Sophomore annual essay ·
Relentless Jokes And Long Daydreams
On Plotinus, The Comedian
In this essay 篇目
The Divine Comedy: Are You Serious?
Plotinus opens his treatise on contemplation1 (III, 8 [30]) in a rather surprising way. What is surprising, however, is not that he opens it with an attempt at humor, but how bad the joke actually is. His clumsiness at poking fun looks almost miserable, and one cannot say if that per se is not funnier than the content of the joke. Yet one is missing the truly profound mystery here if one should judge the philosopher solely based on his bad taste for humor. Perhaps Plotinus being funny or not is the wrong question to ask. Instead, one should wonder: why does he even try to be funny at all, if he is bad at it? why should a philosopher jest? what is that irresistible impulse that drives him onward despite failure? A most extreme example of one thus urged is Chrysippus, the Stoic philosopher who anecdotally died of unconstrained laughter over a bad joke he himself made2.
Yet, are we sure the jesting merely stems from a compelling impulse? One might argue the Plotinean joke reflects nothing like an impulse at all. For while telling a joke, one could be genuine or half-hearted. That is, one could be jesting purely for the fun of it, or could use it as a means for deliberate education, provided the uncultured youths whom a philosopher aims to educate are susceptible to amusement of this kind, and can thus effectively be led on to true philosophy through it. Therefore, one could hypothesize that it is for the benefit of the youths that the philosopher deliberates jesting to be the best course. In the ongoing discussion, I will be basing most of my speculations off this hypothesis, for I disbelieve the Plotinean joke to be only a recondite inside joke, or at least that was not how I first read it. This hypothesis, however, gives rise to a problem: how are we sure that jesting can be at all conducive to the pedagogical purpose? is jesting perhaps not antagonistic to the serious stance required of any teaching?
The means has to be analogical to the end, as is sufficiently expounded by Thomas Aquinas3. Via being directed toward the higher purpose, the means itself must harmonize with its end and not intrinsically fall short of it. The higher purpose in this context, according to Plotinus, seems to be nothing but contemplation, for he says ‘children and adults, jesting or serious, seem to have no other purpose except contemplation’4. This statement raises multiple questions. But now, I should stick to my initial task and ask, first, how is jesting conducive to the pedagogical purpose in general? and second, how is jesting conducive in this particular instance?
In general, jesting is conducive to contemplation for it tends toward it. But this is not sufficient, for as Plotinus says, ‘to contemplation all actions tend’. Jesting is no more superior in this aspect. The following clause in the text is helpful here, for we read, ‘compulsive actions drawing it somewhat towards external objects, voluntary actions less so’5. From Plotinus’ treatise on the three primal hypostases (V, 1 [10]) we also read ‘ignorance of origin is caused by excessive valuation of sense objects and disdain of self’, of which the effect is ‘souls forget the divinity that begot them’6. If these separate statements be combined, one could aver: for Plotinus, jesting has to contain something free and voluntary in itself, and this freedom is a freedom of thought and self-reflection, for it must needs lead one away from the excesses of sense objects and educate one’s soul towards a divine kind of contemplation that reminds it of its origin.
What in our general experience of jesting vindicates this conjecture? Is our example of Chrysippus not contradictory to this view? Somehow, it seems that a burst of laughter is always involuntary and compulsive. And can we really laugh at things internal in lieu of external, or laugh only internally? Perhaps the question is better formulated this way: what is the ultimate object for our laughter?
Allow me to take a bold step here. Even as Socrates needs a whole city in order to inquire into the nature of justice in the soul7, I need a bigger image than one single joke for my inquiry into jesting. What would be helpful here is a constellation of jokes, follies, witticisms, puns, double-entendres and cracks: in short, I need a comedy as my free terrain to roam and foray. I will use The Miller’s Tale from Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales as an example of such.
The Miller’s Tale tells a story about adultery. The adulterer and adulteress in this tale hoaxed the cuckolded husband into believing that an apocalyptic flood was coming, and he, being ridiculously gullible, hid away in a boat afloat in air, while his wife was sleeping with her lover. The climax of this tale, however, occurs when another admirer of the wife came, tricked by her into kissing her ass, for vengeance came back with a red-hot iron staff and poked at the adulterer’s anus. This tale is excessively vulgar. Yet, the sheer vulgarity of this comedy alone does not suffice as an explanation for its humor. In spite of the shock proffered by the obscenity, the humorous aspect of this tale is also achieved on two other levels. First, the intricate design of the drama is quite amusing. The happenstance at the end where hearing the adulterer’s cry for water since his anus was burned, the husband mistook that cry for a signal of the coming flood and cut away the tethers, is especially clever, as it gathers two originally separate narrative threads into one unexpected denouement. Second, the respective stupidities and excesses of the characters also contribute immensely to the humor. The futile wiliness of the adulterer (for he fulfills his desire at a high price), the vulgar mischief of the young wife, the irregularity of the admirer’s obsession, and the utmost simplicity of the husband, all display how far a comedy would go in its multifarious depictions of the human folly. Here, from these two aspects of the tale’s humor, something deeply intellectual about the comedic enterprise has already emerged.
The vulgarity and obscenity of things alone when presented can only be repulsive. The shock from something vulgar becomes funny only when it is intellected in a context. Thus one can say the comedy is comedic only because it is understood. This can also apply to a joke. A joke induces laughter only when the teller tells it in a clear and intelligible way, and when the hearer understands the content and context of it. It can therefore be inferred that the act of jesting is in fact prompted by an intellectual desire. A joke is always intellectually demanding, for one has to be capable of making associations that are otherwise not made between different terms, and to make such associations needs both a prior familiarity with these terms and an acute wit for mastering the new significance created by the joke. For instance, to grasp the joke ‘what do you call a fake noodle? an impasta’ both the semantic linkage between the terms ‘fake’ and ‘impostor’ and the phonological linkage between ‘-postor’ and ‘pasta’ need already be familiar, to allow for a comprehension of the subversion of these relationships. Even in the telling of a joke, a desire at mastering the art of delivery preponderates, and it necessarily compels the teller to fully understand the joke and the circumstances to find the opportune moment and tell it the right way. Also, a joke-teller is sometimes motivated simply by a desire to recollect that clever artifice which makes the joke beautiful, or to invent it if he makes his own material, and thus what he desires in this case is primarily to dwell in an intellectual appreciation for the joke itself. By sharing the joke, he not only entertains his listeners, but promulgates what he considers to be artful and well-designed, not just what is vulgar. Therefore, it is clear that the desire at jesting is, no matter if it pertains to the teller or the listener, an intellectual desire, and this desire is most apparent in our daily experiences when one sees everyone at the table laughing tacitly, him alone being left out of the joke, and feels it almost irresistible to ask others to explain the joke to him. In that scenario, one might even feel ashamed about not ‘getting the joke’. One also notices this aspect of jesting when one fails to remember a joke and feels the strong frustration of not knowing it anymore. Therefore, it is without a doubt that jesting is an intellectual, hence contemplative, practice. Moreover, since the desire is an intellectual desire, the satisfaction one gets is also intellectual: on the one hand, one takes pride in succeeding to grasp or comprehendingly deliver the joke, while on the other hand, the very activity of recognition and comprehension brings fulfillment. Hence, one may argue that there is always a contemplative element contained in our act of jesting, and this contemplation is directed at nothing other than a certain kind of ‘knowledge’ prescribed by our thinking and reasoning capacity.
But this conclusion cannot yet be final. For we know jesting is, after all, distinct from rational knowing, if simply because jesting is always about something unreasonable and ridiculous. A joke always makes terms that are supposed to be unequal equal, thus signifying a failure of reason. This failure is also evident in the fact that as soon as a joke is rationally expounded, it loses its charm. The externality to reason, however, only contributes to humor through the lens of a rational understanding: only a rational soul can understand the failure at rationality and is thereby able to obtain meaningful satisfaction from observing such failure. This satisfaction is synonymous to the satisfaction felt by those who are amused by the stupidities and excesses from characters in a comedy. On this point, Aristotle observes ‘comedy, as we said, is an imitation of people of a lower sort, though not in respect to every vice; rather, what is ridiculous is part of what is ugly. For the ridiculous is a certain sort of missing the mark and a deformity that is painless and not destructive’8. To turn his definition around, one might say that only a person who does not feel pained by the stupidity presented is able to laugh at it. The people who find amusement in comedy, hence, are supposedly superior people who can either comprehend the ugliness without finding themselves ugly, or are able to distance themselves from the ugliness presented. Either case, they are looking down upon the comedic characters from a higher level. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that one main satisfaction one might obtain from seeing a comedy is the self-felt superiority over the ridiculous and the absurd, which comes from a triumph of the rational over the irrational, the wise over the stupid.
It is indeed possible for a spectator of comedy to be amused and pained by it at the same time. Yet my conclusion is not contradicted. For when one relates to the character and sees in the character one’s own vice, one feels the mockery directed at oneself, and pain is thus felt; but if we suppose the soul is ‘divisible’ into an order of hierarchy, the higher and more virtuous ‘part’ of the soul can still feel superior and be amused by its own vice and stupidity as if they belong only to the lower ‘part’. From this posited ‘divisibility’ of oneself ensues the activity of joke-telling (for in telling the joke one temporarily puts on a mask and appears irrational), self-mockery and self-irony, and this activity can be inherent in the affectation in comedy seeing, too. Thus so far we can firmly establish that in general jesting is contemplative, for it cultivates both an intellectual desire to acquire, recollect or originate ‘knowledge’ and a feeling of superiority of ‘wisdom’, and both relate directly to φιλοσοφία.
Now, as the general aspect of jesting is dealt with, it remains to be determined how humor works in this particular Plotinean joke and how this joke should be ‘contemplated’. There are some preliminary observations to be gleaned from it that can be helpful.
First, in this joke, a philosophical doctrine of contemplation is proposed in a jesting way, before it is to be put under ‘serious investigation’9. Second, if this doctrine were proposed jestingly without qualification on the recipients, no person would ‘listen to such nonsense’10. Third, the risk of proposing this doctrine in a jesting way is eliminated by the knowledge that ‘we are here by ourselves’11. Two questions that naturally arise are, therefore, what is the risk involved here? and why should this joke in particular precede the ‘serious investigation’?
The most obvious risk for a joke is of course that of it being either misunderstood or not understood at all. The so-called ‘uninitiated’ lack the context and knowledge to actually see the joke, thus they would not ‘listen to such nonsense’, whereas only among ‘ourselves’ is the joke understood and therefore amusing. But with Plotinus, another likely risk can be that of the joke being treated merely as a joke. If the joke is not seen as an ingress into something more serious, the joke might lose its proper purpose of directing the hearers to ascend. Thus, it is not enough for the ‘initiates’ to merely get the joke, but they also need to transcend the joke and see the touch of divine inherent in the jesting.
Those who never truly devote themselves to contemplation do not get the joke. In order to get the joke, one has to be capable of making sense of this ‘nonsense’, and has to be familiarized already with the activity of contemplation. Only those who have a prior understanding of what contemplation should be, viz a serious mental activity of having grasped, can be shocked by this joke. The joke is (now I am ‘explaining the joke’) that contemplation is described by this doctrine to be the most universal, but it seems absurd to say that all things should contemplate, and all their actions be contemplation. The risk, however, is that even those who actually contemplate and get the joke might persist in their self-ignorance in seeing this doctrine only as an absurdity, hence failing to ascend. Only those who both get the joke and somehow feel intrigued by this seemingly unreasonable position to further inquire into its truth will be able to enjoy this joke fully in transcending themselves through the eventual reception of the doctrine. For them, a second joke is prepared.
In the paragraph that follows immediately afterwards, the transition from jesting to serious investigation is played out: ‘Could it be true that in jesting we are contemplating? Yes. As do all who jest, in jesting we contemplate. One jests because one wants to contemplate’12. The transition effected here is crucial and difficult; but above all, comical. In claiming that the former activity of jesting the reader is engaged in is itself a kind of contemplation, Plotinus effectively shifts to a more serious stance without losing his playfulness of language. By broaching such a surprising claim and following it up with a strong affirmation, he shows how radical his doctrine really is, that even you, who were just now reading the joke and jesting with him, are included in the ‘absurd’ universal contemplation. The once passive observer now is involved as part of the comedy itself, the indifferent superiority being thus challenged: in short, the message is, if this is indeed a comedy, by treating the doctrine as mere jesting, you are exactly the one being jested for jesting along without realizing that what you are now doing is contemplation all the same, which identification has seemed to be precisely what is ridiculous; that the reader has just thoughtlessly participated in a jest which is nonetheless ‘contemplation’ and which he probably feels absurd to call ‘contemplation’, is the second joke.
But this really is a comedy, for the initiation into this doctrine of universal contemplation cannot be effected here through rational persuasion. Moreover, it seems that Plotinus does not even intend to do so. By simply claiming jesting to be also contemplation, he essentially evades the real difficulty of convincing the unconvinced. If we interpret the introductory passage of this treatise to be argumentative, the argument seems to run as follows: 1. the objector does not treat the doctrine of universal contemplation seriously; 2. ‘not treating something seriously’, viz jesting, seems to be a least contemplative activity; 3. but even jesting is a kind of contemplation; 4. therefore, the objector should reconsider his position. To effect the third step, one must already be willing to accept, to some extent, the doctrine itself. For those unconvinced of the equation between jesting and contemplation, this ‘argument’ can only be spurious. And even if the objector concedes that jesting is contemplative, it does not necessitate any wholesale acceptance of the full doctrine: after all, jesting seems to be exclusively a human activity; plants and animals seem to not jest, and likewise not contemplate.
That is why this passage is exactly not meant to be taken as argumentative. Rather, it is a show that Plotinus has put on only to display his good spirit. What else is presented here about his doctrine other than its inherent weaknesses and absurdities? If jesting really is a kind of contemplation, and the doctrine of universal contemplation is put into a jest, is his presentation here not dangerously self-referential? It seems possible to reduce the relationship just outlined to the following: universal contemplation is itself something contemplated. This self-referentiality portends great ‘metaphysical’ trouble: since universal contemplation (taken in the absolute sense) can be encompassed by a particular act of contemplation, should this particular belong to the universal, the same thing would be smaller than itself, thus breaching the principle of self-identity; should this particular not belong to the universal, the universal would stop being universal in the absolute sense; lastly, should this particular not belong to this universal but belong to a higher and more absolute (this is already nonsensical) universal, that more absolute universal in turn can be encompassed by a particular act of contemplation, ad infinitum. Therefore, even before seriously expounding his doctrine, Plotinus has already exposed it as something quite absurd.
Moreover, the very universality claimed by his doctrine (that ‘everything’ contemplates) inevitably entangles all reality to the one absurdity established above, for just as universal contemplation is to be particularly contemplated, every contemplation encompassed by the universal is contemplated likewise, and we are eventually confronted with either a paradox or an infinite regress, so that, via this doctrine, all things become participants in an infinite comedic parade. One should nevertheless not fail to see that the consequence of this installment of an absolute and universal comedy is very serious: are we supposed to live in a world where everything can ultimately be treated as absurd laughing matter? One finally makes the leap from jesting to serious investigation, as soon as one realizes the serious and uncanny consequence possibly entailed by a wholehearted acceptance of the Plotinean doctrine. The thought, however, that he should expose this absurdity even before the doctrine itself gets formally introduced, creates a certain sense of awe in us, which is no less than what one feels upon seeing a warrior who voluntarily exposes his mortal wound; and awe, according to Aristotle, makes men ‘both now begin and at first began to philosophise’13. What Plotinus has put on behind the jesting, therefore, is essentially a challenge, an invitation, a show of his hospitality, instead of an attempt at argumentation, for only through this interpretation are we able to construe his saying ‘we are here by ourselves’, which are his welcoming words of intimacy for us to take on the honorable task of joining the divine comedy to reason with the unreasonable, and to think the unthinkable: that is, to feel awe and philosophise. And is not his bad humor exactly that awesome thing which has initially spurred me on to this task of investigation? It is fortunate that after the initial wonder I should discover other even more wondrous things to extend my pursuit, and thereby overcome myself.
There are different kinds of spirits who read this same passage, and they react in various ways. Some of them fail to get the jokes. Some only get one of the pair. Some get both, but pause before that imminent transition to a more serious attitude, for they are stopped by their stagnant ‘superiority’ from wondering: what if the absurdity has some truth? what if the joke reflects some reality? if truth he really has not, how can he be yet so self-assured that he is willing to expose so many apparent weaknesses? Only those more powerful and adventurous spirits, who are always bored of their unchanged stations and try to overcome themselves, will enjoy the joke to the fullest extent, so that they not only get it, but also decide to learn it by heart.
It will come in handy if I now give a brief summary. To start with, I base the first section of my essay on the hypothesis that the jesting which opens this treatise on contemplation has some pedagogical function. Then I determine that jesting generally can be conducive to philosophical education because it contains something voluntary and free, which here consists in its satisfying an intellectual desire of the soul and nurturing a feeling of superiority of reason and wisdom. But this feeling of superiority, if it becomes stagnant and lethargic, can hamper the soul’s ascent. Therefore, the Plotinean joke in particular has something more to offer: first, it stings that indifferent superiority held by the reader and shakes it up via making him part of the ‘play’; next, by implicating a very serious consequence of everything merging into an absolute comedy, it becomes something uncanny and hence worthy of serious investigation; third, it functions as a highly selective invitation addressed to a certain kind of spirit. This endeavor of serious investigation belongs only to those who are so willing to reason with the unreasonable and to understand the absurd, that they not only see the absurd, but also in their freedom decide to commit themselves to the absurd, at least temporarily. For these spirits are no less enticed by the stance and posture that a thinker exudes than by the actual content of his thought. And one who thus belongs to this tribe of spirits is sometimes called, in short, a free thinker.
Yet, is my hypothesis that the Plotinean joke is nothing but a pre-figurative accessory in the help for the philosophical spirit to its own education not perhaps a too questionable self-delusion? Am I not perhaps too rash and also foolish if I just conclude in a thoughtless rejection of any impulse for laughter and entertainment the philosopher might have had? If I on the one hand stress the voluntary and free aspect of jesting, why do I on the other still subject it to its serviceability to a master, and thereby in a sense disparage its freedom? The issue that I initially undertake to investigate is therefore still not resolved, and shall be taken up in the next section under a different perspective.
Infinite Jest: The Eidological Play
Is it possible for a philosopher to be playful on its own accord, to take up the act of jesting and the attitude of unseriousness simply for the fun of it? This possibility seems, at a first glance, counterintuitive, and when investigated appears even the more unreasonable: is not philosophy the serious profession par excellence, when it concerns itself solely with the gravest matters of life, nature and being? It seems as if philosophy in its very essence is antagonistic to the lightheartedness of play. Yet, by simply reading any Platonic dialogue a conviction such as this would immediately be thrown into doubts and suspicions. What is the significance of the fact that the only writings this most exemplary philosopher bequeathed (either accidentally or intentionally) to later generations consist nearly of nothing other than plays? While it remains true that Plato’s Socrates in Phaedrus apparently dismisses writing as, ironically, ‘mere play’ and thus ‘devalues’ the activity of writing as a whole14, the very paradox of the written-ness of this dismissal has to make us pause. I am not convinced by the claim that Platonic plays are not serious even in their own way, and I believe no one will solemnly conclude from reading Phaedrus that these written plays lack some intrinsic value. The tension between play and philosophy, therefore, is never resolved matter. On the contrary, to even perceive and be able to characterize this tension despite all the presuppositions and prevalent opinions that tend to conceal it is a task strenuous and serious enough to suggest high rewards.
In the first section, I have determined the qualities that play has in service to a subsequent serious investigation. Yet I have scarcely spent ink on explicating the phenomenon itself. This negligence will persist if I, instead of extolling play as the guide to philosophy, start to emphasize its restorative value. For play itself can so easily be glossed over and slide into being a supplement to the ‘solemn’ task of actualizing life, i.e. a mere respite that one uses only to recover the strength necessary for next day’s labor, if one pays no attention. Therefore, one cannot be too careful in hunting down the essence of playfulness, since it is a wily animal: but is ‘hunting’ not already a most exemplary form of play?
For primordial men, hunting figures as a means to provide the household with sustenance, clothing, and livestock. Primarily, hunting aims at the procurement of necessities. But even there it already implicates something more. It first is an exploratory venture, for in pursuing one leaves home. Next, it provides a space for the display of honor, so that those who acquire the biggest game are considered better warriors. Hunting hence always projects beyond itself an excess that surpasses mere survival: one seems capable of ‘surviving’ by feeding solely on the produce from earth. Moreover, this excessiveness becomes ever more amplified as the necessity of hunting gradually recedes, so that in times more recent to ours, hunting eventually became the royal game. And since then a third aspect of hunting has become the most acute: the pure rapture in pursuing the game now is the main motivation. See what Montaigne has to say about this: ‘I think the example of the chase would be more appropriate. Even as there is less pleasure in it, so there is more transport and surprise, whereby our reason, stunned, loses the leisure to prepare and brace itself against it, when after a long quest the beast starts up suddenly and appears in a place where perhaps we were least expecting it. This shock, and the ardor of the hue and cry, strike us so that it would be hard for those who love this sort of hunt to withdraw their thought elsewhere at that point. And the poets make Diana victorious over the torch and arrows of Cupid: Who amid these does not forget the stings and all the cares love brings? [Horace]’15.
Nevertheless, it is exactly on hunting, the activity which, according to Montaigne, extinguishes reason and effaces love, that Plato paradoxically models his most well-known philosophical quest: the hunt for the sophist. To show what is broached there is not merely a superficial parallelism but a thorough fusion of the two pursuits, I shall quote profusely from the text:
STRANGER: [...] Now, then, Theaetetus, this is my own advice to the pair of us, inasmuch as we believe the genus of the sophist to be difficult and hard to hunt down, to make a practice run of his pursuit in something else that’s easier––unless of course you can from somewhere or other speak of a different and easier way.16
STRANGER: Well, if that’s the decision, let’s dismiss you and me, and until we meet with someone who is able to do it, let’s say until then that it’s as certain as anything can be that the sophist is a criminal in the way he has of stopping at nothing, and he has slipped into a trackless region.17
STRANGER: We’ll find, then, if we seek, both now and later, the philosopher in some sort of region like this, and though he too is difficult to see vividly, it’s in another way than his that the sophist’s difficulty is.
THEAETETUS: How’s that?
STRANGER: One’s a fugitive into the darkling of ‘that which is not’, to which he attaches himself by a knack, and on account of the darkness of the region, he’s hard to get an understanding of. Isn’t that so?
THEAETETUS: It seems likely.
STRANGER: Yes, but the philosopher, devoted to the look (idea) of that which is always through calculations, it’s on account of the brilliance of the place that he’s in no way easy to be seen, for the eyes of the soul of the many are incapable of keeping up a steady gaze on the divine.18
THEAETETUS: Yes, but it seems, stranger, to be utterly true––it’s what was said at the beginning about the sophist––that the genus is hard to hunt down. He really does appear to be full of defenses, and whenever he sets up one of them in front of himself, it’s necessary to fight through it first, before arriving at him himself. For now with difficulty we pierced through the defense that ‘that which is not’ is not, and he has to set up another, and we must now prove that there is falsehood of both speech and opinion, and after this perhaps there’s another, and still a different one after that, and, it seems, that no limit will ever appear.19
Unfortunately, I would not be able to undertake a thorough explication of these passages in the space of this treatise. However, one should not fail to perceive that for Plato, the playfulness of philosophy is not an utter impossibility. The rapturous chase which seems most oppositional to a love of reason can nonetheless be used as the paradigm on which a philosophical pursuit is modeled: but in what way? is the paradigm of hunting simply applicable to philosophy without any internal tension? After all, the sophist is not just any beast of game, but a hunted ‘criminal’!
But back to Plotinus. In his treatise on virtues (I, 2 [19]), Plotinus explains: ‘wisdom and prudence [...] are of two kinds, one in The Intelligence and another in The Soul. In The Intelligence they are not virtues. In The Soul they are virtues. What are they then in The Intelligence? Its act and its essence. But in coming from The Intelligence and taking up residence in a being different from them, they are virtues’20. In what follows, he implies that corresponding to each virtue, there is in The Intelligence an original paradigm, an Idea of virtue. Now playfulness, even according to Aristotle, is a virtue21. Should we not then conclude that, even for playfulness, there possibly is an original paradigm in The Intelligence? And is the philosopher, who aspires to the loftiest contemplation, not evincing such transformed ‘virtue’ of the intelligible being when he jests ‘contemplatively’? What could be the nature of such ‘eidological playfulness’ (as that which belongs to the gathering of εἰδη)?
Plato’s Sophist again gives us a lead for addressing these questions. Around 234B, the Eleatic Stranger asks Theaetetus: ‘do you know of any more artful or maybe more charming species of child’s play than the imitative?’22 Playfulness is here determined in its most crucial aspect as imitativeness, that it shows its essence most in relation to the act of imitation. How should one interpret this most decisive claim with respect to our guiding question?
Imitation occurs when something is produced in the likeness of something else. Our human play imitates. Hunting imitates war. Flirting imitates love. In video-games, most digital figures imitate real things. Toy cars imitate vehicles. Yet imitation is of various sorts. To a natural kind of imitation belong quasi-entities such as shadows and mirror-images. Paintings and photographs can be categorized as artificial imitations. Play seems to most appropriately belong to the artificial category. Though sometimes children play with just sticks and rocks, the imitation is still achieved only through an artificially fabricated and jointly shared ‘fantasy’. But a further specification is required since play is not exactly the same as a painting or, for that matter, a video. For play, in its broadest sense, is always ‘acted out’ and immersive. Even a play on stage presents itself as something more than a spectacle: it grips and interacts with the audience in a self-conscious and active way. It stretches itself and extends its scope to those who step in by lighting up a jovial space of fantastical hospitality. Yet an immersion of this kind is never total, for one thus immersed is no less able to recognize this play-space as an imitation: one knows those ‘corpses’ that lie on the ground at the end of a tragedy do not tend to remain there next morning, and one almost always freely enters or exits a play, just like when one daydreams.
This is not so with life. Life seems to not be something over which one has a free mastery. No one is willingly born, and if one ever willingly exits life (instead of merely accepting death as an inevitability), the suicide is always described as a sacrifice, a sin or a most consequential liberation, e.g. what laymen conceive of as ‘nirvana’. The seriousness of life also consists in the fact that life is always determined to some extent by its past history and is therefore unable to always freely rebuild its whole trajectory. Every choice or happening has some irremediable consequence that constitutes our destiny. One labors under such destiny, constantly attacked by chance, either to actualize or to maintain a most vulnerable happiness. This manacle of drudgery, however, is not worn by a player. A player is never serious, for his actions implicate no consequence such as an ultimate triumph or a most sorry debacle. This freedom over life and fate thus characterizes a most essential aspect of a player.
By this criterion, The Intelligence in its activity is most necessarily a player. As it is next to what is the most superior, i.e. The One, and participates in its eternity, it is not entangled in the attacks by what is inferior to it: neither bodily passions, nor the weal and woe of life, nor time disturbs its leisure. Those who contemplate, when contemplating, are likewise free from worldly cares. But how does this eidological freedom relate to imitation? For it seems unlikely that upon the heights of The Intelligence, the contemplator should be imitating human life. Even the playfulness of The Soul does not intend to imitate it, since Plotinus has already determined virtues of the soul to be likenesses of divinity, not of finite existence. Then much less should playfulness of The Intelligence be an imitation of it. And above all, is even human play in its essence an imitation of human life? Only in a sense, for there what the imitation essentially achieves is a feeling of mastery and freedom. What the play imitates, therefore, is ultimately nothing less than the most superior freedom, which amounts to a contemplation of The One. And insofar as highest contemplation is the τέλος of our human life, play is an imitation of it. But play also exceeds life, insofar as it much more directly comports to this happiness our life aims at.––Thus equipped with these preliminary determinations, I am finally able to venture a more definite (hence more definitely wrong) exposition of playfulness in context of the Plotinean doctrine.
The Plotinean philosophy is predominantly a philosophy of signs. This feature of his thought can be discerned most clearly through an understanding of his multifarious delineations of the ascent to The One. These delineations usually conform to a process of him finding on each level of the hierarchy a special index that dialectically points beyond itself to what is higher that unifies and gathers the lower level as a whole. One such delineation can be found in his treatise on contemplation23. My synopsis of it runs as follows.
On the lowest level there is material. But material is a passive multiplicity unified by form; form and material constitute the totality of natural things24. This totality becomes an object for contemplation when it, being ‘the lowest reason’ according to Plotinus25, is unified by The Highest Reason. The Highest Reason, the intermediary reason of actions and the lowest reason of visible shapes then constitute the totality of Nature as Reason26. This totality of Nature, being a lower soul, is again a passive multiplicity to be unified by ‘the higher part’ of The Soul27. The lower and higher parts then constitute The Soul as a totality. This totality abiding with time is in turn gathered by an atemporal activity of thinking into an object for contemplation28. The thinking activity is then unified with its object, i.e. The Soul, into a new totality. Plotinus calls it The Intelligence29. The Intelligence, still split in a sense between the active thinker and the passive thought30, turns to the ultimate unifying principle: The One. This ascent delineated by Plotinus is a dialectical process that unifies, on each level, the oppositional parts of a totality. But what is more significant of this process is the ‘signitive’ nature of it: on each level, there is an active principle of unification, a superior instance from the totality, that in turn represents an activity higher than itself. Form points to The Highest Reason as its producer31, The Highest Reason to the higher part of The Soul32, it to activity and life of The Intelligence33, which ultimately points to The One34. These indexes also relate the totalities to one another in a likewise manner, e.g. The Soul to The Intelligence, so that one totality is said to reproduce an antecedent totality. Therefore, one can say that the Plotinean philosophy is not simply dialectical, but a dialectic of indexical signs that each preserve, sequentially, traces from an antecedent. It is to be noted that being indexes, these signs are not simply landmarks separately distributed on a linear path; rather, they are like inner parts of concentric circles35, each coinciding with a smaller circle that in turn contains a more condensed part. The ascent, once presented this way, is also a process of concentration and contraction.
In no way is this delineation the most precise. In his treatise on souls36, Plotinus further specifies all the sub-levels that characterize the path leading to The Soul. Though the steps are more detailed, the very same pattern still governs his thinking: upon each level of the hierarchy, there is always one superior instance from the totality that would make an index to indicate a higher principle. Thus I say that the Plotinean doctrine can be thoroughly determined as a philosophy of indexical signs.
Yet signs are of different sorts. Some signs are like reflections, photographs and realistic paintings, while others are like words, national flags, and coats of arms. Those belong to the former category are ‘images (εἰκόνες)’ that directly and immediately refer to the objects they represent, whereas those belong to the latter are ‘symbols (συμβόλαια)’ that only indirectly and mediately refer to the objects. Both are imitative so long as both depict ‘things’ and what they are ‘like’, but an image always indicates something in its particularity as a determinate object, while a symbol, that which is ‘thrown together’, only indicates an object that is indeterminate and general. Upon seeing a national flag one does not see the nation itself, yet one interprets from it a general mood that is ‘like’ the national spirit in a very loose sense, symbolized by the color and design of the flag. Upon hearing a word, one does not have before oneself an unproblematic ‘likeness’, for most words do not sound ‘like’ the things they denote, yet through etymological connections a relational similarity between the word to other words and its object to other objects can be established. That is probably why in Cratylus Socrates, not without difficulty, could tentatively treat words as likenesses37. A likeness between an algebraic symbol and the magnitude it signifies might be the most difficult to reckon with, yet insofar as the symbol is as random and coincidental as the magnitude itself can be before it becomes known, the symbol is said to liken what it represents.
So in what sense do those indexical signs in the Plotinean ascent refer to their respective higher realities? And how can their statuses be determined? If falsity, which allows for imitations, really is a mixture of Being and Non-Being as maintained by the Eleatic Stranger38, different kinds of imitations would suggest different ways of mixing the two genera. With what ratio are images mixed and produced? Images are produced when Being and its truth are locked in the eye in the production process, and they are interpreted as images only when their originals are thereby determined. Symbols, on the other hand, are ‘thrown together’ with their referents, as the word συμβόλον originally signifies the two halves of a split coin that help to identify contracting parties. Symbols represent only incidentally, for the person who currently wears this other half of a coin might have robbed it from someone else; while a shadow can never be stolen. The incidence of a symbol, however, comes precisely from its being broken off from its original oneness. Its fragmentary nature makes it something that ‘desires’ its other half and its own completion, but being excluded from its most originary unity, it no longer truly belongs anywhere and is thereby made readily detachable, hence incidental. The symbol is therefore a residue, and its being residual gives it a power to represent something other than its most primordial origin, to represent ‘anything at all’: jettisoned from the transactional configuration of a coin, it can now be carried around as a mark that represents something, precisely because it has been denied its most proper function as currency. Thus, in the process of symbolization, the original has to be irremediably fractured: the two halves of the coin can probably still be fit together, yet the split remains in the middle, and neither of the two halves is still functionally serviceable for the market. The production of images, on the other hand, does not in any way diminish the originals, since images always point to the originals directly: this indexical immediacy would not be possible if with the production of images the originals themselves somehow become confused or less illuminated.
Images, then, are signs produced with prior determinations of originals. Symbols, on the contrary, are fragments that strive to become whole despite remaining incomplete. These, however, are only characterizations of signs as ‘things’. To connect these determinations with playfulness, the differentiation between signitive things have to correspond to a differentiation between practices that ‘act things out’. In the Plotinean doctrine, this correspondence between the imitative thing and the imitative practice can ultimately be discerned in a differentiation between the upward and downward directions of contemplation. As one climbs the ladder leading up to The One from down below studiously, one constantly encounters fragmented things that long to be unified. They are symbols on the road that testify to the indeterminateness of life and of happiness. Yet as one reaches the highest contemplation and thereby contemplates with The Intelligence, one has attained the knowledge of originals upon the eidological terrain, and when one looks down from there, how else can those derivative things be seen but as images and shades? Why else would images be produced when originals are within grasp, if not to play with? At the level of The Intelligence, one is ‘oned’ with The One, eternally blessed in the ultimate happiness: what else remains to be ‘done’ but to play blissfully in this eternal leisure? Sooner or later, a philosopher who has thus left the cave will start to treat his own life as a play of images and shadows, and dwells with it as if a game. And in such playing he achieves a most superior kind of imitation, for through it one imitates The One which ‘descends’ from its self-contentedness to produce its own images. Such a descent is completely free and voluntary: The One has no reason to ‘descend’ and does not ‘really’ descend, and in imitating it the philosopher likewise produces derivative images as freely and playfully. Unlike symbols that always are ‘meaningful’ in pointing toward general ideas that wait to be further examined and determined, images are produced ‘meaningless’, ‘apparent’ and ‘superficial’ in their immediacy, since they are excesses despite the originals: they persist alongside the ultimate fulfillment, as meaningless and nonsensical, hence as playful, as the ‘descent’ of The One. The eidological playfulness, therefore, consists in both an imitation of the playfulness of The One and an unseriousness that most properly belongs to the divine which sees and plays with its own images. However, this eidological play needs be differentiated from the human play in its character of actuality and fulfillment. The human play remains vulnerable to the seriousness of human life and is demarcated by it, so that the human player is still constantly disturbed by the thought of ‘wasting time’ on games and sports instead of investing those chunks of time ‘more efficiently’: to the actualization of ‘real happiness’. But with the eidological playfulness, as the highest contemplation is already achieved, no care of finite human beings should genuinely remain attached to the philosopher. Human play, even if it comports to happiness more directly than the struggle of life does, remains in the earthly realm and is thus often utilized only as an instrument for realizing and habituating one to the ultimate happiness. In other words, unlike the eidological play, the unpurposiveness of play in the human realm is only temporary and is often subsumed under the service of a more general project with the ultimate happiness in scope.
Now I shall recapitulate my exposition. First, I have determined that the Plotinean philosophy is a philosophy of signs. Then I differentiate two categories of signs, that of images and that of symbols. Images refer to determinate objects directly, while symbols refer to indeterminate objects indirectly. The playfulness of the highest contemplator is of an eidological sort, so that he freely participates in a production and play of images that is unserious in two aspects: first, images are produced without any reason other than the superabundance of power, hence a production of images playfully imitates the senseless descent of The One; second, this divine playfulness is utterly unperturbed by the struggle of human existence, and compared to the initial labor it takes to achieve such highest contemplation, this ‘descent’ is most effortless and lighthearted. One could say that here Plotinus has anticipated a reversal of The Divine Comedy: for Dante, it is the descent to inferno that is the most torturous, but as soon as he starts to ascend, his path becomes ever more serene. For Plotinus, however, the comedy consists not so much in seeing heaven in its true face as in striking a fall that is like a somersault, upon the clouds.
Everything That Rises Must Converge: Plotinus contra Augustine
In the second part of this treatise, I have treated generally what it means for a philosopher who contemplates the highest to be playful. Yet play covers a variety of activities: games, sports, theatrical plays, etc. Among them, one particular species of play especially presents a difficulty: how is tragedy considered play? Is tragedy not perhaps exactly about what is serious? In assigning the playfulness of philosophy exclusively to the comic, am I not perhaps overlooking a significant possibility?
Tragedy is playful insofar as it is imitative. But it is imitative in a mode different from a comedy. In a comedy, neither the characters in the play nor the audience are ‘pained’. The audience retain their superiority, whilst the comic characters exude a unique kind of immortality. Every buffoon in a play seems to be somehow put under a strange aegis that protects him against any worldly attack. Jacques the melancholic in As You Like It goes so far as to say: ‘I must have liberty withal, as large a charter as the wind, to blow on whom I please; for so fools and they that are most galled with my folly, they most must laugh’39. A comedy is determined thoroughly as that which is not serious. The comic playfulness plays with shallow images, and is in that sense imagistic. But tragedies always depict a pitiable downfall of the ‘superior people’, and thereby exhibit the indeterminateness of human fate, so as to show how the τέλος of life is forever out of reach for any finite being. This abysmal indeterminateness unconcealed by tragedy makes tragic playfulness a symbolic imitativeness. Tragedy is hence bordering on our human struggle of life and death with fundamental meanings and symbols. Despite this shared border, tragedies can still be counted as play as opposed to serious life only because they in some way break from the normal self-forgetfulness of our quotidian existence and become the ultimate condensation of symbols: they gather the human suffering into an enchanting, maddening and intoxicating totality. In doing this, they transform our daily struggle into a war on the cosmic level and elevate us from our ordinary life-trajectory. Immersed in the hustle and bustle of our lives, we tend to forget about those critical questions such as on mortality, happiness, and truth. In tragedies, these most essential questions concerning mortal existence are raised and addressed. Comedies, on the other hand, tend to suppress such questioning: human existence when put into the comic perspective becomes unserious. Let us reflect how often we try to determine the right and wrong in a tragedy. Is Antigone perhaps too headstrong? Is Creon too austere? These questions are much less often raised by a comedy: as soon as one gets this serious about it, one detaches it from its most primordial sphere of lightheartedness. The tragic playfulness, therefore, does not consist in a jocundity that most properly belongs to comedy, but shows a different sort of transcendence; or rather, it puts the transcendence into a different perspective: in beholding the most sublime possibility of life it struggles to ascend so much that it forcefully ‘breaks free’ from a normal course of time, whereas the imagistic playfulness of the divine jester signifies a freedom that has long been attained and secured. The festivity and eventfulness of tragedy thus hinge on a break from the ordinary self-forgetfulness of human existence, in conjuring up transcendence through the ultimate presentation of a struggle.
Is it possible for the playfulness of The Intelligence to be tragic? This seems to me to be a dubious possibility. Augustine is the most prominent thinker that seems to have approached this question. For being a habituated tragedy lover, even when he later renounces it in words, he still keeps in his thinking his tragic consciousness intact. He exposes this side of himself when he confesses: ‘hence came my love for sufferings, but not of a kind that pierced me very deeply; for my longing was not to experience myself miseries such as I saw on stage. I wanted only to hear stories and imaginary legends of sufferings which, as it were, scratched me on the surface’40. And of his comment on Dido and himself: ‘what is more pitiable than a wretch without pity for himself who weeps over the death of Dido dying for love of Aeneas, but not weeping over himself dying for his lack of love for you, my God [...] ’41. Despite his apparent abstinence from it, is it possible that his love for tragedy only grows subtler as he becomes more mature? Instead of wanting to see the tragedy, has he not perhaps surreptitiously transformed his life into one, thus imbuing his personal experience with a symbolic significance?
Now, a philosopher’s eidological playfulness seems to have become an impossibility under the Augustinian perspective. This is because the eidological terrain is time-less in the strict sense: time is only a ‘possession’ of The Soul, being an imagistic product of The Intelligence. Yet for Augustine in particular and for human existence as he views it in general to be, it is a mere hope to transcend the fragmenting time: ‘You are my eternal Father, but I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand. The storms of incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, until that day when, purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow together to merge into you’42. Augustine, by his belief in the human sin, has to deny any possibility for the earthbound to achieve ultimate freedom without the messianic savior liberating him through grace. Having thus transformed his life-history into a tragic play and his contemplation to a symbol that cries for the advent of God, he demonstrates how the tragic playfulness can be present at a lower level of The Soul, where the human soul remains fragmented. But throughout his contemplation, especially with that vision at Ostia43, an absence of the tragically playful or the playfully tragic from the ordered-ness of The Intelligence is strongly suggested. On this point he therefore seems to converge with the philosopher, since The Intelligence, as described by Plotinus, immediately relates to its own fulfillment and ultimate happiness, and stays one with The One. No tragic split of time separates The Intelligence from its τέλος. But since philosophy, being the highest human attempt at contemplation, aspires to participate in such eidological play, which is nothing other than the inexhaustible activity of the divine νοῦς, the Plotinean comedy is, in its final analysis, marked off against the Augustinian tragedy of faith as a competing interpretation on what is essentially possible for men: are men mortal sinners, or are men players above all? In play, Augustine sees primarily the danger of a sinful pride. This is why he praises child’s play in opposition to the ‘play’ of adults, which consists of all vain customs and proceedings from human society: not because children play better, but because they play less pretentiously so that they do not mistake games for something serious44. Yet with adults, ‘play’ is something always to be guarded against, for it either brings pleasure to the senses and distracts soul, or takes itself too seriously. But is Augustine not blind to himself on this? Does he perhaps not see that he also plays himself too seriously? I leave it at that.
Earlier, I have determined that one aspect of the eidological playfulness stems from an imitation of the playfulness of The One. Yet what is this playfulness? Does The One exhibit a kind of playfulness different from any of those previous determinations? Is The One playful at all? I do not have a definitive answer to these questions. But one does perceive a fundamental difference that separates The One from all its descendants. The One does not imitate, if it imitates at all, in either an imagistic or a symbolic way. Though The Intelligence is said to be an image of The One45, the metaphor employed by Plotinus actually exceeds image and is light itself: all the descendants of The One are, in a manner of speaking, emanations of the same light from the same source46. What is emphasized by this metaphor is an all-encompassing continuity of The One. The One produces neither a stand-alone reflection nor an excluded virtuality. Rather, it embraces and seeps into all entities; and if The One is ever playful, its play is none other than a play of light. This is certainly a very different sort of playfulness that requires further exploration which cannot be taken up here. But it points out a way to further our serious investigation up to this point: it jests towards it.
Now I shall present a final review before concluding this essay. In the first section, I work with the hypothesis that the Plotinean joke is serviceable to a philosophical education. But this hypothesis greatly overlooks the freedom intrinsic to the act of jesting. Therefore, in the second section I shift to a discussion of playfulness itself. I expose the Plotinean philosophy to be a philosophy of signs and thereby determine the philosopher’s playfulness is to be interpreted as a painless descent from the eidological terrain of The Intelligence to an imitative production of images. In the third section, I antagonize Augustine to Plotinus to show that a tragic playfulness can be a competing interpretative possibility as to what men are capable of and where the limit lies. Finally, I raise the question about the kind of playfulness that belongs to The One, which requires further inquiry.
I shall conclude this treatise with a lay snippet from Nietzsche47, who had recovered the tension between play and philosophy before most did, and to whose inspiration this essay is deeply indebted. This snippet delineates a most interesting inter-play between play and the world it is situated in, and is hence fitting as our conclusion:
[...]
World-wheel, spinning by,
Skims goals on its way:
Calamity! is rancor’s cry;
The jester calls it Play!
World-play, the ruling,
Mixes ‘Seems’ with ‘To Be’:
Eternally, such fooling
Mixes us in––the melee!
Notes
- The Essential Plotinus, translated by Elmer O’Brien. III, 8 [30], chapter 1, page 163. ↩
- Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, by Diogenes Laertius. Book VII, chapter 7, line 186. ↩
- The Summa Theologica, by St. Thomas Aquinas. First Part, question 12, article 1, objection 4 and the reply to it. ↩
- The Essential Plotinus. III, 8 [30], chapter 1, page 163. ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Ibid. V, 1 [10], chapter 1, page 91. ↩
- Republic, by Plato. Line 368E. ↩
- Poetics, by Aristotle. Chapter V, line 1449a 30. ↩
- The Essential Plotinus. III, 8 [30], chapter 1, page 163. ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Metaphysics, by Aristotle. Book I, line 982b 10. ↩
- Phaedrus, by Plato. Line 276D. ↩
- The Complete Essays of Montaigne, translated by Donald M. Frame. Book II, essay 11, Of Cruelty, page 313–314. One might argue that Montaigne’s conception of hunting as a game is anachronistic to the subject I have here, namely, hunting as was conceived in antiquity. But regardless of anthropological and historical circumstances, the excessive nature and a potential playfulness of hunting in all times are evident. ↩
- Sophist, by Plato. Line 218D. In Sophist, hunting is literally determined as an art of the acquisitive sort (see line 219D–219E). The playfulness of hunting is therefore consciously suppressed, probably as a joke, by Plato. Yet it is significant that as the coercive art to acquire resources, hunting is an imitation (concealment) of war, hence a play of war. And a war against the sophists is mentioned in later text (see line 261B–261C). This is evidence enough that Plato is conscious of the playful nature of hunting. ↩
- Ibid. Line 239C. ↩
- Ibid. Line 253E–254B. ↩
- Ibid. Line 261A–261B. ↩
- The Essential Plotinus. I, 2 [19], chapter 6, page 116. ↩
- Nicomachean Ethics, by Aristotle. Book IV, chapter 8, line 1127b 30. ↩
- Sophist. Line 234B. ↩
- The Essential Plotinus. III, 8 [30], chapter 1–11, page 163–175. ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 2, page 163–164. ‘Only matter is movable. The efficacy that forms it is not.’ ‘But if one means here the totality of natural things, then Reason will move, too. If, however, one means that a part of Nature is unmoved, this part will be Reason.’ What the second quote essentially means is that, since Reason is identified with Nature, if Nature were then merely taken as a totality of natural things, Reason, qua Nature, will move. But since Nature is not a totality of natural things but a totality of the lowest, the intermediary and the highest reason, Reason will be the unmoving part of Nature. ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 2–3, page 164. ‘Reason that manifests itself in visible shapes is the lowest of its kind, inert, unproductive of another rational form.’ ‘The lowest reason proceeds from contemplation. It is contemplation in the sense that it is the object of contemplation.’ ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 3, page 164–165. ‘Higher reason is of two kinds: one that changes with beings and is not Nature but soul, and another that is in Nature and is Nature.’ ‘Nature does not lack for anything; it produces by the mere fact that it possesses; for it to be is for it to be productive. Because it is Reason, it is contemplation and object contemplated. Being all three––contemplation, object contemplated, and reason––it produces through the mere fact that it is all three.’ The multiplicity of disparate reasons is gathered by the Highest Reason into a totality of Nature, the internal tension of which waits to be further unified under a higher and more potent principle. ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 4–5, page 165–167. ‘What is the meaning here? That what we call “Nature” is a soul; that it was begotten by a higher soul of more powerful life [...].’ ‘The higher part of The Soul, inhabitant of the supreme and, by its sharing in the supreme, filled and enlightened, stays there. The lower part shares in what the higher part has received and proceeds everlastingly from what is above it, life from life, an activity extending to everything and in everything present. Proceeding, The Soul’s higher part stays in the supreme, which the lower part leaves. Detached from its higher part, The Soul would no longer be present everywhere but only where its procession ceased. The part of The Soul that leaves is not the equal of the part that remains.’ From the perspective of The Soul, the individuated souls are not separate from the whole, but only belong to a lower part. However, the individuated souls might view themselves as separated from their origin and thus mistake themselves for independent beings. Nature ‘is’ an independent soul only in this sense. ↩
- Ibid. V, 1 [10], chapter 4, page 95. ‘Since it is in a state of bliss, why should The Intelligence seek change? [...] It is eternally all things in that eternity of which time, which abandons one moment for the next, is only a fleeting image upon the level of The Soul. The Soul’s action is successive, divided by the various objects that draw its attention––now Socrates, now a horse, always some particular.’ This temporality of The Soul, however, is an abiding image of eternity, and is itself eternal. The Soul with Time was, is and always will be. This eternal time of The Soul is hence indexical for the eternal activity of The Intelligence. ↩
- Ibid. ‘Singly they are both intelligence and being. Together they form the totality of intelligence and the totality of being. The Intelligence gives existence to Being in thinking it. Being, by being object of thought, gives to The intelligence its thinking and its existence.’ Ibid. III 8 [30], chapter 6–7, page 168–169. ‘Thus it is that the wise man is penetrated by reason and has wholly within himself what he manifests to others. He contemplates himself. He achieves unity and immobility not only in regard to external objects but also in regard to the things within himself. He finds all things within himself.’ ‘Begetting originates in contemplation and ends in the production of a form, that is, a new object of contemplation. All things, as images of their generating principles, universally produce forms and objects of contemplation. Begotten existences, being imitations of truly real beings, show that the purpose of generation is neither generation nor action but the production of works that are to be contemplated.’ The Soul is begotten by The Intelligence as its image, i.e. an object for its contemplation. The Soul is thus coextensive to the totality of Being, and when further unified by The Intelligence is elevated fully to that status. Just like the wise man finds all things within himself, The Soul contains in its ‘memory’ all beings from past to future, and is an object of contemplation for The Intelligence. ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 9, page 171–172. ‘This multiplicity is The Intelligence and the intelligibles taken together, both at the same time. They are two. Therefore must we find the principle prior to this duality.’ ‘First off, The Intelligence must, so to speak, turn back and, in spite of its duality, give itself over to the reality there; it must, if it wishes to look upon the first principle, cease to be entirely intelligence.’ ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 2, page 164. ‘Nature is a rational principle that produces the Reason that accords something of itself to the substratum while itself remaining unmoved.’ The rational principle qua Nature is The Highest Reason. The Reason that is in direct contact to the material substratum is the lowest reason. See Note 25, 26. ↩
- See Note 27. ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 8, page 170. ‘All life is thought, thought of greater or less obscurity as is life itself. But the life of which it is question now is a life of complete clarity. It is the highest life and the highest intellection identified.’ ‘The highest life is the highest thought; the lowest of lives, the lowest of thoughts. Every life is of this sort and is thought.’ Ibid. V 1 [10], chapter 5, page 96. ‘The Intelligence, manifold and divine, is in The Soul, since The Soul is joined to it, provided The Soul does not will to overstep its bounds and “secede” from it. So close to The Intelligence that it is almost one with it, The Soul is everlastingly vivified.’ Souls, as principles of life, are hence ranked by a hierarchy of degrees up to The Highest Life, which eventually exceeds the totality of The Soul and is identified with The Highest Thought. The Highest Soul qua The Highest Life is one with The Highest Thought, i.e. The Intelligence, which is a totality of abiding intelligences further unified by its own activity and life. Hence in the schema I align The Higher Soul with The Intelligence on the same circumference. ↩
- Ibid. III 8 [30], chapter 9, page 172. ‘Necessarily, therefore, it must proceed from a higher principle that, instead of being within the motion by which The Intelligence runs through all things, is the origin of this motion, of life, of The Intelligence, and of all things.’ ‘The originating principle is not the totality of things, but from it all things proceed.’ Life and activity of The Intelligence are indexical for the origin of this activity, and point to the ultimate principle of unification, i.e. The One. ↩
- Ibid. Chapter 8, page 171. ‘[The Intelligence] deploys itself like a circle which in its deployment becomes figure and surface, circumference, center, radii, higher and lower points––the higher, whence come the radii being the better, and the lower, whither the radii extend being the less good. The originating center is not equivalent to both center and circumference, nor the two to center alone.’ Ibid. VI 9 [9], chapter 10, page 87. ‘The man who obtains the vision becomes, as it were, another being. He ceases to be himself, retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the beyond he is one with it, like a center coincident with another center. While the centers coincide, they are one. They become two only when they separate. It is in this sense that we can speak of The One as something separate.’ The signs are indexical insofar as they each lead to a higher and more condensed circle. See the schema in Appendix. ↩
- Ibid. IV 3 [27], chapter 1–32, page 126–160. ↩
- Cratylus, by Plato. Line 397C–421C. This part of the dialogue works with the premise that the fitness of a name to its referent can be determined solely based off a determination of the etymological relationships this name has to other names. ↩
- Sophist. Line 260C. ↩
- As You Like It, by William Shakespeare. II, vii 47–51. ↩
- Confessions, by St. Augustine. Book III, chapter ii (4). ↩
- Ibid. Book I, chapter xiii (21). ↩
- Ibid. Book XI, chapter xxix (39). ↩
- Ibid. Book IX, chapter x (24). ‘We moved up beyond them so as to attain to the region of inexhaustible abundance where you feed Israel eternally with truth for food.’ This region of abundance seems synonymous to The Intelligence in the Plotinean doctrine. ↩
- Ibid. Book I, chapter ix (15). ‘But we loved to play, and punishments are imposed on us by those who were engaged in adult games. For “the amusement of adults is called business”.’ Ibid. Chapter x (16). ‘Yet I was at fault, Lord God, orderer and creator of all things in nature, but of sinners only the orderer. Lord my God, I sinned by not doing as I was told by my parents and teachers.’ Ibid. Chapter xix (30). ‘For in those endeavors I was the lowest of the low, shocking even the worldly set by the innumerable lies with which I deceived the slave who took me to school and my teachers and parents because of my love of games, my passion for frivolous spectacles, and my restless urge to imitate comic scenes. [...] Even in this game I was overcome by a vain desire to win and was often guilty of cheating.’ Child’s play is not superior to the play of adults for its ‘innocence’, but for its less degree of vanity. ↩
- The Essential Plotinus. V, 1 [10], chapter 7, page 98. ‘We call The Intelligence image of The One.’ ↩
- Ibid. VI, 9 [9], chapter 9, page 84–85. ‘All these entities emanate from The One without any lessening for it is not a material mass. If it were, the emanants would be perishable. But they are eternal because their originating principle always stays the same; not fragmenting itself in producing them, it remains entire. So they persist as well, just as light persists as long as sun shins.’ Ibid. V, 1 [10], chapter 6, page 97. ‘How are we to conceive this sort of generation and its relation to its immovable cause? We are to conceive it as a radiation that, though it proceeds from The One, leaves its selfsameness undisturbed, much in the way the brilliance that encircles and is ceaselessly generated by the sun does not affect its selfsame and unchanging existence.’ ↩
- The Gay Science, by Friedrich Nietzsche. Appendix. To Goethe. ↩
Appendix
Below is an explanatory schema for the concentric coincidence of levels. The solid arrows represent dialectical unification which results in a totality, the dashed arrows represent the indexical signification that leads from one unifying principle to its antecedent. The italicized names represent the totalities that are each images of the other, whilst the roman names represent the corresponding unifying principles. The unifying principles are aligned with those totalities that respectively contain these as average instances, i.e. Nature contains forms, The Soul contains neither-visual-nor-practical Reasons, The Intelligence contains abiding intelligences. This schema is, of course, tentative and is only a convenient summary of my own interpretations. Eventually, the interpenetration of levels and the problematic status of The One in Plotinus’ writings shall unsettle all such schematization.
本文由 AI 从英文原文翻译。请以原文为准。
神曲:你是认真的吗?
普罗提诺以一种颇令人意外的方式,开始了他关于观照的论文1(III, 8 [30])。然而,令人意外的并不是他试图以幽默开篇,而是这个笑话实际上如此糟糕。他逗趣时的笨拙几乎显得可怜,我们甚至说不准,这种笨拙本身是不是比笑话的内容更好笑。不过,若仅凭这位哲人糟糕的幽默品味来评判他,就错过了这里真正深刻的奥秘。或许,普罗提诺究竟好不好笑,本来就问错了。相反,我们应当疑惑:既然不擅长,他为什么还要试着逗笑?哲人为什么应该开玩笑?是什么不可抗拒的冲动,让他即使失败也继续向前?这样一种驱迫的最极端例子,是斯多亚派哲人克律西波斯:据传,他因自己讲的一个糟糕笑话笑得无法自制,竟因此丧命2。
然而,我们能确定,说笑只是源于一种强烈的冲动吗?有人可能认为,普罗提诺的笑话根本不表现任何冲动。因为讲笑话时,人可以真心投入,也可以只是敷衍。也就是说,人可以纯粹为了好玩而说笑,也可以把它作为有意教导的手段:只要哲人希望教导的那些未受教养的青年容易被这种娱乐吸引,就能通过它有效地被引向真正的哲学。因此,我们可以假设,哲人正是为了青年的益处,经过思量而认定说笑是最好的途径。以下讨论中,我的大部分推想都将建立在这个假设上,因为我不相信普罗提诺的笑话只是一个晦涩的圈内笑话,至少我初读时并不这样理解。但这个假设带来一个问题:我们如何确定,说笑究竟能否有助于教学目的?它是否反而与任何教导所要求的严肃态度敌对?
手段必须与目的相类比,托马斯·阿奎那已充分阐述这一点3。由于朝向更高目的,手段本身必须与目的和谐,不能内在地达不到它。在此语境中,按照普罗提诺的说法,更高目的似乎无非就是观照,因为他说:“儿童与成人,无论说笑还是严肃,似乎都没有观照之外的目的。”4这一陈述引出多个问题。但眼下,我应坚持最初的任务,先问:一般而言,说笑如何有助于教学目的?再问:在这个特殊例子中,说笑如何有助于这一目的?
一般而言,说笑有助于观照,因为它趋向观照。但这还不够,因为普罗提诺说,“一切行动都趋向观照”。说笑在这方面并无更大优势。文本接下来的分句有助于理解:“强迫的行动多少将它拉向外部对象,自愿的行动则较少如此。”5在普罗提诺关于三个原初本体的论文(V, 1 [10])中,我们也读到:“对源头的无知,是过分看重感性对象、轻视自身所造成的”,其结果是“灵魂忘记了生育它们的神圣者”6。若将这些分散的陈述结合,可以断言:对普罗提诺而言,说笑本身必须含有某种自由而自愿的东西,这种自由是思想与自我反思的自由,因为它必须引人远离感性对象的过度,引导灵魂朝向某种神圣的观照,使它记起自己的源头。
我们关于说笑的一般经验中,有什么能证实这一推测?克律西波斯的例子难道不与此相反吗?不知为什么,一阵爆笑似乎总是不由自主、强迫性的。而且,我们真的能对内在之物而非外在之物发笑,或只在内心发笑吗?或许更好的问法是:我们的笑,最终朝向什么对象?
请允许我在此大胆迈出一步。正如苏格拉底需要一整个城邦,才能探究灵魂中正义的自然7,要探究说笑,我也需要一个比单独笑话更大的图景。有帮助的会是一片由笑话、愚行、妙语、双关、暧昧语与俏皮话构成的星丛:总之,我需要一出喜剧,作为自由漫游与探险的场地。我将以乔叟《坎特伯雷故事集》中的《磨坊主的故事》为例。
《磨坊主的故事》讲述一桩通奸。故事中的奸夫淫妇哄骗被戴绿帽的丈夫,让他相信灭世洪水即将到来;他轻信得荒唐,躲进一条悬在空中的船里,而妻子正和情人同床。但故事的高潮出现在妻子的另一位追求者到来时:她骗他亲了自己的屁股,他便拿着烧红的铁棍回来报复,捅中了奸夫的肛门。这个故事极为粗俗。但喜剧的粗俗本身,并不足以解释它的幽默。除了淫秽带来的震惊,故事的幽默还在另两个层面上达成。首先,戏剧设计的精巧相当有趣。结尾的巧合尤其聪明:奸夫因肛门被烫而喊水,丈夫听到后误以为洪水来了,便割断系船的绳索;原本分离的两条叙事线,由此汇聚为一个意外的结局。其次,人物各自的愚蠢与过度,也极大地促成了幽默。奸夫徒劳的狡猾(他以高昂代价满足欲望)、年轻妻子粗俗的恶作剧、追求者迷恋的失常,以及丈夫极端的单纯,都表明喜剧可以如何多样而尽情地描绘人的愚行。从故事幽默的这两个方面,喜剧事业中某种深刻的智性意味已经浮现。
事物的粗俗与淫秽若只是被呈现出来,只会令人反感。粗俗之物带来的震惊,只有在语境中被理解,才会变得好笑。因此,可以说,喜剧之所以是喜剧,只因为它被理解。这也适用于笑话。只有讲述者将笑话讲得清晰可懂,听者又理解其内容与语境,笑话才能引人发笑。由此可以推知,说笑活动实际上由一种智性的欲望驱动。笑话总对智性提出要求,因为人必须能在不同词项之间建立平常不会建立的关联;要建立这些关联,既需预先熟悉这些词项,也需敏锐的机智,以把握笑话创造的新意义。例如,要领会“假面条叫什么?impasta”这个笑话,就必须已经熟悉“fake(假的)”与“impostor(冒充者)”的语义关联,以及“-postor”与“pasta(意大利面)”的语音关联,才能理解这些关系被颠覆的方式。即使在讲述笑话时,占主导的也是掌握表达技艺的欲望;它必然促使讲述者充分理解笑话及当时情境,找到合适时机,以恰当方式讲出来。此外,讲笑话的人有时只是渴望回忆使笑话优美的那种巧妙技艺,或者若材料出自自己,就渴望发明它;这种情况下,他首要欲望的便是停留于对笑话本身的智性欣赏。分享笑话时,他不只娱乐听众,也宣扬他认为巧妙而设计精良的东西,而不只是粗俗之物。因此,无论属于讲述者还是听者,说笑的欲望显然都是智性的欲望。日常经验中,这一点最明显的情形是:一个人看见满桌人都心照不宣地笑着,唯独自己没听懂,几乎无法抗拒地想请别人解释笑话。这时,他甚至可能为“没懂笑点”而羞愧。当一个人记不起笑话,因不再知道它而深感沮丧时,也能注意到说笑的这一面。因此,说笑无疑是一种智性的、因而也是观照性的实践。而且,既然欲望是智性的,所得满足也就是智性的:一方面,人因成功领会笑话,或在理解中将它讲出而自豪;另一方面,辨认与理解活动本身也带来充实。所以,可以主张,我们的说笑活动中总包含一个观照的要素,而这种观照所朝向的,无非是由我们的思考与推理能力所规定的某种“知识”。
但这一结论还不能是最终结论。因为我们知道,说笑毕竟不同于理性认识,仅仅因为说笑总关乎某种不合理而可笑的东西。笑话总使本应不相等的词项变得相等,因此标示理性的失败。这种失败也表现在:笑话一旦被理性阐明,就失去魅力。然而,这种外在于理性的东西,只有通过理性理解的透镜,才促成幽默:唯有理性的灵魂才能理解理性的失败,并由观察这种失败而获得有意义的满足。这种满足,与喜剧观众被人物的愚蠢与过度逗乐时所感到的满足相同。对此,亚里士多德指出:“如前所说,喜剧是对较低等之人的模仿,但不是就一切恶习而言;相反,可笑是丑的一部分。因为可笑是某种失误与畸形,却不带来痛苦,也不造成毁灭。”8将这一定义倒过来,可以说,只有不因所呈现的愚蠢而痛苦的人,才能对它发笑。因此,能在喜剧中感到愉悦的人,按说是更高等的人:他们要么能理解丑而不觉得自己丑,要么能与所呈现的丑保持距离。无论哪种情况,他们都是从更高层次俯视喜剧人物。所以,有理由得出结论:观看喜剧可能带来的一种主要满足,就是自觉高于荒唐与荒谬,而这种优越感来自理性对非理性、智慧对愚蠢的胜利。
喜剧观众确实可能同时被它逗乐,又感到痛苦。但这并不反驳我的结论。因为当人与人物相认,在人物身上看见自己的恶习时,就觉得嘲弄指向自己,因此感到痛苦;但若假设灵魂能够被“划分”为一个层级秩序,灵魂较高、较有德性的“部分”仍可以对自己的恶习与愚蠢感到优越,并被逗乐,仿佛它们只属于较低的“部分”。从这种被设定的自身“可分性”中,便产生讲笑话(因为讲述时,人暂时戴上面具,显得不理性)、自嘲与自我反讽的活动;这种活动也可以内在于观看喜剧时的感受中。所以,到此我们可以牢固地确立:一般而言,说笑具有观照性,因为它既培养获取、回忆或创生“知识”的智性欲望,也培养“智慧”的优越感,而二者都直接关联于φιλοσοφία,即爱智慧。
既然说笑的一般方面已得到处理,剩下的就是确定,幽默如何在普罗提诺这个特殊笑话中运作,以及这个笑话应如何被“观照”。从中可以取得若干有用的初步观察。
首先,在这个笑话中,一种关于观照的哲学学说,以说笑的方式被提出,然后才被置于“严肃的探究”之下9。其次,若不区分听者就以说笑方式提出这个学说,便没有人会“听这种胡说”10。第三,知道“这里只有我们自己”,就消除了以说笑方式提出该学说的风险11。所以,自然出现两个问题:这里涉及什么风险?以及为什么偏偏这个笑话要先于“严肃的探究”?
笑话最明显的风险,当然是被误解或根本不被理解。所谓“未入门者”缺少真正听懂笑话的语境与知识,所以不会“听这种胡说”;唯有在“我们自己”之间,笑话才被理解,因而有趣。但对普罗提诺来说,另一种可能的风险,是笑话只被当作笑话。若它不被看作通向更严肃事物的入口,就可能失去引导听者上升的恰当目的。因此,“入门者”仅仅听懂笑话还不够,他们还须超越笑话,看见说笑内在的一抹神圣。
那些从未真正投身观照的人听不懂这个笑话。要听懂,就必须能从这种“胡说”中理解出意义,并已经熟悉观照活动。唯有预先理解观照应当是什么,即一种有所把握的严肃精神活动的人,才可能被这个笑话震动。笑话在于(现在我是在“解释笑话”),这个学说将观照描述为最普遍的活动,但说一切东西都应当观照、一切活动都应当是观照,似乎荒谬。风险却在于,即使真正从事观照、也听懂笑话的人,仍可能坚持对自己的无知,只把这一学说视为荒谬,从而未能上升。只有既听懂笑话,又对这个看似不合理的立场产生兴趣、愿意进一步探究其真理的人,才能通过最终接受学说而超越自身,充分享受这个笑话。对他们,还准备了第二个笑话。
紧接着的段落演出了从说笑到严肃探究的转变:“难道我们在说笑时也在观照,这会是真的吗?是的。正如所有说笑者一样,我们在说笑中观照。一个人说笑,是因为他想观照。”12这里达成的转变既关键又困难;但首先,它是滑稽的。普罗提诺声称,读者刚刚参与的说笑活动本身就是一种观照,从而有效地转入更严肃的立场,却没有失去语言的嬉戏意味。他提出如此惊人的主张,继而强烈肯定它,展示出学说究竟有多激进:连刚才还在读笑话、与他一同说笑的你,也被包含在这“荒谬”的普遍观照中。原先被动的旁观者,如今成为喜剧本身的一部分,冷漠的优越感因此受到挑战。简言之,其意思是:如果这确实是一出喜剧,那么,把学说当作单纯说笑的你,恰恰就是被取笑的那个;因为你随之说笑,却没有意识到自己正在做的同样是观照,而这一等同恰恰曾显得可笑。读者刚刚不假思索地参与了一个笑话,而这个笑话却仍是“观照”,尽管他可能觉得称它为“观照”荒谬——这就是第二个笑话。
但这确实是一出喜剧,因为对普遍观照学说的入门,不能在这里通过理性说服来完成。而且,普罗提诺似乎甚至无意如此。仅仅宣称说笑也是观照,实质上回避了说服未被说服者的真正困难。如果将这篇论文的引言理解为论证,论证似乎如下:1.反对者并不严肃看待普遍观照学说;2.“不严肃看待某物”,也就是说笑,似乎是一种最不具观照性的活动;3.但连说笑也是一种观照;4.所以,反对者应重新考虑其立场。要完成第三步,就必须已经在某种程度上愿意接受这个学说本身。对于不相信说笑与观照相等的人,这一“论证”只能是伪论证。即使反对者承认说笑具有观照性,也不必因此全盘接受整个学说:毕竟,说笑似乎专属于人的活动;植物与动物似乎不说笑,也同样不观照。
所以,这一段恰恰不应被当作论证。相反,它是普罗提诺上演的一场表演,只为展示他昂扬的精神。这里除了学说内在的弱点与荒谬,还呈现了什么?如果说笑确实是一种观照,而普遍观照学说又被置于一个笑话中,他这里的呈现岂非危险地自我指涉?似乎可以把刚才勾画的关系还原为:普遍观照本身也是被观照之物。这种自我指涉预示着巨大的“形而上学”麻烦:既然普遍观照(按绝对意义理解)可以被一个特殊的观照活动包容,那么若这个特殊活动属于普遍者,同一事物就会小于它自身,从而违反自身同一原则;若这个特殊活动不属于普遍者,普遍者就不再是绝对意义上的普遍者;最后,若这个特殊活动不属于这个普遍者,却属于更高、更绝对的普遍者(这已经是胡说),那个更绝对的普遍者又可以被一个特殊观照活动包容,如此直至无限。因此,普罗提诺甚至还未严肃阐述学说,就已将它暴露为颇荒谬的东西。
而且,学说所声称的普遍性本身,即“一切”都观照,不可避免地将全部实在牵连进上述同一个荒谬:正如普遍观照要被特殊地观照,被这一普遍者包容的每个观照也同样被观照,我们最终面对的不是悖论,就是无限倒退。所以,通过这个学说,万物都成为一场无限喜剧游行的参与者。然而,不应看不到,确立这样一种绝对而普遍的喜剧,其后果极其严肃:难道我们应当生活在一个一切最终都能被当作荒谬笑料的世界中吗?只要意识到全心接受普罗提诺学说可能带来的严肃而诡异的后果,人就终于从说笑跃入严肃探究。但想到他竟在正式介绍学说之前就暴露这一荒谬,我们又会感到某种惊异,不亚于看见战士自愿暴露致命伤口时的感受;而按照亚里士多德,正是惊异使人“无论如今还是最初,都开始从事哲学”13。所以,普罗提诺在说笑背后上演的,本质上是一个挑战、一份邀请、一次好客的展示,而非论证的尝试。唯有这样理解,才能解释他所说的“这里只有我们自己”:这是一句亲密的欢迎辞,邀请我们承担光荣的任务,加入神圣喜剧,与不合理者讲理,思考不可思者,也就是惊异并从事哲学。而他糟糕的幽默,不正是最初推动我承担这一探究任务的、令人惊异之物吗?幸运的是,最初惊奇之后,我又发现其他更加奇妙的东西,使追索得以延展,并由此超越自身。
不同类型的精神读到同一段文字,反应也各不相同。有些没听懂笑话。有些只听懂其中一个。有些两个都懂,却在即将转入更严肃态度之前停住,因为停滞的“优越感”阻止了他们追问:如果荒谬中有某种真理呢?如果笑话反映某种实在呢?如果他真的没有真理,为什么还如此自信,愿意暴露这么多显见的弱点?只有更强大、更富冒险精神的人,总对自己不变的位置感到厌倦,并试图超越自身,才能最充分地享受这个笑话:他们不仅听懂它,还决定将它铭记于心。
现在作一个简短回顾会有帮助。首先,本文第一节建立在这样一个假设上:这篇关于观照的论文开头的说笑,具有某种教学功能。接着,我确定,说笑一般而言能够有助于哲学教育,因为它含有自愿而自由的东西;这里,这体现为它满足灵魂的智性欲望,并培育理性与智慧的优越感。但这种优越感一旦停滞而迟钝,就可能妨碍灵魂上升。因此,普罗提诺这个特殊的笑话,还提供了更多东西:首先,它让读者成为“游戏”的一部分,从而刺痛并摇撼读者冷漠的优越感;其次,它暗示一切汇入绝对喜剧这一极严肃的后果,从而变得诡异,值得严肃探究;第三,它是一份高度选择性的邀请,面向某一类精神。严肃探究的事业只属于这样一些人:他们如此愿意与不合理者讲理,愿意理解荒谬,以至于不仅看见荒谬,而且在自由中决定至少暂时投身荒谬。因为对这些精神而言,思想家流露的立场与姿态,并不比其思想的实际内容更少吸引力。而属于这一精神族类的人,有时被简称为自由思想者。
然而,我假定普罗提诺的笑话只是预先示意的辅助物,帮助哲学精神自我教育,这难道不可能是一种过于可疑的自我欺骗?如果我就此不假思索地否认哲人可能有任何想笑、想娱乐的冲动,难道不太仓促,也太愚蠢吗?若一方面强调说笑自愿而自由的一面,为什么另一方面仍让它服从于为某个主人效劳,从而在某种意义上贬损它的自由?因此,我最初着手探究的问题仍未解决,下一节将从不同视角重新处理它。
无尽的玩笑:理念论的游戏
哲人是否可能自发地嬉戏,仅仅为了好玩而说笑,采取不严肃的态度?这种可能性乍看违反直觉,考察之后似乎更不合理:哲学只关心生命、自然与在最重大的问题,难道不正是最典型的严肃事业吗?仿佛哲学在本质上就敌对于游戏的轻松愉悦。然而,只要读任何一篇柏拉图对话,这种确信就会立即陷入疑虑。这位最具典范性的哲人留给后世的唯一文字(不论出于偶然还是有意),几乎全都是戏剧,这一事实有什么意义?尽管柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底在《斐德罗》中似乎反讽地将书写斥为“单纯的游戏”,由此“贬低”整个书写活动14,但这一贬斥自身被写下来所构成的悖论,必须让我们停顿。我不相信柏拉图的戏剧即使以自身方式来看也并不严肃;我也相信,没有人会在读完《斐德罗》后郑重得出结论,说这些写成的戏剧缺乏任何内在价值。因此,游戏与哲学之间的张力从未得到解决。相反,尽管各种预设与流行意见倾向于遮蔽它,仍要感知并刻画这种张力,本身就已是一项足够艰巨而严肃的任务,预示着丰厚回报。
第一节中,我规定了游戏服务于随后严肃探究时所具有的性质。但我几乎没有花笔墨阐明游戏现象本身。若不再赞扬游戏是哲学的引路者,转而强调它恢复精力的价值,这种忽视依然会持续。因为稍不留意,游戏本身就很容易被略过,滑落为实现生命这一“庄严”任务的补充,也就是一种仅供恢复次日劳作所需力量的短暂休息。因此,追猎嬉戏性的本质时,无论多小心都不为过,因为它是一头狡猾的动物:但“狩猎”难道不已经是最典型的游戏形式吗?
对于原初的人,狩猎是一种为家庭提供食物、衣物与牲畜的手段。狩猎首要目标是获取必需品。但即使在那里,它已经意味着更多。首先,它是一种探索性的冒险,因为追逐意味着离家。其次,它提供展示荣誉的空间,取得最大猎物的人被视为更好的战士。因此,狩猎总在自身之外投射某种超出单纯生存的剩余:人似乎只靠大地的出产也能“活下去”。而且,随着狩猎的必要性逐渐消退,这种过剩性愈发放大,以至于在离我们更近的时代,狩猎终于成为最具代表性的王室游戏。此后,狩猎的第三个方面变得最鲜明:追逐猎物的纯粹狂喜成为主要动机。看看蒙田怎么说:“我觉得,狩猎的例子会更合适。即使其中快乐较少,激动与惊讶却更多;长久搜寻后,野兽突然跃起,出现在或许最意想不到的地方,我们的理性被震住,失去从容准备、抵御它的余裕。这一冲击,以及呼喊追逐的热烈,如此击中我们,以至于热爱这种狩猎的人,在那一刻很难把思想转向别处。因此诗人让狄安娜战胜丘比特的火炬与箭矢:身在其间,谁不会忘记爱情的刺痛,以及爱情带来的一切忧虑?[贺拉斯]”15
然而,正是以这种据蒙田所说会熄灭理性、抹去爱情的狩猎活动为模型,柏拉图悖论性地塑造了自己最著名的哲学追索:猎捕智者。为表明这里提出的不只是表面的平行,而是两种追寻的彻底融合,我将大量引用原文:
客人:……那么现在,泰阿泰德,既然我们认为智者之属难以捉摸、难以猎捕,我给我们两人的建议就是,在某个别的、更容易的东西上,先练习追逐他——当然,除非你能从哪里提出另一条更容易的道路。16
客人:好吧,若这样决定,就让你我退下;在找到能够做这件事的人之前,我们先说,最确定不过的是:智者在其无所不用其极的行径上是个罪犯,而他已经溜进一片无迹可寻的地域。17
客人:那么,无论现在还是以后,只要寻找,我们都会在某个类似的地域发现哲人。虽然他也难以被清晰看见,但智者之难,与他的难却不是同一种方式。
泰阿泰德:怎么说?
客人:一个逃入“非在者”的幽暗,凭某种伎俩依附其上;由于这一地域黑暗,他难以被理解。不是这样吗?
泰阿泰德:似乎是。
客人:是的,但哲人始终通过推论,专注于在者的相(idea);正因为所在之处太过光明,他也绝不容易被看见,因为多数人灵魂的眼睛,无法持续凝视神圣之物。18
泰阿泰德:可是,客人,最初关于智者所说的——这个属难以猎捕——看来完全正确。他确实满身防御;每当他在面前竖起一道,就必须先打穿它,才能抵达他本人。因为我们刚刚艰难地穿透“非在者不是”这道防线,他又竖起另一道;现在我们必须证明,言说与意见都有虚假,此后或许还有一道,再此后又有另一道,看起来永远不会出现尽头。19
遗憾的是,本文篇幅不足以彻底阐释这些段落。但不应看不到,对柏拉图来说,哲学的嬉戏性并非全然不可能。那种似乎最敌对于理性之爱的狂喜追逐,仍然能够成为塑造哲学追寻的范型:但以何种方式?狩猎范型能否直接适用于哲学,而不产生任何内在张力?毕竟,智者并非随便一头猎兽,而是被猎捕的“罪犯”!
但让我们回到普罗提诺。在论德性的论文(I, 2 [19])中,他解释:“智慧与审慎……有两种,一种在理智[努斯]中,另一种在灵魂中。在理智中,它们不是德性。在灵魂中,它们是德性。那么,它们在理智中是什么?是理智的活动与本质。但当它们来自理智,居于一个不同于它们的存在者中时,它们便是德性。”20随后,他暗示,每一种德性都对应于理智中的一个原初范型,一个德性的理念。而嬉戏,即使按照亚里士多德,也是一种德性21。那么,我们是否应当推论,即使嬉戏,也可能在理智中有其原初范型?向往最高观照的哲人,在“观照地”说笑时,难道不正展示着可知存在者这种转变后的“德性”吗?这种“理念论的嬉戏性”(作为属于εἰδη之聚集的东西),其自然可能是什么?
柏拉图的《智者》再次给我们处理这些问题的线索。在234B附近,埃利亚客人问泰阿泰德:“你还知道任何一种儿童游戏,比模仿性的游戏更有技巧,或也许更迷人的吗?”22这里,嬉戏性在其最关键的方面被规定为模仿性,即它最充分地在与模仿活动的关系中显露本质。相对于我们的问题主线,应如何理解这一极具决定性的主张?
当某物依照另一物的相似性被生产出来,模仿便发生了。人的游戏进行模仿。狩猎模仿战争。调情模仿爱情。电子游戏中,大多数数字形象模仿真实事物。玩具汽车模仿车辆。但模仿有不同种类。影子与镜像这样的准实体属于自然的模仿;绘画与照片则可归为人为模仿。游戏似乎最适合属于人为一类。虽然孩子有时只是拿树枝与石头玩,模仿仍只能通过人为编造、共同分享的“幻想”来实现。但还需要进一步规定,因为游戏并不完全等同于绘画,也不等同于视频。因为在最广义上,游戏总被“演出来”,并使人沉浸其中。即使舞台上的戏剧,呈现自身时也不只是景观:它以自觉而主动的方式抓住观众,与之互动。它点亮一个充满幻想与好客之意的欢乐空间,从而伸展自身,把范围延伸到踏入其中的人。然而,这种沉浸从不是全然的,因为沉浸者仍能认出这一游戏空间是模仿:人知道悲剧结束时躺在地上的那些“尸体”,通常不会第二天早晨还躺在那里;人几乎总能自由进入或退出游戏,正如做白日梦时一样。
生命却不是如此。生命似乎不是人能自由掌握的东西。没有人自愿出生;而若有人自愿退出生命(而非仅将死亡接受为不可避免),自杀总被描述为牺牲、罪,或最具后果的解脱,例如俗人所理解的“涅槃”。生命的严肃也在于,它总在某种程度上被过去的历史规定,因此不能总是自由地重建整个轨迹。每个选择或事件都有某种不可补救的后果,构成我们的命运。人在这样的命运之下劳作,不断遭到偶然的袭击,或为实现、或为维持一种极其脆弱的幸福。但游戏者并不戴着这副劳役的镣铐。游戏者从不严肃,因为其行为并不牵涉最终胜利或最悲惨败局这样的后果。因此,对生命与命运的这种自由,刻画了游戏者最本质的一个方面。
依这个标准,理智在其活动中最必然是一位游戏者。由于它仅次于最至高者,即太一,又分享其永恒,它就不被低于自身之物的袭击所纠缠:身体的激情、生命的祸福、时间,都不能扰乱它的闲暇。观照者在观照时,同样摆脱尘世忧虑。但这种理念论的自由,如何关联于模仿?因为在理智的高处,观照者似乎不太可能模仿人的生活。甚至灵魂的嬉戏性也无意模仿人的生活,因为普罗提诺已将灵魂的德性规定为神圣者的相似物,而非有限存在的相似物。那么,理智的嬉戏性就更不应模仿它。而且,更根本地说,即使人的游戏,在本质上就是模仿人的生活吗?只在某种意义上是,因为这里模仿本质上达成的,是掌握与自由的感受。所以,游戏最终模仿的无非是最高的自由,而这等于对太一的观照。最高观照既然是人的生命的τέλος,即目的,游戏就是对它的模仿。但游戏也超出了生命,因为它更直接地与生命所追求的这种幸福相契合。——有了这些初步规定,我终于可以大胆尝试,在普罗提诺学说的语境中,对嬉戏性作出更确定的(因而错得更确定的)阐释。
普罗提诺的哲学,主要是一种符号的哲学。理解他对上升至太一的各种描绘,就最能清楚辨认其思想的这一特征。这些描绘通常遵循这样的过程:他在层级的每一层找到一个特殊指示,它辩证地越出自身,指向更高者;更高者又将较低层次作为整体统一并聚集。其中一种描绘,见于他论观照的论文23。我的梗概如下。
最低层是材料。但材料是被形式统一的被动杂多;形式与材料构成自然事物的总体24。按照普罗提诺,这个总体是“最低的理则”25;当它被最高理则统一时,便成为观照对象。最高理则、居中的行动理则与最低的可见形状之理则,随后构成自然作为理则的总体26。自然的这个总体,作为较低的灵魂,又是有待由灵魂“较高部分”统一的被动杂多27。较低与较高部分随后构成灵魂这一总体。这个与时间共在的总体,又被一种非时间的思维活动聚集为观照对象28。思维活动继而与其对象,即灵魂,统一为一个新总体。普罗提诺称之为理智29。理智在某种意义上,仍分裂为主动的思者与被动的所思30,于是转向最终的统一原则:太一。普罗提诺描绘的这一上升,是在每一层统一总体之对立部分的辩证过程。但更具意义的,是这一过程的“符号性”:每一层都有一个主动的统一原则,一个来自总体的较高环节,它又代表着高于自身的活动。形式指向作为其生产者的最高理则31,最高理则指向灵魂的较高部分32,后者指向理智的活动与生命33,而这最终指向太一34。这些指示也以类似方式使诸总体相互关联,例如灵魂关联于理智,从而一个总体被说成复现一个在先总体。因此,可以说,普罗提诺的哲学不只是辩证法,而是指示性符号的辩证法,每个符号都依次保存来自先行者的痕迹。应注意,作为指示,这些符号不只是分布在线性路径上的独立路标;相反,它们像同心圆的内部部分35,每个部分都与一个更小的圆重合,后者又包含更凝缩的部分。如此呈现的上升,也是一种集中与收缩的过程。
这一描绘绝不是最精确的。在论灵魂的论文中36,普罗提诺进一步规定了通向灵魂的路径上的所有次级层次。虽然步骤更详细,同一个模式仍统摄其思想:在层级的每一层,总有来自总体的一个较高环节,作为指示标记而指向更高原则。因此,我说,普罗提诺的学说可以被彻底规定为一种指示性符号的哲学。
但符号有不同种类。有些像映像、照片与写实绘画,另一些像词语、国旗与纹章。前一类是“图像(εἰκόνες)”,直接而无中介地指向其所代表的对象;后一类是“象征(συμβόλαια)”,只间接而有中介地指向对象。只要二者都描绘“事物”及其“像什么”,它们都具有模仿性;但图像总在特殊性中将某物指示为确定对象,象征——即被“抛在一起”的东西——却只指示一个不确定而一般的对象。看见国旗,人并不看见国家本身,却从中解释出一种一般情绪,在很宽泛的意义上“像”民族精神,由旗帜的颜色与设计象征。听见一个词,人面前并没有一种毫无疑难的“相似”,因为多数词听起来并不“像”它们所指之物;但通过词源关联,可以在词与其他词的关系,以及其对象与其他对象的关系之间,建立一种关系上的相似性。这大概就是为什么苏格拉底在《克拉底鲁》中,虽然困难重重,仍能暂且把词语当作相似物37。代数符号与其所表示之量的相似性,或许最难理解;但只要符号和尚未被认识之前的量本身一样任意而偶然,就可以说,符号类似于它所代表的东西。
那么,普罗提诺式上升中的那些指示性符号,在何种意义上指向各自更高的实在?它们的地位又如何规定?如果使模仿成为可能的虚假,确如埃利亚客人所言,是在与非在的混合38,那么不同种类的模仿,就意味着这两个属的不同混合方式。图像依照什么比例混合而产生?当生产过程始终目不转睛地注视在及其真理时,图像便被生产出来;也只有当原本由此被确定时,它们才被解释为图像。象征则与其所指“被抛在一起”,因为συμβόλον这个词原本指被剖开的硬币的两半,用于辨认缔约双方。象征只是偶然地代表,因为目前佩戴另一半硬币的人,可能从别人那里抢来了它;而影子却永远不能被偷走。然而,象征的偶然性恰恰来自它与原初一体的断裂。其碎片性质,使它成为某种“渴望”另一半及自身完整的东西;但被排除于最原初的统一之外,它就不再真正属于任何地方,因而变得容易脱离,也就具有偶然性。所以,象征是一种残余,而这种残余性赋予它一种能力:代表某种不同于最原初源头的东西,代表“无论什么”。它被抛出硬币的交易构造后,如今可以作为代表某物的标记被随身携带,恰恰因为它被剥夺了作为货币的最恰当功能。因此,在象征化过程中,原本必须遭到不可补救的破裂:硬币的两半大概仍能拼合,但裂缝仍在中间,任一半在功能上都不再适用于市场。另一方面,图像的生产丝毫不会削弱原本,因为图像总直接指向原本:若图像的生产使原本自身变得含混或不再明亮,这种指示的直接性就不可能成立。
因此,图像是在原本已被规定的前提下生产的符号。相反,象征是虽始终不完整,却力求完整的碎片。但这些只是把符号当作“东西”时的刻画。要将这些规定与嬉戏性联系起来,就必须使符号性事物之间的差异,对应于“将事物演出来”的实践之间的差异。在普罗提诺学说中,模仿之物与模仿实践之间的这一对应,最终可以在观照的向上与向下两个方向的区分中辨认出来。当人从下方勤勉地攀登通向太一的阶梯,就不断遭遇渴望被统一的破碎事物。它们是路上的象征,见证生命与幸福的不确定性。但当人抵达最高观照,由此与理智共同观照,就已经在理念的领域中获得了对原本的知识;从那里向下看,这些派生事物除了被看作图像与影子,还能被看作什么?原本既然已在掌握之中,若不是为了玩弄,为什么还要生产图像?在理智的层次上,人同太一“合一”,在最终的幸福中永恒受福:除了在这种永恒闲暇中幸福地游戏,还有什么需要“做”?如此离开洞穴的哲人,迟早会开始把自己的生命当作图像与影子的游戏,像置身游戏一样与之共处。在这样的游戏中,他实现了最高等的模仿,因为由此他模仿太一:太一从自我满足中“下降”,生产自身的图像。这种下降完全自由而自愿:太一没有理由“下降”,也不“真正”下降;模仿它的哲人也同样自由而嬉戏地生产派生图像。象征总是“有意义”的,因为它指向等待进一步考察与规定的一般理念;图像却在其直接性中被生产为“无意义的”“表面的”“肤浅的”,因为尽管原本已在,它们仍是过剩之物:它们与最终的充实一同存在,和太一的“下降”一样无意义、无道理,因而充满嬉戏。所以,理念论的嬉戏性既包括模仿太一的嬉戏,也包括一种最恰当地属于神圣者的不严肃——神圣者观看并玩弄自身的图像。但这种理念论游戏,须因其实在与充实的性质而与人的游戏区别开。人的游戏仍易受人生严肃性的冲击,也被它划界,所以人的游戏者仍不断被一个想法困扰:自己是在游戏与运动上“浪费时间”,而没有“更有效地”把这些时间投入“真正幸福”的实现。但就理念论的嬉戏性而言,既然最高观照已经达成,有限人类的忧虑就不应再真正依附于哲人。人的游戏即使比生活的挣扎更直接地与幸福契合,仍停留于尘世领域,因此常被仅仅用作工具,以实现最终幸福,并使人习惯于它。换言之,与理念论游戏不同,人间游戏的无目的性只是暂时的,常被纳入服务某个更普遍事业的框架,而那个事业以最终幸福为目标。
现在,让我回顾上述阐释。首先,我将普罗提诺的哲学规定为符号的哲学。继而区分两类符号:图像与象征。图像直接指向确定对象,象征间接指向不确定对象。最高观照者的嬉戏性属于理念论,因此他自由参与图像的生产与游戏;它在两方面不严肃:第一,生产图像除力量过剩外没有任何理由,因此图像的生产嬉戏地模仿了太一无缘由的下降;第二,这种神圣的嬉戏性全不受人生存之挣扎的扰动,与最初为达成最高观照所需的劳作相比,这种“下降”极其轻松、不费力。可以说,普罗提诺在此预先颠倒了《神曲》:对但丁,下降地狱最为折磨,而一旦开始上升,道路就愈发宁静。但对普罗提诺,喜剧并不主要在于看见天堂的真容,而在于完成一次如同翻筋斗般的跌落,落在云上。
一切上升之物必将汇聚:普罗提诺反对奥古斯丁
本文第二部一般地讨论了,观照最高者的哲人充满嬉戏意味是什么。但游戏涵盖各种活动:游戏、运动、舞台剧等等。其中,一个特殊种类尤其提出困难:悲剧如何能被视为游戏?悲剧难道不恰恰关乎严肃之物?将哲学的嬉戏性完全归于喜剧,我是否忽视了一种重要的可能性?
悲剧只要具有模仿性,就具有嬉戏性。但它模仿的模式不同于喜剧。喜剧中,无论剧中人物还是观众,都不“感到痛苦”。观众保有优越感,喜剧人物则流露一种独特的不死性。戏中每个丑角似乎都处于一种奇怪的庇护之下,使其免受任何尘世攻击。《皆大欢喜》中忧郁的杰奎斯甚至说:“我必须同样拥有自由,像风一样宽广的特许,吹向任何我愿意吹的人;因为愚人如此,而那些最被我的愚行刺痛的人,更必须笑。”39喜剧被彻底规定为不严肃之物。喜剧的嬉戏玩弄浅表图像,在这个意义上是图像式的。但悲剧总描绘“较高等之人”令人怜悯的坠落,由此展示人类命运的不确定性,表明生命的τέλος,即目的,对任何有限存在者都永远不可企及。悲剧揭示的这种深渊般的不确定性,使悲剧的嬉戏性成为一种象征性的模仿。因此,悲剧与我们人类关于生死的挣扎接壤,涉及根本意义与象征。尽管有共同边界,悲剧仍能相对于严肃生活而被视为游戏,只因为它以某种方式打破日常存在惯常的自我遗忘,成为象征的最终凝结:它把人类苦难聚集为一个迷人、疯狂、令人陶醉的总体。如此,它将日常挣扎变成宇宙层面的战争,使我们超出普通的人生轨迹。沉浸于生活的喧嚣忙碌时,我们往往忘记必死性、幸福、真理这样的关键问题;而在悲剧中,这些关乎凡人存在的最本质问题被提出并处理。喜剧则往往压制这类追问:人的存在一旦被置于喜剧视角,就变得不严肃。想想我们多么常试图判断悲剧中的对错:安提戈涅是不是太固执?克瑞翁是不是太严厉?喜剧较少引出这些问题:只要认真到这种程度,就使它脱离最原初的轻松领域。所以,悲剧的嬉戏性并不在于那种最恰当地属于喜剧的欢快,而显示出另一种超越;或者说,它把超越置于另一视角:它在凝视生命最崇高的可能性时,如此竭力向上,以至于强行从正常时间进程中“挣脱”;而神圣说笑者的图像式嬉戏性,则标志着一种早已达到并得到保障的自由。因此,悲剧的节庆性与事件性,依赖于打破人生存在通常的自我遗忘,通过对挣扎的最终呈现来唤起超越。
理智的嬉戏性有可能是悲剧性的吗?在我看来,这是一种可疑的可能性。奥古斯丁似乎是曾接近这一问题的最显著思想家。作为习惯性的悲剧爱好者,即使后来在言辞上弃绝悲剧,他在思想中仍完整保留了悲剧意识。他这样忏悔时,暴露了自己这一面:“由此产生了我对苦难的爱,但不是那种深深刺痛我的苦难;因为我渴望的,并非亲自经历舞台上所见的悲惨。我只想听苦难的故事与虚构传说,它们仿佛只轻轻划过我的表面。”40又如他对狄多与自身的评论:“有什么比这样一个不怜悯自身的可怜人更可怜:他为狄多因爱埃涅阿斯而死流泪,却不为自己因缺少对你的爱而死流泪,我的神啊……”41尽管表面上戒绝悲剧,他对悲剧的爱是否只是随着成熟而变得更微妙?他或许不再想观看悲剧,却已悄悄将自己的生命变成一出悲剧,从而为个人经验注入象征性的意义?
现在,从奥古斯丁的视角看,哲人的理念论嬉戏性似乎已变得不可能。因为理念领域在严格意义上无时间:时间只是灵魂的“所有物”,而灵魂是理智的图像式产物。但对奥古斯丁个人,以及他所理解的一般人类存在而言,超越使人破碎的时间,只是一种希望:“你是我永恒的父,而我散落在诸时间中,不理解它们的秩序。不相连贯的事件之风暴,将我的思想、我灵魂最深的内脏撕成碎片,直到那一天,我被你爱的火焰净化、熔化,重新汇流,融入你。”42奥古斯丁由于信仰人的罪,必须否认地上的人能够在弥赛亚救主以恩典解放他之前,获得最终自由的任何可能。如此将生命历史变成一出悲剧,将观照变成一个呼求神降临的象征之后,他展示了悲剧性的嬉戏如何能存在于灵魂的较低层次,在那里,人的灵魂仍然破碎。但在他的整个观照中,尤其在奥斯提亚的异象中43,都强烈暗示,理智的有序性中并不存在悲剧式的嬉戏或嬉戏式的悲剧。因此,在这一点上,他似乎与哲人汇合了,因为普罗提诺所描述的理智,直接关联于自身的充实与最终幸福,并与太一保持为一。时间的悲剧性分裂,并不将理智与其τέλος,即目的,分隔。但哲学作为人对观照的最高尝试,渴望参与这种理念论游戏,它无非就是神圣νοῦς,即努斯,无穷无尽的活动。因此,归根结底,普罗提诺的喜剧与奥古斯丁的信仰悲剧相区别,构成关于人本质上可能做什么的竞争性解释:人是必死的罪人,还是首先是游戏者?奥古斯丁在游戏中首先看见的是有罪之骄傲的危险。因此,他赞美儿童游戏,以反对成年人的“游戏”——后者由人类社会一切虚荣的习俗与活动构成;这不是因为儿童玩得更好,而是因为他们玩得较少装腔作势,不把游戏误认作严肃之事44。对成年人而言,“游戏”却总须提防,因为它要么取悦感官、分散灵魂,要么把自己看得过于严肃。但奥古斯丁在这一点上,难道不对自身盲目吗?他或许没有看见,自己也太严肃地扮演着自己?就说到这里。
此前,我已规定,理念论嬉戏性的一个方面来自对太一之嬉戏性的模仿。但这种嬉戏性是什么?太一是否展示了一种不同于此前所有规定的嬉戏性?太一究竟嬉戏吗?我对这些问题没有确定答案。但我们确实察觉到一种根本差异,将太一与其一切后裔区分开。太一若有模仿,也既不以图像式,也不以象征性的方式模仿。尽管理智被说成太一的图像45,普罗提诺使用的比喻实际上却超出图像,成为光本身:可以说,太一的一切后裔,都是同一源头流溢的同一道光46。这一比喻强调的是太一无所不包的连续性。太一既不生产独立的映像,也不生产被排除的潜在性。相反,它拥抱并渗入一切存在者;如果太一有所嬉戏,其游戏无非就是光的游戏。这当然是一种极不相同的嬉戏性,需要进一步探究,而这里无法承担。但它指出了如何推进我们至今的严肃探究:它朝那个方向说笑。
结束本文之前,我将作最后回顾。第一节中,我采用的假设是,普罗提诺的笑话服务于哲学教育。但这一假设极大忽视了说笑活动内在的自由。因此,第二节转向讨论嬉戏性本身。我揭示普罗提诺哲学是一种符号的哲学,由此规定,哲人的嬉戏性应被理解为:从理智的理念领域,无痛地下降到图像的模仿性生产。第三节中,我让奥古斯丁与普罗提诺对立,以表明悲剧性的嬉戏,可以成为一种竞争性的解释可能,涉及人能够做什么,以及界限在哪里。最后,我提出属于太一的嬉戏究竟是哪一种的问题,它仍需进一步探究。
我将以尼采的一小段诗结束本文47。他比多数人更早重新发现游戏与哲学之间的张力,本文深受他的启发。这段诗描绘了游戏与其所处世界之间极有趣的相互游戏,因此适合作为结尾:
[……]
世界之轮,旋转而过,
沿途掠过一个个目标:
“灾祸!”怨恨这样哭喊;
说笑者却称它为游戏!
世界之戏,统摄一切,
将“似乎”与“在”混合:
永恒地,这样的嬉闹,
也把我们卷入——混战!
注释
- 《普罗提诺精要》,Elmer O’Brien译。III, 8 [30],第1章,163页。↩
- 第欧根尼·拉尔修,《名哲言行录》。第VII卷,第7章,186行。↩
- 圣托马斯·阿奎那,《神学大全》。第一部,第12问,第1条,反对意见4及其答复。↩
- 《普罗提诺精要》。III, 8 [30],第1章,163页。↩
- 同上。↩
- 同上。V, 1 [10],第1章,91页。↩
- 柏拉图,《理想国》。368E。↩
- 亚里士多德,《诗学》。第V章,1449a 30。↩
- 《普罗提诺精要》。III, 8 [30],第1章,163页。↩
- 同上。↩
- 同上。↩
- 同上。↩
- 亚里士多德,《形而上学》。第I卷,982b 10。↩
- 柏拉图,《斐德罗》。276D。↩
- 《蒙田随笔全集》,Donald M. Frame译。第II卷,第11篇,《论残酷》,313—314页。有人可能认为,蒙田将狩猎视为游戏的观念,相对于我这里讨论的古代狩猎观念,犯了时代错置。但无论人类学与历史情境如何,各个时代狩猎的过剩性质与潜在嬉戏性都显而易见。↩
- 柏拉图,《智者》。218D。在《智者》中,狩猎按字面被规定为获取类的技艺(参见219D—219E)。因此,柏拉图有意识地压制狩猎的嬉戏性,或许这也是个玩笑。然而,有意义的是,作为强制获取资源之术,狩猎是对战争的模仿(掩饰),因此是战争的游戏。后文也提到与智者作战(参见261B—261C)。这些足以证明,柏拉图意识到狩猎的嬉戏性质。↩
- 同上。239C。↩
- 同上。253E—254B。↩
- 同上。261A—261B。↩
- 《普罗提诺精要》。I, 2 [19],第6章,116页。↩
- 亚里士多德,《尼各马可伦理学》。第IV卷,第8章,1127b 30。↩
- 《智者》。234B。↩
- 《普罗提诺精要》。III, 8 [30],第1—11章,163—175页。↩
- 同上。第2章,163—164页。“只有质料是可动的。塑造它的效力则不动。”“但如果这里指的是自然事物的总体,那么理则也会运动。然而,如果说自然的一部分是不动的,这一部分就是理则。”第二段引文本质上的意思是:既然理则与自然被等同,如果自然只被理解为自然事物的总体,理则作为自然也就会运动。但由于自然并非自然事物的总体,而是最低、居中与最高理则的总体,理则便是自然中不动的部分。↩
- 同上。第2—3章,164页。“在可见形状中显现自身的理则,是同类中最低的,惰性的,不能生产另一种理性形式。”“最低理则来自观照。它是观照,因为它是观照的对象。”↩
- 同上。第3章,164—165页。“更高的理则有两种:一种随存在者变化,并非自然而是灵魂;另一种在自然中,而且就是自然。”“自然无所匮乏;它仅因拥有而生产,对它而言,在就是生产。因为它是理则,它就是观照,也是被观照的对象。它既是三者——观照、被观照的对象与理则——便仅因它是三者而生产。”彼此有别的诸多理则,被最高理则聚集为自然的总体,其内在张力仍待在更高、更有力的原则下进一步统一。↩
- 同上。第4—5章,165—167页。“这里的意思是什么?我们称为‘自然’的东西,是一个灵魂;它由一个生命更强有力的较高灵魂生出……”“灵魂较高的部分居于至高者中,通过分享至高者而充盈、明亮,并停留在那里。较低部分分享较高部分所接受的东西,并永恒地从上方而来,生命出自生命,一种活动延伸至一切,也在一切之中临在。在流出时,灵魂较高的部分仍留在至高者中,而较低部分离开那里。若与较高部分分离,灵魂就不再处处临在,而只在其流出终止之处。灵魂离开的部分,并不等同于留下的部分。”从灵魂的视角看,个体化的灵魂并未与整体分离,只属于较低部分。然而,个体化灵魂可能把自己看作与源头分离,由此误认自身为独立的存在者。自然只在这个意义上“是”一个独立灵魂。↩
- 同上。V, 1 [10],第4章,95页。“既然处于至福,理智为什么还要寻求变化?……它在永恒中永恒地是一切;时间舍弃一个瞬间而去往下一个,只是这一永恒在灵魂层次上的飞逝图像。灵魂的行动是相继的,被吸引其注意的不同对象分开——现在是苏格拉底,现在是一匹马,总是某个特殊之物。”然而,灵魂的这种时间性,是永恒的一个持存图像,本身也是永恒的。灵魂与时间曾是、现在是、将永远是。因此,灵魂的这一永恒时间,指示着理智的永恒活动。↩
- 同上。“分别地看,它们都是理智与在。合在一起,则构成理智的总体与在的总体。理智在思在时,给予在以存在。在作为思想对象,给予理智以思维与存在。”同上,III, 8 [30],第6—7章,168—169页。“因此,智者被理则贯穿,他向他人显现的一切,完全在自身之内。他观照自身。他不只对外部对象,也对自身内部之物,达成统一与不动。他在自身中发现一切。”“生育起于观照,终于形式的生产,也就是新观照对象的生产。一切东西,作为其生成原则的图像,都普遍地生产形式与观照对象。被生出的存在,作为真正实在的存在者的模仿,表明生成的目的既非生成,也非行动,而是生产有待被观照的作品。”灵魂由理智生出,作为理智的图像,即其观照对象。因此,灵魂与在的总体同延;进一步由理智统一时,便被完全提升到这一地位。正如智者在自身中发现一切,灵魂在其“记忆”中包含从过去到未来的一切在者,是理智的观照对象。↩
- 同上。第9章,171—172页。“这一多,就是理智与可知者合在一起,两者同时在。它们是二。因此,我们必须找到先于这一二重性的原则。”“首先,理智必须可以说转过身去,尽管具有二重性,仍将自身交付给那里的实在;如果它想观看第一原则,就必须不再完全是理智。”↩
- 同上。第2章,164页。“自然是一个理性原则,生产出将自身的某些东西赋予基底、而自身保持不动的理则。”作为自然的理性原则,就是最高理则。与质料基底直接接触的理则,是最低理则。参见注25、26。↩
- 参见注27。↩
- 同上。第8章,170页。“一切生命都是思想,思想如同生命自身一样,或更晦暗,或较少晦暗。但此刻所说的生命,是完全清晰的生命。它是最高生命与最高思维的同一。”“最高的生命是最高的思想;最低的生命是最低的思想。每个生命都如此,且都是思想。”同上,V, 1 [10],第5章,96页。“多样而神圣的理智在灵魂之中,因为灵魂与它相联,只要灵魂不愿越过自己的界限而从它那里‘脱离’。灵魂如此接近理智,几乎与它为一,由此永恒地被赋予生命。”灵魂作为生命原则,因而按程度组成层级,直至最高生命;最高生命最终超出灵魂的总体,与最高思想被等同。最高灵魂作为最高生命,与最高思想,即理智为一;理智是持存的诸理智的总体,又由自身活动与生命进一步统一。因此,在图式中,我将较高灵魂与理智放在同一圆周上。↩
- 同上。III, 8 [30],第9章,172页。“所以,它必然来自更高原则;这个原则不在理智遍历一切的运动中,而是这一运动、生命、理智以及万物的源头。”“起源原则不是万物的总体,但一切都从它而来。”理智的生命与活动,指示这一活动的源头,并指向最终的统一原则,即太一。↩
- 同上。第8章,171页。“[理智]像圆一样展开自身,在展开中成为图形与表面、圆周、中心、半径、较高点与较低点——较高处是半径的源头,因而较好;较低处是半径伸达之处,因而较不好。起源的中心并不等同于中心加圆周,二者也不等同于中心本身。”同上,VI, 9 [9],第10章,87页。“获得这一观看的人,仿佛变成了另一个存在者。他不再是自己,不保留任何自身的东西。被吸收于彼岸,他与之为一,像一个中心与另一个中心重合。当中心重合时,它们是一。只有分离,才成为二。我们正是在这个意义上,能够把太一说成某种分离之物。”这些符号具有指示性,因为每个都引向更高、更凝缩的圆。参见附录图式。↩
- 同上。IV, 3 [27],第1—32章,126—160页。↩
- 柏拉图,《克拉底鲁》。397C—421C。这部分对话的前提是,仅凭规定名称与其他名称的词源关系,就能确定名称是否适合其所指。↩
- 《智者》。260C。↩
- 威廉·莎士比亚,《皆大欢喜》。II, vii 47—51。↩
- 圣奥古斯丁,《忏悔录》。第III卷,第ii章(4)。↩
- 同上。第I卷,第xiii章(21)。↩
- 同上。第XI卷,第xxix章(39)。↩
- 同上。第IX卷,第x章(24)。“我们上升,超出它们,抵达那无穷丰盛的领域,你在那里永恒地以真理为食物,养育以色列。”这一丰盛领域,似乎与普罗提诺学说中的理智同义。↩
- 同上。第I卷,第ix章(15)。“但我们爱玩,而惩罚我们的,正是那些从事成人游戏的人。因为‘成年人的娱乐被称为正事’。”同上,第x章(16)。“然而,我有错,主啊,神啊,你是自然万物的安排者与创造者,却只是罪人的安排者。主我的神,我犯罪了,因为没有照父母和老师所说的去做。”同上,第xix章(30)。“因为在这些活动中,我是最低劣者中的最低劣者;由于爱游戏、热衷轻浮的表演,以及不安分地想模仿喜剧情景,我以无数谎言欺骗送我上学的奴隶、老师和父母,连世俗之徒都为之震惊。……即使在这种游戏中,我也被虚荣的求胜欲压倒,常常犯下作弊之罪。”儿童游戏优于成人游戏,并非因为“纯真”,而是因为虚荣程度较低。↩
- 《普罗提诺精要》。V, 1 [10],第7章,98页。“我们称理智为太一的图像。”↩
- 同上。VI, 9 [9],第9章,84—85页。“所有这些存在者从太一流溢,却不使它有任何减少,因为它不是一团物质。若是,流溢者就会朽灭。但它们永恒,因为起源原则始终如一;它在生产它们时不使自身破碎,而保持完整。因此,它们也持续存在,正如只要太阳照耀,光就持续存在。”同上,V, 1 [10],第6章,97页。“我们应如何构想这种生成及其与不动原因的关系?应将它构想为辐射:虽出自太一,却不扰动其自身同一,正如围绕太阳、不断由太阳生成的光辉,不影响太阳自身同一而不变的存在。”↩
- 弗里德里希·尼采,《快乐的科学》。附录,《致歌德》。↩
附录
下图是对各层次同心重合关系的解释性图式。实线箭头表示产生总体的辩证统一,虚线箭头表示从一个统一原则引向其先行者的指示性意指。斜体名称代表彼此各为图像的总体,正体名称则代表相应的统一原则。统一原则与那些分别将它们作为普通实例包含在内的总体对齐:也就是说,自然包含形式,灵魂包含既非视觉也非实践的理则,理智包含持存的诸理智。当然,这个图式是暂定的,只是对我自己解释的一种方便概括。归根结底,普罗提诺著作中诸层次的相互渗透,以及太一颇成问题的地位,都会动摇所有这样的图式化。