清楚的说明。这些问题将在我接下来很快展开的其他工作中进一步阐述。