Gui Ruiyan

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Number and Its Ideal History

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Numbers are products of an ideal history, and this history has to be questioned. This, however, does not amount to saying that numbers are merely contingent constructions, or that they do not have an a priori significance. Anyone who is familiar with Euclid and his method can be assured of this, that every demonstration in Elements is itself a working-through of ideas, thus an ideal history at work. Suppose someone who has not read Euclid before is confronted with proposition 47 in Book I, the enunciation does not immediately reveal the totality of the truth of this proposition to him. Rather, he has to proceed step by step in an ordered sequence to arrive at the final conclusion, where the whole proof of the enunciation is accomplished. Only then can he reflect upon the starting place and connect the origin with the subsequent history into one whole. Hence, we could say that every demonstration in Elements has an inherent historical structure.

However, this historicity does not do harm to the universal validity of Euclid’s claim, demonstration or method. The fact that aprioricity does not exclude historicity in Euclid urges us to inquire again into the relationship between history and mathematical truths, thus to inquire into inquiry (ἱστορία) itself. This, perhaps, is too grand a task to undertake here. But it will remain the underlying thread and rationale for the following thoughts in this paper.

Some might think it questionable to apply the historicity manifested by a proposition to an idea, the two being different in kind. The idea of number, blossoming into a definition, should be given from the start, whereas the proposition is merely the synthetical usage of these definitions. Hence, one might argue, a definition by its very nature should be analytical and ahistorical (which is synonymous to unquestionable, as now inquiries are prohibited). By that argument, we are in an impasse.

Nevertheless, we should pursue the set out goal dauntingly. The reason is as follows. First, a definition is not the same as a postulate. A postulate literally is a begging for others to accept, hence is not required to be well founded in reason. But a definition should be well founded, since it is a boundary (ὅρος) that delimits the gathering (λόγος), and should itself be articulate in speech, through speech, at least partially. Hence, different from a postulate, a definition should withstand inquiry, instead of refusing to be questioned at all.

Second, an idea is also different from a definition, though intimately related. The reason is that, an idea (εἶδος) is that which is seen, whereas a definition (ὅρος) is merely a boundary. Roughly speaking, an idea is a positive manifestation of the thing under discussion, whereas a definition is a negative articulation of it with other things. In other words, an idea shows an original and unified intuition of the source, whereas a definition delineates an adumbration that is demarcated by other adjacent realms. Therefore, a definition is already a negative and relational composite that has to be dependent upon an originality (ἀρχή) prior to it; and this prior experience can only be accessed through a historical questioning into the source.

So far, I have justified my attempt to question into the historical origin of numbers. But two questions still remain, viz. by what method could I achieve what I set off to do, and is this reactivation of the original experience really achievable? Notwithstanding these concerns, perhaps the best course here is to lay out the whole process of my working-through-thought first, and only afterwards to reflect upon the successes and failures of my method respectively.

The natural starting place for an inquiry into numbers can only be its definition. Euclid defines number as “a multitude composed of units”, and from here we can already notice two interesting things. First, Euclid differentiates a multitude (πλῆθος) from a number, in spite of the fact that for him a number seems to be plural as well. The predication implicates that a number is more of a subcategory for multitude. Another thing worth noticing is how a unit is defined differently from numbers. For Euclid, therefore, the equivalence of a unit to a number is not as natural as in modern day mathematics. This leads to a general observation: an idea of number is not immediately given in the Euclidean context, but has to be traced back to the definition of a unit, thus opening up a new beginning for our task.

The definition for units is relatively richer than that for numbers, and even more intriguing. Euclid defines the unit as “that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one”. The complexity is immediately present. First, a unit is not one, but merely that which allows something to be called one. How should we understand this statement? The most intuitive way seems to be equating this mathematical unit with the physical unit we encounter in daily life. For instance, we can say a chair is a unit, since “chair” allows all those that are chairs to be called “one”. Or, we might say a meter is such a unit as well.

However, is this understanding not, perhaps, too real? We have to examine this question more closely. When we use any physical unit, what is it that we are using? Some might say that it is very simple: my perception of the chair gives the chair as a unit. But does this perception of the chair come first already as a “one”? Before I can determine my perception of the chair as a perception of one, I have to already possess, according to Euclid, a something by virtue of which one can be called one. Then is that idea of “chair” the unit, in lieu of the physical reality perceived by me? But what is that “idea” of chairs that is independent of real chairs?

Then let it be hypothesized that the idea of chair is the unit. This can be illustrated by the example of a meter as well. The meter is determined by a real stick situated in France; however, it does not seem to be the case that, when the meter stick shortens over time, the meter per se should also be modified accordingly. Thus, in the other example, we might hypothesize the idea of meter to be the unit. This now seems to suffice as a proper understanding.

But this understanding soon encounters its own demise. The reason is as follows. With the idea of chair being the unit, only chairs can be counted. The same with meters. The definition, however, designates the unit proper to “each of the things that exist”. Chairs or meters can hardly encompass the whole scope of “each of the things that exist”. Thus, we can only speak of chairs as singular instances of things that exist, but if we claim a chair is a unit we are making the same mistake Meno makes as he gives many particular answers to one question concerning the whole. The same applies to the generalization into physical units as a totality. The fact that physical units are already ideal gives us pause. Plus, there is no reason to believe that things that exist can only signify physical realities. Therefore, we can conclude that the unit is necessarily more universal than its individual instantiations; the fact that we can call a chair a unit does not shed light to the unit itself.

But even this conclusion is not radical enough. I would claim, rather, that the unit is nothing like a physical unit. The “chair”, therefore, is nothing like a mathematical unit. My reason is twofold. First, the definition can be understood in two ways. It can either mean “anything by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called one is a unit”, or “only that by virtue of which everything that exist is called one is a unit”. The difference lies in this: in one case, a unit is merely a general name for all common names we use in daily life; in the other, a unit is that universality itself. To give an example, one can think of how “all things” (τα πάντα) is different from “the All” (το πᾶν); one being a loose set for all particular cases, the other being a particularized universal, a totality. With the alternative understanding, a unit is not a general name loosely applied to all physical realities, and the “chair” would no longer be considered a rigorously mathematical unit, since it can only be applied within limits and is hence excluded from the universal proper. The second reason supports the first, as Euclid is no longer dealing with magnitudes but moves beyond “the things that exist” and proceeds towards a further realm. In this definition, he draws the line between the unit and the things that exist, and one cannot help but raise the question, i.e. does the unit exist as a thing? The very fact that he seems to separate the things and the unit implies, however, a more transcendent attitude. Hence, it now becomes difficult to say that a chair is an example of a unit, when the existent belongs to a realm affected and operated on by units, but not vice versa.

The other way to think about this is to consider, if the mathematical unit is really a physical, hence finite and non-absolute, unit, what will happen. The ἀπορία is revealed when one is asked the question “is ‘chair’ one unit, and with ‘meter’ makes two”? The finite unit itself then has to be counted through another unit, which requires a unit of units. But this would lead to an impasse ad infinitum. Therefore, by this account, I feel confident to say that the Euclidean mathematical unit is one species apart from the normal physical unit we speak of.

Let this definition be studied more carefully. One is something different from a unit. By virtue of a unit, a thing can be called one. But there is another latent difficulty: what is this “each” (ἕκαστον) prior to being called “one”? how to bridge this gap of “calling” and “naming”? what is a calling?

Perhaps to proceed in the best course, we have to start from the less manifest. Let us address, first, the question of calling. A human, maybe all too human, reaction is to ask who calls what. This naturally assumes the caller to be in a standing opposite relationship to the called. Hence arises the distinction between convention and nature. Is this “calling”, then, an arbitrary designation, or a befitting confluence with the things themselves? But here perhaps we can resort to Plato’s Cratylus and finds an easy way out: naming is a movement toward, a spinning to, and an inquiry into the thing’s history. And “calling something one” is, in the mean time, to inquire into the thing’s oneness.

But the unit allows each thing that exist to be called one. The “each” thus signifies the originary experience in which a oneness is latent and unsounded in an equally originary experience of plurality, τα ὄντα. When this experience, however, is intuited in its mathematical and categorial rigor, can be named and inquired. The unit, as that which allows for this inquiry, is hence historicity itself. And mathematics, together with the idea of mathesis universalis, is nothing else than a universal historicity of things.

But let us retrace the steps and set out another beginning. Perhaps I am relying on the easy way too much, and have to take away that ladder from now on, and pose the question yet again: what is a number? what is a unit?

The fact that, in this definition of units, an originary contradistinction between unity and plurality is given, suggests more than a prior realm of wild significations. Rather, this origination also determines, to a certain extent, the necessary transition from units to numbers. Let us consider any scenario in which a plurality of things is given, and each is called one. What does this mean?

It means a counting has to follow. Before me stand all kinds of objects, chairs, tables, lights, water bottles and books. Each of them is called one, and this calling has to incorporate all things that exist, in the form of “each”, i.e. one after the other. If before me lies but a undifferentiated multitude, none can be called one; but if there is but one unity, there is no each. To relate the multitude to the unity, a counting has to be established.

Is counting really what Euclid means here? This can be answered from multiple angles. Apart from the fact that in order to mediate “each” and “things that exist”, a counting has to be, the usage of “one” in Euclid also reinforces this signification. For one thing, Euclid does not say that a number is composed of “ones”, even though each thing is said to be one. One plausible explanation is that, “one” is singularly applied to an “each”, as that which is presented, in contradistinction to an absence; but units, as things eternal, as historicities, cannot be absent. To avoid sounding too metaphysical, I will now turn to further clarify this difference and deepen it.

Let us consider counting and different histories respectively. Counting is the most originary form in which things show themselves in the modality of a mathematical “each”. “Each” does not mean an “all at once”. Rather, what is presented in front of me is only a thing in itself, hence is exclusively not many. However, in its singular existence, it brings forth something absent into its aura, in which the absence is still preserved as something different. “Each”, in its essence, signifies a standing out among many in its totality, a self-differentiation, a one-by-one singularity against singularity, hence a counting. A counting is thus a retentional modification of all other things in their own differentiated temporal positionings; or rather, counting itself constitutes time. And here we have a corresponding type of history, the history in which a prior temporal position is inquired and retraced, thus a remembrance.

But a second type of history has to be distinguished here carefully. A unit is not a unit for counting, but is rather that which allows for things that exist to be called one, thus that which allows for counting. As counting is the most originary constitution of time, what a unit signifies is exactly that which gives forth time: a historicity. Let us consider this for a better understanding. Every moment is a composite of past, present and future, since I always retain the memory of the past and lean towards the anticipation of the future. But what first establishes that difference between the past and the present, the present and the future? The Now, as a wellspring that intensifies the present, always fulfills and differentiates it from other modifications with a most rich intuition. The Now, as soon as it enters consciousness, is temporally modified to leave room for the all-renewing Now and self-splits into the past. This Now, now, allows for a different type of history: a history that does not in futile attempt to retrace infinitely the next farthest past, but inquires into this Now itself, into its original presentation, into its true beginnings. This history, different from remembrance, is called recollection.

This history of recollection, thus, is aimed at the origin of time. And its unit is thus the mathematical unit proper; a unit outside of time, an eternal unit of things that exist. Its object is not particular histories, but rather historicities themselves. In a number, therefore, what are collected are not past, present and future, but different Nows - different original presentations.

Then what is a number? Is number not always involved in counting? But perhaps that is exactly how number moves beyond mere counting. Numbers, as a multitude composed of units, are always eternal co-presentations of the origins. In this sense, it is not just any multitude, but a multitude that gathers itself into an atemporal unity, which can in this way not just be retained and remembered, but also recollected, and enable us to partake of the divine (since numbers are composed of units, but not “ones”, they are already one realm beyond the existing things). Time, as a moving image of the eternal, should always be related to numbers. Numbers themselves are not counted; on the contrary, it is things that are counted to numbers.

Another mystery can now be solved. The wild realm of significations, the prior meanings of “each” and “things” as unity and plurality, is in fact not prior, but rather a resulted counting founded upon the original mathematical units. It is not the case that we encounter each of the things that exist first and then decide to call them “ones”, but because we partake of units and numbers, that things become countable, and this gives rise retroactively to a temporal experience of unity and plurality, which is not independent from our mathematical experience. To put it simply, our mathematical experience is our original experience. A subversion is made whenever we call the mathematical experience something derivative, or unoriginal; the mathematical experience is, when moving in time, how we see and intellect different Nows as origins, and synthesize them into a living present.

Is it not uncanny that we set off to inquire into numbers, but end up inquiring into inquiries (or, inquirabilities) themselves? But perhaps this is not really a shock, since I can now complete the circle, by simply commenting that my method coincides with my content. Nevertheless, I should still observe my method and replace the coincidence with a necessity.

What I do here is not merely coincidental, since this is not an imposition on my part to make the raw materials conform to a predetermined structure. On the contrary, it is numbers themselves that invoke, by necessity, such a reflection. Numbers are not mere formal indexes, but are themselves the essential guiding threads to the questioning of a whole and its different origins.

I shall feel content now as an outline for the ideal history of numbers is presented. To conclude in an aphoristic way, perhaps it is not far off if I claim that the ideal history of numbers is the ideal history proper, an ideal history of ideal history. But some questions are still not dealt with as delicately, or explained as clearly as possible in this paper due to the length limit. These questions will be expounded further in my other undertakings that will soon ensue.