Gui Ruiyan

Paper / 论文 ·

On the Generality of General Calculus

In On Recondite Geometry, Leibniz boldly claims that ‘while before now algebraists have taken letters or general numbers for the quantities sought, I have taken general or indefinite equations for the lines sought in such transcendent problems’. The force of his calculus, under this context, is viewed to rest not simply on a higher, more abstract generality of quantities, but a generality of a different kind. As algebra is an abstraction from definite quantities, so is calculus an abstraction from definite equations. Since any definite algebraic equation expresses the law of correlation between indefinite quantities, Leibniz interprets calculus to be an abstraction from definite laws, a principle of all principles.

In order to substantiate this claim, we have to retrace the steps in this unfolding of generality within calculus. What are these generalities? To what problems do these generalities pertain? Every abstraction is effected to resolve a problem, i.e. an exception to the rule, that calls for a more general determination of a solution. I hereby claim without proof: to every derived generality corresponds an original exception. This should be the axiom for any mathematical construct.

The exception Leibniz is confronted with in On Recondite Geometry are transcendent quantities. From the start of the main body of this text, he reveals the problem by revealing one ‘source of Transcendent Quantities, that is, a reason why some problems are neither plane, nor solid, nor sursolid, nor of any definite degree, but transcend every algebraic equation’. What are the problems? Leibniz generously provides two: ‘cutting an angle’ and ‘finding an arbitrary number of mean proportionals’. These are problems because they vex the limits of preceding algebraic geometry: they, in any of our attempts to solve them, transcend definite degrees. The resources of preceding algebraic geometry cannot cope with such indefiniteness.

Yet what constitutes a problem? What is the reason for our determination of some things being problems, while others not? In the same passage, Leibniz gives the following reasons for including transcendent quantities into ‘the general problematic’ of geometry: 1. proposable as a problem inside geometry, that is, the problem should be one that naturally arises from a geometrical operation, 2. determinate, 3. describable by an exact and continuous motion, 4. useful.

From such determinations of what a geometrical problem is we should be capable of deriving the requisite characteristics of a mathematical generality that is devised to solve these problems. First, the generality should still be immanent to the original scope. For instance, a metaphysical generality cannot be either sufficient or desirable as a solution to a geometrical problem. Second, the generality should provide a generative principle that answers to any specific instance of determination. Third, this generality should be inherently unified. This requirement ensures that generality is not a simple grouping of ad hoc premises or rules, but must be one rule universally applicable to any specific problem. Otherwise, the relationship between one problem to another, or in Leibniz’s own terms, the ‘motion’ from one instance to another, like from one point to another point on the same curve, would be neither continuous nor exact. Finally, the generality should be simple, so that the solution is practical.

Leibniz’s stroke of genius here, however, may consist in this alone: instead of moving between a proposed generality and specific problems, he identifies the problem to be the generality itself. A general rule is either inferred or deduced. An inferred generality can only incompletely solve the problems, since new exceptions might spring up and refute the rule previously instituted. But if all such specific problems are grasped as one general problem, the deduced general rule necessarily solves all of them all at once. Therefore, in the following paragraph, Leibniz shifts his focus from the specific problems of transcendent quantities to the problem of transcendence in general: ‘moreover, because the method of investigating indefinite quadratures of their impossibilities is for me only a special case (and indeed an easier one) of a much greater problem, which I call the inverse Method of Tangents, in which the greatest part of transcendent geometry is contained, and because if this problem can be solved algebraically, all sorts of discoveries might be made...’

The general problem formulated by Leibniz is: given any property of the relation between two quantities, one is to find the curve that expresses this relation. The given property can be in any form. The examples Leibniz gives in his On Recondite Geometry are illuminating. It could be a property relating the rate of change of one quantity to the other quantity (dx/dy). The problem is in this case called an ‘inverse tangent problem’. It could also describe the positioning of two quantities as in one geometrical figure: one quantity being the abscissa on the radius of a circle, while the other being the arc determined in relation to this abscissa. Despite apparent differences, the latter example can eventually be reduced to an inverse tangent problem. For if we relate the rate of change of the arc length to the abscissa of the given circle, we discover a fixed relationship between the two through similar triangles. Therefore, this specific geometrical problem of representing arc length through its abscissa is transformed into a special case of inverse tangent problems. The same holds for problems of quadrature, since any problem of quadrature is solved through establishing the rule for the tangents of the quadratrix. For the area under the quadranda is obtained through integrating the infinitesimal rectangles formed by the ordinates and the differences in abscissa (∫ydx). The rate of change of the ordinate of the quadratrix in relation to its abscissa is therefore determined as the rate of change of the area under the quadranda in relation to the abscissa (dv = d∫ydx = ydx), which yields the tangent of the quadratrix to be the function of the quadranda (dv/dx = y). All these specific geometrical problems, therefore, can be reduced to the general problem of inverse tangents. The specific problems of transcendent curves can accordingly be reduced to one general problem of transcendence, since this general problem of transcendence is itself only a special case of the inverse tangent problem.

To grasp transcendent problems as one problem of transcendence does not mean, however, to simply identify the common characteristic among these transcendent quantities, though it might be the preliminary step. Instead, what is crucial in such metamorphosis is to establish the proper way to represent this common characteristic mathematically. The Leibnizian expression of this general problem is formulated thus:

0 = a + bx + cy + exy + fx2 + gy2 etc. + v

in which ‘v’ stands for the transcendent quantity. Its transcendence is not simply stipulated, but also manifest in contrast to what precedes, i.e. an indefinite algebraic expression of quantities of finite degrees. Moreover, transcendence in general is only intelligible in such conjunction to finite quantities: ‘v’ by itself only represents an indefinite quantity that is not exclusively a transcendent one, whereas symbols such as ‘vw’ or ‘cos v’ are too specific for transcendence in general. Therefore, one indeed can say the Leibnizian expression of a general transcendence is its most proper expression.

The other important aspect of this formula is already hinted at at the beginning of this essay. Leibniz claims that his originality here consists in taking ‘general or indefinite equations for the lines sought in such transcendent problems’. What he is effectively saying is that, he reinvents the ‘general problematic’. Every generality is devised against a set of problems. A genus is posited to include and help define all the related species. What is unique about algebra and the analytical tradition it continues, however, is that the generality is transferred from the realm of solutions to the realm of problems. Instead of positing the generality as an answer to the set of problems, the generality itself becomes the problem. In other words, ‘x’, which stands for the general number, is not a solution to a problem, like a genus is to the definition of a species, but a symbol that represents that which is to be sought. The algebraic symbol stands for something unknown and is thereby posited as a problem, whereas the metaphysical genus is a known generality proposed to resolve problems of particular definitions.

Leibniz inherits from this tradition of thinking. For him, the generality of calculus as a modus operandi is first and foremost founded on the generality of the problem it encounters. The curve, whether transcendent or algebraic, needs to be first posed as a ‘general’ or ‘indefinite’ equation that is to be solved by a general method. The generality of calculus, therefore, rests upon confronting not a set of particular problems, e.g. cutting angles and finding mean proportionals, but rather the one general problematic of finding any curve whatsoever, i.e. the inverse tangent problem. It is only due to this fact that Leibniz objects to the prevalent misconception on the part of other mathematicians: ‘sometimes some things remain arbitrary, in which case innumerable lines can be found that satisfy the problem, which is the reason why many, seeing it afterwards, might think that the problem is not sufficiently defined and is not in our power’. The fault of others, according to Leibniz, consists not so much in denying the general nature of the solution, i.e. the method through which ‘innumerable lines can be found’, but primarily in rejecting the possible generality of a problem. To their own disadvantage, they wrongly believe that only the method for arriving at particular solutions for particular problems is general and do not realize that the problem itself can also be generalized. The true Leibnizian renovation is only intelligible in this context of a tradition of general problematic. What he invents majorly hinges on his widening the scope of what counts as a problem. He surpasses preceding algebraists mainly in this sense, that the general problem for preceding algebra is the unknown quantity, whereas the general problem for calculus becomes the unknown relation between quantities. A function is that which expresses the relation between quantities. More specifically, it expresses the relation between the ordinates and abscissas of a geometrical figure. To solve the general problem of finding curves is thus to solve the general problem of establishing laws between quantities.

The internal structure of On Recondite Geometry can therefore be revealed via the following logical steps that Leibniz takes in order. First, Leibniz claims that the specific problems that involve transcendent quantities can be reduced to one general problem of inverse tangents. Then he gives a mathematical expression for the general problem of inverse tangents: given any tangent property, one can solve for the curve through employing the algebraic expression of any indefinite and general equation; if it turns out unsolvable, one can be certain that the problem is a transcendent problem. Next, he provides multiple examples of solving these transcendent problems with the implication that these problems can be reduced to the general problem through his differential and integral calculus.

Finally, we should determine if the generality of calculus fits the criteria we derive in the earlier part of this essay. To be sure, when Leibniz posits those characteristics of geometrical problems he has a more limited and specific set of problems in mind. But the criteria should not vary no matter on what scale they are applied. Here I restate the criteria for what constitutes a geometrical problem: 1. inherence within geometry; 2. determinateness; 3. describability through continuous and exact motion; 4. usefulness. The corresponding criteria which we derive for a generality that ‘solves’ such problems are: 1. the same inherence within geometry; 2. universal generativeness; 3. unity; 4. simplicity.

Now, it is not difficult to see that the generality of method of differential calculus depends upon the generality of the problem it posits for itself. Since integration is only the reciprocal process for differentiation, and for any inverse tangent problem, including transcendent problems, the ratio between differential quantities (tangent) is determinate, all inverse tangent problems are solvable through integration. Hence so long as the problem of inverse tangents includes all geometrical problems, the method of calculus is the general method for any problem. As Leibniz himself claims: ‘hardly anything can be imagined that is more useful, concise, and universal for treating transcendent problems by calculation wherever measurements and tangents occur than my differential calculus or analysis of indivisibles and infinites’. Therefore the question now becomes: is the problem of inverse tangents general enough?

I claim this problem of inverse tangents is properly considered the general problem for Leibnizian calculus. This problem of inverse tangents, qua problem, arises naturally within the pursuit of geometrical determination and is determinate, though not particular. It also describes a space in which a curve is continuously varied and modulated so as to ‘satisfy the problem’, such as all logarithmic lines are lines which conform to Barrow’s Theorem. Qua generality, this general problem universally represents all possible determinations of specific problems and itself maintains one simple expression, i.e. through the mathematical formula of an indefinite equation as the unknown. Therefore, the problem calculus defines for itself is properly general. The only reason why one might hesitate on this issue is that one cannot be sure if all specific geometrical problems can be reduced to a problem of finding the curve for two related quantities, and if it is always possible to determine the relationship between the differentials of these two quantities, since these are the prerequisites for transforming a geometrical problem into an inverse tangent problem. Yet I believe it is sufficient to reply that only a problem that can be turned into a inverse tangent problem constitutes a proper geometrical problem. A problem where the differential quantities are not determinable contradicts the criterion of determinateness and continuity (for if the differentials of two quantities do not maintain one singular relationship, then either the two quantities are totally indeterminate with respect to each other, or as at a certain point their relationship shall change, they are not continuous in relation to each other), and is therefore not a geometrical problem at all. The problem of inverse tangents is therefore the most general problem of geometry, and calculus the highest generality.